WO2014048197A1 - Procédé, système et dispositif permettant à un équipement d'utilisateur de sélectionner un réseau mobile terrestre public visité - Google Patents
Procédé, système et dispositif permettant à un équipement d'utilisateur de sélectionner un réseau mobile terrestre public visité Download PDFInfo
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- WO2014048197A1 WO2014048197A1 PCT/CN2013/082191 CN2013082191W WO2014048197A1 WO 2014048197 A1 WO2014048197 A1 WO 2014048197A1 CN 2013082191 W CN2013082191 W CN 2013082191W WO 2014048197 A1 WO2014048197 A1 WO 2014048197A1
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- vplmn
- network element
- 3gpp aaa
- server
- authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W8/00—Network data management
- H04W8/02—Processing of mobility data, e.g. registration information at HLR [Home Location Register] or VLR [Visitor Location Register]; Transfer of mobility data, e.g. between HLR, VLR or external networks
- H04W8/08—Mobility data transfer
- H04W8/12—Mobility data transfer between location registers or mobility servers
Definitions
- User equipment selects methods, systems and devices for accessing public land mobile networks
- the present invention relates to a selection technique for a visited network, and more particularly to a method, system and device for a user equipment in an evolved packet system (EPS, Evolved Packet System) to select a public land mobile network.
- EPS evolved packet system
- Background technique Evolved Packet System
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the system architecture of the EPS.
- the EPS network architecture of the non-roaming scenario by the evolved universal mobile communication system land E-UTRAN (Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network), Mobility Management Entity (MME), S-GW (Serving Gateway), Packet Data Network Gateway (P-GW or The PDN GW (Packet Data Network Gateway) is composed of a Home Subscriber Server (HSS), a Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF), and an operator's IP service network.
- the PCRF is the core of Policy and Charging Control (PCC) and is responsible for policy decision making and charging rules.
- PCC Policy and Charging Control
- the PCRF provides network control rules based on service data flows, including network traffic detection, Gating Control, Quality of Service (QoS) control, and traffic-based charging rules. Wait.
- the PCRF sends its policy and charging rules to the Policy and Charging Enforcement Function (PCEF).
- PCEF Policy and Charging Enforcement Function
- the PCRF also needs to ensure that these rules are consistent with the user's subscription information.
- the basis for formulating the policy and charging rules by the PCRF includes: obtaining information related to the service from the application function entity (AF, Application Function); and obtaining the user policy charging control sign from the user subscription database (SPR, Subscription Profile Repository) About information; Obtain information about the bearer-related network from the PCEF.
- EPS supports interworking with non-3GPP systems. Interworking with non-3GPP systems is implemented through the S2a/S2b/S2c interface, which acts as an anchor between 3GPP and non-3GPP systems. As shown in FIG. 1, in the EPS system, the non-3GPP system is divided into a trusted non-3GPP IP access network and an untrusted non-3GPP IP access network.
- Trusted non-3GPP IP access networks and untrusted non-3GPP IP access networks are authenticated by EPS's insurance, authorization, and AAA, Authentication, Authorization, Accounting server (Server); trusted non-3GPP IP
- the access network can be directly connected to the P-GW through the S2a interface; the untrusted non-3GPP IP access network needs to be connected to the P-GW through the ePLG (Evolved Packet Data Gateway), and can be accessed through the ePDG. GW;
- the interface between the ePDG and the P-GW is S2b, and the user equipment (UE, User Equipment) and the ePDG use the Internet Protocol Security (IPSec, IP and Security) to encrypt the signaling and data.
- the S2c provides user plane-related control and mobility support between the UE and the P-GW.
- the supported mobility management protocol is the Moblie IPv6 support for dual stack Hosts and Router (DSMIPv6).
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a home routing roaming architecture in a policy interworking scenario in which a UE accesses a 3GPP core network through a BBF access network (also referred to as a fixed broadband access network).
- the BBF access network is considered to be an untrusted non-3GPP interface. Network access.
- the UE accesses the mobile core network through the BBF access network.
- the routing mode is an evolved packet core network route (EPC-routed)
- the other is a UE accessed service.
- EPC-routed evolved packet core network route
- Non-Seamless WLAN Offload For the architecture shown in Figure 2, the BBF access network needs to visit the public land mobile network (VPLMN, Visited Public Land). Mobile Network) Interoperates with the Home Public Land Mobile Network (HPLMN), including authentication, data routing, and policy control.
- VPN public land mobile network
- HPLMN Home Public Land Mobile Network
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a home routing roaming architecture in a policy convergence scenario in which a UE accesses a 3GPP core network through a BBF access network.
- the main difference from FIG. 2 is that the BBF access network and the VPLMN belong to the same operator, and the V-PCRF passes the Gxd.
- the interface supports interaction with the IP edge.
- the H-PCRF needs to interact with the BBF access network through the V-PCRF.
- FIG. 4 is a flow chart of attachment of a UE when accessing 3GPP through the DSMIPv6 protocol, and specifically includes the following steps:
- Step 101 The UE accesses the BBF access network, and performs 3GPP-based authentication.
