WO2018165920A1

WO2018165920A1 - Security verification method and apparatus for pos machine

Info

Publication number: WO2018165920A1
Application number: PCT/CN2017/076811
Authority: WO
Inventors: 胡剑文
Original assignee: 深圳大趋智能科技有限公司
Priority date: 2017-03-15
Filing date: 2017-03-15
Publication date: 2018-09-20
Also published as: CN107466455A; CN107466455B

Abstract

Provided are a security verification method and apparatus for a POS machine. The method involves: when, in a POS machine, a starting, downloading or updating operation is carried out with regard to an application program or a change operation is carried out with regard to a master key, verifying the permission of the operation; and if verification is passed, execute the corresponding operation, and if verification is not passed, blocking the operation. The present invention guarantees the security of a master key and an application program in a POS machine, prevents the master key and the application program in the POS machine from being illegitimately tampered with and downloaded, and prevents the whole POS machine from being switched.

Description

POS machine security verification method and device

Technical field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of payment devices, and in particular, to a POS machine security verification method and apparatus.

Background technique

[0002] The POS terminal is shipped from the manufacturer to a plurality of third-party payment companies, and then distributed by different third-party payment companies to the respective agents. The agents distribute the POS terminals to the merchants according to the business. Each P OS terminal corresponds to the service of a third-party payment company and has unique relevance.

[0003] However, there are a lot of instability in the agents of the third-party payment companies in the market, and there is a phenomenon that the POS terminal is cut, and the POS terminal that runs the agent A service is switched to the service of the agent B. . It is possible to switch a large number of high-quality merchants from the third-party payment company A to the third-party payment company B, resulting in the illegal transfer of the third-party payment company A business and the loss of the merchant.

[0004] The POS machine is shipped from the manufacturer to the third-party payment company, and before being placed in the merchant, the pre-installation procedure and the filling key are required. The manufacturer downloads the corresponding application and the main according to the business of the third-party payment company. The key TMK, after which the implement is owned by the third party payment company, other third parties cannot update the application and master key TMK. The running application corresponds to the business of the merchant, and the master key TMK is provided by the payment company, one machine and one secret. After the POS machine is used by the merchant, the master key TMK in the machine will be used to verify the work key issued by the agent in the background. Only the master key TMK in the machine is correct, and the normal login transaction can be completed.

[0005] In order to prevent the POS machine running business from being illegally tampering and switching, it is necessary to ensure the security of the two parts. The first is that the application running in the POS tool cannot be illegally tampered with and needs to be legally signed to download and update. The second is that the master key TMK in the POS device cannot be illegally tampered with the master key of other payment companies.

[0006] There are two existing implementations. The first one is that the manufacturer of the POS machine pre-installs the application program and the master key TMK, and the program and the key download have no protection scheme such as signature verification. Because the program download does not have signature verification, it is easy to be tampered with, and the illegal application is downloaded to the POS machine to switch the merchant service running by the POS device to another merchant service. [0007] The second is that the manufacturer of the POS machine pre-installs the application and the master key TMK, but the application needs to be signed by the key before downloading. When downloading to the POS machine, the key in the POS tool is used for calibration. After the verification, the verification can be updated to the POS machine. This solution can prevent illegal applications from being downloaded to the P OS tool, but it cannot prevent the whole machine from switching. It will copy the FLASH of the normal POS device of the agent A, and then copy the FLASH to the POS device of the agent B, and the agent will be The POS machine of the business B becomes the machine of the agent A, and the business of the agent A is operated.

technical problem

[0008] The main object of the present invention is to provide a POS machine security verification method and device, which ensures the security of the primary key and the application program in the POS machine.

Problem solution

Technical solution

[0009] The present invention provides a POS machine security verification method, including the following steps:

[0010] in the POS machine, the application is started, downloaded, updated, or the master key is changed, and the authority of the operation is verified;

[0011] If the verification passes, the corresponding operation is performed; if not, the operation is blocked.

[0012] Further, when the application is started, downloaded, updated, or changed by the master key in the POS machine, the steps of verifying the authority of the operation include:

[0013] performing a hash calculation according to the POS hardware ID and the application signature public key to generate a first hash value, and preset the first hash value in the POS machine;

[0014] After the POS application is started, performing a hash calculation according to the current hardware ID of the POS machine and the application signature public key to generate a second hash value;

[0015] The comparison verifies whether the second hash value is the same as the first hash value; if the verification is the same, the verification fails, and the verification fails.

