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WO1994019770A1 - Instrument d'identification personnelle protege et son procede de production - Google Patents

Instrument d'identification personnelle protege et son procede de production Download PDF

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Publication number
WO1994019770A1
WO1994019770A1 PCT/CA1994/000084 CA9400084W WO9419770A1 WO 1994019770 A1 WO1994019770 A1 WO 1994019770A1 CA 9400084 W CA9400084 W CA 9400084W WO 9419770 A1 WO9419770 A1 WO 9419770A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
instrument
data
personal
code
encrypted
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CA1994/000084
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Sherman M. Chow
Nur M. Serinken
Seymour Shlien
Original Assignee
Her Majesty In Right Of Canada, As Represented By The Minister Of Communications
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Her Majesty In Right Of Canada, As Represented By The Minister Of Communications filed Critical Her Majesty In Right Of Canada, As Represented By The Minister Of Communications
Priority to AU60349/94A priority Critical patent/AU6034994A/en
Priority to DE4490836T priority patent/DE4490836T1/de
Priority to GB9516080A priority patent/GB2289965B/en
Publication of WO1994019770A1 publication Critical patent/WO1994019770A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/06009—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking
    • G06K19/06037—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking multi-dimensional coding
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B42—BOOKBINDING; ALBUMS; FILES; SPECIAL PRINTED MATTER
    • B42D—BOOKS; BOOK COVERS; LOOSE LEAVES; PRINTED MATTER CHARACTERISED BY IDENTIFICATION OR SECURITY FEATURES; PRINTED MATTER OF SPECIAL FORMAT OR STYLE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; DEVICES FOR USE THEREWITH AND NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; MOVABLE-STRIP WRITING OR READING APPARATUS
    • B42D25/00—Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof
    • B42D25/20—Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof characterised by a particular use or purpose
    • B42D25/23—Identity cards
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B42—BOOKBINDING; ALBUMS; FILES; SPECIAL PRINTED MATTER
    • B42D—BOOKS; BOOK COVERS; LOOSE LEAVES; PRINTED MATTER CHARACTERISED BY IDENTIFICATION OR SECURITY FEATURES; PRINTED MATTER OF SPECIAL FORMAT OR STYLE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; DEVICES FOR USE THEREWITH AND NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; MOVABLE-STRIP WRITING OR READING APPARATUS
    • B42D25/00—Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof
    • B42D25/30—Identification or security features, e.g. for preventing forgery
    • B42D25/309—Photographs
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B42—BOOKBINDING; ALBUMS; FILES; SPECIAL PRINTED MATTER
    • B42D—BOOKS; BOOK COVERS; LOOSE LEAVES; PRINTED MATTER CHARACTERISED BY IDENTIFICATION OR SECURITY FEATURES; PRINTED MATTER OF SPECIAL FORMAT OR STYLE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; DEVICES FOR USE THEREWITH AND NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; MOVABLE-STRIP WRITING OR READING APPARATUS
    • B42D25/00—Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof
    • B42D25/30—Identification or security features, e.g. for preventing forgery
    • B42D25/318—Signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/08—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means
    • G06K19/10—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means at least one kind of marking being used for authentication, e.g. of credit or identity cards
    • G06K19/14—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means at least one kind of marking being used for authentication, e.g. of credit or identity cards the marking being sensed by radiation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/347—Passive cards
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
    • G07C9/25—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
    • G07C9/257—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition electronically
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/12—Card verification
    • G07F7/125—Offline card verification