- the third-generation partner program verification, authorization, and accounting agent (3GPPAAA Proxy) authenticates to the broadband forum.
- the Authorization and Accounting Server (BBF AAA) returns the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where it is located;
- the 3GPP-based authentication is performed by: the BBF AAA interacts with the 3GPP AAA server through the 3GPP AAA Proxy to complete the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication. Further, the 3GPP AAA server also interacts with the HSS.
- EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
- Step 102 The IP Edge in the BBF access network allocates a local IP address to the UE.
- IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange
- the ePDG interacts with the 3GPP AAA server through the 3GPP AAA Proxy to complete EAP authentication.
- the UE selects the ePDG located in the VPLMN as follows: The UE may use the static configuration or dynamically select the ePDG.
- the UE uses the VPLMN ID known by itself as the operator identifier to construct a Full Quality Domain Name (FQDN).
- FQDN Full Quality Domain Name
- DNS Domain Name System
- Step 104 The ePDG sends a last IKEv2 message to the UE, where the IP address assigned to the UE is carried, and the IP address identifier assigned to the UE is IPAddress3, which is the care-of address (CoA) of the UE.
- IP address assigned to the UE is carried, and the IP address identifier assigned to the UE is IPAddress3, which is the care-of address (CoA) of the UE.
- Step 105 An Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) tunnel is established between the UE and the ePDG.
- Step 106 The ePDG initiates a gateway control session establishment process by using the step 103. Specifically, the ePDG sends a gateway control session to the H-PCRF through the V-PCRF. The message is set to carry the information such as the IP address, user identifier, and PDN identifier of the UE; the H-PCRF returns an acknowledgement message.
- IPSec Internet Protocol Security
- Step 107 The UE performs a Bootstraping process, where the UE acquires an IP address of the P-GW that is to access the PDN, and completes communication with the 3GPP AAA server by using the P-GW.
- the P-GW allocates an IPv6 address or prefix to the UE as the home address (HoA) of the UE;
- the 3GPP AAA server also interacts with the HSS; the IP address of the P-GW that the UE acquires to access the PDN is: The UE is based on the access point name (APN, Access Point Name) ) Perform a naming system (DNS, Domain Name)
- the UE uses IKEv2 to establish a security association and uses EAP for authentication.
- Step 108 The UE sends a DSMHV6 binding update message to the P-GW, and the P-GW establishes a binding context.
- the binding update message carries CoA and HoA; in the binding message, the lifetime parameter is not zero.
- Step 109 The PCEF in the P-GW sends an IP connection access network (IP-CAN, IP-Connectivity Access Network) session establishment indication message to the H-PCRF; the H-PCRF is based on the IP-CAN.
- IP-CAN IP connection access network
- Step 110 The P-GW returns a binding acknowledgement message to the UE.
- Step 111 The H-PCRF sends a PCR-initiated gateway control session establishment trigger message to the BPCF through the V-PCRF of the VPLMN, and the BPCF returns an acknowledgement message through the V-PCRF, and initiates a gateway control session flow to the H-PCRF.
- step 112 the BPCF provides a policy to the IP Edge.
- the UE when the UE dynamically selects the ePDG, the UE performs a DNS lookup using the VPLMN ID known by itself as the operator identity configuration FQDN to obtain the IP address of the ePDG in the VPLMN; however, the UE itself cannot be guaranteed.
- the known VPLMN ID is the same as the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the 3GPP AAA Proxy is located. That is, the ePDG selected by the UE and the 3GPP AAA Proxy cannot be located in the same VPLMN, and the V-PCRF selected by the EPC-routed and the V-PCRF selected by the NSWO are not guaranteed. the same one. Summary of the invention
- the embodiment of the present invention mainly provides a method, a system, and a device for a user equipment to select a public land mobile network.
- the UE accesses the 3GPP through the DSMIPv6 protocol
- the ePDG selected by the UE and the 3GPP AAA Proxy are located in the same VPLMN.
- the method for the UE to select the VPLMN is provided by the embodiment of the present invention.
- the method includes: the authentication server sends the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN selected by the UE to perform the access authentication to the UE, and the UE selects the core network of the VPLMN according to the VPLMN ID. And performing an IKEv2 tunnel establishment process with the core network element.
- the authentication server sends the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN selected by the UE when performing the access authentication to the UE:
- the authentication server is a verification, authorization, and accounting server (BBF AAA) of the broadband forum
- BBF AAA verification, authorization, and accounting server
- the BBF AAA receives the VPLMN ID sent by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting Agent (3GPP AAA Proxy) or the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the 3GPP AAA Proxy is located according to the communication peer address. Sending the VPLMN ID to the UE.
- the authentication server sends the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN selected by the UE when performing the access authentication to the UE:
- the authentication server is an HSS and/or a 3GPP AAA server.
- the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server saves the VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy.
- the HSS and the HSS And the 3GPP AAA server verifies whether the saved VPLMN ID is consistent with the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the core network element selected by the UE is located, and if not, the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server returns a reject message to the UE, and the reject message carries Reject the reason value and the VPLMN ID saved by itself.