[0016] Further, the POS hardware ID includes a CPU ID and a FLASH ID.

[0017] Further, when the application is started, downloaded, updated, or changed to the master key in the POS machine, the step of verifying the authority of the operation includes:

[0018] The POS machine application downloads, updates, and uses the key to perform signature verification on the application;

[0019] If the verification is correct, the verification is passed; if the verification is incorrect, the verification fails. [0020] Further, the step of verifying the authority of the operation by performing a startup, download, update operation or a change operation on the master key in the POS machine includes:

[0021] After making a change to the master key in the POS machine, performing signature verification on the master key;

[0022] If the verification is correct, the verification is passed; if the verification is incorrect, the verification fails.

[0023]

[0024] The present invention also provides a POS machine security verification device, including:

[0025] a verification unit, configured to perform a startup, download, update operation on the application in the POS machine or perform a change operation on the primary key, and verify the authority of the operation;

[0026] The processing unit is configured to perform a corresponding operation when the verification is passed; if not, the operation is blocked.

[0027] Further, the verification unit includes:

[0028] a preset subunit, configured to perform a hash calculation according to the POS hardware ID and the application signature public key to generate a first hash value, and preset the first hash value in the POS machine;

[0029] a calculation subunit, configured to start, after the POS application is started, perform a hash calculation according to the current hardware ID of the POS machine and the application signature public key to generate a second hash value;

[0030] a comparison subunit, configured to compare and verify whether the second hash value is the same as the first hash value;

, the verification passes, and the verification fails.

[0031] Further, the POS hardware ID includes a CPU ID and a FLASH ID.

[0032] Further, the verification unit includes:

[0033] a first verification subunit, configured to download and update the POS application, and perform signature verification on the application by using a key;

[0034] The first determining subunit, for verifying correct, passes the verification; if the verification is incorrect, the verification fails.

[0035] Further, the verification unit includes:

[0036] a second verification subunit, configured to perform a signature verification on the master key after performing a change on the master key in the POS machine;

[0037] The second determining subunit, if the verification is correct, the verification is passed; if the verification is incorrect, the verification fails.

Advantageous effects of the invention

Beneficial effect

[0038] The POS machine security verification method and apparatus provided in the present invention have the following beneficial effects: [0039] The POS machine security verification method and device provided by the present invention, in the POS machine to start, download, update the application or modify the master key, verify the authority of the operation; If yes, the corresponding operation is performed; if not, the operation is blocked; the security of the master key and the application in the POS machine is secured, and the master key and the application program in the POS machine are prevented from being illegally tampered and downloaded, thereby preventing the POS device Switched by the whole machine.

Brief description of the drawing

DRAWINGS

1 is a schematic diagram of steps of a POS machine security verification method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

2 is a schematic view showing the specific steps of step S1 in FIG. 1;

3 is a schematic diagram of key verification in an embodiment of the present invention;

4 is a schematic structural diagram of a POS machine security verification apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention;

5 is a schematic structural diagram of a verification unit according to an embodiment of the present invention;

6 is a schematic structural diagram of a verification unit according to another embodiment of the present invention;

7 is a schematic structural diagram of a verification unit in still another embodiment of the present invention.

[0047]

[0048] The implementation, functional features, and advantages of the present invention will be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION

The specific embodiments described herein are intended to be illustrative only and not to limit the invention.

[0050] The singular forms "a", "an", "the" It will be further understood that the phrase "comprising", used in the <RTI ID=0.0></RTI><RTIgt;</RTI> is intended to mean the presence of the features, integers, steps, operations, components, units, modules and/or components, but does not exclude the presence or addition of one or more Other characteristics, integers, steps, operations, components, units, modules, components, and/or groups thereof. It will be understood that when we refer to an element being "connected" or "coupled" to another element, it can be directly connected or coupled to the other element, or an intermediate element can be present. Further, "connected" or "coupled" as used herein may include either a wireless connection or a wireless coupling. The phrase "and/or" used herein includes all or any one of one or more of the associated listed items. Yuan and all combinations.

[0051] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that all terms (including technical and scientific terms) used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention belongs, unless otherwise defined. It should also be understood that terms such as those defined in a general dictionary should be understood to have meaning consistent with the meaning in the context of the prior art, and will not be idealized or excessive unless specifically defined as here. The formal meaning is explained.

