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WO2018123692A1 - Système de prévention d'établissement de communication non autorisée - Google Patents

Système de prévention d'établissement de communication non autorisée Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018123692A1
WO2018123692A1 PCT/JP2017/045330 JP2017045330W WO2018123692A1 WO 2018123692 A1 WO2018123692 A1 WO 2018123692A1 JP 2017045330 W JP2017045330 W JP 2017045330W WO 2018123692 A1 WO2018123692 A1 WO 2018123692A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
signal strength
signal
communication
measurement
unit
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PCT/JP2017/045330
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English (en)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
佳之 大屋
惠 森
明暁 岩下
一輝 内木
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株式会社東海理化電機製作所
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Application filed by 株式会社東海理化電機製作所 filed Critical 株式会社東海理化電機製作所
Publication of WO2018123692A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018123692A1/fr

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
    • B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
    • E—FIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E05—LOCKS; KEYS; WINDOW OR DOOR FITTINGS; SAFES
    • E05B—LOCKS; ACCESSORIES THEREFOR; HANDCUFFS
    • E05B49/00—Electric permutation locks; Circuits therefor ; Mechanical aspects of electronic locks; Mechanical keys therefor
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04Q—SELECTING
    • H04Q9/00—Arrangements in telecontrol or telemetry systems for selectively calling a substation from a main station, in which substation desired apparatus is selected for applying a control signal thereto or for obtaining measured values therefrom

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a communication fraud establishment prevention system that determines whether wireless communication is right or wrong.
  • an electronic key system that performs ID verification by wirelessly transmitting a key ID from an electronic key to the vehicle in a vehicle or the like is well known.
  • an illegal act using a repeater (refer to Patent Document 1, etc.) as an illegal act intended to establish ID verification without depending on the user's will.
  • the repeater use fraudulent act is an act of establishing a communication between these two parties by connecting the electronic key to the vehicle by a plurality of repeaters and relaying radio waves. is there. Therefore, since ID verification is established without the user's knowledge, there is a possibility that the door is unlocked or the engine is illegally operated by a third party.
  • Patent Document 2 there is a system for determining communication fraud by detecting the received signal strength in wireless communication between the vehicle and the electronic key and confirming the correlation between the received signal strengths as a countermeasure against fraudulent use of the repeater.
  • An object of the present invention is to provide a communication fraud establishment prevention system capable of accurately judging unauthorized communication.
  • a communication fraud establishment prevention system is a communication fraud establishment prevention system that performs wireless communication using radio waves in the same frequency band between a communication master and a terminal, and determines whether the wireless communication is correct or not.
  • One of the communication master and the terminal transmits a transmission radio wave
  • the other of the communication master and the terminal transmits a reply radio wave to the transmission radio wave, and at least one of the transmission radio wave and the reply radio wave
  • a division unit that divides the signal into a plurality of divided signals, a first transmission unit that transmits at least one of the plurality of divided signals as a signal strength measurement signal, and a measurement response signal that is a response signal to the signal strength measurement signal
  • a second transmission unit a first measurement unit that measures a first signal strength that is a received signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal; and a received signal strength of the measurement response signal
  • radio waves in the same frequency band transmitted and received between the communication master and the terminal are divided, and the first signal intensity is measured using at least a part of the divided radio waves as a signal intensity measurement signal.
  • the second signal strength of the measurement response signal which is a response signal of the measurement signal, is measured, and whether wireless communication is right or wrong is determined based on the first signal strength and the second signal strength. For this reason, it is easy to confirm the received signal strength of radio waves in the same frequency band, and it is possible to accurately determine whether radio communication is correct or not.
  • a new signal strength measurement signal is not required to measure the received signal strength, and only a measurement response signal needs to be added. Therefore, increase in communication time can be suppressed.
  • transmission / reception of the signal strength measurement signal and the measurement response signal between the communication master and the terminal is performed a plurality of times, and the correctness determination unit is configured to perform the measurement of the plurality of times. It is preferable to determine whether wireless communication is right or wrong based on one signal strength and the second signal strength.