- the core network element of the VPLMN is an ePDG or a P-GW.
- the UE selects a core network element of the VPLMN according to the VPLMN ID as follows: the UE constructs a full-quality domain name (FQDN) by using a VPLMN ID sent by the authentication server as an operator identifier, and performs a domain name system (DNS) search to obtain The IP address of the ePDG or P-GW in the VPLMN corresponding to the VPLMN ID.
- FQDN full-quality domain name
- DNS domain name system
- the method further includes: when the UE performs access authentication, the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server saves the VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy, and in the process of establishing the IKEv2 tunnel, the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server authenticates and saves itself. Whether the VPLMN ID is consistent with the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the core network element selected by the UE is located, and if not, the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server returns a reject message to the UE, the reject message carrying the reject cause value and/or itself The saved VPLMN ID.
- a system for selecting a VPLMN by a UE includes: an authentication server, a UE, and a core network element of a VPLMN;
- the authentication server is configured to send, to the UE, a VPLMN ID of the VPLMN selected by the UE when performing the access authentication;
- the UE is configured to: according to the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN sent by the authentication server, select a core network element of the VPLMN, and perform a process of establishing an IKEv2 tunnel with the core network element;
- the core network element of the VPLMN is configured to complete the process of establishing an IKEv2 tunnel.
- the authentication server is a BBF AAA, configured to receive a VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy or a VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the 3GPP AAA Proxy is located according to the communication peer address when the UE performs access authentication, and the VPLMN is configured.
- the ID is sent to the UE;
- the system further includes: a 3GPP AAA Proxy configured to send the VPLMN ID to the BBF AAA when the UE performs access authentication.
- a 3GPP AAA Proxy configured to send the VPLMN ID to the BBF AAA when the UE performs access authentication.
- the system further includes: an HSS and/or a 3GPP AAA server, configured to save the VPLMN ID when the UE performs the access authentication, and verify whether the saved VPLMN ID is the core selected by the UE during the establishment of the IKEv2 tunnel.
- the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the network element is located is the same.
- a reject message is returned to the UE, where the reject message carries the reject reason value and/or the VPLMN ID saved by itself.
- the authentication server is an HSS and/or a 3GPP AAA server, and is configured to save the VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy when the UE performs the access authentication, and verify whether the saved VPLMN ID is in the process of establishing the ⁇ 2 tunnel. Consistent with the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the core network element selected by the UE is located, when the inconsistency, the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server returns a reject message to the UE, where the reject message carries the reject reason value and the VPLMN ID saved by itself;
- the system further includes: a 3GPP AAA Proxy configured to send the VPLMN ID to the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server when the UE performs the access authentication.
- the core network element of the VPLMN is an ePDG or a P-GW.
- the UE includes: a network element selection module and a tunnel establishment module; wherein the network element selection module is configured to be based on the VPLMN sent by the authentication server
- VPLMN ID select the ePDG or P-GW of the VPLMN;
- the tunnel establishment module is configured to perform an IKEv2 tunnel establishment process with the ePDG or P-GW selected by the network element selection module.
- the network element selection module is configured to be sent by using an authentication server.
- the VPLMN ID constructs an FQDN as an operator identifier, performs a DNS lookup, and obtains the VPLMN.
- IP address of the ePDG or P-GW in the VPLMN corresponding to the ID is the IP address of the ePDG or P-GW in the VPLMN corresponding to the ID.
- the authentication server specifically includes: an ID obtaining module, a verification module, and a response module;
- the ID obtaining module is configured to save the VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy when the UE performs access authentication;
- the verification module is configured to verify, in the process of establishing the IKEv2 tunnel, whether the VPLMN ID saved by the ID obtaining module is consistent with the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the core network element selected by the UE is located, and if not, the notification response module returns a rejection to the UE.
- the response module is configured to return a reject message to the UE, where the reject message carries the reject cause value and the VPLMN ID saved by the ID acquisition module.
- a UE is provided by the embodiment of the present invention, where the UE includes: a network element selection module and a tunnel establishment module;
- the network element selection module is configured to select an ePDG or a P-GW of the VPLMN according to the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN sent by the authentication server;
- the tunnel establishment module is configured to perform an IKEv2 tunnel establishment process with the ePDG or P-GW selected by the network element selection module.
- An authentication server is provided by the embodiment of the present invention, where the authentication server includes: ID acquisition Module, verification module, response module;
- the ID obtaining module is configured to save the VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy when the UE performs access authentication;
- the verification module is configured to verify, in the process of establishing the IKEv2 tunnel, whether the VPLMN ID saved by the ID obtaining module is consistent with the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the core network element selected by the UE is located, and if not, the notification response module returns a rejection to the UE.
- the response module is configured to return a rejection message to the UE.
- the embodiment of the present invention provides a method, a system, and a device for a user equipment to select a public land mobile network.
- the authentication server sends a VPLMN ID of the VPLMN selected by the UE when performing the access authentication to the UE, and the UE uses the VPLMN.
- the ID selects the core network element of the VPLMN and completes the IKEv2 tunnel establishment process with the core network element.
