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WO2018123692A1 - Unauthorized communication establishment preventing system - Google Patents

Unauthorized communication establishment preventing system Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018123692A1
WO2018123692A1 PCT/JP2017/045330 JP2017045330W WO2018123692A1 WO 2018123692 A1 WO2018123692 A1 WO 2018123692A1 JP 2017045330 W JP2017045330 W JP 2017045330W WO 2018123692 A1 WO2018123692 A1 WO 2018123692A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
signal strength
signal
communication
measurement
unit
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/JP2017/045330
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French (fr)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
佳之 大屋
惠 森
明暁 岩下
一輝 内木
Original Assignee
株式会社東海理化電機製作所
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Application filed by 株式会社東海理化電機製作所 filed Critical 株式会社東海理化電機製作所
Publication of WO2018123692A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018123692A1/en

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
    • B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
    • E—FIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E05—LOCKS; KEYS; WINDOW OR DOOR FITTINGS; SAFES
    • E05B—LOCKS; ACCESSORIES THEREFOR; HANDCUFFS
    • E05B49/00—Electric permutation locks; Circuits therefor ; Mechanical aspects of electronic locks; Mechanical keys therefor
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04Q—SELECTING
    • H04Q9/00—Arrangements in telecontrol or telemetry systems for selectively calling a substation from a main station, in which substation desired apparatus is selected for applying a control signal thereto or for obtaining measured values therefrom

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a communication fraud establishment prevention system that determines whether wireless communication is right or wrong.
  • an electronic key system that performs ID verification by wirelessly transmitting a key ID from an electronic key to the vehicle in a vehicle or the like is well known.
  • an illegal act using a repeater (refer to Patent Document 1, etc.) as an illegal act intended to establish ID verification without depending on the user's will.
  • the repeater use fraudulent act is an act of establishing a communication between these two parties by connecting the electronic key to the vehicle by a plurality of repeaters and relaying radio waves. is there. Therefore, since ID verification is established without the user's knowledge, there is a possibility that the door is unlocked or the engine is illegally operated by a third party.
  • Patent Document 2 there is a system for determining communication fraud by detecting the received signal strength in wireless communication between the vehicle and the electronic key and confirming the correlation between the received signal strengths as a countermeasure against fraudulent use of the repeater.
  • An object of the present invention is to provide a communication fraud establishment prevention system capable of accurately judging unauthorized communication.
  • a communication fraud establishment prevention system is a communication fraud establishment prevention system that performs wireless communication using radio waves in the same frequency band between a communication master and a terminal, and determines whether the wireless communication is correct or not.
  • One of the communication master and the terminal transmits a transmission radio wave
  • the other of the communication master and the terminal transmits a reply radio wave to the transmission radio wave, and at least one of the transmission radio wave and the reply radio wave
  • a division unit that divides the signal into a plurality of divided signals, a first transmission unit that transmits at least one of the plurality of divided signals as a signal strength measurement signal, and a measurement response signal that is a response signal to the signal strength measurement signal
  • a second transmission unit a first measurement unit that measures a first signal strength that is a received signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal; and a received signal strength of the measurement response signal
  • radio waves in the same frequency band transmitted and received between the communication master and the terminal are divided, and the first signal intensity is measured using at least a part of the divided radio waves as a signal intensity measurement signal.
  • the second signal strength of the measurement response signal which is a response signal of the measurement signal, is measured, and whether wireless communication is right or wrong is determined based on the first signal strength and the second signal strength. For this reason, it is easy to confirm the received signal strength of radio waves in the same frequency band, and it is possible to accurately determine whether radio communication is correct or not.
  • a new signal strength measurement signal is not required to measure the received signal strength, and only a measurement response signal needs to be added. Therefore, increase in communication time can be suppressed.
  • transmission / reception of the signal strength measurement signal and the measurement response signal between the communication master and the terminal is performed a plurality of times, and the correctness determination unit is configured to perform the measurement of the plurality of times. It is preferable to determine whether wireless communication is right or wrong based on one signal strength and the second signal strength.
  • the division unit, the first transmission unit, the second measurement unit, and the correctness determination unit are provided in one of the communication master and the terminal, and the first measurement And the second transmission unit are provided in either the communication master or the terminal, the second transmission unit uses the first response intensity measured by the first measurement unit as the measurement response signal. It is preferable to include and transmit.
  • the dividing unit, the first transmitting unit, and the second measuring unit are provided in one of the communication master and the terminal, and the first measuring unit and the second measuring unit are provided.
  • the transmission unit and the correctness determination unit are provided on the other of the communication master and the terminal, the first transmission unit uses the second signal strength measured by the second measurement unit as the signal strength measurement. It is preferable to transmit by including in the signal.
  • the communication master determines whether the wireless communication is correct based on an ID collation for confirming whether the ID registered in the terminal is correct, and the first signal strength and the second signal strength. A signal strength determination is performed, and when the validity of the ID is confirmed by the ID verification and the validity of the wireless communication is confirmed by the signal strength determination, it is determined that the wireless communication is performed without fraud. It is preferable to do.
  • the ID verification performed at the time of wireless communication is performed by each of the communication master and the terminal to calculate a response code by passing a challenge code through an encryption key.
  • the dividing unit uses at least one of the challenge code and the response code as the signal strength measurement signal, respectively. It is preferable to divide the signal.
  • the ID verification performed at the time of the wireless communication is such that either the communication master or the terminal transmits an ID code and the other one of the communication master and the terminal receives the ID. It is preferable that the code is collated, and the dividing unit divides the ID code into the plurality of divided signals respectively used as the signal strength measurement signals.
  • unauthorized communication can be accurately determined.
  • the block diagram which shows schematic structure of one Embodiment of a communication fraud establishment prevention system.
  • the vehicle 1 constructs an electronic key system 3 together with the electronic key 2, and performs ID collation with the electronic key 2 by wireless communication.
  • the electronic key system 3 is a key operation free system that performs ID collation with the electronic key 2 through narrow-range wireless communication in response to communication from the vehicle 1.
  • ID collation performed in a key operation free system is called “smart collation”, and the communication is called “smart communication”.
  • the electronic key 2 corresponds to a terminal.
  • the vehicle 1 includes a collation ECU (Electronic Control Unit) 11 that performs ID collation (smart collation), a body ECU 12 that manages the power source of the in-vehicle electrical components, and an engine ECU 13 that controls the engine 14. These ECUs are connected through a communication line 15 in the vehicle.
  • the communication line 15 includes, for example, a CAN (Controller Area Network) or a LIN (Local Interconnect Network).
  • the verification ECU 11 the key ID and the encryption key of the electronic key 2 registered in the vehicle 1 are written and stored in the memory 11a.
  • the encryption key is used in challenge response authentication performed in the process of ID verification.
  • the verification ECU 11 corresponds to a communication master.
  • the vehicle 1 includes an outdoor transmitter 16 that transmits radio waves outdoors, an indoor transmitter 17 that transmits radio waves indoors, and a radio transmitter / receiver 18 that transmits and receives radio waves in the vehicle 1.
  • the outdoor transmitter 16 and the indoor transmitter 17 transmit radio waves in, for example, an LF (Low Frequency) band.
  • the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18 transmits / receives radio waves in, for example, a UHF (Ultra High Frequency) band.
  • the electronic key system 3 authenticates the electronic key 2 through LF-UHF bidirectional communication and UHF-UHF bidirectional communication.
  • the body ECU 12 switches the locking / unlocking of the door of the vehicle 1 by controlling the operation of the door lock mechanism 19 provided on the door of the vehicle 1.
  • the electronic key 2 includes a key control unit 21 that controls the operation of the electronic key 2, a receiving unit 22 that receives radio waves in the electronic key 2, and a transmission / reception unit 23 that transmits and receives radio waves in the electronic key 2.
  • a key ID unique to the electronic key 2 and an encryption key used in challenge response authentication for ID verification are written and stored in the memory 21a.
  • the receiving unit 22 receives, for example, LF band radio waves.
  • the transmission / reception unit 23 transmits / receives UHF band radio waves, for example.
  • the verification ECU 11 periodically transmits the wake signal Swk from the outdoor transmitter 16 or the indoor transmitter 17 by radio waves in the LF band, and monitors the establishment of communication with the electronic key 2.
  • the verification ECU 11 executes specific verification communication.
  • the electronic key 2 receives the wake signal Swk
  • the electronic key 2 transmits the ACK signal Sack from the transmission / reception unit 23 using a radio wave in the UHF band. That is, the electronic key system 3 performs LF-UHF bidirectional communication when monitoring the establishment of communication between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2.
  • the electronic key system 3 performs verification communication in which the electronic key 2 receives the transmission radio wave Sa from the verification ECU 11 and returns the response radio wave Sb from the electronic key 2.
  • the verification ECU 11 transmits the transmission radio wave Sa in the UHF band
  • the electronic key 2 transmits the reply radio wave Sb in the UHF band. That is, the electronic key system 3 performs UHF-UHF bidirectional communication during verification communication.
  • key ID verification for confirming the correctness of the key ID registered in the electronic key 2 and response by calculating a challenge code with an encryption key in both the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2 Includes challenge response authentication to verify the code.
  • the transmission radio wave Sa transmitted from the verification ECU 11 to the electronic key 2 includes an ID code and a response code for challenge response authentication.
  • the reply radio wave Sb transmitted from the electronic key 2 to the verification ECU 11 includes a challenge response authentication challenge code.
  • the electronic key system 3 includes a communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 that prevents communication fraud by determining whether wireless communication is right or wrong.
  • the verification ECU 11 divides the transmission radio wave Sa into a plurality of signals and transmits each divided signal to the electronic key 2 as a signal strength measurement signal.
  • the electronic key 2 divides the return radio wave Sb into a plurality of signals, and transmits each divided signal to the verification ECU 11 as a signal strength measurement signal.
  • the verification ECU 11 receives a signal strength measurement signal from the electronic key 2 (in this example, each divided signal of the return radio wave Sb), the verification for the signal strength measurement signal is performed.
  • a response signal Sk is transmitted to the electronic key 2.
  • the electronic key 2 receives a signal strength measurement signal (in this example, each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa) from the verification ECU 11, the electronic key 2 transmits a measurement response signal Sk to the signal strength measurement signal to the verification ECU 11. Then, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 determines whether the wireless communication is correct or not based on the first signal strength that is the received signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal and the second signal strength that is the received signal strength of the measurement response signal Sk. To do. In this manner, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 performs fraud determination for wireless communication by a half-duplex method in which radio waves are alternately transmitted between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2.
  • a signal strength measurement signal in this example, each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa
  • the process of measuring the signal strength of wireless communication by transmitting and receiving radio waves between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2 can increase the accuracy of wireless communication determination as the number of times increases. For this reason, it is preferable that the number of times of processing for measuring the signal strength of the wireless communication is increased.
  • the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 includes a first dividing unit 31 that divides a transmission radio wave Sa used for signal strength measurement.
  • the 1st division part 31 is provided in collation ECU11.
  • the first division unit 31 divides one set of information and code included in the transmission radio wave Sa into a plurality of signals, and transmits each division signal from the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18.
  • the first dividing unit 31 divides the challenge code, which is the transmission radio wave Sa, into a plurality of signals, and causes all of the divided signals of the challenge code to be transmitted from the radio transceiver 18 as signal strength measurement signals.
  • the verification ECU 11 intermittently transmits each signal strength measurement signal from the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18.
  • the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 includes a second dividing unit 32 that divides the return radio wave Sb used for signal strength measurement.
  • the second dividing unit 32 is provided in the key control unit 21.