  • the division unit, the first transmission unit, the second measurement unit, and the correctness determination unit are provided in one of the communication master and the terminal, and the first measurement And the second transmission unit are provided in either the communication master or the terminal, the second transmission unit uses the first response intensity measured by the first measurement unit as the measurement response signal. It is preferable to include and transmit.
  • the dividing unit, the first transmitting unit, and the second measuring unit are provided in one of the communication master and the terminal, and the first measuring unit and the second measuring unit are provided.
  • the transmission unit and the correctness determination unit are provided on the other of the communication master and the terminal, the first transmission unit uses the second signal strength measured by the second measurement unit as the signal strength measurement. It is preferable to transmit by including in the signal.
  • the communication master determines whether the wireless communication is correct based on an ID collation for confirming whether the ID registered in the terminal is correct, and the first signal strength and the second signal strength. A signal strength determination is performed, and when the validity of the ID is confirmed by the ID verification and the validity of the wireless communication is confirmed by the signal strength determination, it is determined that the wireless communication is performed without fraud. It is preferable to do.
  • the ID verification performed at the time of wireless communication is performed by each of the communication master and the terminal to calculate a response code by passing a challenge code through an encryption key.
  • the dividing unit uses at least one of the challenge code and the response code as the signal strength measurement signal, respectively. It is preferable to divide the signal.
  • the ID verification performed at the time of the wireless communication is such that either the communication master or the terminal transmits an ID code and the other one of the communication master and the terminal receives the ID. It is preferable that the code is collated, and the dividing unit divides the ID code into the plurality of divided signals respectively used as the signal strength measurement signals.
  • unauthorized communication can be accurately determined.
  • the block diagram which shows schematic structure of one Embodiment of a communication fraud establishment prevention system.
  • the vehicle 1 constructs an electronic key system 3 together with the electronic key 2, and performs ID collation with the electronic key 2 by wireless communication.
  • the electronic key system 3 is a key operation free system that performs ID collation with the electronic key 2 through narrow-range wireless communication in response to communication from the vehicle 1.
  • ID collation performed in a key operation free system is called “smart collation”, and the communication is called “smart communication”.
  • the electronic key 2 corresponds to a terminal.
  • the vehicle 1 includes a collation ECU (Electronic Control Unit) 11 that performs ID collation (smart collation), a body ECU 12 that manages the power source of the in-vehicle electrical components, and an engine ECU 13 that controls the engine 14. These ECUs are connected through a communication line 15 in the vehicle.
  • the communication line 15 includes, for example, a CAN (Controller Area Network) or a LIN (Local Interconnect Network).
  • the verification ECU 11 the key ID and the encryption key of the electronic key 2 registered in the vehicle 1 are written and stored in the memory 11a.
  • the encryption key is used in challenge response authentication performed in the process of ID verification.
  • the verification ECU 11 corresponds to a communication master.
  • the vehicle 1 includes an outdoor transmitter 16 that transmits radio waves outdoors, an indoor transmitter 17 that transmits radio waves indoors, and a radio transmitter / receiver 18 that transmits and receives radio waves in the vehicle 1.
  • the outdoor transmitter 16 and the indoor transmitter 17 transmit radio waves in, for example, an LF (Low Frequency) band.
  • the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18 transmits / receives radio waves in, for example, a UHF (Ultra High Frequency) band.
  • the electronic key system 3 authenticates the electronic key 2 through LF-UHF bidirectional communication and UHF-UHF bidirectional communication.
  • the body ECU 12 switches the locking / unlocking of the door of the vehicle 1 by controlling the operation of the door lock mechanism 19 provided on the door of the vehicle 1.
  • the electronic key 2 includes a key control unit 21 that controls the operation of the electronic key 2, a receiving unit 22 that receives radio waves in the electronic key 2, and a transmission / reception unit 23 that transmits and receives radio waves in the electronic key 2.