- the ePDG selected by the UE and the 3GPP AAA Proxy are located in the same VPLMN.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a system architecture of an EPS in the prior art
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a home routing roaming architecture in a scenario of a policy interworking scenario in which a UE accesses a 3GPP core network through a BBF access network in the prior art;
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a home routing roaming architecture in a policy convergence scenario in which a UE accesses a 3GPP core network through a BBF access network in the prior art;
- FIG. 4 is a flow chart of attaching a UE to a 3GPP through the DSMIPv6 protocol in the prior art
- FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of a method for implementing a UE to select a VPLMN according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a system for implementing a UE to select a VPLMN according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 7 is a schematic flowchart of a method for a UE to select a VPLMN according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 8 is a schematic flowchart of a method for a UE to select a VPLMN according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention
- FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of a UE according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention
- the policy of accessing the 3GPP core network through the BBF access network Schematic diagram of the home route roaming architecture in a slightly intercommunication scenario
- FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of a home routing roaming architecture in a policy convergence scenario in which a UE accesses a 3GPP core network through a BBF access network according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention
- FIG. 11 is a schematic flowchart of a method for implementing a UE to select a VPLMN according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention. detailed description
- the authentication server sends the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN selected by the UE to the UE when performing the access authentication, and the UE selects the core network element of the VPLMN according to the VPLMN ID, and performs IKEv2 with the core network element. Tunnel establishment process.
- the embodiment of the present invention implements a method for a UE to select a VPLMN. As shown in FIG. 5, the method includes the following steps:
- Step 201 The authentication server sends the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN selected by the UE when performing the access authentication to the UE.
- the authentication server is a BBF AAA.
- the BBF AAA receives the VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy or obtains the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the 3GPP AAA Proxy is located according to the communication peer address.
- the VPLMN ID is sent to the UE;
- the authentication server is an HSS and/or a 3GPP AAA server.
- the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server saves the VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy.
- the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server verifies that the VPLMN ID saved by the UE is consistent with the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the core network element selected by the UE is located, and if not, the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server returns a reject message to the UE.
- the rejection message carries the rejection reason value and its own saved VPLMN ID.
- Step 202 The UE selects a core network element of the VPLMN according to the VPLMN ID, and The core network element completes an IKEv2 tunnel establishment process;
- the core network element of the VPLMN is generally an ePDG or a P-GW;
- the UE selects the core network element of the VPLMN according to the VPLMN ID, specifically: the UE uses the VPLMN ID sent by the authentication server as the operator identifier to construct the FQDN, performs a DNS lookup, and obtains the ePDG or P in the VPLMN corresponding to the VPLMN ID. -GW's IP address;
- the step further includes: when the authentication server is a BBF AAA, the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server saves the VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy, and in the process of establishing the IKEv2 tunnel, the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server Verifying that the saved VPLMN ID is consistent with the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the core network element selected by the UE is located. If not, the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server returns a reject message to the UE, where the reject message carries the reject cause value and/or Or the VPLMN ID saved by itself, if they are consistent, continue to establish an IKEv2 tunnel until the IKEv2 tunnel is established.
- the method further includes: after the UE and the ePDG complete the establishment of the IKEv2 tunnel, an IPSec tunnel is established between the UE and the ePDG;
- the method further includes: the ePDG initiates a gateway control session establishment procedure; the UE performs a Bootstraping process, and then sends a DSMIPv6 binding update message to the P-GW, and the P-GW establishes a binding context; the PCEF direction in the P-GW
- the H-PCRF sends an IP-CAN session establishment indication message; the H-PCRF performs QoS authorization according to the user identifier in the IP-CAN session establishment indication message, the UE's IP address, and the NSW0-APN, and returns an acknowledgement message to the PCEF in the P-GW.
- the P-GW returns a binding acknowledgement message to the UE; the H-PCRF sends a gateway control session trigger message initiated by the PCRF to the BPCF through the V-PCRF of the VPLMN, and the BPCF returns an acknowledgement message through the V-PCRF, and initiates a gateway establishment to the H-PCRF. Control the session flow; BPCF provides QoS policies to the IP Edge.
- an embodiment of the present invention further provides a system for a UE to select a VPLMN.
- the system includes: an authentication server 61, a UE 62, and a core network element 63 of the VPLMN;
- the authentication server 6 1 is configured to send the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN selected by the UE 62 when performing the access authentication to the UE 62;
- the UE 62 is configured to select a core network element 63 of the VPLMN according to the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN sent by the authentication server 61, and perform a process of establishing an IKEv2 tunnel with the core network element 63;
- the core network element 63 of the VPLMN is configured to complete the process of establishing an IKEv2 tunnel.
- the authentication server 61 is a BBF AAA configured to receive the VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy 64 when the UE 62 performs the access authentication, or obtain the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the 3GPP AAA Proxy 64 is located according to the communication peer address, and the VPLMN The ID is sent to the UE 62;
- the system further includes: a 3GPP AAA Proxy 64 configured to send a VPLMN ID to the BBF AAA when the UE 62 performs access authentication;
- the system further includes: an HSS and/or a 3GPP AAA server, configured to save the VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy 64 when the UE 62 performs the access authentication, and verify whether the saved VPLMN ID is related to the UE during the IKEv2 tunnel establishment process.