  • the second dividing unit 32 divides one set of information and code included in the reply radio wave Sb and causes each of the divided signals to be transmitted from the transmission / reception unit 23.
  • the second dividing unit 32 divides each of the ID code and the response code, which are the return radio waves Sb, into a plurality of signals, and all the divided signals of the ID code and the divided signals of the response code have signal strength.
  • the measurement signal is transmitted from the transmission / reception unit 23.
  • the key control unit 21 causes each signal strength measurement signal to be transmitted intermittently from the transmission / reception unit 23.
  • the communication fraud prevention system 30 includes a measurement unit 33 that measures the received signal strength of the signal received by the radio wave transceiver 18.
  • the measurement unit 33 is provided in the verification ECU 11.
  • the measuring unit 33 functions as a second measuring unit when receiving the measurement response signal Sk for each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first dividing unit 31, and the reply divided by the second dividing unit 32.
  • each divided signal of the radio wave Sb is received, it functions as a first measurement unit.
  • the communication fraud prevention system 30 includes a measurement unit 34 that measures the received signal strength of the signal received by the transmission / reception unit 23.
  • the measurement unit 34 is provided in the key control unit 21. Note that the measurement unit 34 functions as a first measurement unit when receiving each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first division unit 31 and each division of the reply radio wave Sb divided by the second division unit 32. When the measurement response signal Sk for the signal is received, it functions as a second measurement unit.
  • the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18 functions as a first transmission unit when transmitting each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first division unit 31, and the return radio wave Sb divided by the second division unit 32.
  • the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18 functions as a first transmission unit when transmitting each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first division unit 31, and the return radio wave Sb divided by the second division unit 32.
  • the measurement response signal Sk When transmitting the measurement response signal Sk for each divided signal, it functions as a second transmitter.
  • the transmission / reception unit 23 functions as a second transmission unit when transmitting the measurement response signal Sk for each divided signal (that is, signal strength measurement signal) of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first division unit 31, and the second transmission unit When transmitting each divided signal (that is, signal strength measurement signal) of the reply radio wave Sb divided by the dividing unit 32, it functions as a first transmission unit.
  • the transmission / reception unit 23 receives each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa, the transmission / reception unit 23 includes the first signal strength, which is the received signal strength of the divided signal, in the measurement response signal Sk for the divided signal and transmits the signal.
  • the transmission / reception unit 23 when the transmission / reception unit 23 receives the measurement response signal Sk for each divided signal of the return radio wave Sb, the transmission / reception unit 23 sets the second signal strength that is the received signal strength of the measurement response signal Sk to the subsequent return radio wave Sb. To be included and sent.
  • the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 includes a correctness determination unit 35 that determines whether wireless communication between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2 is correct.
  • the correctness determination unit 35 is provided in the verification ECU 11.
  • the correctness determination unit 35 compares the signal strength of the transmission radio wave Sa and the signal strength of the return radio wave Sb to determine whether the radio communication is correct or not by signal strength determination that confirms whether the signal strength difference falls within a predetermined range.
  • the verification ECU 11 performs ID verification for confirming whether the key ID registered in the electronic key 2 is correct and signal strength determination, confirms the validity of the key ID by ID verification, and performs wireless communication by signal strength determination. When the validity is confirmed, it is determined that the wireless communication is performed without fraud.
  • the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 performs signal strength determination in the process of challenge response authentication.
  • the first dividing unit 31 divides the challenge-response authentication challenge code included in the transmission radio wave Sa into a plurality of signals and causes each radio signal to be transmitted from the radio transceiver 18.
  • the second dividing unit 32 divides the ID code included in the return radio wave Sb into a plurality of signals, and also divides the response code for challenge response authentication contained in the return radio wave Sb into a plurality of signals, Each divided signal and each divided signal of the response code are transmitted from the transmission / reception unit 23.
  • the communication fraud prevention system 30 divides the challenge code into three signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3, and each signal strength measurement signal Sc1, Sc2 , Sc3, the first signal strength, which is the received signal strength, and the second signal strength, which is the received signal strength of each of the measurement response signals Sk1, Sk2, Sk3, which are the respective response signals to the signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3, The signal strength is determined using Further, when the electronic key 2 transmits an ID code to the vehicle 1, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 divides the ID code into three signal intensity measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3, and each signal intensity measurement signal Si1, Si2 , Si3, the first signal strength, which is the received signal strength, and the second signal strength, which is the received signal strength of each of the measurement response signals Sk4, Sk5, Sk6, which are the response signals to the signal strength measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3, The signal strength is determined using Further, when the electronic key 2 transmits a response code to the vehicle 1, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 divides the ID code into three signal intensity measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3, and
  • the verification ECU 11 In performing smart communication, the verification ECU 11 periodically transmits a wake signal Swk using an LF band radio wave. When the electronic key 2 is activated by receiving the wake signal Swk, the electronic key 2 transmits the ack signal Sack by radio waves in the UHF band. When the verification ECU 11 receives the ACK signal Sack within a specified time after transmitting the wake signal Swk, the verification ECU 11 starts verification communication for confirming whether the electronic key 2 is correct.
  • the verification ECU 11 executes challenge response authentication as verification communication.
  • the verification ECU 11 transmits to the electronic key 2 a challenge signal including a challenge code (random number) whose value changes every time it is transmitted.
  • the electronic key 2 Upon receiving the challenge signal, the electronic key 2 calculates a response code by passing the challenge code through its encryption key.
  • the verification ECU 11 transmits a challenge signal to the electronic key 2, it itself calculates a response code. Thereby, when the verification ECU 11 receives the response code from the electronic key 2, it is possible to confirm whether the response code is correct.
  • the verification ECU 11 performs signal strength determination together with challenge response authentication. At this time, the verification ECU 11 intermittently transmits the signal intensity measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3 obtained by dividing the challenge code from the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18 to the electronic key 2 by using radio waves in the UHF band. The electronic key 2 returns measurement response signals Sk1, Sk2, Sk3 to the signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3 received intermittently.
  • the electronic key 2 when the electronic key 2 returns the measurement response signals Sk1, Sk2, and Sk3 to the signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, and Sc3 received as the transmission radio wave Sa including the challenge code, the electronic key 2 returns the response to the transmission radio wave Sa.
  • a plurality of signal intensity measurement signals obtained by dividing the return radio wave Sb are intermittently transmitted from the transmission / reception unit 23 to the vehicle 1 using UHF band radio waves.
  • the electronic key 2 divides and transmits the return radio wave Sb including the ID code into the signal intensity measurement signals Si1, Si2, and Si3, and further transmits the return radio wave Sb including the response code to the signal intensity measurement signals Sr1 and Sr2. , Sr3 and transmitted.
  • the verification ECU 11 returns measurement response signals Sk4, Sk5, Sk6 to the signal strength measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3 (divided ID codes) received intermittently. Further, the verification ECU 11 returns measurement response signals Sk7, Sk8, Sk9 to the signal strength measurement signals Sr1, Sr2, Sr3 (divided response codes) received intermittently.
  • the electronic key 2 and the verification ECU 11 determine the signal strength by simply adding nine measurement response signals Sk in addition to the challenge code and response code related to challenge response authentication and the ID code related to ID verification. .
  • the signal strength determination includes signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3 obtained by dividing the challenge code, signal strength measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3 obtained by dividing the ID code, and signal strength measurement signals Sr1, Sr2, obtained by dividing the response code. It carries out for each of Sr3. Then, when the difference between the first signal strength and the second signal strength falls within a predetermined range for each signal strength measurement signal, the verification ECU 11 establishes the signal strength determination.
  • the communication of the electronic key system 3 is processed as not established. Thereby, challenge response authentication is forcibly terminated. That is, smart communication is forcibly terminated midway, and for example, even if a third party tries to establish communication illegally using a repeater, this is disabled.
  • the verification ECU 11 When the verification ECU 11 confirms that the challenge response authentication is established and the verification of the key ID is established, the verification ECU 11 processes the smart verification as established. As a result, the verification ECU 11 permits the operation of the vehicle 1. For example, an operation of locking / unlocking the door of the vehicle 1 is permitted or executed, or a power supply transition operation (engine start operation) of the vehicle 1 is permitted.
  • the electronic key system of the comparative example when the vehicle receives the ACK signal Sack transmitted in the UHF band from the electronic key within a specified time after the vehicle transmits the wake signal Swk, the electronic key The verification communication for confirming correctness is started.
  • the vehicle first performs challenge response authentication as verification communication. At this time, the vehicle transmits the challenge code as a transmission radio wave Sa to the electronic key in the LF band.
  • the challenge code may be transmitted using UHF band radio waves.
  • the electronic key calculates a response code, transmits the ID code as a return radio wave Sb in the UHF band, and transmits the response code as a return radio wave Sb in the UHF band.
  • the vehicle can confirm whether the response code is correct.
  • the vehicle executes signal response determination after performing challenge response authentication.
  • the signal strength measurement signal must be separately transmitted from at least one of the vehicle and the electronic key in order to measure the signal strength.
  • signal strength measurement signals Sx1, Sx2, Sx3, Sx4, Sx5,..., Sxn are transmitted from the vehicle.
  • measurement response signals Sy1, Sy2, Sy3, Sy4, Sy5,..., Sxn which are response signals to the signal strength measurement signals Sx1, Sx2, Sx3, Sx4, Sx5,.
  • the number n of signal strength measurement signals Sxn transmitted from the vehicle is transmitted as many as necessary for the determination.
  • a total of nine signal intensities including three signal strength measurement signals obtained by dividing the challenge code, three signal strength measurement signals obtained by dividing the ID code, and three signal strength measurement signals obtained by dividing the response code.
  • a measurement signal is being transmitted. If nine signal strength measurement signals are transmitted in the modified example as in the above embodiment, the time required for verification communication in the modified example is longer than that in the above embodiment. That is, according to the above-described embodiment in which challenge response authentication and signal strength determination are performed simultaneously, it is possible to shorten the time required for verification communication as compared with the case where signal strength determination is separately performed.
  • a signal transmitted and received in the same frequency band between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2 is divided into a plurality of signals, and each divided signal is used as a signal strength measurement signal, and the received signal of the signal strength measurement signal
  • the strength (first signal strength) is measured, and the received signal strength (second signal strength) of the measurement response signal Sk that is a response signal of each signal strength measurement signal is measured.
  • whether wireless communication is right or wrong is determined based on the first signal strength and the second signal strength. For this reason, it is easy to confirm the received signal strength of radio waves in the same frequency band, and it is possible to accurately determine whether radio communication is correct or not.
  • the said embodiment can also be implemented with the following forms which changed this suitably.
  • the number of division of the challenge code, ID code, and response code is not limited to three, and can be arbitrarily set. Further, the number of divisions of the challenge code, the ID code, and the response code may be the same or different.
  • all of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the challenge code are signal strength measurement signals, but at least one of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the challenge code may be used as the signal strength measurement signal. Good.
  • all of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the ID code are signal strength measurement signals, but at least one of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the ID code may be used as the signal strength measurement signal. Good.
  • all of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the response code are signal strength measurement signals.
  • at least one of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the response code may be used as the signal strength measurement signal. Good.
  • the response code is transmitted from the electronic key 2 next to the ID code.
  • the ID code may be transmitted from the electronic key 2 next to the response code.
  • each of the challenge code, ID code, and response code is divided, but only the challenge code may be divided. That is, the ID code and the response code may not be divided. In this case, no signal strength measurement signal is transmitted from the electronic key 2 and no measurement response signal is returned from the vehicle 1. In this way, it is not necessary to provide the second division unit 32 in the electronic key 2.