Definitions

  • FIELD OF THE INVENTION This invention relates to personal identification instruments and in particular to an instrument and method of creating such an instrument which has a high degree of security from fraud.
  • BACKGROUND TO THE INVENTION Personal identity instruments are widely used in society, e.g. passports, credit cards, driver's licences, building passes, etc. Such instruments are very valuable, and therefore are often illegally fabricated or stolen and altered so that they can be used fraudulently by another person. Such an instrument ideally should be useless in the hands of another person.
  • U.S. Patent 5,027,113 describes a process and apparatus for making a personal identification instrument which is subject to machine verification.
  • An instrument according to that patent is first made carrying e.g. indicia and/or a photograph, and deviations from a standard of the outlines of at least some of the indicia (on a magnified scale) are stored in a memory.
  • a machine reads the exact outline of corresponding indicia. Since paper fibers, ink bleeds, etc. result in a different outline than the original, the machine comparing the deviation data with the originally stored outline deviation data can result in the declaration of a fraudulent instrument.
  • the entire photograph is read by a camera.
  • the variation of the distribution of grey levels in the image scanned by the camera, as compared with stored data describing the variation of the distribution of grey levels, stored from the original authentic photograph, can result in detection of a fraudulent instrument.
  • the present invention provides a means for realizing a personal identification instrument which has extremely high security, and is virtually immune to falsification. There is no need for storage of massive amounts of any data at any central location nor of transmission of any data; all of the verification data is carried on the instrument itself. Each verification station need only contain a processor capable of processing an algorithm and a scanner for scanning the instrument and reading data from the instrument into the processor.
  • a personal identification instrument is comprised of a substrate, and carried on the substrate are a photograph and/or a personal signature, personal information relating to the legitimate holder of the instrument, and an encrypted machine readable security code carried by the instrument, the code being comprised of a combination of digitized personal information and a digitized descriptor of the photograph and/or personal signature.
  • a method of creating a personal identification instrument on which personal data and a picture and/or signature of a legitimate holder are retained is comprised of acquiring a first digital representation of the picture and/or signature of a legitimate holder of said instrument, extracting first feature data from the digital representation, reading the personal data, combining the feature data with the personal data into a single data sequence and generating a security code by encrypting the sequence with a secret key, and affixing the security code to the instrument to provide a substantially forgery-proof instrument.
  • Figure 1 is an apparatus that can be used to read a personal identification instrument
  • Figure 2 illustrates a face of an instrument in accordance with a first embodiment
  • Figure 3 illustrates a face of an instrument in accordance with a second embodiment
  • Figure 4 illustrates a face of an instrument in accordance with a third embodiment
  • Figure 5 illustrates a face of an instrument in accordance with a fourth embodiment
  • Figure 6 illustrates an imprinted carrier on which is imprinted an encoded matrix in accordance with another embodiment of the invention.
  • a personal identification instrument is divided into three areas: area 1 which contains biographical data of the legitimate holder of the instrument, area 2 which contains either or both of a picture and signature of the legitimate holder of the instrument, and area 3 which contains authentication information.
  • areas 1, 2 and 3 do not have any significance in the present invention. They can be arranged in a book form or in a one or two- sided card form, depending on the requirements of the application.
  • the biographical data in area 1 should be in a human readable form, that can be electro-optically read by validation equipment at the authentication station.
  • the subject matter in areas 2 and 3 can be in human readable form but should be in machine readable form.
  • Modern encryption algorithms such as symmetric or asymmetric key systems can provide means for protecting the data stored in area 3. Even though such algorithms become public domain, it is extremely difficult for someone to decode the data without knowing the secret key used in the encryption. Millions of years of computer time have been estimated to be required to break some of the encoding schemes. The particular encoding scheme used is not particular to this invention, so long as it is encrypted.
  • the encoded information is dependent on the photograph and other information on the instrument, it is extremely difficult to alter the information or photograph on the instrument without escaping detection, even though the method of validating the instrument may be known to the public. For example, it would be next to impossible for a person to generate a new encrypted code for the instrument based on modified information on the instrument without knowing the secret key used by the encryption scheme.
  • the number of bits contributed by area 2 to area 3 in accordance with one embodiment of this invention is in the order of 100 bits.
  • the contribution from area 1 to area 3 can be from a few bits to thousands of bits. If the information output of the biographical area is too large to fit into the bit space allocated in the authentication area, the information can be passed through a one way cryptographic hash function to limit this contribution to allocated bit space.
  • the tamper proof instrument can be copied or transmitted; if the copies are of high quality (reproduction of colour, resolution, dimensions, brightness, contrast, etc.), then the copies will have the same attributes as the original. Copies can be authenticated since no alterations will have been made on them. Indeed, the whole document can become image area 2, and there may be no contribution from area 1; or vice versa, full contribution from area 1 and no area 2, area 3 will constitute the descriptor of the whole document. As one example, area 3 can contain 640 bits.
  • the information stored in area 3 is in the form of a two-dimensional, high density, bar code
  • 640 bits can be stored in an area occupied by a postage stamp. This can be divided to store 128 bits of the image (area 2) and 496 bits from the biographical data (area 1) plus 16 bits of error protection.