- the selected VPLMN ID of the VPLMN is the same as that of the selected network element 63, and returns a reject message to the UE 62 when the inconsistency occurs, and the reject message carries the reject reason value and/or the VPLMN ID saved by itself;
- the authentication server 61 is an HSS and/or a 3GPP AAA server, configured to save the VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy 64 when the UE 62 performs access authentication, and verify the saved VPLMN in the process of establishing the IKEv2 tunnel. Whether the ID is consistent with the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the core network element 63 selected by the UE 62 is located.
- the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server When the ID is inconsistent, the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server returns a reject message to the UE 62, and the reject message carries the reject cause value and the self-saved VPLMN ID;
- the system also includes a 3GPP AAA Proxy 64 configured to send a VPLMN ID to the HSS and/or 3GPP AAA server when the UE 62 performs access authentication.
- the core network element 63 of the VPLMN is generally an ePDG or a P-GW;
- the UE 62 specifically includes: a network element selection module 621 and a tunnel establishment module 622.
- the network element selection module 621 is configured to select an ePDG or a P-type of the VPLMN according to the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN sent by the authentication server 61.
- GW Gateway
- the tunnel establishment module 622 is configured to perform an IKEv2 tunnel establishment process with the ePDG or the P-GW selected by the network element selection module 621.
- the network element selection module 621 is configured to use the VPLMN ID sent by the authentication server 61 as an operator identifier to construct an FQDN, perform a DNS lookup, and obtain an IP address of an ePDG or a P-GW in the VPLMN corresponding to the VPLMN ID.
- the method includes: an ID obtaining module, a verification module, and a response module;
- the ID obtaining module is configured to: when the UE 62 performs access authentication, save the VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy;
- the verification module is configured to verify, in the process of establishing the IKEv2 tunnel, whether the VPLMN ID saved by the ID obtaining module is consistent with the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the core network element 63 selected by the UE 62 is located, and if not, notify the response module to the UE. 62. Returning the reject message; the answering module, configured to return a reject message to the UE 62, the reject message carrying the reject cause value and the VPLMN ID saved by the ID acquisition module.
- the embodiment of the present invention further provides a UE.
- the UE 62 includes: a network element selection module 621 and a tunnel establishment module 622.
- the network element selection module 621 is configured to select an ePDG or a P-GW of the VPLMN according to the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN sent by the authentication server 61.
- the tunnel establishment module 622 is configured to be selected with the ePDG or the network element selection module 621. The process of establishing an IKEv2 tunnel by the P-GW;
- the network element selection module 621 is configured to use the VPLMN ID sent by the authentication server 61 as an operator identifier to construct an FQDN, perform a DNS lookup, and obtain an IP address of an ePDG or a P-GW in the VPLMN corresponding to the VPLMN ID.
- the embodiment of the present invention further provides an authentication server, where the authentication server is an HSS and/or a 3GPP AAA server, and includes: an ID acquisition module, a verification module, and a response module;
- the ID obtaining module is configured to save the VPLMN ID sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy when the UE performs access authentication;
- the verification module is configured to verify, in the process of establishing the IKEv2 tunnel, whether the VPLMN ID saved by the ID obtaining module is consistent with the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the core network element selected by the UE is located, and if not, the notification response module returns a rejection to the UE.
- the response module is configured to return a reject message to the UE, where the reject message carries the reject reason value and/or the VPLMN ID saved by the ID obtaining module. Reason.
- the embodiment is based on the architecture diagram of FIG. 2 or FIG. 3, and the method for the UE to select the VPLMN is implemented in this embodiment. As shown in FIG. 7, the method includes the following steps:
- Step 301 The UE accesses the BBF access network, and performs 3GPP-based authentication.
- the 3GPP AAA Proxy returns the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the BVPMN is located or the BBF AAA of the VPLMN where the 3GPP AAA Proxy is located according to the communication peer address. ID, the BBF AAA sends the VPLMN ID to the UE;
- BBF AAA interacts with the 3GPP AAA server through the 3GPP AAA Proxy to complete the EAP authentication, and further, the 3GPP AAA server also The HSS interacts.
- BBF AAA further informs the IP Edge of the VPLMN ID
- the 3GPP AAA Proxy reports the VPLMN ID to the 3GPP AAA server or the 3GPP AAA server obtains the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the 3GPP AAA Proxy is located according to the communication peer address, and the 3GPP AAA server saves the VPLMN ID, and/or the 3GPP AAA server.
- the VPLMN ID is sent to the HSS, and the HSS saves the VPLMN ID.
- Step 302 The IP edge in the BBF access network allocates a local IP address to the UE, and performs a process of establishing an IKEv2 tunnel with the ePDG.
- the ePDG interacts with the 3GPP AAA server through the 3GPP AAA Proxy to complete EAP authentication.