[0052] In the prior art, in order to ensure the service security of the POS machine, the service of the POS machine is prevented from being illegally tampered and switched. As described above, there are usually two solutions, which all have certain defects and deficiencies. The embodiment of the invention provides a POS machine security verification method and device, which ensures the security of the master key and the application program in the POS machine, prevents the master key and the application program in the POS machine from being illegally tampering and downloading, and prevents the POS machine from being hacked. Switching the whole machine.

1 is a schematic diagram of steps of a POS machine security verification method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0054] In the embodiment of the present invention, a POS security verification method is provided, which includes the following steps:

[0055] Step S1, in the POS machine, start, download, update the application or perform a change operation on the master key, and verify the authority of the operation;

[0056] Step S2, if the verification is passed, the corresponding operation is performed; if not, the operation is blocked.

[0057] In this embodiment, in the POS machine, the application is started, downloaded, updated, or the master key is changed, and the permissions of the operation are verified, wherein different operations are different. The way to verify. For example, after starting the application operation in the POS machine, it is necessary to perform a hash calculation according to the current hardware ID of the POS machine and the application signature public key to generate a hash value and compare and verify the hash value prestored in the POS machine; After the POS application is downloaded and updated, the key is used to verify the signature of the application. The key can be the master key pre-existing in the POS machine. For example, in the POS machine, the master key is used. After the change, the master key needs to be signed and verified. The verification methods are diversified and are not exhaustive here.

[0058] Only after the verification is passed, the corresponding operation can be performed on the POS machine. If the verification fails, the operation is automatically blocked and the execution cannot be continued. Therefore, in the POS machine to start, download, update the operation or change the master key, the security of the master key and the application in the POS machine can be guaranteed, and the master key and application in the POS machine can be prevented. Illegal tampering and downloading, preventing POS machines Switched by the whole machine.

[0059] Referring to FIG. 2, in an embodiment, the step S1 of verifying the authority of the operation by performing a startup, download, update operation or a change operation on the master key in the POS machine Including

[0060] Step S101: Perform a hash calculation according to the POS hardware ID and the application signature public key to generate a first hash value, and preset the first hash value in the POS machine;

[0061] Step S102, the POS application starts, and performs a hash calculation according to the current hardware ID of the POS machine and the application signature public key to generate a second hash value.

[0062] Step S103: Verify that the second hash value is the same as the first hash value; if the verification is the same, the verification is passed, and if the verification is different, the verification fails.

[0063] When the POS machine is cut by the whole machine (ie, copy one copy of the FLASH of the normal POS machine of the agent A, copy it to the POS machine of the agent B, and change the POS tool of the agent B into the agent A. After the machine, running the agent A's business), even if the application is signed and verified, it is impossible to check the application that is running after the machine is tampering.

[0064] Therefore, in this embodiment, the first hash value is first generated according to the original hardware ID of the POS machine and the application signature public key, and the first hash value is preset at the POS. In the machine; each time the application on the POS machine is started, the second hash value is generated according to the current hardware ID of the startup device and the application signature public key, and the second hash value is compared and verified. Whether the first hash value is the same; if the same, the verification passes, and if not, the verification fails. Specifically, the POS hardware ID includes a CPU ID and a FLASH ID.

[0065] After the POS machine is cut by the whole machine, the CPU and the FLASH component are different, the CPU ID and the FLASH ID are changed, and the second hash value calculated according to the CPU ID and the FLASH ID also changes. If the hash value is different, the program cannot be run. If the hash value is the same, the verification is passed and the program runs. In the solution in this embodiment, the CPU ID, the FLASH ID, and the key pk are used for hash calculation, and the hash value is verified to ensure the unique association between the CPU FLASH and the public key PK, and the P0S machine is protected after being switched by the whole machine. Unable to pass the verification, it can protect the P0S machine terminal from being operated normally after being switched by the illegal machine.

[0066] In another embodiment, the starting, downloading, and updating operations of the application in the POS machine or The step S1 of verifying the authority of the operation includes:

[0067] After the POS application is downloaded and updated, the application is signed and verified using the key;

[0068] If the verification is correct, the verification is passed; if the verification is incorrect, the verification fails.