  • each of the challenge code, ID code, and response code is divided, but only the ID code may be divided. That is, the challenge code and the response code may not be divided. In this case, no signal strength measurement signal is transmitted from the vehicle 1, and no measurement response signal is returned from the electronic key 2. In this way, the vehicle 1 need not be provided with the first division unit 31.
  • each of the challenge code, ID code, and response code is divided, but only the response code may be divided. That is, the challenge code and the ID code may not be divided. In this case, no signal strength measurement signal is transmitted from the vehicle 1, and no measurement response signal is returned from the electronic key 2. In this way, the vehicle 1 need not be provided with the first division unit 31.
  • the number of divisions by the first division unit 31 and the number of divisions by the second division unit 32 may be predetermined numbers, or may be changed as appropriate.
  • the first signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal and the second signal strength of the measurement response signal are compared to determine whether the signal strength difference is within a predetermined range.
  • the signal strength may be determined by confirming the correlation between the first signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal and the second signal strength of the measurement response signal.
  • the correctness determination unit 35 determines the correctness of wireless communication based on the first signal strength of the plurality of signal strength measurement signals and the second signal strength of the plurality of measurement response signals. However, whether the wireless communication is correct or not may be determined based on the first signal strength of one signal strength measurement signal and the second signal strength of one measurement response signal.
  • the transmission radio wave Sa may be transmitted from the electronic key 2 and the reply radio wave Sb may be transmitted from the verification ECU 11.
  • the correctness determination unit 35 may be provided in either the verification ECU 11 or the electronic key 2. In this case, it is necessary to transmit the received signal strength to the side where the correctness determination unit 35 is provided.
  • the electronic key system 3 is not limited to the system which performs smart communication, It is good also as a system using another communication format or another frequency band.
  • collation ECU11 was made into the communication master, it is not limited to collation ECU11, It can change into another apparatus and apparatus.
  • the electronic key 2 is a terminal.
  • the terminal is not limited to the electronic key 2, and various terminals can be used.
  • the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 is not limited to being applied to the vehicle 1 and may be employed in other devices and devices.
  • the unauthorized communication establishment prevention system 30 is not limited to the half-duplex method, and may perform communication using the full-duplex method.

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
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Abstract

This unauthorized communication establishment preventing system determines whether radio communications performed using radio waves having the same frequency band between a verification ECU and an electronic key are valid or unauthorized. The unauthorized communication establishment preventing system is provided with: a dividing unit which divides a transmission radio wave (Sa) and/or a reply radio wave (Sb) into a plurality of divided signals (Sc1 to Sc3; Si1 to Si3; Sr1 to Sr3); a first transmitting unit which transmits each divided signal as a signal strength measurement signal; a second transmitting unit which transmits a measurement response signal (Sk) with respect to each signal strength measurement signal; a first measuring unit which measures a first signal strength, which is the received signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal; a second measuring unit which measures a second signal strength, which is the received signal strength of the measurement response signal; and a validity determining unit which determines whether a radio communication is valid or unauthorized on the basis of the first signal strength and the second signal strength.

Description

通信不正成立防止システムCommunication fraud prevention system
　本発明は、無線通信の正否を判定する通信不正成立防止システムに関する。 The present invention relates to a communication fraud establishment prevention system that determines whether wireless communication is right or wrong.
　従来、車両等において、電子キーからキーＩＤを車両に無線送信してＩＤ照合を行う電子キーシステムが周知である。ところで、この種の電子キーシステムにおいては、ユーザの意志によらないところでＩＤ照合の成立を謀る不正行為として、中継器を使用した不正行為（中継器使用不正行為：特許文献１等参照）というものがある。中継器使用不正行為は、例えば電子キーが車両から遠い場所に位置する際に、この電子キーを複数の中継器によって車両と繋いで電波を中継し、これら２者間の通信を成立させる行為である。よって、ユーザが気付かないところでＩＤ照合が成立されてしまうので、第三者によって不正にドアの解錠やエンジンの始動が行われてしまう可能性がある。 2. Description of the Related Art Conventionally, an electronic key system that performs ID verification by wirelessly transmitting a key ID from an electronic key to the vehicle in a vehicle or the like is well known. By the way, in this kind of electronic key system, an illegal act using a repeater (refer to Patent Document 1, etc.) as an illegal act intended to establish ID verification without depending on the user's will. There is. For example, when the electronic key is located at a location far from the vehicle, the repeater use fraudulent act is an act of establishing a communication between these two parties by connecting the electronic key to the vehicle by a plurality of repeaters and relaying radio waves. is there. Therefore, since ID verification is established without the user's knowledge, there is a possibility that the door is unlocked or the engine is illegally operated by a third party.
　そこで、中継器使用不正行為の対策として、車両と電子キーとの間の無線通信における受信信号強度をそれぞれ検出してこれら受信信号強度の相関を確認することで通信不正を判定するシステムがある（特許文献２参照）。 Therefore, there is a system for determining communication fraud by detecting the received signal strength in wireless communication between the vehicle and the electronic key and confirming the correlation between the received signal strengths as a countermeasure against fraudulent use of the repeater ( Patent Document 2).
特開２００６－１６１５４５号公報JP 2006-161545 A 特開２０１２－６０４８２号公報JP 2012-60482 A
　中継器を使用した不正通信である中継器使用不正行為に対する対策をとるにあたって、不正通信を正確に判定することが望まれている。
　本発明の目的は、不正通信を正確に判定することのできる通信不正成立防止システムを提供することにある。 In taking measures against illegal acts of using a repeater, which is unauthorized communication using a repeater, it is desired to accurately determine unauthorized communication.
An object of the present invention is to provide a communication fraud establishment prevention system capable of accurately judging unauthorized communication.
　一態様の通信不正成立防止システムは、通信マスタと端末との間で同一周波数帯の電波で無線通信を行い、当該無線通信の正否を判定する通信不正成立防止システムであって、前記無線通信において、前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか一方が送信電波を送信し、前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか他方が前記送信電波に対する返信電波を送信し、前記送信電波及び前記返信電波の少なくとも一方を複数の分割信号に分割する分割部と、前記複数の分割信号の少なくとも一つを信号強度測定信号として送信する第１送信部と、前記信号強度測定信号に対する応答信号である測定応答信号を送信する第２送信部と、前記信号強度測定信号の受信信号強度である第１信号強度を測定する第１測定部と、前記測定応答信号の受信信号強度である第２信号強度を測定する第２測定部と、前記第１信号強度と前記第２信号強度とに基づいて無線通信の正否を判定する正否判定部と、を備える。 A communication fraud establishment prevention system according to one aspect is a communication fraud establishment prevention system that performs wireless communication using radio waves in the same frequency band between a communication master and a terminal, and determines whether the wireless communication is correct or not. One of the communication master and the terminal transmits a transmission radio wave, the other of the communication master and the terminal transmits a reply radio wave to the transmission radio wave, and at least one of the transmission radio wave and the reply radio wave A division unit that divides the signal into a plurality of divided signals, a first transmission unit that transmits at least one of the plurality of divided signals as a signal strength measurement signal, and a measurement response signal that is a response signal to the signal strength measurement signal A second transmission unit; a first measurement unit that measures a first signal strength that is a received signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal; and a received signal strength of the measurement response signal There comprises a second measuring unit for measuring a second signal strength, and a determining correctness determination unit success or failure of the wireless communication based on the first signal strength and the second signal strength.
　上記構成によれば、通信マスタ及び端末の間で送受信される同一周波数帯の電波を分割して、この分割した電波の少なくとも一部を信号強度測定信号として第１信号強度を測定し、信号強度測定信号の応答信号である測定応答信号の第２信号強度を測定し、第１信号強度と第２信号強度とに基づいて無線通信の正否を判定する。このため、同一周波数帯の電波の受信信号強度を確認することが容易となり無線通信の正否を正確に判定することができるようになる。また、送信電波及び返信電波の少なくとも一方を分割して信号強度測定信号とすることで、受信信号強度を測定するために新たな信号強度測定信号が不要であり、測定応答信号の追加のみでよいため通信時間の増加を抑制することができる。 According to the above configuration, radio waves in the same frequency band transmitted and received between the communication master and the terminal are divided, and the first signal intensity is measured using at least a part of the divided radio waves as a signal intensity measurement signal. The second signal strength of the measurement response signal, which is a response signal of the measurement signal, is measured, and whether wireless communication is right or wrong is determined based on the first signal strength and the second signal strength. For this reason, it is easy to confirm the received signal strength of radio waves in the same frequency band, and it is possible to accurately determine whether radio communication is correct or not. Further, by dividing at least one of the transmission radio wave and the return radio wave into a signal strength measurement signal, a new signal strength measurement signal is not required to measure the received signal strength, and only a measurement response signal needs to be added. Therefore, increase in communication time can be suppressed.
　上記通信不正成立防止システムについて、前記通信マスタ及び前記端末の間で前記信号強度測定信号と前記測定応答信号との送受信は、複数回実行され、前記正否判定部は、複数回測定された前記第１信号強度と前記第２信号強度とに基づいて無線通信の正否を判定することが好ましい。 In the communication fraud establishment prevention system, transmission / reception of the signal strength measurement signal and the measurement response signal between the communication master and the terminal is performed a plurality of times, and the correctness determination unit is configured to perform the measurement of the plurality of times. It is preferable to determine whether wireless communication is right or wrong based on one signal strength and the second signal strength.
　上記構成によれば、複数の信号強度に基づいて無線通信の正否を判定するため、不正通信の判定を精度よく判定することが可能となる。
　上記通信不正成立防止システムについて、例えば、前記分割部と前記第１送信部と前記第２測定部と前記正否判定部とが前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか一方に設けられ、前記第１測定部と前記第２送信部とが前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか他方に設けられるとき、前記第２送信部は、前記第１測定部が測定した前記第１信号強度を、前記測定応答信号に含めて送信することが好ましい。 According to the above configuration, whether or not wireless communication is correct is determined based on a plurality of signal strengths, and therefore it is possible to determine whether or not unauthorized communication is accurate.
For the communication fraud establishment prevention system, for example, the division unit, the first transmission unit, the second measurement unit, and the correctness determination unit are provided in one of the communication master and the terminal, and the first measurement And the second transmission unit are provided in either the communication master or the terminal, the second transmission unit uses the first response intensity measured by the first measurement unit as the measurement response signal. It is preferable to include and transmit.
　上記通信不正成立防止システムについて、例えば、前記分割部と前記第１送信部と前記第２測定部とが前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか一方に設けられ、前記第１測定部と前記第２送信部と前記正否判定部とが前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか他方に設けられるとき、前記第１送信部は、前記第２測定部が測定した前記第２信号強度を、前記信号強度測定信号に含めて送信することが好ましい。 In the communication fraud prevention system, for example, the dividing unit, the first transmitting unit, and the second measuring unit are provided in one of the communication master and the terminal, and the first measuring unit and the second measuring unit are provided. When the transmission unit and the correctness determination unit are provided on the other of the communication master and the terminal, the first transmission unit uses the second signal strength measured by the second measurement unit as the signal strength measurement. It is preferable to transmit by including in the signal.
　上記通信不正成立防止システムについて、前記通信マスタは、前記端末に登録されたＩＤの正否を確認するＩＤ照合と、前記第１信号強度と前記第２信号強度とに基づいて無線通信の正否を判定する信号強度判定とを行い、前記ＩＤ照合により前記ＩＤの正当性を確認し且つ前記信号強度判定により前記無線通信の正当性を確認した場合に、前記無線通信が不正なく行われていると判断することが好ましい。 In the communication fraud establishment prevention system, the communication master determines whether the wireless communication is correct based on an ID collation for confirming whether the ID registered in the terminal is correct, and the first signal strength and the second signal strength. A signal strength determination is performed, and when the validity of the ID is confirmed by the ID verification and the validity of the wireless communication is confirmed by the signal strength determination, it is determined that the wireless communication is performed without fraud. It is preferable to do.