- the UE selects the ePLG of the VPLMN according to the VPLMN ID sent by the BBF AAA: the UE constructs the FQDN by using the VPLMN ID sent by the BBF AAA as the carrier identifier, performs a DNS lookup, and obtains the IP address of the ePDG in the VPLMN;
- the 3GPP AAA server also interacts with the HSS.
- the step further includes: in the process of establishing the IKEv2 tunnel, the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server verify whether the saved VPLMN ID is selected by the UE.
- the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN is the same as the IKEv2 tunnel.
- the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server returns a refusal message to the UE. carry out;
- the UE sends an IKE authentication request (IKE_AUTH Request) to the ePDG, and the ePDG sends an AAR (Authentication and Authorization Request) message to the 3GPP AAA Proxy.
- the 3GPP AAA proxy sends an AAR message to the 3GPP AAA server, where the AAR message carries the 3GPP.
- the 3GPP AAA server After receiving the AAR message sent by the 3GPP AAA Proxy, the 3GPP AAA server will send the AAR message.
- the carried VPLMN ID and the 3GPP AAA server compare the VPLMN ID saved when the UE accesses the authentication or further request the HSS to obtain the VPLMN ID saved when the user accesses the authentication, and in the case of inconsistency, the authentication authorization returned to the 3GPP AAA proxy
- a refusal message is returned in the AAA, Authentication and Authorization Answer message, and the refusal message may carry a reject reason value, that is, the VPLMN selection is inconsistent, and the reject message may also carry the VPLMN ID selected by the UE when accessing the authentication, 3GPP AAA
- the MME sends the AAA message to the ePDG, and the ePDG sends an IKE authentication response (IKE_AUTH Answer) message to the UE.
- the IKE authentication response message carries the refusal indication and the rejection reason value, and the IKE authentication response message carries the UE access authentication.
- the BBF AAA does not send the VPLMN ID to the UE in step 301, but only in step 303, the refusal message returned by the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server carries the VPLMN ID saved by itself, triggering the UE to perform the re-execution.
- the ePDG is selected, and then steps 303-312 are performed.
- the embodiment is based on the architecture diagram of FIG. 2 or 3.
- the method for the UE to select the VPLMN is implemented. As shown in FIG. 8, the method includes the following steps:
- Step 401 The UE accesses the BBF access network, and performs 3GPP-based authentication.
- the 3GPP AAA Proxy returns the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the BVPMN is located or the BBF AAA of the VPLMN where the 3GPP AAA Proxy is located according to the communication peer address. ID, the BBF AAA sends the VPLMN ID to the UE;
- BBF AAA interacts with the 3GPP AAA server through the 3GPP AAA Proxy to complete EAP authentication. Further, the 3GPP AAA server also interacts with the HSS. BBF AAA further informs the IP Edge of the VPLMN ID;
- the 3GPP AAA Proxy reports the VPLMN ID to the 3GPP AAA server or the 3GPP AAA server obtains the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the 3GPP AAA Proxy is located according to the communication peer address, and the 3GPP AAA server saves the VPLMN ID, and/or the 3GPP AAA server.
- the VPLMN ID is sent to the HSS, and the HSS saves the VPLMN ID.
- Step 402 The IP Edge in the BBF access network allocates a local IP address to the UE, and performs a process of establishing an IKEv2 tunnel with the ePDG.
- the ePDG interacts with the 3GPP AAA server through the 3GPP AAA Proxy to complete EAP authentication.
- the ePLG of the VPLMN selected by the UE in the BBF AAA is:
- the UE uses the VPLMN ID sent by the BBF AAA as the operator identifier to construct the FQDN, performs a DNS lookup, and obtains the IP address of the ePDG in the VPLMN;
- the 3GPP AAA server also interacts with the HSS.
- the step further includes: in the process of establishing the IKEv2 tunnel, the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server verify whether the saved VPLMN ID is selected by the UE.
- the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the ePDG is located is consistent.
- the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server returns a reject message to the UE.
- the IKEv2 tunnel is continuously established until the IKEv2 tunnel is established.
- the UE sends an IKE authentication request to the ePDG
- the ePDG sends an AAR message to the 3GPP AAA Proxy
- the 3GPP AAA proxy sends an AAR message to the 3GPP AAA server, where the AAR message carries the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the 3GPP AAA Proxy is located
- the 3GPP AAA server receives the 3GPP AAA server.
- the AAA Proxy compare the VPLMN ID carried in the AAR message with the VPLMN ID saved by the 3GPP AAA server when the UE accesses the authentication, or further request the HSS to obtain the VPLMN ID saved during the user access authentication.
- the refusal message may be returned, and the refusal message may carry the refusal reason value, that is, the VPLMN selection is inconsistent, and the refusal message may also carry the VPLMN ID selected when the UE accesses the authentication.
- the 3GPP AAA Proxy forwards the AAA message to the ePDG, and the ePDG sends an IKE authentication response message to the UE.
- the IKE authentication response message carries the reject indication and the reject reason value, and the IKE authentication response message carries the VPLMN selected when the UE accesses the authentication. ID, where the cause value and the VPLMN ID can be delivered at the same time, or one of them can be issued.