  • a key ID unique to the electronic key 2 and an encryption key used in challenge response authentication for ID verification are written and stored in the memory 21a.
  • the receiving unit 22 receives, for example, LF band radio waves.
  • the transmission / reception unit 23 transmits / receives UHF band radio waves, for example.
  • the verification ECU 11 periodically transmits the wake signal Swk from the outdoor transmitter 16 or the indoor transmitter 17 by radio waves in the LF band, and monitors the establishment of communication with the electronic key 2.
  • the verification ECU 11 executes specific verification communication.
  • the electronic key 2 receives the wake signal Swk
  • the electronic key 2 transmits the ACK signal Sack from the transmission / reception unit 23 using a radio wave in the UHF band. That is, the electronic key system 3 performs LF-UHF bidirectional communication when monitoring the establishment of communication between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2.
  • the electronic key system 3 performs verification communication in which the electronic key 2 receives the transmission radio wave Sa from the verification ECU 11 and returns the response radio wave Sb from the electronic key 2.
  • the verification ECU 11 transmits the transmission radio wave Sa in the UHF band
  • the electronic key 2 transmits the reply radio wave Sb in the UHF band. That is, the electronic key system 3 performs UHF-UHF bidirectional communication during verification communication.
  • key ID verification for confirming the correctness of the key ID registered in the electronic key 2 and response by calculating a challenge code with an encryption key in both the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2 Includes challenge response authentication to verify the code.
  • the transmission radio wave Sa transmitted from the verification ECU 11 to the electronic key 2 includes an ID code and a response code for challenge response authentication.
  • the reply radio wave Sb transmitted from the electronic key 2 to the verification ECU 11 includes a challenge response authentication challenge code.
  • the electronic key system 3 includes a communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 that prevents communication fraud by determining whether wireless communication is right or wrong.
  • the verification ECU 11 divides the transmission radio wave Sa into a plurality of signals and transmits each divided signal to the electronic key 2 as a signal strength measurement signal.
  • the electronic key 2 divides the return radio wave Sb into a plurality of signals, and transmits each divided signal to the verification ECU 11 as a signal strength measurement signal.
  • the verification ECU 11 receives a signal strength measurement signal from the electronic key 2 (in this example, each divided signal of the return radio wave Sb), the verification for the signal strength measurement signal is performed.
  • a response signal Sk is transmitted to the electronic key 2.
  • the electronic key 2 receives a signal strength measurement signal (in this example, each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa) from the verification ECU 11, the electronic key 2 transmits a measurement response signal Sk to the signal strength measurement signal to the verification ECU 11. Then, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 determines whether the wireless communication is correct or not based on the first signal strength that is the received signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal and the second signal strength that is the received signal strength of the measurement response signal Sk. To do. In this manner, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 performs fraud determination for wireless communication by a half-duplex method in which radio waves are alternately transmitted between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2.
  • a signal strength measurement signal in this example, each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa
  • the process of measuring the signal strength of wireless communication by transmitting and receiving radio waves between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2 can increase the accuracy of wireless communication determination as the number of times increases. For this reason, it is preferable that the number of times of processing for measuring the signal strength of the wireless communication is increased.
  • the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 includes a first dividing unit 31 that divides a transmission radio wave Sa used for signal strength measurement.
  • the 1st division part 31 is provided in collation ECU11.
  • the first division unit 31 divides one set of information and code included in the transmission radio wave Sa into a plurality of signals, and transmits each division signal from the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18.
  • the first dividing unit 31 divides the challenge code, which is the transmission radio wave Sa, into a plurality of signals, and causes all of the divided signals of the challenge code to be transmitted from the radio transceiver 18 as signal strength measurement signals.
  • the verification ECU 11 intermittently transmits each signal strength measurement signal from the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18.
  • the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 includes a second dividing unit 32 that divides the return radio wave Sb used for signal strength measurement.
