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WO1992016913A1 - Securisation d'operations financieres - Google Patents

Securisation d'operations financieres Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO1992016913A1
WO1992016913A1 PCT/GB1992/000512 GB9200512W WO9216913A1 WO 1992016913 A1 WO1992016913 A1 WO 1992016913A1 GB 9200512 W GB9200512 W GB 9200512W WO 9216913 A1 WO9216913 A1 WO 9216913A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
card
data
magnetic stripe
coded marking
bar code
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/GB1992/000512
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Alan J. Bell
Colin Henry Bloy
Original Assignee
The Security Systems Consortium Limited
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by The Security Systems Consortium Limited filed Critical The Security Systems Consortium Limited
Publication of WO1992016913A1 publication Critical patent/WO1992016913A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/08—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means
    • G06K19/10—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means at least one kind of marking being used for authentication, e.g. of credit or identity cards
    • G06K19/14—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means at least one kind of marking being used for authentication, e.g. of credit or identity cards the marking being sensed by radiation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/347—Passive cards
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1025—Identification of user by a PIN code
    • G07F7/1058—PIN is checked locally
    • G07F7/1066—PIN data being compared to data on card

Definitions

  • This invention relates to securing financial transactions.
  • the PIN number approach provides a relatively high degree of security. Its use is however limited by the need to have the number checked and correlated with the data on the cash card at the time of the transaction. This is conventionally effected by connecting the automated teller machine on-line to a mainframe computer which, if a correct PIN number is provided by the user of the machine, authorises the transaction and enables the machine to dispense the cash.
  • the present invention sales to provide an improved system using an improved form of card and novel authentication equipment.
  • an authentication card having a magnetic strip with magnetically recorded data thereon, and additional coded marking which is invisible to the naked eye but machine readable.
  • This provides a first line of defence against card fraud if it is arranged that part of the data recorded magnetically and part of the invisibly recorded data are correlated in some way since then any magnetic tampering with the magnetically recorded data (which is often undertaken by professional thieves) will remove the correlation and enable a simple self-contained detector unit to show at the point of the transaction that the card has been tampered with.
  • the coded marking is invisible to the naked eye, it is not immediately apparent usually to the would-be card forger that the marking is there at all.
  • the marking is coded, for purposes which appear more fully below, the additional marking may also serve as a security feature merely by its presence.
  • the additional marking is effected using a material having certain physical characteristics and which is one not normally found in credit and charge cards, or one the synthesis of which is difficult to achieve, a forged card may be distinguished from a genuine merely by the presence of the material making up the coded marking.
  • the data on the magnetic strip and the data in the additional coded marking may be directly correlated to enable simple detection of tampering of the magnetic data.
  • a major advantage of the present invention is that such data as is coded in the magnetic strip and the coded marking may be correlated via a PIN number known to the holder of the card but apparent from neither the magnetic data nor the invisible data.
  • a card coded in this way it is possible to authenticate a transaction without the necessity of referring to a mainframe computer but with a very high degree of certainty by reading data from the card, both the magnetic data and the non-visible data, and correlating that data with a PIN number provided by the card holder at the time of the transaction.
  • the PIN number may be inserted into the detector unit by the card holder in a fashion which does not reveal the PIN number to the bystander, or for example the cashier, at the vending establishment.
  • a detector unit may be used to validate the transaction.
  • validation apparatus for use with a card of the type described above which comprises means for reading data recorded magnetically on a magnetic strip of the card, means for reading data from the additional coded marking thereon, personal identification number input means, a pre-programmed processing unit adapted to process data input from the magnetic strip coded marking and PIN number inputs and to display the results of such processing as a visual indication corroborating or denying the validity of a proposed transaction.
  • swipe readers for cards bearing a magnetically coded stripe are well known and find application in numerous areas of technology, for example in electronic tills and card operated telephone boxes. They usually include a channel along which the card is passed, either by hand or driven by appropriate machinery, so that the magnetic stripe on the card passes over a magnetic reading head.
  • the invisibly coded marking on the card can be read at the same time, this generally implying that the coded marking extends linearly in a direction parallel to that of the magnetic stripe.
  • a preferred marking is a bar code type marking which is easily applied during manufacture of the card. The bar code marking may be on the same side of the card as the magnetic stripe or on the opposite side and the swipe reader will need to be constructed accordingly.
  • the additional coded marking on the card is invisible to the naked eye.
  • the marking may be effected in a material which is itself effectively invisible (transparent or the same colour as the material of card) or it may be made in a material which when directly viewed is visible but which is rendered invisible by being covered with an opaque layer rendering it invisible to the human eye but where the opaque layer is not opaque to some appropriate form of sensing.
  • the code may be printed using a material giving a detectable infra-red absorption or reflectance but covered by a material transparent to infra-red radiation but opaque to the human eye. Putting the marking in the interior of the card also makes it much more difficult for a person who wishes to commit fraud by using a stolen card to change the data on the card.
  • a particularly preferred form of card in accordance with the present invention is a plastics card having, printed in the interior thereof, a marking readable at non-visible wavelengths, preferably at infra-red wavelengths, the marking being located between a plastics card base and a cover laminated to the base and transparent to the wavelength at which the bar code is readable.
  • a stylised credit card 1 which may be of standard shape and size.
  • a magnetic stripe 2 of standard construction.
  • bar code 3 and a patch 4 are also printed on the card.