　上記構成によれば、無線通信の正否をＩＤ照合と信号強度判定とに基づいて判定するため、通信マスタ及び端末間の無線通信の正否を精度よく判定することが可能となる。
　上記通信不正成立防止システムについて、前記無線通信時に行われるＩＤ照合は、チャレンジコードを暗号鍵に通してレスポンスコードを求める演算を前記通信マスタ及び前記端末の各々で行い、前記通信マスタで求められたレスポンスコードと前記端末で求められたレスポンスコードとを比較するチャレンジレスポンス認証を含み、前記分割部は、前記チャレンジコード及び前記レスポンスコードの少なくとも一方を、それぞれ前記信号強度測定信号として用いる前記複数の分割信号に分割することが好ましい。 According to the above configuration, whether wireless communication is correct or not is determined based on ID collation and signal strength determination, so that it is possible to accurately determine whether wireless communication is correct or not between the communication master and the terminal.
In the communication fraud prevention system, the ID verification performed at the time of wireless communication is performed by each of the communication master and the terminal to calculate a response code by passing a challenge code through an encryption key. Including a challenge response authentication for comparing a response code with a response code obtained by the terminal, wherein the dividing unit uses at least one of the challenge code and the response code as the signal strength measurement signal, respectively. It is preferable to divide the signal.
　上記構成によれば、チャレンジレスポンス認証を行いながら受信信号強度による判定を行うことが可能となるため、通信に要する時間を短くするのに有利である。
　上記通信不正成立防止システムについて、前記無線通信時に行われるＩＤ照合は、前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか一方がＩＤコードを送信し、前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか他方が受信した前記ＩＤコードを照合し、前記分割部は、前記ＩＤコードを、それぞれ前記信号強度測定信号として用いる前記複数の分割信号に分割することが好ましい。 According to the above configuration, it is possible to perform determination based on the received signal strength while performing challenge response authentication, which is advantageous in shortening the time required for communication.
In the communication fraud prevention system, the ID verification performed at the time of the wireless communication is such that either the communication master or the terminal transmits an ID code and the other one of the communication master and the terminal receives the ID. It is preferable that the code is collated, and the dividing unit divides the ID code into the plurality of divided signals respectively used as the signal strength measurement signals.
　上記構成によれば、ＩＤ照合のＩＤコードを受信しながら受信信号強度による判定を行うことが可能となるため、通信に掛かる時間を短くするのに有利である。 According to the above configuration, it is possible to make a determination based on the received signal strength while receiving an ID code for ID verification, which is advantageous in shortening the time required for communication.
　本発明によれば、不正通信を正確に判定することができる。 According to the present invention, unauthorized communication can be accurately determined.
通信不正成立防止システムの一実施形態の概略構成を示すブロック図。The block diagram which shows schematic structure of one Embodiment of a communication fraud establishment prevention system. 一実施形態の通信不正成立防止システムの通信シーケンスを示す図。The figure which shows the communication sequence of the communication fraud establishment prevention system of one Embodiment. 比較例の通信不正成立防止システムの通信シーケンスを示す図。The figure which shows the communication sequence of the communication fraud establishment prevention system of a comparative example.
　以下、図１～図３を参照して、通信不正成立防止システムを車両の電子キーシステムに具体化した一実施形態について説明する。
　図１に示すように、車両１は、電子キー２とともに電子キーシステム３を構築し、電子キー２との間で無線通信によるＩＤ照合を行う。電子キーシステム３は、車両１からの通信を契機に狭域無線通信を通じて電子キー２とＩＤ照合を実施するキー操作フリーシステムである。一般に、キー操作フリーシステムで実施されるＩＤ照合を「スマート照合」といい、その通信を「スマート通信」という。なお、電子キー２が端末に相当する。 Hereinafter, an embodiment in which the communication fraud establishment preventing system is embodied in an electronic key system of a vehicle will be described with reference to FIGS.
As shown in FIG. 1, the vehicle 1 constructs an electronic key system 3 together with the electronic key 2, and performs ID collation with the electronic key 2 by wireless communication. The electronic key system 3 is a key operation free system that performs ID collation with the electronic key 2 through narrow-range wireless communication in response to communication from the vehicle 1. Generally, ID collation performed in a key operation free system is called “smart collation”, and the communication is called “smart communication”. The electronic key 2 corresponds to a terminal.
　車両１は、ＩＤ照合（スマート照合）を行う照合ＥＣＵ（Ｅｌｅｃｔｒｏｎｉｃ　Ｃｏｎｔｒｏｌ　Ｕｎｉｔ）１１と、車載電装品の電源を管理するボディＥＣＵ１２と、エンジン１４を制御するエンジンＥＣＵ１３とを備える。これらＥＣＵは、車内の通信線１５を通じて接続されている。通信線１５は、例えばＣＡＮ（Ｃｏｎｔｒｏｌｌｅｒ　Ａｒｅａ　Ｎｅｔｗｏｒｋ）やＬＩＮ（Ｌｏｃａｌ　Ｉｎｔｅｒｃｏｎｎｅｃｔ　Ｎｅｔｗｏｒｋ）からなる。照合ＥＣＵ１１には、車両１に登録された電子キー２のキーＩＤ及び暗号鍵がメモリ１１ａに書き込み保存されている。暗号鍵は、ＩＤ照合の過程で実施されるチャレンジレスポンス認証で使用される。なお、照合ＥＣＵ１１が通信マスタに相当する。 The vehicle 1 includes a collation ECU (Electronic Control Unit) 11 that performs ID collation (smart collation), a body ECU 12 that manages the power source of the in-vehicle electrical components, and an engine ECU 13 that controls the engine 14. These ECUs are connected through a communication line 15 in the vehicle. The communication line 15 includes, for example, a CAN (Controller Area Network) or a LIN (Local Interconnect Network). In the verification ECU 11, the key ID and the encryption key of the electronic key 2 registered in the vehicle 1 are written and stored in the memory 11a. The encryption key is used in challenge response authentication performed in the process of ID verification. The verification ECU 11 corresponds to a communication master.
　車両１は、室外に電波を送信する室外送信機１６と、室内に電波を送信する室内送信機１７と、車両１において電波を送受信する電波送受信機１８とを備える。室外送信機１６及び室内送信機１７は、例えばＬＦ（Ｌｏｗ　Ｆｒｅｑｕｅｎｃｙ）帯の電波を送信する。電波送受信機１８は、例えばＵＨＦ（Ｕｌｔｒａ　Ｈｉｇｈ　Ｆｒｅｑｕｅｎｃｙ）帯の電波を送受信する。電子キーシステム３は、ＬＦ－ＵＨＦの双方向通信及びＵＨＦ－ＵＨＦの双方向通信によって電子キー２を認証する。ボディＥＣＵ１２は、車両１のドアに設けられたドアロック機構１９の作動を制御することにより、車両１のドアの施解錠を切り替える。 The vehicle 1 includes an outdoor transmitter 16 that transmits radio waves outdoors, an indoor transmitter 17 that transmits radio waves indoors, and a radio transmitter / receiver 18 that transmits and receives radio waves in the vehicle 1. The outdoor transmitter 16 and the indoor transmitter 17 transmit radio waves in, for example, an LF (Low Frequency) band. The radio wave transmitter / receiver 18 transmits / receives radio waves in, for example, a UHF (Ultra High Frequency) band. The electronic key system 3 authenticates the electronic key 2 through LF-UHF bidirectional communication and UHF-UHF bidirectional communication. The body ECU 12 switches the locking / unlocking of the door of the vehicle 1 by controlling the operation of the door lock mechanism 19 provided on the door of the vehicle 1.
　電子キー２は、電子キー２の動作を制御するキー制御部２１と、電子キー２において電波を受信する受信部２２と、電子キー２において電波を送受信する送受信部２３とを備える。キー制御部２１には、電子キー２に固有のキーＩＤと、ＩＤ照合のチャレンジレスポンス認証で使用する暗号鍵とが、メモリ２１ａに書き込み保存されている。受信部２２は、例えばＬＦ帯の電波を受信する。送受信部２３は、例えばＵＨＦ帯の電波を送受信する。 The electronic key 2 includes a key control unit 21 that controls the operation of the electronic key 2, a receiving unit 22 that receives radio waves in the electronic key 2, and a transmission / reception unit 23 that transmits and receives radio waves in the electronic key 2. In the key control unit 21, a key ID unique to the electronic key 2 and an encryption key used in challenge response authentication for ID verification are written and stored in the memory 21a. The receiving unit 22 receives, for example, LF band radio waves. The transmission / reception unit 23 transmits / receives UHF band radio waves, for example.
　照合ＥＣＵ１１は、ウェイク信号Ｓｗｋを室外送信機１６又は室内送信機１７から定期的にＬＦ帯の電波で送信し、電子キー２との通信確立を監視する。照合ＥＣＵ１１は、ウェイク信号Ｓｗｋを受信した電子キー２からアック信号Ｓａｃｋを受信すると、具体的な照合通信を実行する。なお、電子キー２は、ウェイク信号Ｓｗｋを受信すると、ＵＨＦ帯の電波でアック信号Ｓａｃｋを送受信部２３から送信する。すなわち、電子キーシステム３は、照合ＥＣＵ１１と電子キー２との通信確立の監視時にはＬＦ－ＵＨＦの双方向通信を行う。 The verification ECU 11 periodically transmits the wake signal Swk from the outdoor transmitter 16 or the indoor transmitter 17 by radio waves in the LF band, and monitors the establishment of communication with the electronic key 2. When receiving the ACK signal Sack from the electronic key 2 that has received the wake signal Swk, the verification ECU 11 executes specific verification communication. In addition, when the electronic key 2 receives the wake signal Swk, the electronic key 2 transmits the ACK signal Sack from the transmission / reception unit 23 using a radio wave in the UHF band. That is, the electronic key system 3 performs LF-UHF bidirectional communication when monitoring the establishment of communication between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2.
　電子キーシステム３は、照合ＥＣＵ１１からの送信電波Ｓａを電子キー２に受信させて電子キー２から返信電波Ｓｂを返信させる照合通信を行う。なお、照合ＥＣＵ１１は送信電波ＳａをＵＨＦ帯で送信し、電子キー２は返信電波ＳｂをＵＨＦ帯で送信する。すなわち、電子キーシステム３は、照合通信時にはＵＨＦ－ＵＨＦの双方向通信を行う。照合通信時に実施されるＩＤ照合には、電子キー２に登録されているキーＩＤの正否を確認するキーＩＤ照合や、車両１及び電子キー２の双方でチャレンジコードを暗号鍵で演算してレスポンスコードを確認するチャレンジレスポンス認証などが含まれている。すなわち、照合ＥＣＵ１１から電子キー２に送信される送信電波Ｓａには、ＩＤコードと、チャレンジレスポンス認証のレスポンスコードとが含まれる。また、電子キー２から照合ＥＣＵ１１に送信される返信電波Ｓｂには、チャレンジレスポンス認証のチャレンジコードが含まれる。 The electronic key system 3 performs verification communication in which the electronic key 2 receives the transmission radio wave Sa from the verification ECU 11 and returns the response radio wave Sb from the electronic key 2. The verification ECU 11 transmits the transmission radio wave Sa in the UHF band, and the electronic key 2 transmits the reply radio wave Sb in the UHF band. That is, the electronic key system 3 performs UHF-UHF bidirectional communication during verification communication. For ID verification performed during verification communication, key ID verification for confirming the correctness of the key ID registered in the electronic key 2 and response by calculating a challenge code with an encryption key in both the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2 Includes challenge response authentication to verify the code. That is, the transmission radio wave Sa transmitted from the verification ECU 11 to the electronic key 2 includes an ID code and a response code for challenge response authentication. The reply radio wave Sb transmitted from the electronic key 2 to the verification ECU 11 includes a challenge response authentication challenge code.