  • the second dividing unit 32 is provided in the key control unit 21.
  • the second dividing unit 32 divides one set of information and code included in the reply radio wave Sb and causes each of the divided signals to be transmitted from the transmission / reception unit 23.
  • the second dividing unit 32 divides each of the ID code and the response code, which are the return radio waves Sb, into a plurality of signals, and all the divided signals of the ID code and the divided signals of the response code have signal strength.
  • the measurement signal is transmitted from the transmission / reception unit 23.
  • the key control unit 21 causes each signal strength measurement signal to be transmitted intermittently from the transmission / reception unit 23.
  • the communication fraud prevention system 30 includes a measurement unit 33 that measures the received signal strength of the signal received by the radio wave transceiver 18.
  • the measurement unit 33 is provided in the verification ECU 11.
  • the measuring unit 33 functions as a second measuring unit when receiving the measurement response signal Sk for each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first dividing unit 31, and the reply divided by the second dividing unit 32.
  • each divided signal of the radio wave Sb is received, it functions as a first measurement unit.
  • the communication fraud prevention system 30 includes a measurement unit 34 that measures the received signal strength of the signal received by the transmission / reception unit 23.
  • the measurement unit 34 is provided in the key control unit 21. Note that the measurement unit 34 functions as a first measurement unit when receiving each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first division unit 31 and each division of the reply radio wave Sb divided by the second division unit 32. When the measurement response signal Sk for the signal is received, it functions as a second measurement unit.
  • the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18 functions as a first transmission unit when transmitting each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first division unit 31, and the return radio wave Sb divided by the second division unit 32.
  • the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18 functions as a first transmission unit when transmitting each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first division unit 31, and the return radio wave Sb divided by the second division unit 32.
  • the measurement response signal Sk When transmitting the measurement response signal Sk for each divided signal, it functions as a second transmitter.
  • the transmission / reception unit 23 functions as a second transmission unit when transmitting the measurement response signal Sk for each divided signal (that is, signal strength measurement signal) of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first division unit 31, and the second transmission unit When transmitting each divided signal (that is, signal strength measurement signal) of the reply radio wave Sb divided by the dividing unit 32, it functions as a first transmission unit.
  • the transmission / reception unit 23 receives each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa, the transmission / reception unit 23 includes the first signal strength, which is the received signal strength of the divided signal, in the measurement response signal Sk for the divided signal and transmits the signal.
  • the transmission / reception unit 23 when the transmission / reception unit 23 receives the measurement response signal Sk for each divided signal of the return radio wave Sb, the transmission / reception unit 23 sets the second signal strength that is the received signal strength of the measurement response signal Sk to the subsequent return radio wave Sb. To be included and sent.
  • the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 includes a correctness determination unit 35 that determines whether wireless communication between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2 is correct.
  • the correctness determination unit 35 is provided in the verification ECU 11.
  • the correctness determination unit 35 compares the signal strength of the transmission radio wave Sa and the signal strength of the return radio wave Sb to determine whether the radio communication is correct or not by signal strength determination that confirms whether the signal strength difference falls within a predetermined range.
  • the verification ECU 11 performs ID verification for confirming whether the key ID registered in the electronic key 2 is correct and signal strength determination, confirms the validity of the key ID by ID verification, and performs wireless communication by signal strength determination. When the validity is confirmed, it is determined that the wireless communication is performed without fraud.
  • the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 performs signal strength determination in the process of challenge response authentication.
  • the first dividing unit 31 divides the challenge-response authentication challenge code included in the transmission radio wave Sa into a plurality of signals and causes each radio signal to be transmitted from the radio transceiver 18.
  • the second dividing unit 32 divides the ID code included in the return radio wave Sb into a plurality of signals, and also divides the response code for challenge response authentication contained in the return radio wave Sb into a plurality of signals, Each divided signal and each divided signal of the response code are transmitted from the transmission / reception unit 23.