  • Bar code 3 and patch 4 may be made of the same material or may be different. Although barcode 3 is shown on the drawing for clarity visibly, it may be printed in a material visually indistinguishable from the background. Barcode 3 and patch 4 may be printed on the card base and then covered with, for example, a visually opaque, infra-red transparent cover sheet.
  • the bar code 3 and patch 4 may be printed on the card or on a layer making up the card by any convenient means. Ink jet printing of bar codes is a convenient and inexpensive means of printing bar codes on successive cards which vary from card to card. This is important for reasons indicated below.
  • Cards of the type illustrated in the top left of the accompanying drawing, and including e.g. printing with graphic material indicative of the intended card issuer are produced by standard mass production processes. However for use, cards must carry data personal to the user. Standard machines are accordingly available in commerce for processing pre-manufactured cards to personalise them. A typical such machine is commercially available under the trade designation Datacard 4650 from Data Card Limited and its affiliates. Other card embossing and recording systems are available from other manufacturers.
  • box 10 having an input tray 11 for cards to be personalised and an output delivery 12 where cards which have been processed collect.
  • the card embossing and recording system 10 is connected via a suitable data transmission links 15 and 16 with a mainframe computer schematically indicated at 20 and under the control of the card issuer, for example a bank, finance company or the like.
  • the invisible bar code 3 is read by a suitable reader within unit 10. This is fed via data transmission line 15 to the mainframe computer 20 together with a request to provide data to be put on the card. Thus the mainframe computer may be requested to provide the embossing and recording system with the account number name and details of the intended card holder. This is then transmitted from the mainframe computer 20 to the embossing and recording system 10 via data link 16.
  • the mainframe computer which receives the data as to the bar code 3, carries out suitable mathematical processing on the number represented by the bar code and on other numbers associated with the particular account or person to whom the card will be issued.
  • the mathematical process or algorithm used may vary widely but is used to combine the invisible number from bar code 3 with data e.g. from the person's account number, and with a randomly generated PIN number which will be assigned to the cardholder.
  • one form of mathematical processing may be to take the number represented by the bar code 3, add the person's account number to it, multiply that sum by the randomly generated PIN number and discard all but the last three digits of the resulting large number. Those three digits can then be regarded as a checking number which is then fed back via data link 16 to the embossing and recording system 10.
  • the embossing and recording system may be arranged to record those three digits on to the magnetic stripe 2.
  • the top right hand corner of the drawing shows diagrammatically the card after processing. It still has unchanged bar code 3, patch 4 and magnetic stripe 2. However the cardholder's account number 30 has been embossed thereon and is shown and this number and the check digits are recorded on magnetic stripe 2.
  • the card may also be appropriately embossed or otherwise identified e.g. with the name of the cardholder and an expiry date.
  • the so processed card can then be transmitted to the cardholder in the usual way while the mainframe computer 20 (which of course knows the PIN number allotted to that customer) may generate a separate letter which the computer separately despatches to the cardholder advising him or her of the PIN number he or she has been assigned.
  • the mainframe computer 20 which of course knows the PIN number allotted to that customer
  • the card may include a conventional signature strip and may be validated by signature comparison or using some form of on-line validation as is well known. However, because of the presence of bar code 3 in the card and patch 4 further means of validation are now available.
  • the bottom of the attached drawing shows diagrammatically a self contained validator unit which may be located at any appropriate transaction processing station for example in a store, supermarket, restaurant or the like.
  • This unit has a slot 40 through which the card 1 may be swiped.
  • Located either side of slot 40 within the validator unit are appropriate sensors for reading magnetic data on magnetic stripe 2 and the coded data on bar code 3.
  • Patch 4 may be used in conjunction with the bar code to facilitate reading. For example if patch 4 is of known width, the amount of time patch 4 is under a detector head may give an indication of appropriate clocking speed for reading the bar code, thus compensating for different swipe speeds.
  • the card is first swiped through the slot 40 and the cardholder is then invited to input his or her PIN number via a conventional keypad 41.
  • Keypad 41 is surrounded by screens 42,43 in order to minimise the chance of the PIN number being detected by a casual observer.
  • This is arranged to receive data read from the card and data input form the keypad 41 and then to take the data read from the card (the account number from magnetic stripe 2 and the bar code 3) and combine it in the same way as the mainframe computer 20 did when the card was being personalised, to generate a large number and therefor the three check digits by the system explained above.
  • the circuit also contains comparison means to determine whether the three check digits so generated match the three check digits read from magnetic stripe 2. If they do, an indicator such as a bright light emitting diode 50 located on the side of the validator unit lights up green thus enabling the proposed transaction to be authorised while if they do not match, diode 50 lights red. - li ⁇
  • the validator unit shown at the bottom of the drawing may simply act as a transaction validator as indicated above or it may be more sophisticated. For example it may include large quantities of electronic memory enabling it to record details of each transaction for example the date the identity of the checkout store and perhaps of the checkout operator and perhaps other data enabling tracing to be carried out if it is subsequently decided that a use of particular card needs to be traced.
  • the circuitry within the unit may also for example incorporate programming enabling detection of operation at unusual hours or to enable an unusual pattern of operation to be detected, for example if repeated attempts are made to validate the same card using a succession of different PIN numbers as would occur if a member of a supermarket staff who had picked up a lost card but not declared that tried to find the PIN number related to that card by repeated trial and error.
  • the validator unit may of course have means enabling it to be programmed or reprogrammed or enabling material stored by it to be downloaded for subsequent investigative processing.
  • the unit must of course be rendered reasonably secure against tampering by any appropriate means including for example means erasing its programming if the casing is opened by an unauthorised person.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)