- Step 404 triggered by step 403, the ePDG initiates a gateway control session establishment process. Specifically, the ePDG sends a gateway control session setup message to the H-PCRF through the V-PCRF, and carries information such as the IP address, user identifier, and PDN identifier of the UE; - The PCRF returns a confirmation message.
- Step 405 After the ePDG selects the P-GW, sends a DSMIPv6 binding update message to the selected P-GW, and the P-GW establishes a binding context.
- the binding update message carries CoA and HoA; in the binding message, the lifetime parameter is not zero.
- Step 406 The P-GW sends an update P-GW IP address message to the 3GPP AAA server, and sends the IP address of the P-GW to the 3GPP AAA server.
- the 3GPP AAA server further interacts with the HSS to save the address of the P-GW to the HSS.
- Step 407 The PCEF in the P-GW sends an IP-CAN session establishment indication message to the H-PCRF.
- the H-PCRF performs QoS authorization according to the user identifier in the IP-CAN session establishment indication message, the IP address of the UE, and the NSWO-APN. Returning a confirmation message to the PCEF in the P-GW;
- Step 408 The P-GW returns a binding acknowledgement message to the ePDG, and carries an IP address allocated to the UE.
- Step 409 the binding update is successful, and an IPSec tunnel is established between the UE and the ePDG.
- Step 411 triggered by step 404, the V-PCRF initiates a gateway control session establishment procedure. Specifically, in the architecture shown in FIG. 2, the H-PCRF sends a PCRF initiated gateway control session establishment trigger message to the BPCF through the V-PCRF of the VPLMN.
- the BPCF receives the trigger message, sends a gateway control session establishment message to the V-PCRF, and the V-PCRF returns an acknowledgement message, and initiates a gateway control session flow to the H-PCRF;
- the H-PCRF sends a PCRF-initiated gateway control session establishment trigger message to the IP Edge through the V-PCRF of the VPLMN to provide the local IP address of the UE; the IP Edge receives the trigger message to the V-
- the PCRF sends a gateway control session setup message, the V-PCRF returns an acknowledgement message, and initiates a gateway control session flow to the H-PCRF.
- Step 412 The BPCF or IP Edge returns an acknowledgement message to the H-PCRF.
- the BBF AAA does not send the VPLMN ID to the UE in step 401, but only in step 403, the reject message returned by the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server further carries the VPLMN ID saved by itself, triggering the UE to perform the re-run.
- the ePDG is selected, and then step 403-step 412 is performed.
- the embodiment is based on the architecture diagram of FIG. 9 or 10.
- the method for the UE to select the VPLMN is implemented. As shown in FIG. 11, the method includes the following steps:
- Step 501 The UE accesses the BBF access network, and performs 3GPP-based authentication.
- the 3GPP AAA Proxy returns the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the BVPMN is located or the BBF AAA of the VPLMN where the 3GPP AAA Proxy is located according to the communication peer address. ID, the BBF AAA sends the VPLMN ID to the UE;
- the 3GPP-based authentication is performed as follows: BBF AAA interacts with the 3GPP AAA server through the 3GPP AAA Proxy to complete EAP authentication. Further, the 3GPP AAA server also interacts with the HSS.
- BBF AAA further informs the IP Edge of the VPLMN ID; Further, the 3GPP AAA Proxy reports the VPLMN ID to the 3GPP AAA server or the 3GPP AAA server obtains the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the 3GPP AAA Proxy is located according to the communication peer address, and the 3GPP AAA server saves the VPLMN ID, and/or the 3GPP AAA server.
- the VPLMN ID is sent to the HSS, and the HSS saves the VPLMN ID.
- Step 502 The IP Edge in the BBF access network allocates a local IP address to the UE.
- Step 503 The UE performs a Bootstraping process, where the UE selects a P-GW of the VPLMN according to the VPLMN ID sent by the BBF AAA, and performs a IKEv2 tunnel establishment process with the P-GW.
- the P-GW interacts with the 3GPP AAA server through the 3GPP AAA Proxy to complete the EAP authentication.
- the P-GW of the VPLMN is selected by the UE according to the VPLMN ID sent by the BBF AAA: the UE uses the VPLMN ID sent by the BBF AAA as the operator identifier to construct the FQDN, performs a DNS lookup, and obtains the IP address of the P-GW in the VPLMN;
- the 3GPP AAA server also interacts with the HSS.
- the step further includes: in the process of establishing the IKEv2 tunnel, the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server verify whether the saved VPLMN ID is selected by the UE.
- the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN where the P-GW is located is the same.
- the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server returns a reject message to the UE. If the IKEv2 tunnel is established, the IKEv2 tunnel is established.
- the UE sends an IKE authentication request to the P-GW
- the P-GW sends an AAR message to the 3GPP AAA Proxy
- the 3GPP AAA proxy sends an AAR message to the 3GPP AAA server, where the AAR message carries the VPLMN ID of the network where the 3GPP AAA Proxy is located
- the server After receiving the 3GPP AAA Proxy, the server compares the VPLMN ID carried in the message with the VPLMN ID saved by the 3GPP AAA server when the UE accesses the authentication, or further requests the HSS to obtain the VPLMN ID saved when the UE accesses the authentication.