  • the communication fraud prevention system 30 divides the challenge code into three signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3, and each signal strength measurement signal Sc1, Sc2 , Sc3, the first signal strength, which is the received signal strength, and the second signal strength, which is the received signal strength of each of the measurement response signals Sk1, Sk2, Sk3, which are the respective response signals to the signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3, The signal strength is determined using Further, when the electronic key 2 transmits an ID code to the vehicle 1, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 divides the ID code into three signal intensity measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3, and each signal intensity measurement signal Si1, Si2 , Si3, the first signal strength, which is the received signal strength, and the second signal strength, which is the received signal strength of each of the measurement response signals Sk4, Sk5, Sk6, which are the response signals to the signal strength measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3, The signal strength is determined using Further, when the electronic key 2 transmits a response code to the vehicle 1, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 divides the ID code into three signal intensity measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3, and
  • the verification ECU 11 In performing smart communication, the verification ECU 11 periodically transmits a wake signal Swk using an LF band radio wave. When the electronic key 2 is activated by receiving the wake signal Swk, the electronic key 2 transmits the ack signal Sack by radio waves in the UHF band. When the verification ECU 11 receives the ACK signal Sack within a specified time after transmitting the wake signal Swk, the verification ECU 11 starts verification communication for confirming whether the electronic key 2 is correct.
  • the verification ECU 11 executes challenge response authentication as verification communication.
  • the verification ECU 11 transmits to the electronic key 2 a challenge signal including a challenge code (random number) whose value changes every time it is transmitted.
  • the electronic key 2 Upon receiving the challenge signal, the electronic key 2 calculates a response code by passing the challenge code through its encryption key.
  • the verification ECU 11 transmits a challenge signal to the electronic key 2, it itself calculates a response code. Thereby, when the verification ECU 11 receives the response code from the electronic key 2, it is possible to confirm whether the response code is correct.
  • the verification ECU 11 performs signal strength determination together with challenge response authentication. At this time, the verification ECU 11 intermittently transmits the signal intensity measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3 obtained by dividing the challenge code from the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18 to the electronic key 2 by using radio waves in the UHF band. The electronic key 2 returns measurement response signals Sk1, Sk2, Sk3 to the signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3 received intermittently.
  • the electronic key 2 when the electronic key 2 returns the measurement response signals Sk1, Sk2, and Sk3 to the signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, and Sc3 received as the transmission radio wave Sa including the challenge code, the electronic key 2 returns the response to the transmission radio wave Sa.
  • a plurality of signal intensity measurement signals obtained by dividing the return radio wave Sb are intermittently transmitted from the transmission / reception unit 23 to the vehicle 1 using UHF band radio waves.
  • the electronic key 2 divides and transmits the return radio wave Sb including the ID code into the signal intensity measurement signals Si1, Si2, and Si3, and further transmits the return radio wave Sb including the response code to the signal intensity measurement signals Sr1 and Sr2. , Sr3 and transmitted.
  • the verification ECU 11 returns measurement response signals Sk4, Sk5, Sk6 to the signal strength measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3 (divided ID codes) received intermittently. Further, the verification ECU 11 returns measurement response signals Sk7, Sk8, Sk9 to the signal strength measurement signals Sr1, Sr2, Sr3 (divided response codes) received intermittently.
  • the electronic key 2 and the verification ECU 11 determine the signal strength by simply adding nine measurement response signals Sk in addition to the challenge code and response code related to challenge response authentication and the ID code related to ID verification. .
  • the signal strength determination includes signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3 obtained by dividing the challenge code, signal strength measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3 obtained by dividing the ID code, and signal strength measurement signals Sr1, Sr2, obtained by dividing the response code. It carries out for each of Sr3. Then, when the difference between the first signal strength and the second signal strength falls within a predetermined range for each signal strength measurement signal, the verification ECU 11 establishes the signal strength determination.