[0069] In this embodiment, after the POS application is downloaded and updated, the application is signed and verified using the key. Referring to Figure 3 specifically, the application file needs to be verified by the signature to be downloaded to the POS machine. The application root public key in Boot is solidified in the Boot program. The Code.pk public key can only be downloaded to the POS machine after being signed by the program's root private key. Boot.bin, core.bin, and app.bin are application or resource files that can only be downloaded and updated to the POS machine after being signed by the Code.sk private key. The root private key of the application and the Code.pk/sk public and private key are controlled by the manufacturer of the POS machine. The application files and resource files that need to be downloaded and updated need to be controlled by the manufacturer to be updated successfully. The solution in this embodiment can ensure that the application files of the POS machine are not illegally tampering and updating, thereby ensuring the security of the POS application.

[0070] In still another embodiment, the step S1 of verifying the authority of the operation by performing an activation, download, update operation or a change operation on the master key in the POS machine includes:

[0071] after performing a change on the master key in the POS machine, performing signature verification on the master key;

[0072] If the verification is correct, the verification is passed; if the verification is incorrect, the verification fails.

Referring to FIG. 3, in the present embodiment, the master key TMK needs to be verified by the signature to be downloaded to the POS machine. The key root public key in Boot is solidified in the Boot program. The Key.pk public key can only be downloaded to the P0S machine after being signed by the root private key of the key. acquirerN.pk is used to download and verify the master key of each third-party payment company TMK, acquirerN.pk needs to be signed by the Key.sk private key to download to the POS machine. The key root private key and the Key.sk private key are controlled by the P0S machine manufacturer, the acquirerN.pk/sk public private key is controlled by the third party company, and the acquirerN.pk needs to be updated by the manufacturer's Key.sk signature. The solution in this embodiment can ensure that the master key system is not illegally falsified, thereby ensuring the security of the P0S machine master key.

[0074] It can be understood that the security verification of the POS machine can be performed by using more than one of the multiple verification methods described in the foregoing embodiments, and it is more beneficial to protect the P by using all the verification methods described above. OS and security.

[0075] The above is the POS machine security verification method provided in the present invention, and the application program is started in the POS machine.

, download, update operation, or make changes to the master key, verify the permissions of the operation ; If the verification is passed, the corresponding operation is performed; if not, the operation is blocked; the security of the master key and the application in the POS machine is guaranteed, and the master key and the application program in the POS machine are prevented from being illegally tampered and downloaded, thereby preventing The POS machine is switched by the whole machine.

[0076] In order to further explain the POS machine security verification method provided in the present invention, a POS machine security verification apparatus is also provided in the embodiment of the present invention.

[0077] Referring to FIG. 4, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a POS security verification apparatus, including:

[0078] The verification unit 10 is configured to perform a startup, download, update operation on the application in the POS machine or perform a change operation on the master key, and verify the authority of the operation;

[0079] The processing unit 20 is configured to perform a corresponding operation when the verification is passed; if not, the operation is blocked.

[0080] In this embodiment, the startup, download, update operation or the change operation of the master key is performed on the application in the POS machine, and the verification unit 10 has to verify the authority of the operation, wherein different The operation corresponds to different verification methods. For example, after starting the application operation in the POS machine, it is necessary to perform hash calculation according to the current hardware ID of the POS machine and the application signature public key to generate a hash value and compare and verify the hash value pre-stored in the P OS machine. After the POS application is downloaded and updated, Bessie will use the key to verify the signature of the application. The key can be the master key pre-existing in the POS machine; for example, in the POS machine After the key is changed, the master key needs to be signed and verified. The verification methods are diversified and are not exhaustive here.

[0081] Only after the verification is passed, the processing unit 20 can perform corresponding operations on the POS machine. If the verification fails, the operation is automatically blocked and the execution cannot be continued. Therefore, in the POS machine to start, download, update the operation or change the master key, the security of the master key and the application in the POS machine can be guaranteed, and the master key and application in the POS machine can be prevented. Illegal tampering and downloading to prevent POS devices from being switched by the whole machine.

[0082] Referring to FIG. 5, in an embodiment, the verification unit 10 includes:

[0083] The preset subunit 101 is configured to perform a hash calculation according to the POS hardware ID and the application signature public key to generate a first hash value, and preset the first hash value in the POS machine;

[0084] The calculating subunit 102 is configured to: after the POS application is started, perform a hash calculation according to the current hardware ID of the POS machine and the application signature public key to generate a second hash value;

[0085] a comparison subunit 103, configured to compare and verify whether the second hash value is the same as the first hash value; If the verification is the same, the verification will not pass.