Abstract

On décrit un système permettant la sécurisation d'opérations financières basées sur l'utilisation de cartes de crédit et de paiement. La carte comporte, en plus de la bande magnétique habituelle (2), des informations codées invisibles, par exemple un code à barres (3) lisible à l'infrarouge (mais non visible à l'÷il humain). Lorsque la carte est personnalisée, les données enregistrées sur la bande magnétique (2) peuvent être combinées au code à barres (3) et à un numéro d'identification personnelle (NIP) pour fournir des chiffres de contrôle suivant un algorithme donné. Lesdits chiffres de contrôle peuvent être enregistrés dans la bande magnétique (2). Un moyen indépendant de validation, c'est à dire non relié à un ordinateur principal, peut lire à la fois les données contenues dans la bande magnétique (2) et les données codées, par exemple celles du code à barres (3) et peut traiter les données et le numéro d'identification personnelle introduit au moyen d'un pavé (41) suivant l'algorithme pour établir les chiffres de contrôle s'il y a correspondance; ensuite, une signalisation peut être donnée, par exemple au moyen d'une diode électroluminescente verte (50), pour indiquer que l'opération a été validée.
PCT/GB1992/000512 1991-03-20 1992-03-20 Securisation d'operations financieres WO1992016913A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB919105851A GB9105851D0 (en) 1991-03-20 1991-03-20 Securing financial transactions
GB9105851.1 1991-03-20

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO1992016913A1 true WO1992016913A1 (fr) 1992-10-01

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ID=10691857

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/GB1992/000512 WO1992016913A1 (fr) 1991-03-20 1992-03-20 Securisation d'operations financieres

Country Status (3)

Country Link
AU (1) AU1451592A (fr)
GB (1) GB9105851D0 (fr)
WO (1) WO1992016913A1 (fr)