  • the communication of the electronic key system 3 is processed as not established. Thereby, challenge response authentication is forcibly terminated. That is, smart communication is forcibly terminated midway, and for example, even if a third party tries to establish communication illegally using a repeater, this is disabled.
  • the verification ECU 11 When the verification ECU 11 confirms that the challenge response authentication is established and the verification of the key ID is established, the verification ECU 11 processes the smart verification as established. As a result, the verification ECU 11 permits the operation of the vehicle 1. For example, an operation of locking / unlocking the door of the vehicle 1 is permitted or executed, or a power supply transition operation (engine start operation) of the vehicle 1 is permitted.
  • the electronic key system of the comparative example when the vehicle receives the ACK signal Sack transmitted in the UHF band from the electronic key within a specified time after the vehicle transmits the wake signal Swk, the electronic key The verification communication for confirming correctness is started.
  • the vehicle first performs challenge response authentication as verification communication. At this time, the vehicle transmits the challenge code as a transmission radio wave Sa to the electronic key in the LF band.
  • the challenge code may be transmitted using UHF band radio waves.
  • the electronic key calculates a response code, transmits the ID code as a return radio wave Sb in the UHF band, and transmits the response code as a return radio wave Sb in the UHF band.
  • the vehicle can confirm whether the response code is correct.
  • the vehicle executes signal response determination after performing challenge response authentication.
  • the signal strength measurement signal must be separately transmitted from at least one of the vehicle and the electronic key in order to measure the signal strength.
  • signal strength measurement signals Sx1, Sx2, Sx3, Sx4, Sx5,..., Sxn are transmitted from the vehicle.
  • measurement response signals Sy1, Sy2, Sy3, Sy4, Sy5,..., Sxn which are response signals to the signal strength measurement signals Sx1, Sx2, Sx3, Sx4, Sx5,.
  • the number n of signal strength measurement signals Sxn transmitted from the vehicle is transmitted as many as necessary for the determination.
  • a total of nine signal intensities including three signal strength measurement signals obtained by dividing the challenge code, three signal strength measurement signals obtained by dividing the ID code, and three signal strength measurement signals obtained by dividing the response code.
  • a measurement signal is being transmitted. If nine signal strength measurement signals are transmitted in the modified example as in the above embodiment, the time required for verification communication in the modified example is longer than that in the above embodiment. That is, according to the above-described embodiment in which challenge response authentication and signal strength determination are performed simultaneously, it is possible to shorten the time required for verification communication as compared with the case where signal strength determination is separately performed.
  • a signal transmitted and received in the same frequency band between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2 is divided into a plurality of signals, and each divided signal is used as a signal strength measurement signal, and the received signal of the signal strength measurement signal
  • the strength (first signal strength) is measured, and the received signal strength (second signal strength) of the measurement response signal Sk that is a response signal of each signal strength measurement signal is measured.
  • whether wireless communication is right or wrong is determined based on the first signal strength and the second signal strength. For this reason, it is easy to confirm the received signal strength of radio waves in the same frequency band, and it is possible to accurately determine whether radio communication is correct or not.
  • the said embodiment can also be implemented with the following forms which changed this suitably.
  • the number of division of the challenge code, ID code, and response code is not limited to three, and can be arbitrarily set. Further, the number of divisions of the challenge code, the ID code, and the response code may be the same or different.
  • all of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the challenge code are signal strength measurement signals, but at least one of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the challenge code may be used as the signal strength measurement signal. Good.
  • all of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the ID code are signal strength measurement signals, but at least one of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the ID code may be used as the signal strength measurement signal. Good.
  • all of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the response code are signal strength measurement signals.
  • at least one of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the response code may be used as the signal strength measurement signal. Good.
  • the response code is transmitted from the electronic key 2 next to the ID code.
  • the ID code may be transmitted from the electronic key 2 next to the response code.