  • Figure 1 illustrates in block diagram a typical system which can be used to encode or authenticate the instrument.
  • the instrument 5 can be placed on a table 7 which is moved in the directions of the arrow by means of motor driven rollers 9 or pulled by hand. As the table moves to the right, it carries the instrument 5 under scanner 11. The sampled image data is passed into processor 13 , to which a display 15 is connected.
  • a flat bed scanner such as Hewlett Packard Model lie Scanjet can be used.
  • Such a scanner produces a grey level black and white image of the picture to a resolution to 150 dots per inch, which has been found to be adequate for most applications.
  • the present invention is intended to include all possible means of acquiring the data, including colour data.
  • the processor executes algorithms, such as described below, to extract data from the photograph. It may be necessary, for some applications to include algorithms to find the location of the picture due to placement inaccuracies.
  • the algorithm extracting the information from the picture is preferred to extract global features from the picture, i.e. not local to any specific position in the picture but which depend on its overall characteristics. These features make very little assumptions regarding the contents of the image, so that they will still work if the image does not contain a face. However the algorithm is preferably optimized for the more usual situation where the photograph does contain a face. About 10 features are preferred to be extracted, which are encoded as small numbers. Concatenating the bits of these features produces a 50 to 128 bit number which is associated with the photograph. The features are preferably computed by taking weighted averages. As the weighting functions are highly non-linear, it is very difficult to create an image which would have the same averages and yet the image contain a face or signature of a specific person.
  • the next step in the process is to input other personal information for area 1, such as the age, height, colour of eyes, birth date, birth place, etc. of the authentic holder of the instrument.
  • This is preferably read from an imprint already on the card, although instead it could be input on a keyboard.
  • the information should describe unalterable properties of the person.
  • the validation machine could display this information to the validation station user ' if a one-way hash function is not used.
  • the image is applied to the document by direct recording or by attachment of image material to the instrument.
  • the image that is part of the instrument in area 2 is recorded in human visible form and is acquired by the electro-optical means (e.g. by the scanner) from the instrument.
  • the combination of the personal information and a digitized descriptor of the photograph and/or personal information forms a code, which after encrypting using a secret key is recorded in area 3 on the instrument in any reliable machine readable form, for example any of the forms shown in Figures 2-5.
  • the encryption algorithm used in processor 13 can use either private or public key encryption techniques. These techniques are well known in literature; an example of each is Data Encryption Standard (DES) for private key and Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) algorithm for public key techniques.
  • DES Data Encryption Standard
  • RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
  • the resulting personal identification instrument is as shown in Figures 2-5.
  • a system such as that shown in Figure 1 can be used.
  • the instrument 5 is placed on table 7 and is passed under scanner 11.
  • the biographical information is acquired from the recorded area 1 of the document, and is converted into binary format in processor 13 as was done in the document creation process and is saved in a local memory.
  • the image in area 2 of the instrument is acquired in a similar manner, and is processed by the image processing algorithm, to extract image descriptors. It is preferred that this is done by calculating weighted averages, as will be described below.
  • the image descriptors are also saved in a local memory.
  • the information stored in area 3 is read and is decrypted using the secret decryption key.
  • the binary vector resulting from the decryption is separated into two parts.
  • the part containing the biographical data is compared to the biographical data that was read from the area 1 of the instrument, and if there is any discrepancy between the two sets of biographical data streams, the document is declared as a fake. If the biographical data test is positive, then a distance measure is applied between the image descriptor that is generated at the authentication stage, and the decrypted image descriptor from the information stored in area 3. If the distance measure is greater than a predetermined limit, the document is declared as a counterfeit.
  • the aforenoted one-way hash function (which is also known as a message digest algorithm or manipulation detection code) , is a message of variable length and provides a fixed length code. It appears to be computationally infeasible to find two different messages with the same output code, if this code is larger than 64 bits. With this property, if the input is altered in any way, it will be detected by a mismatch of the output code generated.
  • the detection process in the authentication station is required only to detect the presence of the manipulation, but not the location or magnitude or of the manipulation.
  • the present invention dispenses with verification of the entire photograph, and instead utilizes selected features. Different features differ in the amount of sensitivity (for distinguishing nearly similar pictures) and robustness to environmental changes that can occur due to the changes in the photograph or scanner.
  • Photographs in passports are in many cases black and white.
  • Black and white pictures provide more definition and are more robust to environment changes. It is preferred in the present invention, to convert all scanned pictures to black and white. The conversion of colour photographs to black and white often results in loss of contrast.
  • the feature extraction technique used in the present invention should be robust enough to handle this loss in contrast.
  • the image should be acquired by electro- optical means.
  • the resolution of the scanned image should be reduced to about 100 dots per inch if it were digitized at a higher resolution. If the digitized picture is in colour, the luminance component should be extracted and the hue and saturation components discarded.
  • the area of the digitized document where the photograph is located should be determined.
  • the picture could always be located in one place, to a high tolerance, or the position could be located automatically, either from datum points or from an analysis algorithm.
  • the digitized image should then be converted from as many grey levels as the equipment provides