[0086] When the POS machine is cut by the whole machine (ie, copy one copy of the FLASH of the normal POS machine of the agent A, copy it to the POS machine of the agent B, and change the POS tool of the agent B into the agent A. After the machine, running the agent A's business), even if the application is signed and verified, it is impossible to check the application that is running after the machine is tampering.

[0087] Therefore, in this embodiment, first performing hash calculation according to the original hardware ID of the POS machine and the application signature public key to generate a first hash value, and preset the first hash value to the POS. In the machine; each time the application on the POS machine is started, the second hash value is generated according to the current hardware ID of the startup device and the application signature public key, and the second hash value is compared and verified. Whether the first hash value is the same; if the same, the verification passes, and if not, the verification fails. Specifically, the POS hardware ID includes a CPU ID and a FLASH ID.

[0088] When the POS machine is cut by the whole machine, the CPU and the FLASH component are different, the CPU ID and the FLASH ID are changed from the original one, and the second hash value calculated according to the CPU ID and the FLASH ID also changes. If the hash value is different, the program cannot be run. If the hash value is the same, the verification is passed and the program runs. In the solution in this embodiment, the CPU ID, the FLASH ID, and the key pk are used for hash calculation, and the hash value is verified to ensure the unique association between the CPU FLASH and the public key PK, and the POS machine is protected from being switched by the whole machine. Unable to pass the verification, it can protect the POS machine terminal from being operated normally after being switched by the illegal machine.

[0089] Referring to FIG. 6, in another embodiment, the verification unit 10 includes:

[0090] The first verification sub-unit 104 is configured to perform a signature verification on the application by using a key after the POS application is downloaded and updated.

[0091] The first determining sub-unit 105 is configured to verify that the verification is correct, and if the verification is incorrect, the verification is not passed.

[0092] In this embodiment, after the POS application is downloaded and updated, the application is signed and verified using the key. Referring specifically to Figure 3, the application file needs to be verified by the signature to be downloaded to the POS machine. The application root public key in Boot is solidified in the Boot program. The Code.pk public key can only be downloaded to the P0S machine after being signed by the root private key of the program. Boot.bin, core.bin, and app.bin are application or resource files that can only be downloaded and updated to the P0S machine after being signed by the Code.sk private key. Application root private key And the Code.pk/sk public and private key is controlled by the manufacturer of the POS machine. The application files and resource files that need to be downloaded and updated need to be controlled by the manufacturer to be updated successfully. The solution in this embodiment can ensure that the application files of the POS machine are not illegally modified and updated, thereby ensuring the security of the POS application.

[0093] Referring to FIG. 7, in another embodiment, the verification unit 10 includes:

[0094] The second verification sub-unit 106 is configured to perform a signature verification on the master key after performing a change on the master key in the POS machine.

[0095] The second determining sub-unit 107 is configured to verify that the verification is correct, and if the verification is incorrect, the verification is not passed.

[0096] Referring to FIG. 3, in the present embodiment, the master key TMK needs to be verified by the signature to be downloaded to the POS machine. The key root public key in Boot is solidified in the Boot program. The Key.pk public key can only be downloaded to the POS machine after being signed by the root private key of the key. acquirerN.pk is used to download and verify the master key of each third-party payment company TMK, acquirerN.pk needs to be signed by the Key.sk private key to download to the POS machine. The key root private key and the Key.sk private key are controlled by the POS manufacturer. The acquirerN.pk/sk public private key is controlled by the third party company, and acquirerN.pk needs to be updated by the manufacturer's Key.sk signature. The solution in this embodiment can ensure that the master key system is not illegally tampered, thereby ensuring the security of the POS machine master key.

[0097] It can be understood that the POS machine can be used for security verification using one or more of the plurality of verification devices described in the above embodiments, and it is more advantageous to protect the P by using all the verification devices described above. OS and security.

[0098] In summary, the POS machine security verification method and device provided in the embodiment of the present invention initiates, downloads, updates or changes the master key in the POS machine, and the verification unit 10, verifying the authority of the operation; the processing unit 20 is used for verification, and then performing corresponding operations; if not, blocking the operation; securing the master key and the application in the POS machine, preventing the POS machine The master key and the application are illegally tampered with and downloaded to prevent the POS device from being switched by the whole machine.