  • each of the challenge code, ID code, and response code is divided, but only the challenge code may be divided. That is, the ID code and the response code may not be divided. In this case, no signal strength measurement signal is transmitted from the electronic key 2 and no measurement response signal is returned from the vehicle 1. In this way, it is not necessary to provide the second division unit 32 in the electronic key 2.
  • each of the challenge code, ID code, and response code is divided, but only the ID code may be divided. That is, the challenge code and the response code may not be divided. In this case, no signal strength measurement signal is transmitted from the vehicle 1, and no measurement response signal is returned from the electronic key 2. In this way, the vehicle 1 need not be provided with the first division unit 31.
  • each of the challenge code, ID code, and response code is divided, but only the response code may be divided. That is, the challenge code and the ID code may not be divided. In this case, no signal strength measurement signal is transmitted from the vehicle 1, and no measurement response signal is returned from the electronic key 2. In this way, the vehicle 1 need not be provided with the first division unit 31.
  • the number of divisions by the first division unit 31 and the number of divisions by the second division unit 32 may be predetermined numbers, or may be changed as appropriate.
  • the first signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal and the second signal strength of the measurement response signal are compared to determine whether the signal strength difference is within a predetermined range.
  • the signal strength may be determined by confirming the correlation between the first signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal and the second signal strength of the measurement response signal.
  • the correctness determination unit 35 determines the correctness of wireless communication based on the first signal strength of the plurality of signal strength measurement signals and the second signal strength of the plurality of measurement response signals. However, whether the wireless communication is correct or not may be determined based on the first signal strength of one signal strength measurement signal and the second signal strength of one measurement response signal.
  • the transmission radio wave Sa may be transmitted from the electronic key 2 and the reply radio wave Sb may be transmitted from the verification ECU 11.
  • the correctness determination unit 35 may be provided in either the verification ECU 11 or the electronic key 2. In this case, it is necessary to transmit the received signal strength to the side where the correctness determination unit 35 is provided.
  • the electronic key system 3 is not limited to the system which performs smart communication, It is good also as a system using another communication format or another frequency band.
  • collation ECU11 was made into the communication master, it is not limited to collation ECU11, It can change into another apparatus and apparatus.
  • the electronic key 2 is a terminal.
  • the terminal is not limited to the electronic key 2, and various terminals can be used.
  • the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 is not limited to being applied to the vehicle 1 and may be employed in other devices and devices.
  • the unauthorized communication establishment prevention system 30 is not limited to the half-duplex method, and may perform communication using the full-duplex method.

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  • Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système de prévention d'établissement de communication non autorisée qui détermine si des communications radio effectuées par ondes radio ayant la même bande de fréquences entre une ECU de vérification et une clé électronique sont valides ou non autorisées. Le système de prévention d'établissement de communication non autorisée comprend : une unité de division qui divise une onde radio de transmission (Sa) et/ou une onde radio de réponse (Sb) en une pluralité de signaux divisés (Sc1 à Sc3 ; Si1 à Si3 ; Sr1 à Sr3) ; une première unité de transmission qui transmet chaque signal divisé en tant que signal de mesure d'intensité de signal ; une seconde unité de transmission qui transmet un signal de réponse de mesure (Sk) par rapport à chaque signal de mesure d'intensité de signal ; une première unité de mesure qui mesure une première intensité de signal, qui est l'intensité de signal reçu du signal de mesure d'intensité de signal ; une seconde unité de mesure qui mesure une seconde intensité de signal, qui est l'intensité de signal reçu du signal de réponse de mesure ; et une unité de détermination de validité qui détermine si une communication radio est valide ou non autorisée sur la base de la première intensité de signal et de la seconde intensité de signal.
PCT/JP2017/045330 2016-12-26 2017-12-18 Système de prévention d'établissement de communication non autorisée WO2018123692A1 (fr)

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WO2020210990A1 (fr) * 2019-04-16 2020-10-22 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Système et procédé d'authentification d'une connexion entre un dispositif utilisateur et un véhicule à l'aide d'une technologie bluetooth basse énergie

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