  • the weighted averages of the dark component in the multi-tone average should then be computed.
  • the weighted averages of the light component in the multi-tone image should then be computed.
  • the averages should then be encoded into a number with a fixed number of bits.
  • One way of digitizing the picture is to represent it as a two-dimensional array of numbers or pixels where the dimensions of the array depend on the size of the picture.
  • P(i,j) denote the value of that pixel located at the i-th row and j-th column of this array.
  • the dimensions of the array were 64 by 64, which was achieved by a suitable selection for scanning parameters and by cropping the edges of the picture.
  • Each pixel element took a value between 0 and 255 where low values denoted a dark pixel and high values denoted a bright pixel.
  • each pixel in the array P(i,j) was assigned a new value, either 0, 1 or 2 depending upon the original value of that pixel.
  • the 0 value was assigned to all dark pixels whose original intensity level lay within a range of 0 to THR1 inclusive where THR1 is some threshold value selected.
  • the 2 value was assigned to all bright pixels whose intensity level lay between THR2 and 255 inclusive where THR2 is a higher threshold.
  • the 1 value was assigned to all the remaining pixels.
  • THR1 and THR2 The choice of these thresholds THR1 and THR2 depends upon the specific image and the manner in it was scanned. As some pictures are over or under exposed (or faded) , it was necessary to make some allowance. It may be necessary to compensate for different scanning hardware which may be calibrated differently, in other systems.
  • the thresholds were chosen so that one third of the pixel elements in the picture were assigned to each of the three categories 0, 1 and 2. This was accomplished by computing a histogram of the pixel values in the digitized picture P(i,j) and by finding the levels which divided the distribution into approximately 3 equal parts.
  • the spatial distribution of all the pixels assigned to the zero category was analyzed. For example one can compute the mean, variance and correlation of the i and j-th spatial coordinates of all the pixels assigned to this category. (Recall that i and j address the row and column number of the pixels in the digitized picture.)
  • the parameters that were used were the weighted averages of the i-th coordinate, the j-th coordinate and the product of the i-th and j- th coordinates. Two different weighting functions were used to obtain 6 averages - three for each weighting function.
  • the weighting functions serve two purposes.
  • the first weighting function gives the pixels located in the central part of the picture more weight.
  • the face is usually centered in the picture and it is the component of the picture which is most difficult to modify without escaping detection.
  • the weighting function also serves the purpose of making it more difficult for someone to tamper with the image in order to get a specific set of six spatial parameters.
  • the weighting functions were based on the harmonic functions sine and cosine.
  • the first weighting function represents the first half of the sine wave (from zero to 180 degrees) .
  • the second weight function represents the full sine wave from zero to 360 degrees. Hence the second weighting function is non-symmetric across the image and contains negative weights.
  • To compute the weights the i-th and j-th coordinates were converted to two angles by dividing them by 64 (the weight of the picture) and then multiplying them by 180 or 360.
  • the averages of the i-th and j-th coordinates must lie in a fixed range (-64 to +64) . In actual practice it was found that they lie in a smaller range.
  • the average of the i*j-th product is divided by 20 to confine them to a smaller workable range. In fact, each of these parameters can be encoded in a single 8 bit byte. There are 12 parameters, so 96 bits were used to encode the characteristics of the image.
  • the fixed number which is a digitized descriptor of the photograph (and/or personal signature if used)
  • the digitized personal information or code resulting from the hash function processed personal information is encrypted and is fixed to the card in area 3 in e.g. one of the forms shown in Figures 2-5.
  • the square Euclidean distance is computed between the decoded information obtained from area 3 and the image descriptor generated from the digitized image of area 2 of the personal identification instrument, which has been read by the authentication system.
  • the square Euclidean distance is then compared with a threshold limit, in order to provide an accept or reject indication of the instrument as being genuine or fake, e.g. as on display 15 or by other means.
  • the security code can contain combined data from areas l and 2 of the instrument into the security code or from either. Indeed, the instrument can carry only area 1 or 2 data, and the area 2 data can be comprised of the image descriptors of the whole instrument, whatever imprint is carried thereon.
  • a personal identification instrument in which a photo of the legitimate holder is incorporated with biographical data into an encoded, encrypted file.
  • the image is first digitized and compressed into a file which can reproduce a recognizable likeness in about 900 bytes of data.
  • the biographical data is appended to the image forming a file of about 1000 bytes. Error correction bits are added producing a file of about 1400 bytes.
  • the file is encrypted using the secret key of a public key encryption scheme in which the key used is about 600 bits.
  • the encrypted data is printed on a carrier 19 as a matrix 20 of black and white rectangles, using a laser printer, representing the binary number, as shown in Figure 6.
  • the 1400 bytes of data, and thus the printed area, can occupy an area of about 6 to 8 square inches. No photograph is printed on the carrier, nor biographical data although it may be desired to imprint the owner's name in some circumstances.
  • a verification station is used.
  • the verification station is comprised of a scanner connected to a desk top computer.
  • the matrix 20 is first scanned into the computer and converted to a binary number.
  • an error correction procedure is applied to remove scanning errors. This process will overcome disfigurement of the matrix due to usage (e.g. discoloration due to handling, pencil marks and staple holes) .
  • the error corrected file now is comprised of about 1000 bytes, which is then decrypted using the public key.
  • the information after decryption is displayed on the monitor of the computer.
  • the displayed likeness of the legitimate holder and the displayed biographical data can be used to check against the person to ensure authenticity. Forgery and tampering with the photo or the data contained in the matrix is not possible unless the secret key is