　電子キーシステム３は、無線通信の正否を判定することで通信不正を防止する通信不正成立防止システム３０を備える。本例の通信不正成立防止システム３０では、照合ＥＣＵ１１は、送信電波Ｓａを複数の信号に分割して、各分割信号を信号強度測定信号として電子キー２に送信する。同様に、電子キー２は、返信電波Ｓｂを複数の信号に分割して、各分割信号を信号強度測定信号として照合ＥＣＵ１１に送信する。また、本例の通信不正成立防止システム３０では、照合ＥＣＵ１１は、電子キー２からの信号強度測定信号（本例では、返信電波Ｓｂの各分割信号）を受信すると、その信号強度測定信号に対する測定応答信号Ｓｋを電子キー２に送信する。同様に、電子キー２は、照合ＥＣＵ１１からの信号強度測定信号（本例では、送信電波Ｓａの各分割信号）を受信すると、その信号強度測定信号に対する測定応答信号Ｓｋを照合ＥＣＵ１１に送信する。そして、通信不正成立防止システム３０は、信号強度測定信号の受信信号強度である第１信号強度と、測定応答信号Ｓｋの受信信号強度である第２信号強度とに基づいて無線通信の正否を判定する。このように、通信不正成立防止システム３０は、照合ＥＣＵ１１及び電子キー２の間で交互に電波を送信する半二重方式により無線通信の不正判定を行う。なお、照合ＥＣＵ１１及び電子キー２の間で電波を送受信して無線通信の信号強度を測定する処理は、回数を増やすほど無線通信の正否の判定精度を高めることができる。このため、上記無線通信の信号強度を測定する処理の回数は多く実施されることが好ましい。 The electronic key system 3 includes a communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 that prevents communication fraud by determining whether wireless communication is right or wrong. In the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 of this example, the verification ECU 11 divides the transmission radio wave Sa into a plurality of signals and transmits each divided signal to the electronic key 2 as a signal strength measurement signal. Similarly, the electronic key 2 divides the return radio wave Sb into a plurality of signals, and transmits each divided signal to the verification ECU 11 as a signal strength measurement signal. In the communication fraud prevention system 30 of this example, when the verification ECU 11 receives a signal strength measurement signal from the electronic key 2 (in this example, each divided signal of the return radio wave Sb), the verification for the signal strength measurement signal is performed. A response signal Sk is transmitted to the electronic key 2. Similarly, when the electronic key 2 receives a signal strength measurement signal (in this example, each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa) from the verification ECU 11, the electronic key 2 transmits a measurement response signal Sk to the signal strength measurement signal to the verification ECU 11. Then, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 determines whether the wireless communication is correct or not based on the first signal strength that is the received signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal and the second signal strength that is the received signal strength of the measurement response signal Sk. To do. In this manner, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 performs fraud determination for wireless communication by a half-duplex method in which radio waves are alternately transmitted between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2. Note that the process of measuring the signal strength of wireless communication by transmitting and receiving radio waves between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2 can increase the accuracy of wireless communication determination as the number of times increases. For this reason, it is preferable that the number of times of processing for measuring the signal strength of the wireless communication is increased.
　通信不正成立防止システム３０は、信号強度の測定に用いる送信電波Ｓａを分割する第１分割部３１を備える。本例において、第１分割部３１は、照合ＥＣＵ１１に設けられている。第１分割部３１は、送信電波Ｓａに含まれる１セット分の情報やコードを複数の信号に分割して、各分割信号を電波送受信機１８から送信させる。本例では、第１分割部３１は、送信電波Ｓａであるチャレンジコードを複数の信号に分割して、チャレンジコードの各分割信号を全て信号強度測定信号として電波送受信機１８から送信させる。照合ＥＣＵ１１は、各信号強度測定信号を電波送受信機１８から間欠的に送信させる。 The communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 includes a first dividing unit 31 that divides a transmission radio wave Sa used for signal strength measurement. In this example, the 1st division part 31 is provided in collation ECU11. The first division unit 31 divides one set of information and code included in the transmission radio wave Sa into a plurality of signals, and transmits each division signal from the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18. In this example, the first dividing unit 31 divides the challenge code, which is the transmission radio wave Sa, into a plurality of signals, and causes all of the divided signals of the challenge code to be transmitted from the radio transceiver 18 as signal strength measurement signals. The verification ECU 11 intermittently transmits each signal strength measurement signal from the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18.
　通信不正成立防止システム３０は、信号強度の測定に用いる返信電波Ｓｂを分割する第２分割部３２を備える。本例において、第２分割部３２は、キー制御部２１に設けられている。第２分割部３２は、返信電波Ｓｂに含まれる１セット分の情報やコードを分割して、各分割信号を送受信部２３から送信させる。本例では、第２分割部３２は、返信電波ＳｂであるＩＤコードとレスポンスコードの各々を複数の信号に分割して、ＩＤコードの各分割信号とレスポンスコードの各分割信号とを全て信号強度測定信号として送受信部２３から送信させる。キー制御部２１は、各信号強度測定信号を送受信部２３から間欠的に送信させる。 The communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 includes a second dividing unit 32 that divides the return radio wave Sb used for signal strength measurement. In this example, the second dividing unit 32 is provided in the key control unit 21. The second dividing unit 32 divides one set of information and code included in the reply radio wave Sb and causes each of the divided signals to be transmitted from the transmission / reception unit 23. In this example, the second dividing unit 32 divides each of the ID code and the response code, which are the return radio waves Sb, into a plurality of signals, and all the divided signals of the ID code and the divided signals of the response code have signal strength. The measurement signal is transmitted from the transmission / reception unit 23. The key control unit 21 causes each signal strength measurement signal to be transmitted intermittently from the transmission / reception unit 23.
　通信不正成立防止システム３０は、電波送受信機１８が受信した信号の受信信号強度を測定する測定部３３を備える。本例において、測定部３３は、照合ＥＣＵ１１に設けられている。なお、測定部３３は、第１分割部３１によって分割された送信電波Ｓａの各分割信号に対する測定応答信号Ｓｋを受信したときには第２測定部として機能し、第２分割部３２によって分割された返信電波Ｓｂの各分割信号を受信したときには第１測定部として機能する。 The communication fraud prevention system 30 includes a measurement unit 33 that measures the received signal strength of the signal received by the radio wave transceiver 18. In this example, the measurement unit 33 is provided in the verification ECU 11. The measuring unit 33 functions as a second measuring unit when receiving the measurement response signal Sk for each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first dividing unit 31, and the reply divided by the second dividing unit 32. When each divided signal of the radio wave Sb is received, it functions as a first measurement unit.
　通信不正成立防止システム３０は、送受信部２３が受信した信号の受信信号強度を測定する測定部３４を備える。本例において、測定部３４は、キー制御部２１に設けられている。なお、測定部３４は、第１分割部３１によって分割された送信電波Ｓａの各分割信号を受信したときには第１測定部として機能し、第２分割部３２によって分割された返信電波Ｓｂの各分割信号に対する測定応答信号Ｓｋを受信したときには第２測定部として機能する。 The communication fraud prevention system 30 includes a measurement unit 34 that measures the received signal strength of the signal received by the transmission / reception unit 23. In this example, the measurement unit 34 is provided in the key control unit 21. Note that the measurement unit 34 functions as a first measurement unit when receiving each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first division unit 31 and each division of the reply radio wave Sb divided by the second division unit 32. When the measurement response signal Sk for the signal is received, it functions as a second measurement unit.
　ここで、電波送受信機１８は、第１分割部３１によって分割された送信電波Ｓａの各分割信号を送信するときには第１送信部として機能し、第２分割部３２によって分割された返信電波Ｓｂの各分割信号に対する測定応答信号Ｓｋを送信するときには第２送信部として機能する。 Here, the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18 functions as a first transmission unit when transmitting each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first division unit 31, and the return radio wave Sb divided by the second division unit 32. When transmitting the measurement response signal Sk for each divided signal, it functions as a second transmitter.
　また、送受信部２３は、第１分割部３１によって分割された送信電波Ｓａの各分割信号（即ち、信号強度測定信号）に対する測定応答信号Ｓｋを送信するときには第２送信部として機能し、第２分割部３２によって分割された返信電波Ｓｂの各分割信号（即ち、信号強度測定信号）を送信するときには第１送信部として機能する。本例では、送受信部２３は、送信電波Ｓａの各分割信号を受信したとき、その分割信号の受信信号強度である第１信号強度を、その分割信号に対する測定応答信号Ｓｋに含めて送信する。また、本例では、送受信部２３は、返信電波Ｓｂの各分割信号に対する測定応答信号Ｓｋを受信したとき、その測定応答信号Ｓｋの受信信号強度である第２信号強度を、後続の返信電波Ｓｂに含めて送信する。 The transmission / reception unit 23 functions as a second transmission unit when transmitting the measurement response signal Sk for each divided signal (that is, signal strength measurement signal) of the transmission radio wave Sa divided by the first division unit 31, and the second transmission unit When transmitting each divided signal (that is, signal strength measurement signal) of the reply radio wave Sb divided by the dividing unit 32, it functions as a first transmission unit. In this example, when the transmission / reception unit 23 receives each divided signal of the transmission radio wave Sa, the transmission / reception unit 23 includes the first signal strength, which is the received signal strength of the divided signal, in the measurement response signal Sk for the divided signal and transmits the signal. Further, in this example, when the transmission / reception unit 23 receives the measurement response signal Sk for each divided signal of the return radio wave Sb, the transmission / reception unit 23 sets the second signal strength that is the received signal strength of the measurement response signal Sk to the subsequent return radio wave Sb. To be included and sent.
　通信不正成立防止システム３０は、照合ＥＣＵ１１及び電子キー２の間の無線通信の正否を判定する正否判定部３５を備える。本例において、正否判定部３５は、照合ＥＣＵ１１に設けられている。正否判定部３５は、送信電波Ｓａの信号強度と返信電波Ｓｂの信号強度とを比較して信号強度差が所定範囲以内に収まるか否かを確認する信号強度判定により無線通信の正否を判定する。また、照合ＥＣＵ１１は、電子キー２に登録されたキーＩＤの正否を確認するＩＤ照合と、信号強度判定とを行い、ＩＤ照合によりキーＩＤの正当性を確認し且つ信号強度判定により無線通信の正当性を確認した場合に、無線通信が不正なく行われていると判断する。 The communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 includes a correctness determination unit 35 that determines whether wireless communication between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2 is correct. In this example, the correctness determination unit 35 is provided in the verification ECU 11. The correctness determination unit 35 compares the signal strength of the transmission radio wave Sa and the signal strength of the return radio wave Sb to determine whether the radio communication is correct or not by signal strength determination that confirms whether the signal strength difference falls within a predetermined range. . Further, the verification ECU 11 performs ID verification for confirming whether the key ID registered in the electronic key 2 is correct and signal strength determination, confirms the validity of the key ID by ID verification, and performs wireless communication by signal strength determination. When the validity is confirmed, it is determined that the wireless communication is performed without fraud.