Cited By (50)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0609937A2 (fr) * 1993-01-26 1994-08-10 Be'eri Printers Moyens de paiement
WO1994019770A1 (fr) * 1993-02-19 1994-09-01 Her Majesty In Right Of Canada, As Represented By The Minister Of Communications Instrument d'identification personnelle protege et son procede de production
WO1994027259A1 (fr) * 1993-05-14 1994-11-24 Abathorn Limited Systeme de securite
EP0683471A1 (fr) * 1992-02-07 1995-11-22 American Bank Note Holographics, Inc. Amélioration de la sécurité d'un document
WO1999019823A2 (fr) * 1997-10-10 1999-04-22 Interval Research Corporation Procedes et systemes permettant de fournir des interfaces homme/machine
US5984366A (en) * 1994-07-26 1999-11-16 International Data Matrix, Inc. Unalterable self-verifying articles
US6256638B1 (en) 1998-04-14 2001-07-03 Interval Research Corporation Printable interfaces and digital linkmarks
US6262711B1 (en) 1995-08-03 2001-07-17 Interval Research Corporation Computerized interactor systems and method for providing same
GB2366645A (en) * 2000-09-09 2002-03-13 Ibm Human readable barcode label
US6439459B1 (en) 1997-10-07 2002-08-27 Interval Research Corporation Methods and systems for providing human/computer interfaces
US6467691B1 (en) * 1996-11-23 2002-10-22 Thorn Secure Science Limited Record carrier and method of labelling an article of value
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US6940486B2 (en) 1995-08-03 2005-09-06 Vulcan Patents Llc Computerized interactor systems and methods for providing same
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US7357312B2 (en) 1998-05-29 2008-04-15 Gangi Frank J System for associating identification and personal data for multiple magnetic stripe cards or other sources to facilitate a transaction and related methods
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Cited By (80)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0683471A1 (fr) * 1992-02-07 1995-11-22 American Bank Note Holographics, Inc. Amélioration de la sécurité d'un document
EP0609937A2 (fr) * 1993-01-26 1994-08-10 Be'eri Printers Moyens de paiement
EP0609937A3 (fr) * 1993-01-26 1996-01-10 Be Eri Printers Moyens de paiement.
WO1994019770A1 (fr) * 1993-02-19 1994-09-01 Her Majesty In Right Of Canada, As Represented By The Minister Of Communications Instrument d'identification personnelle protege et son procede de production
GB2289965A (en) * 1993-02-19 1995-12-06 Ca Minister Communications Secure personal indentification instument and method for creating same
WO1994027259A1 (fr) * 1993-05-14 1994-11-24 Abathorn Limited Systeme de securite
US5984366A (en) * 1994-07-26 1999-11-16 International Data Matrix, Inc. Unalterable self-verifying articles
US7050603B2 (en) 1995-07-27 2006-05-23 Digimarc Corporation Watermark encoded video, and related methods
US7436976B2 (en) 1995-07-27 2008-10-14 Digimarc Corporation Digital watermarking systems and methods
US6262711B1 (en) 1995-08-03 2001-07-17 Interval Research Corporation Computerized interactor systems and method for providing same
US6940486B2 (en) 1995-08-03 2005-09-06 Vulcan Patents Llc Computerized interactor systems and methods for providing same
US6467691B1 (en) * 1996-11-23 2002-10-22 Thorn Secure Science Limited Record carrier and method of labelling an article of value
US6518950B1 (en) 1997-10-07 2003-02-11 Interval Research Corporation Methods and systems for providing human/computer interfaces
US6989816B1 (en) 1997-10-07 2006-01-24 Vulcan Patents Llc Methods and systems for providing human/computer interfaces
US6439459B1 (en) 1997-10-07 2002-08-27 Interval Research Corporation Methods and systems for providing human/computer interfaces
US6540141B1 (en) 1997-10-07 2003-04-01 Interval Research Corporation Methods and systems for providing human/computer interfaces
US6164541A (en) * 1997-10-10 2000-12-26 Interval Research Group Methods and systems for providing human/computer interfaces
WO1999019823A2 (fr) * 1997-10-10 1999-04-22 Interval Research Corporation Procedes et systemes permettant de fournir des interfaces homme/machine
WO1999019823A3 (fr) * 1997-10-10 1999-08-19 Interval Research Corp Procedes et systemes permettant de fournir des interfaces homme/machine
US6256638B1 (en) 1998-04-14 2001-07-03 Interval Research Corporation Printable interfaces and digital linkmarks
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