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  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Human Computer Interaction (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Collating Specific Patterns (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Un instrument d'identification personnelle comprend un substrat et, sur le substrat: une photographie et/ou une signature personnelle, des données personnelles se rapportant au détenteur légitime de l'instrument, ainsi qu'un code de sécurité chiffré lisible par machine et porté par l'instrument, ce code étant composé d'une combinaison d'informations personnelles numérisées ainsi que d'un descripteur numérisé de la photographie et/ou de la signature personnelle.
PCT/CA1994/000084 1993-02-19 1994-02-17 Instrument d'identification personnelle protege et son procede de production WO1994019770A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU60349/94A AU6034994A (en) 1993-02-19 1994-02-17 Secure personal identification instrument and method for creating same
DE4490836T DE4490836T1 (de) 1993-02-19 1994-02-17 Sicheres Personen-Identifizierungsinstrument sowie Verfahren zu seiner Herstellung
GB9516080A GB2289965B (en) 1993-02-19 1994-02-17 Secure personal identification instrument and method for creating same

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US1958993A 1993-02-19 1993-02-19
US019,589 1993-02-19

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO1994019770A1 true WO1994019770A1 (fr) 1994-09-01

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Family Applications (1)

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PCT/CA1994/000084 WO1994019770A1 (fr) 1993-02-19 1994-02-17 Instrument d'identification personnelle protege et son procede de production

Country Status (5)

Country Link
AU (1) AU6034994A (fr)
CA (1) CA2115905C (fr)
DE (1) DE4490836T1 (fr)
GB (1) GB2289965B (fr)
WO (1) WO1994019770A1 (fr)