　次に、図２を参照して、通信不正成立防止システム３０の動作を説明する。
　図２に示すように、通信不正成立防止システム３０は、信号強度判定をチャレンジレスポンス認証の過程で行う。本例では、第１分割部３１は、送信電波Ｓａに含まれるチャレンジレスポンス認証のチャレンジコードを複数の信号に分割して各分割信号を電波送受信機１８から送信させる。また、第２分割部３２は、返信電波Ｓｂに含まれるＩＤコードを複数の信号に分割するとともに、返信電波Ｓｂに含まれるチャレンジレスポンス認証のレスポンスコードを複数の信号に分割して、ＩＤコードの各分割信号及びレスポンスコードの各分割信号を送受信部２３から送信させる。例えば、通信不正成立防止システム３０は、車両１が電子キー２にチャレンジコードを送信するとき、チャレンジコードを３つの信号強度測定信号Ｓｃ１，Ｓｃ２，Ｓｃ３に分割し、各信号強度測定信号Ｓｃ１，Ｓｃ２，Ｓｃ３の受信信号強度である第１信号強度と、信号強度測定信号Ｓｃ１，Ｓｃ２，Ｓｃ３に対するそれぞれの応答信号である各測定応答信号Ｓｋ１，Ｓｋ２，Ｓｋ３の受信信号強度である第２信号強度とを用いて信号強度判定を行う。また、通信不正成立防止システム３０は、電子キー２が車両１にＩＤコードを送信するとき、ＩＤコードを３つの信号強度測定信号Ｓｉ１，Ｓｉ２，Ｓｉ３に分割し、各信号強度測定信号Ｓｉ１，Ｓｉ２，Ｓｉ３の受信信号強度である第１信号強度と、信号強度測定信号Ｓｉ１，Ｓｉ２，Ｓｉ３に対するそれぞれの応答信号である各測定応答信号Ｓｋ４，Ｓｋ５，Ｓｋ６の受信信号強度である第２信号強度とを用いて信号強度判定を行う。さらに、通信不正成立防止システム３０は、電子キー２が車両１にレスポンスコードを送信するとき、レスポンスコードを３つの信号強度測定信号Ｓｒ１，Ｓｒ２，Ｓｒ３に分割し、各信号強度測定信号Ｓｒ１，Ｓｒ２，Ｓｒ３の受信信号強度である第１信号強度と、信号強度測定信号Ｓｒ１，Ｓｒ２，Ｓｒ３に対するそれぞれの応答信号である各測定応答信号Ｓｋ７，Ｓｋ８，Ｓｋ９の受信信号強度である第２信号強度とを用いて信号強度判定を行う。 Next, the operation of the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 will be described with reference to FIG.
As shown in FIG. 2, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 performs signal strength determination in the process of challenge response authentication. In this example, the first dividing unit 31 divides the challenge-response authentication challenge code included in the transmission radio wave Sa into a plurality of signals and causes each radio signal to be transmitted from the radio transceiver 18. The second dividing unit 32 divides the ID code included in the return radio wave Sb into a plurality of signals, and also divides the response code for challenge response authentication contained in the return radio wave Sb into a plurality of signals, Each divided signal and each divided signal of the response code are transmitted from the transmission / reception unit 23. For example, when the vehicle 1 transmits a challenge code to the electronic key 2, the communication fraud prevention system 30 divides the challenge code into three signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3, and each signal strength measurement signal Sc1, Sc2 , Sc3, the first signal strength, which is the received signal strength, and the second signal strength, which is the received signal strength of each of the measurement response signals Sk1, Sk2, Sk3, which are the respective response signals to the signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3, The signal strength is determined using Further, when the electronic key 2 transmits an ID code to the vehicle 1, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 divides the ID code into three signal intensity measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3, and each signal intensity measurement signal Si1, Si2 , Si3, the first signal strength, which is the received signal strength, and the second signal strength, which is the received signal strength of each of the measurement response signals Sk4, Sk5, Sk6, which are the response signals to the signal strength measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3, The signal strength is determined using Further, when the electronic key 2 transmits a response code to the vehicle 1, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 divides the response code into three signal strength measurement signals Sr1, Sr2, Sr3, and each signal strength measurement signal Sr1, Sr2 , Sr3, the first signal strength, which is the received signal strength, and the second signal strength, which is the received signal strength of each of the measurement response signals Sk7, Sk8, Sk9, which are the response signals for the signal strength measurement signals Sr1, Sr2, Sr3, The signal strength is determined using
　スマート通信を行うにあたり、照合ＥＣＵ１１は、ウェイク信号ＳｗｋをＬＦ帯の電波で定期的に送信する。電子キー２は、ウェイク信号Ｓｗｋを受信して起動すると、アック信号ＳａｃｋをＵＨＦ帯の電波で送信する。照合ＥＣＵ１１は、ウェイク信号Ｓｗｋを送信してから規定時間内にアック信号Ｓａｃｋを受信すると、電子キー２の正否を確認する照合通信を開始する。 In performing smart communication, the verification ECU 11 periodically transmits a wake signal Swk using an LF band radio wave. When the electronic key 2 is activated by receiving the wake signal Swk, the electronic key 2 transmits the ack signal Sack by radio waves in the UHF band. When the verification ECU 11 receives the ACK signal Sack within a specified time after transmitting the wake signal Swk, the verification ECU 11 starts verification communication for confirming whether the electronic key 2 is correct.
　照合ＥＣＵ１１は、照合通信としてチャレンジレスポンス認証を実行する。このとき、照合ＥＣＵ１１は、送信の度に値が毎回変化するチャレンジコード（乱数）を含むチャレンジ信号を電子キー２に送信する。電子キー２は、チャレンジ信号を受信すると、チャレンジコードを自身の暗号鍵に通すことにより、レスポンスコードを演算する。照合ＥＣＵ１１は、チャレンジ信号を電子キー２に送信するにあたり、自身も同様にレスポンスコードを演算する。これにより、照合ＥＣＵ１１は、電子キー２からレスポンスコードを受信したとき、このレスポンスコードの正否を確認することが可能である。 The verification ECU 11 executes challenge response authentication as verification communication. At this time, the verification ECU 11 transmits to the electronic key 2 a challenge signal including a challenge code (random number) whose value changes every time it is transmitted. Upon receiving the challenge signal, the electronic key 2 calculates a response code by passing the challenge code through its encryption key. When the verification ECU 11 transmits a challenge signal to the electronic key 2, it itself calculates a response code. Thereby, when the verification ECU 11 receives the response code from the electronic key 2, it is possible to confirm whether the response code is correct.
　また、照合ＥＣＵ１１は、チャレンジレスポンス認証とともに信号強度判定も実行する。このとき、照合ＥＣＵ１１は、チャレンジコードを分割して得られた信号強度測定信号Ｓｃ１，Ｓｃ２，Ｓｃ３を電波送受信機１８から電子キー２にＵＨＦ帯の電波で間欠的に送信する。電子キー２は、間欠的に受信した信号強度測定信号Ｓｃ１，Ｓｃ２，Ｓｃ３に対して測定応答信号Ｓｋ１，Ｓｋ２，Ｓｋ３をそれぞれ返信する。 Also, the verification ECU 11 performs signal strength determination together with challenge response authentication. At this time, the verification ECU 11 intermittently transmits the signal intensity measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3 obtained by dividing the challenge code from the radio wave transmitter / receiver 18 to the electronic key 2 by using radio waves in the UHF band. The electronic key 2 returns measurement response signals Sk1, Sk2, Sk3 to the signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3 received intermittently.
　続いて、電子キー２は、チャレンジコードを含む送信電波Ｓａとして受信した信号強度測定信号Ｓｃ１，Ｓｃ２，Ｓｃ３に対して測定応答信号Ｓｋ１，Ｓｋ２，Ｓｋ３をそれぞれ返信すると、この送信電波Ｓａに対する返信として、返信電波Ｓｂを分割して得られた複数の信号強度測定信号を送受信部２３から車両１にＵＨＦ帯の電波で間欠的に送信する。本例では、電子キー２は、ＩＤコードを含む返信電波Ｓｂを信号強度測定信号Ｓｉ１，Ｓｉ２，Ｓｉ３に分割して送信し、さらに、レスポンスコードを含む返信電波Ｓｂを信号強度測定信号Ｓｒ１，Ｓｒ２，Ｓｒ３に分割して送信する。 Subsequently, when the electronic key 2 returns the measurement response signals Sk1, Sk2, and Sk3 to the signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, and Sc3 received as the transmission radio wave Sa including the challenge code, the electronic key 2 returns the response to the transmission radio wave Sa. A plurality of signal intensity measurement signals obtained by dividing the return radio wave Sb are intermittently transmitted from the transmission / reception unit 23 to the vehicle 1 using UHF band radio waves. In this example, the electronic key 2 divides and transmits the return radio wave Sb including the ID code into the signal intensity measurement signals Si1, Si2, and Si3, and further transmits the return radio wave Sb including the response code to the signal intensity measurement signals Sr1 and Sr2. , Sr3 and transmitted.
　照合ＥＣＵ１１は、間欠的に受信する信号強度測定信号Ｓｉ１，Ｓｉ２，Ｓｉ３（分割されたＩＤコード）に対して測定応答信号Ｓｋ４，Ｓｋ５，Ｓｋ６をそれぞれ返信する。また、照合ＥＣＵ１１は、間欠的に受信する信号強度測定信号Ｓｒ１，Ｓｒ２，Ｓｒ３（分割されたレスポンスコード）に対して測定応答信号Ｓｋ７，Ｓｋ８，Ｓｋ９をそれぞれ返信する。 The verification ECU 11 returns measurement response signals Sk4, Sk5, Sk6 to the signal strength measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3 (divided ID codes) received intermittently. Further, the verification ECU 11 returns measurement response signals Sk7, Sk8, Sk9 to the signal strength measurement signals Sr1, Sr2, Sr3 (divided response codes) received intermittently.
　電子キー２及び照合ＥＣＵ１１は、チャレンジレスポンス認証に関連するチャレンジコード及びレスポンスコードと、ＩＤ照合に関連するＩＤコードとに加えて、９個の測定応答信号Ｓｋを追加するだけで信号強度判定を行う。信号強度判定は、チャレンジコードを分割した信号強度測定信号Ｓｃ１，Ｓｃ２，Ｓｃ３と、ＩＤコードを分割した信号強度測定信号Ｓｉ１，Ｓｉ２，Ｓｉ３と、レスポンスコードを分割した信号強度測定信号Ｓｒ１，Ｓｒ２，Ｓｒ３とのそれぞれについて行う。そして、照合ＥＣＵ１１は、各信号強度測定信号について第１信号強度と第２信号強度との差が所定範囲内に収まると、信号強度判定を成立とする。 The electronic key 2 and the verification ECU 11 determine the signal strength by simply adding nine measurement response signals Sk in addition to the challenge code and response code related to challenge response authentication and the ID code related to ID verification. . The signal strength determination includes signal strength measurement signals Sc1, Sc2, Sc3 obtained by dividing the challenge code, signal strength measurement signals Si1, Si2, Si3 obtained by dividing the ID code, and signal strength measurement signals Sr1, Sr2, obtained by dividing the response code. It carries out for each of Sr3. Then, when the difference between the first signal strength and the second signal strength falls within a predetermined range for each signal strength measurement signal, the verification ECU 11 establishes the signal strength determination.