[0099]

[0100] It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that, for the convenience and brevity of the description, the specific working process of the terminal, the device and the unit described above may refer to the corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiment, and details are not described herein again. . [0101] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the present invention includes apparatus related to performing one or more of the operations described herein. These devices may be specially designed and manufactured for the required purposes, or may also include known devices in a general purpose computer. These devices have computer programs stored therein that are selectively activated or reconfigured. Such computer programs may be stored in a device (eg, computer) readable medium or in any type of medium suitable for storing electronic instructions and respectively coupled to a bus, including but not limited to any Types of disks (including floppy disks, hard disks, CDs, CD-ROMs, and magneto-optical disks), ROM (Read-Only Memory, read-only memory), RAM (Random Access Memory), EPROM (Erasable)

Programmable Read-Only

Memory, EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory), flash memory, magnetic card or light card. That is, a readable medium includes any medium that is stored or transmitted by a device (e.g., a computer) in a readable form.

[0102] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that each block of the block diagrams and/or block diagrams and/or flow diagrams can be implemented with computer program instructions and in the block diagrams and/or block diagrams and/or flow diagrams. The combination of boxes. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that these computer program instructions can be implemented by a general purpose computer, a professional computer, or a processor of other programmable data processing methods, such that the processor is executed by a computer or other programmable data processing method. The block diagrams and/or block diagrams of the invention and/or the schemes specified in the blocks or blocks of the flow diagram are invented.

[0103] Those skilled in the art can understand that the various operations, methods, and steps, measures, and solutions in the present invention may be alternated, changed, combined, or deleted. Further, various operations, methods, and other steps, measures, and arrangements in the process of the present invention may be alternated, changed, rearranged, decomposed, combined, or deleted. Further, the steps, measures, and solutions in the various operations, methods, and processes disclosed in the prior art may be alternated, changed, rearranged, decomposed, combined, or deleted.

The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the scope of the invention, and the equivalent structure or equivalent process transformations made by the description of the present invention and the drawings are used directly or indirectly. Other related technical fields are equally included in the scope of patent protection of the present invention.

Claims

Claim

A POS machine security verification method, characterized in that the method comprises the following steps:

After the application is started, downloaded, updated, or changed by the master key in the POS machine, the authority of the operation is verified;

If the verification passes, the corresponding operation is performed; if not, the operation is blocked.

The POS security verification method according to claim 1, wherein the operating, the downloading, the updating operation, or the changing operation of the master key in the PO S machine, the authority to the operation The steps to verify include:

Performing a hash calculation according to the POS hardware ID and the application signature public key to generate a first hash value, and preset the first hash value in the POS machine;

After the POS application is started, the second hash value is generated according to the current hardware ID of the POS machine and the application signature public key.

The comparison verifies whether the second hash value is the same as the first hash value; if the same, the verification passes, and if not, the verification fails.

The POS security verification method according to claim 2, wherein the POS hardware ID comprises a CPU ID and a FLASH ID.

The POS machine security verification method according to claim 1, wherein the PO is in the PO

The application starts, downloads, updates, or changes the master key in the S machine. The steps to verify the permissions of the operation include:

After the POS application is downloaded and updated, the application is signed and verified using the key. If the verification is correct, the verification is passed. If the verification is incorrect, the verification fails.

After the master key is changed in the POS machine, the master key is signed and verified; if the verification is correct, the verification is passed; if the verification is incorrect, the verification fails.

A POS machine security verification device, comprising:

A verification unit for launching, downloading, updating, or After the change operation is performed on the master key, the authority of the operation is verified; the processing unit is used to verify the passage, and the corresponding operation is performed; if not, the operation is blocked.

The POS security verification device according to claim 6, wherein the verification unit comprises:

a preset subunit, configured to perform a hash calculation according to the POS hardware ID and the application signature public key to generate a first hash value, and preset the first hash value in the POS machine; After the POS application is started, the second hash value is generated according to the current hardware ID of the POS machine and the application signature public key.

a comparison subunit, configured to compare and verify whether the second hash value is the same as the first hash value; if the same, the verification passes, and if not, the verification fails.

The POS security verification device according to claim 7, wherein the POS hardware ID comprises a CPU ID and a FLASH ID.

The first verification sub-unit is used for downloading and updating the POS application, and performing signature verification using the key corresponding program;

The first determining sub-unit, if the verification is correct, the verification is passed; if the verification is incorrect, the verification fails.

a second verification subunit, configured to perform a signature verification on the master key after the master key is changed in the POS machine;

The second determining subunit, for verifying correctness, passes the verification; if the verification is incorrect, the verification fails.