Cited By (21)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO1996003286A1 (fr) * 1994-07-26 1996-02-08 International Data Matrix, Inc. Articles inalterables a verification integree
US5505494A (en) * 1993-09-17 1996-04-09 Bell Data Software Corporation System for producing a personal ID card
US5530438A (en) * 1995-01-09 1996-06-25 Motorola, Inc. Method of providing an alert of a financial transaction
EP0805409A2 (fr) * 1994-03-21 1997-11-05 I.D. Tec, S.L. Procédé biométrique de sécurité et d'authentification de cartes d'identité et de crédit, de visas, de passeports et de reconnaissance faciale
GB2342743A (en) * 1998-10-17 2000-04-19 Nicholas Paul Elliot Verification method
NL1010443C2 (nl) * 1998-11-02 2000-05-03 Robert Arnout Van Der Ing Loop Fraudebestendig identificatie- en legitimatiesysteem waarbij de identificatie- en legitimatiegegevens op een gegevensdrager worden vastgelegd in optisch leesbaar en in digitaal formaat, waarbij de digitaal opgeslagen gegevens middels cryptografie (digitale handtekening) zijn beveiligd.
EP1018712A1 (fr) * 1998-12-22 2000-07-12 Eastman Kodak Company Procédé et appareil pour la sécurité d'une carte de transaction avec insertion de données d'image
WO2000042577A1 (fr) * 1999-01-18 2000-07-20 Iridian Technologies, Inc. Procede et appareil de transmission et d'authentification sures de donnees biometriques via un reseau
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WO2018067974A1 (fr) * 2016-10-07 2018-04-12 Chronicled, Inc. Registre ouvert pour identification humaine
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EP0805409A3 (fr) * 1994-03-21 1998-07-01 I.D. Tec, S.L. Procédé biométrique de sécurité et d'authentification de cartes d'identité et de crédit, de visas, de passeports et de reconnaissance faciale
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EP0730243A3 (fr) * 1995-02-28 2000-08-02 AT&T Corp. Système et méthode de vérification de cartes d'identification
US7010694B2 (en) 1998-10-14 2006-03-07 Harri Vatanen Method and system for application of a safety marking
GB2342743A (en) * 1998-10-17 2000-04-19 Nicholas Paul Elliot Verification method
GB2342743B (en) * 1998-10-17 2003-05-14 Nicholas Paul Elliot Verification method
NL1010443C2 (nl) * 1998-11-02 2000-05-03 Robert Arnout Van Der Ing Loop Fraudebestendig identificatie- en legitimatiesysteem waarbij de identificatie- en legitimatiegegevens op een gegevensdrager worden vastgelegd in optisch leesbaar en in digitaal formaat, waarbij de digitaal opgeslagen gegevens middels cryptografie (digitale handtekening) zijn beveiligd.
EP1018712A1 (fr) * 1998-12-22 2000-07-12 Eastman Kodak Company Procédé et appareil pour la sécurité d'une carte de transaction avec insertion de données d'image
US6321981B1 (en) 1998-12-22 2001-11-27 Eastman Kodak Company Method and apparatus for transaction card security utilizing embedded image data
US6536665B1 (en) 1998-12-22 2003-03-25 Eastman Kodak Company Method and apparatus for transaction card security utilizing embedded image data
US6332193B1 (en) 1999-01-18 2001-12-18 Sensar, Inc. Method and apparatus for securely transmitting and authenticating biometric data over a network
WO2000042577A1 (fr) * 1999-01-18 2000-07-20 Iridian Technologies, Inc. Procede et appareil de transmission et d'authentification sures de donnees biometriques via un reseau
US6907528B1 (en) 1999-03-26 2005-06-14 Fujitsu Services Limited Method and system for cryptographically authenticating a printed document by a trusted party
GB2348343A (en) * 1999-03-26 2000-09-27 Int Computers Ltd Authentication of MOT certificate using encryption
WO2001043067A3 (fr) * 1999-12-10 2002-05-10 Durand Technology Ltd Ameliorations relatives a des applications des techniques fractales et/ou chaotiques
WO2002043012A3 (fr) * 2000-11-25 2003-11-13 Orga Kartensysteme Gmbh Procede de fabrication d'un support de donnees et support de donnees
WO2002089068A1 (fr) * 2001-05-02 2002-11-07 Navigator Solutions Limited Procede et appareil d'identification biometrique
WO2003073387A2 (fr) * 2002-02-28 2003-09-04 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procede, dispositif et programme d'ordinateur permettant de verifier l'authenticite de documents non electroniques
WO2003073387A3 (fr) * 2002-02-28 2004-10-28 Siemens Ag Procede, dispositif et programme d'ordinateur permettant de verifier l'authenticite de documents non electroniques
WO2006090172A2 (fr) * 2005-02-25 2006-08-31 First Ondemand Ltd Systemes d'identification
WO2006090172A3 (fr) * 2005-02-25 2006-12-07 First Ondemand Ltd Systemes d'identification
US10210527B2 (en) 2015-06-04 2019-02-19 Chronicled, Inc. Open registry for identity of things including social record feature
US11113699B2 (en) 2015-06-04 2021-09-07 Chronicled, Inc. Open registry for identity of things
US11354676B2 (en) 2015-06-04 2022-06-07 Chronicled, Inc. Open registry for identity of things
US11107088B2 (en) 2016-05-27 2021-08-31 Chronicled, Inc. Open registry for internet of things
WO2018067974A1 (fr) * 2016-10-07 2018-04-12 Chronicled, Inc. Registre ouvert pour identification humaine
US12045811B2 (en) 2017-07-31 2024-07-23 Chronicled Inc. Secure and confidential custodial transaction system, method and device using zero-knowledge protocol

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GB2289965A (en) 1995-12-06
DE4490836T1 (de) 1996-01-11
GB2289965B (en) 1997-01-22
CA2115905A1 (fr) 1994-08-20
AU6034994A (en) 1994-09-14
CA2115905C (fr) 2004-11-16
GB9516080D0 (en) 1995-10-11

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