　一方、いずれかの信号強度測定信号について信号強度判定が成立しないと、電子キーシステム３の通信を不成立として処理する。これにより、チャレンジレスポンス認証が強制終了される。すなわち、スマート通信が途中で強制終了され、例えば第三者が中継器を使用して不正に通信を成立させようとしても、これが不可にされる。 On the other hand, if the signal strength determination is not established for any of the signal strength measurement signals, the communication of the electronic key system 3 is processed as not established. Thereby, challenge response authentication is forcibly terminated. That is, smart communication is forcibly terminated midway, and for example, even if a third party tries to establish communication illegally using a repeater, this is disabled.
　照合ＥＣＵ１１は、チャレンジレスポンス認証が成立するとともに、キーＩＤの照合が成立することを確認すると、スマート照合を成立として処理する。これにより、照合ＥＣＵ１１は、車両１の操作を許可する。例えば、車両１のドアの施解錠の操作が許可又は実行されたり、車両１の電源の遷移操作（エンジン始動操作）が許可されたりする。 When the verification ECU 11 confirms that the challenge response authentication is established and the verification of the key ID is established, the verification ECU 11 processes the smart verification as established. As a result, the verification ECU 11 permits the operation of the vehicle 1. For example, an operation of locking / unlocking the door of the vehicle 1 is permitted or executed, or a power supply transition operation (engine start operation) of the vehicle 1 is permitted.
　ここで、図３に示す比較例と比較する。比較例は、照合通信を行う際に、チャレンジレスポンス認証を行った後に、信号強度判定の処理を別途行うものである。
　比較例の電子キーシステムでは、上記実施形態と同様に、車両がウェイク信号Ｓｗｋを送信してから規定時間内に電子キーからＵＨＦ帯の電波で送信されたアック信号Ｓａｃｋを受信すると、電子キーの正否を確認する照合通信を開始する。 Here, it compares with the comparative example shown in FIG. In the comparative example, when performing verification communication, after performing challenge response authentication, a signal strength determination process is separately performed.
In the electronic key system of the comparative example, when the vehicle receives the ACK signal Sack transmitted in the UHF band from the electronic key within a specified time after the vehicle transmits the wake signal Swk, the electronic key The verification communication for confirming correctness is started.
　車両は、照合通信として、まずチャレンジレスポンス認証を実行する。このとき、車両は、チャレンジコードを送信電波ＳａとしてＬＦ帯で電子キーに送信する。なお、チャレンジコードをＵＨＦ帯の電波で送信してもよい。電子キーは、チャレンジコードを受信すると、レスポンスコードを演算して、ＩＤコードを返信電波ＳｂとしてＵＨＦ帯で送信するとともに、レスポンスコードを返信電波ＳｂとしてＵＨＦ帯で送信する。車両は、電子キーからレスポンスコードを受信すると、このレスポンスコードの正否を確認することが可能である。 The vehicle first performs challenge response authentication as verification communication. At this time, the vehicle transmits the challenge code as a transmission radio wave Sa to the electronic key in the LF band. The challenge code may be transmitted using UHF band radio waves. When the electronic key receives the challenge code, it calculates a response code, transmits the ID code as a return radio wave Sb in the UHF band, and transmits the response code as a return radio wave Sb in the UHF band. When the vehicle receives the response code from the electronic key, the vehicle can confirm whether the response code is correct.
　続いて、車両は、チャレンジレスポンス認証を行った後に、信号強度判定を実行する。チャレンジコード、ＩＤコード、レスポンスコードを信号強度測定信号として使用しない比較例の場合には、信号強度を測定するために信号強度測定信号を車両及び電子キーの少なくとも一方から別途送信しなければならない。ここでは、車両から信号強度測定信号Ｓｘ１，Ｓｘ２，Ｓｘ３，Ｓｘ４，Ｓｘ５，…，Ｓｘｎを送信する。また、電子キーから信号強度測定信号Ｓｘ１，Ｓｘ２，Ｓｘ３，Ｓｘ４，Ｓｘ５，…，Ｓｘｎに対する応答信号である測定応答信号Ｓｙ１，Ｓｙ２，Ｓｙ３，Ｓｙ４，Ｓｙ５，…，Ｓｘｎを送信する。車両から送信される信号強度測定信号Ｓｘｎの数量ｎは、判定に必要な数だけ送信する。上記実施形態では、チャレンジコードを分割した３つの信号強度測定信号と、ＩＤコードを分割した３つの信号強度測定信号と、レスポンスコードを分割した３つの信号強度測定信号との計９個の信号強度測定信号を送信している。変形例において上記実施形態と同様に９個の信号強度測定信号を送信するとなると、変形例の方が上記実施形態よりも照合通信に掛かる時間が長くなる。すなわち、チャレンジレスポンス認証と信号強度判定とを同時に行う上記実施形態によれば、信号強度判定を別途行うものよりも照合通信に掛かる時間を短くすることが可能である。 Subsequently, the vehicle executes signal response determination after performing challenge response authentication. In the comparative example in which the challenge code, ID code, and response code are not used as the signal strength measurement signal, the signal strength measurement signal must be separately transmitted from at least one of the vehicle and the electronic key in order to measure the signal strength. Here, signal strength measurement signals Sx1, Sx2, Sx3, Sx4, Sx5,..., Sxn are transmitted from the vehicle. Further, measurement response signals Sy1, Sy2, Sy3, Sy4, Sy5,..., Sxn, which are response signals to the signal strength measurement signals Sx1, Sx2, Sx3, Sx4, Sx5,. The number n of signal strength measurement signals Sxn transmitted from the vehicle is transmitted as many as necessary for the determination. In the above embodiment, a total of nine signal intensities, including three signal strength measurement signals obtained by dividing the challenge code, three signal strength measurement signals obtained by dividing the ID code, and three signal strength measurement signals obtained by dividing the response code. A measurement signal is being transmitted. If nine signal strength measurement signals are transmitted in the modified example as in the above embodiment, the time required for verification communication in the modified example is longer than that in the above embodiment. That is, according to the above-described embodiment in which challenge response authentication and signal strength determination are performed simultaneously, it is possible to shorten the time required for verification communication as compared with the case where signal strength determination is separately performed.
　以上説明したように、本実施形態によれば、以下の効果を奏することができる。
　（１）照合ＥＣＵ１１及び電子キー２の間で同一周波数帯の電波で送受信される信号を複数の信号に分割して、各分割信号を信号強度測定信号として用いてその信号強度測定信号の受信信号強度（第１信号強度）を測定し、各信号強度測定信号の応答信号である測定応答信号Ｓｋの受信信号強度（第２信号強度）を測定する。そして、第１信号強度と第２信号強度とに基づいて無線通信の正否を判定する。このため、同一周波数帯の電波の受信信号強度を確認することが容易となり無線通信の正否を正確に判定することができるようになる。また、送信電波Ｓａ及び返信電波Ｓｂをそれぞれ分割して信号強度測定信号とすることで、受信信号強度を測定するために新たな信号強度測定信号が不要であり、測定応答信号の追加のみでよいため通信時間の増加を抑制することができる。 As described above, according to this embodiment, the following effects can be obtained.
(1) A signal transmitted and received in the same frequency band between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2 is divided into a plurality of signals, and each divided signal is used as a signal strength measurement signal, and the received signal of the signal strength measurement signal The strength (first signal strength) is measured, and the received signal strength (second signal strength) of the measurement response signal Sk that is a response signal of each signal strength measurement signal is measured. Then, whether wireless communication is right or wrong is determined based on the first signal strength and the second signal strength. For this reason, it is easy to confirm the received signal strength of radio waves in the same frequency band, and it is possible to accurately determine whether radio communication is correct or not. Further, by dividing the transmission radio wave Sa and the return radio wave Sb into signal intensity measurement signals, a new signal intensity measurement signal is not required to measure the reception signal intensity, and only a measurement response signal needs to be added. Therefore, increase in communication time can be suppressed.
　（２）複数の信号強度に基づいて無線通信の正否を判定するため、不正通信が行われているか否かを精度よく判定することが可能となる。
　（３）ＩＤ照合によりキーＩＤの正当性を確認し且つ信号強度判定により無線通信の正当性を確認した場合に、無線通信が不正なく行われていると判断する。このため、照合ＥＣＵ１１及び電子キー２の無線通信の正否を精度よく判定することが可能となる。 (2) Since whether or not wireless communication is correct is determined based on a plurality of signal strengths, it is possible to accurately determine whether or not unauthorized communication is being performed.
(3) When the validity of the key ID is confirmed by the ID verification and the validity of the wireless communication is confirmed by the signal strength determination, it is determined that the wireless communication is performed without fraud. Therefore, it is possible to accurately determine whether wireless communication between the verification ECU 11 and the electronic key 2 is correct.
　（４）チャレンジレスポンス認証を行いながら受信信号強度による判定を行うことが可能となるため、通信に要する時間を短くするのに有利である。
　（５）ＩＤ照合のＩＤコードを受信しながら受信信号強度による判定を行うことが可能となるため、通信に掛かる時間を短くするのに有利である。 (4) Since it is possible to perform determination based on the received signal strength while performing challenge response authentication, it is advantageous for shortening the time required for communication.
(5) Since it is possible to make a determination based on the received signal strength while receiving an ID code for ID verification, it is advantageous for shortening the time required for communication.
　なお、上記実施形態は、これを適宜変更した以下の形態にて実施することもできる。
　・上記実施形態において、チャレンジコードとＩＤコードとレスポンスコードの各々を分割する個数は３個に限らず、任意に設定可能である。また、チャレンジコードとＩＤコードとレスポンスコードの各々を分割する個数は同一であっても異なってもよい。 In addition, the said embodiment can also be implemented with the following forms which changed this suitably.
In the above embodiment, the number of division of the challenge code, ID code, and response code is not limited to three, and can be arbitrarily set. Further, the number of divisions of the challenge code, the ID code, and the response code may be the same or different.
　・上記実施形態では、チャレンジコードを分割して得た複数の信号の全てを信号強度測定信号としたが、チャレンジコードを分割して得た複数の信号の少なくとも１つを信号強度測定信号としてもよい。 In the above embodiment, all of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the challenge code are signal strength measurement signals, but at least one of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the challenge code may be used as the signal strength measurement signal. Good.
　・上記実施形態では、ＩＤコードを分割して得た複数の信号の全てを信号強度測定信号としたが、ＩＤコードを分割して得た複数の信号の少なくとも１つを信号強度測定信号としてもよい。 In the above embodiment, all of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the ID code are signal strength measurement signals, but at least one of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the ID code may be used as the signal strength measurement signal. Good.
　・上記実施形態では、レスポンスコードを分割して得た複数の信号の全てを信号強度測定信号としたが、レスポンスコードを分割して得た複数の信号の少なくとも１つを信号強度測定信号としてもよい。 In the above embodiment, all of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the response code are signal strength measurement signals. However, at least one of the plurality of signals obtained by dividing the response code may be used as the signal strength measurement signal. Good.
　・上記実施形態において、電子キー２からＩＤコードの次にレスポンスコードを送信したが、電子キー２からレスポンスコードの次にＩＤコードを送信するようにしてもよい。
　・上記実施形態において、チャレンジコードとＩＤコードとレスポンスコードの各々を分割したが、チャレンジコードのみを分割してもよい。すなわち、ＩＤコードとレスポンスコードとは分割せずともよい。この場合、電子キー２から信号強度測定信号の送信がなく、車両１から測定応答信号の返信もない。このようにすれば、電子キー２に第２分割部３２を設けなくてもよい。 In the above embodiment, the response code is transmitted from the electronic key 2 next to the ID code. However, the ID code may be transmitted from the electronic key 2 next to the response code.
In the above embodiment, each of the challenge code, ID code, and response code is divided, but only the challenge code may be divided. That is, the ID code and the response code may not be divided. In this case, no signal strength measurement signal is transmitted from the electronic key 2 and no measurement response signal is returned from the vehicle 1. In this way, it is not necessary to provide the second division unit 32 in the electronic key 2.
　・上記実施形態において、チャレンジコードとＩＤコードとレスポンスコードの各々を分割したが、ＩＤコードのみを分割してもよい。すなわち、チャレンジコードとレスポンスコードとは分割せずともよい。この場合、車両１から信号強度測定信号の送信がなく、電子キー２から測定応答信号の返信もない。このようにすれば、車両１に第１分割部３１を設けなくてもよい。 In the above embodiment, each of the challenge code, ID code, and response code is divided, but only the ID code may be divided. That is, the challenge code and the response code may not be divided. In this case, no signal strength measurement signal is transmitted from the vehicle 1, and no measurement response signal is returned from the electronic key 2. In this way, the vehicle 1 need not be provided with the first division unit 31.
　・上記実施形態において、チャレンジコードとＩＤコードとレスポンスコードの各々を分割したが、レスポンスコードのみを分割してもよい。すなわち、チャレンジコードとＩＤコードとは分割せずともよい。この場合、車両１から信号強度測定信号の送信がなく、電子キー２から測定応答信号の返信もない。このようにすれば、車両１に第１分割部３１を設けなくてもよい。 In the above embodiment, each of the challenge code, ID code, and response code is divided, but only the response code may be divided. That is, the challenge code and the ID code may not be divided. In this case, no signal strength measurement signal is transmitted from the vehicle 1, and no measurement response signal is returned from the electronic key 2. In this way, the vehicle 1 need not be provided with the first division unit 31.
　・上記実施形態において、第１分割部３１による分割の個数及び第２分割部３２による分割の個数は、予め規定した個数であってもよいし、分割の個数を適宜変更してもよい。
　・上記実施形態では、信号強度測定信号の第１信号強度と測定応答信号の第２信号強度とを比較して信号強度差が所定範囲以内に収まるか否かで信号強度判定を行った。しかしながら、信号強度測定信号の第１信号強度と測定応答信号の第２信号強度との相関を確認することで信号強度判定を行ってもよい。 In the above embodiment, the number of divisions by the first division unit 31 and the number of divisions by the second division unit 32 may be predetermined numbers, or may be changed as appropriate.
In the above embodiment, the first signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal and the second signal strength of the measurement response signal are compared to determine whether the signal strength difference is within a predetermined range. However, the signal strength may be determined by confirming the correlation between the first signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal and the second signal strength of the measurement response signal.
　・上記実施形態では、正否判定部３５が複数の信号強度測定信号の第１信号強度と複数の測定応答信号の第２信号強度とに基づいて無線通信の正否を判定した。しかしながら、１つの信号強度測定信号の第１信号強度と１つの測定応答信号の第２信号強度とに基づいて無線通信の正否を判定してもよい。 In the above embodiment, the correctness determination unit 35 determines the correctness of wireless communication based on the first signal strength of the plurality of signal strength measurement signals and the second signal strength of the plurality of measurement response signals. However, whether the wireless communication is correct or not may be determined based on the first signal strength of one signal strength measurement signal and the second signal strength of one measurement response signal.
　・上記実施形態において、電子キー２から送信電波Ｓａを送信して、照合ＥＣＵ１１から返信電波Ｓｂを送信するようにしてもよい。
　・上記実施形態において、正否判定部３５は、照合ＥＣＵ１１及び電子キー２のどちらかに設けられていればよい。この場合、正否判定部３５が設けられた方に受信信号強度を送信する必要がある。 In the above embodiment, the transmission radio wave Sa may be transmitted from the electronic key 2 and the reply radio wave Sb may be transmitted from the verification ECU 11.
In the above embodiment, the correctness determination unit 35 may be provided in either the verification ECU 11 or the electronic key 2. In this case, it is necessary to transmit the received signal strength to the side where the correctness determination unit 35 is provided.
　・上記実施形態において、電子キーシステム３は、スマート通信を行うシステムに限定されず、他の通信形式や他の周波数帯を用いたシステムとしてもよい。
　・上記実施形態において、照合ＥＣＵ１１を通信マスタとしたが、照合ＥＣＵ１１に限定されず、他の装置や機器に変更可能である。 -In above-mentioned embodiment, the electronic key system 3 is not limited to the system which performs smart communication, It is good also as a system using another communication format or another frequency band.
-In above-mentioned embodiment, although collation ECU11 was made into the communication master, it is not limited to collation ECU11, It can change into another apparatus and apparatus.
　・上記実施形態において、電子キー２を端末としたが、電子キー２に限らず、種々の端末が採用可能である。
　・上記実施形態において、通信不正成立防止システム３０は、車両１に適用されることに限らず、他の装置や機器に採用してもよい。 In the above embodiment, the electronic key 2 is a terminal. However, the terminal is not limited to the electronic key 2, and various terminals can be used.
In the above-described embodiment, the communication fraud establishment prevention system 30 is not limited to being applied to the vehicle 1 and may be employed in other devices and devices.
　・上記実施形態において、通信不正成立防止システム３０は、半二重方式に限らず、全二重方式により通信を行ってもよい。 In the above embodiment, the unauthorized communication establishment prevention system 30 is not limited to the half-duplex method, and may perform communication using the full-duplex method.

Claims (7)

  1. 　通信マスタと端末との間で同一周波数帯の電波で無線通信を行い、当該無線通信の正否を判定する通信不正成立防止システムであって、
    　前記無線通信において、前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか一方が送信電波を送信し、前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか他方が前記送信電波に対する返信電波を送信し、
    　前記送信電波及び前記返信電波の少なくとも一方を複数の分割信号に分割する分割部と、
    　前記複数の分割信号の少なくとも一つを信号強度測定信号として送信する第１送信部と、
    　前記信号強度測定信号に対する応答信号である測定応答信号を送信する第２送信部と、
    　前記信号強度測定信号の受信信号強度である第１信号強度を測定する第１測定部と、
    　前記測定応答信号の受信信号強度である第２信号強度を測定する第２測定部と、
    　前記第１信号強度と前記第２信号強度とに基づいて無線通信の正否を判定する正否判定部と、を備える
    　通信不正成立防止システム。     A communication fraud prevention system that performs wireless communication with radio waves in the same frequency band between a communication master and a terminal, and determines whether the wireless communication is correct or not,
    In the wireless communication, one of the communication master and the terminal transmits a transmission radio wave, and the other of the communication master and the terminal transmits a reply radio wave to the transmission radio wave,
    A division unit that divides at least one of the transmission radio wave and the return radio wave into a plurality of division signals;
    A first transmitter that transmits at least one of the plurality of divided signals as a signal strength measurement signal;
    A second transmitter that transmits a measurement response signal that is a response signal to the signal strength measurement signal;
    A first measurement unit that measures a first signal strength that is a received signal strength of the signal strength measurement signal;
    A second measuring unit for measuring a second signal strength that is a received signal strength of the measurement response signal;
    A communication fraud establishment prevention system comprising: a correctness determination unit that determines whether wireless communication is correct or not based on the first signal strength and the second signal strength.
  2. 　前記通信マスタ及び前記端末の間で前記信号強度測定信号と前記測定応答信号との送受信は、複数回実行され、
    　前記正否判定部は、複数回測定された前記第１信号強度と前記第２信号強度とに基づいて無線通信の正否を判定する
    　請求項１に記載の通信不正成立防止システム。     Transmission / reception of the signal strength measurement signal and the measurement response signal between the communication master and the terminal is executed a plurality of times,
    The communication fraud establishment prevention system according to claim 1, wherein the correctness determination unit determines whether wireless communication is correct or not based on the first signal strength and the second signal strength measured a plurality of times.
  3. 　前記分割部と前記第１送信部と前記第２測定部と前記正否判定部とが前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか一方に設けられ、
    　前記第１測定部と前記第２送信部とが前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか他方に設けられるとき、
    　前記第２送信部は、前記第１測定部が測定した前記第１信号強度を、前記測定応答信号に含めて送信する
    　請求項１又は２に記載の通信不正成立防止システム。     The division unit, the first transmission unit, the second measurement unit, and the correctness determination unit are provided in any one of the communication master and the terminal,
    When the first measurement unit and the second transmission unit are provided on the other of the communication master and the terminal,
    The communication improper establishment prevention system according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the second transmission unit transmits the first signal intensity measured by the first measurement unit by including the first response strength in the measurement response signal.
  4. 　前記分割部と前記第１送信部と前記第２測定部とが前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか一方に設けられ、
    　前記第１測定部と前記第２送信部と前記正否判定部とが前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか他方に設けられるとき、
    　前記第１送信部は、前記第２測定部が測定した前記第２信号強度を、前記信号強度測定信号に含めて送信する
    　請求項１又は２に記載の通信不正成立防止システム。     The division unit, the first transmission unit, and the second measurement unit are provided in one of the communication master and the terminal,
    When the first measurement unit, the second transmission unit, and the correctness determination unit are provided on the other of the communication master and the terminal,
    The communication improper establishment prevention system according to claim 1, wherein the first transmission unit transmits the second signal strength measured by the second measurement unit by including the second signal strength in the signal strength measurement signal.
  5. 　前記通信マスタは、前記端末に登録されたＩＤの正否を確認するＩＤ照合と、前記第１信号強度と前記第２信号強度とに基づいて無線通信の正否を判定する信号強度判定とを行い、前記ＩＤ照合により前記ＩＤの正当性を確認し且つ前記信号強度判定により前記無線通信の正当性を確認した場合に、前記無線通信が不正なく行われていると判断する
    　請求項１～４のいずれか一項に記載の通信不正成立防止システム。     The communication master performs ID verification for confirming whether the ID registered in the terminal is correct, and signal strength determination for determining whether wireless communication is correct based on the first signal strength and the second signal strength. The wireless communication is determined to be performed without fraud when the validity of the ID is confirmed by the ID verification and the validity of the wireless communication is confirmed by the signal strength determination. The communication fraud prevention system according to claim 1.
  6. 　前記無線通信時に行われるＩＤ照合は、チャレンジコードを暗号鍵に通してレスポンスコードを求める演算を前記通信マスタ及び前記端末の各々で行い、前記通信マスタで求められたレスポンスコードと前記端末で求められたレスポンスコードとを比較するチャレンジレスポンス認証を含み、
    　前記分割部は、前記チャレンジコード及び前記レスポンスコードの少なくとも一方を、それぞれ前記信号強度測定信号として用いる前記複数の分割信号に分割する
    　請求項１～５のいずれか一項に記載の通信不正成立防止システム。     The ID verification performed at the time of the wireless communication is performed by each of the communication master and the terminal performing an operation for obtaining a response code by passing a challenge code through an encryption key, and the response code determined by the communication master and the terminal. Including challenge response authentication that compares the response code
    The communication fraud prevention according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the dividing unit divides at least one of the challenge code and the response code into the plurality of divided signals respectively used as the signal strength measurement signal. system.
  7. 　前記無線通信時に行われるＩＤ照合は、前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか一方がＩＤコードを送信し、前記通信マスタ及び前記端末のいずれか他方が受信した前記ＩＤコードを照合し、
    　前記分割部は、前記ＩＤコードを、それぞれ前記信号強度測定信号として用いる前記複数の分割信号に分割する
    　請求項１～６のいずれか一項に記載の通信不正成立防止システム。     The ID verification performed at the time of the wireless communication is performed by either the communication master or the terminal transmitting an ID code, and verifying the ID code received by the other of the communication master or the terminal,
    The communication fraud establishment preventing system according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein the division unit divides the ID code into the plurality of divided signals respectively used as the signal strength measurement signals.
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