- the AAA message returned by the 3GPP AAA proxy returns a reject message, and the reject message may carry a reject cause value, that is, the VPLMN selection is inconsistent, and the reject message may also carry the VPLMN ID selected when the UE accesses the authentication, and the 3GPP AAA Proxy to P -
- the GW forwards the AAA message, and the P-GW sends an IKE authentication response (IKE_AUTH Answer) to the UE, where the message carries a rejection indication and a rejection reason value, and the IKE authentication response message carries the VPLMN ID selected when the UE accesses the authentication.
- the cause value and the VPLMN ID can be delivered at the same time, or one of them can be issued.
- Step 504 The UE sends a DSMIPv6 binding update message to the P-GW, where the P-GW establishes a binding context.
- the binding update message carries CoA and HoA; in the binding message, the lifetime parameter is not zero.
- Step 505 The PCEF in the P-GW sends an IP-CAN session establishment indication message to the H-PCRF.
- the H-PCRF performs QoS authorization according to the user identifier in the IP-CAN session establishment indication message, the IP address of the UE, and the NSWO-APN. Returning a confirmation message to the PCEF in the P-GW;
- Step 506 The P-GW returns a binding acknowledgement message to the UE.
- Step 507 triggered by step 504, the V-PCRF initiates a gateway control session establishment procedure.
- the H-PCRF sends a PCRF-initiated gateway control session establishment trigger to the BPCF through the V-PCRF of the VPLMN. a message, providing a local IP address of the UE; the BPCF receives the trigger message, sends a gateway control session establishment message to the V-PCRF, and the V-PCRF returns an acknowledgement message, and initiates a gateway control session flow to the H-PCRF;
- the H-PCRF sends a PCRF-initiated gateway control session establishment trigger message to the IP Edge through the V-PCRF of the VPLMN, and provides the local IP address of the UE; the IP Edge receives the trigger message to the V-
- the PCRF sends a gateway control session setup message, the V-PCRF returns an acknowledgement message, and initiates a gateway control session flow to the H-PCRF.
- Step 508 The BPCF or IP Edge returns an acknowledgement message to the H-PCRF.
- the BBF AAA does not send the VPLMN ID to the UE in step 501, but only in step 503, the reject message returned by the HSS and/or the 3GPP AAA server further carries the VPLMN ID saved by itself, triggering the UE to perform the re-execution.
- the P-GW selects, and then performs steps 503-508.
- the authentication server sends the VPLMN ID of the VPLMN selected by the UE to the UE when performing the access authentication, and the UE selects the core network element of the VPLMN according to the VPLMN ID, and completes with the core network element.
- the IKEv2 tunnel establishment process is performed. In this way, when the UE accesses the 3GPP through the DSMIPv6 protocol, the ePDG selected by the UE and the 3GPP AAA Proxy are located in the same VPLMN.
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Abstract
La présente invention concerne un procédé permettant à un équipement d'utilisateur (UE) de sélectionner un réseau mobile terrestre public visité (VPLMN). Selon l'invention, un serveur de certification envoie, à un UE, un ID de VPLMN d'un VPLMN qui est sélectionné lorsque l'UE effectue une certification d'accès, et l'UE sélectionne un élément de réseau central du VPLMN, conformément à l'ID de VPLMN, et exécute un flux d'établissement de tunnel de protocole d'échange de clé Internet version 2 (IKEv2) avec l'élément de réseau central. L'invention concerne également un système et un dispositif permettant à un équipement d'utilisateur de sélectionner un réseau mobile terrestre public visité. La solution de la présente invention permet de garantir qu'un élément de réseau central du VPLMN sélectionné par un UE se trouve dans un seul et même VPLMN en tant que mandataire de vérification, d'autorisation et de comptabilisation de projet de partenariat de troisième génération.
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US10485035B2 (en) | 2015-04-28 | 2019-11-19 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Adaptive peer status check over wireless local area networks |
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CN105208555B (zh) * | 2014-06-16 | 2020-01-14 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 集群业务注册方法及装置 |
WO2016186684A1 (fr) * | 2015-05-18 | 2016-11-24 | Intel IP Corporation | Dispositif, système et procédé de sélection d'une passerelle epdg hplmn préférée dans des scénarios d'itinérance |
US10237795B2 (en) * | 2015-10-11 | 2019-03-19 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Evolved packet data gateway (EPDG) reselection |
CN109587680B (zh) * | 2017-09-29 | 2021-11-30 | 华为技术有限公司 | 参数的保护方法、设备和系统 |
CN111163493B (zh) * | 2018-11-08 | 2022-08-19 | 中国电信股份有限公司 | 通信配置方法、系统和相关设备 |
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CN100512488C (zh) * | 2005-03-24 | 2009-07-08 | 华为技术有限公司 | 无线局域网向呈现系统提供呈现信息的方法及系统 |
WO2011052995A2 (fr) * | 2009-10-27 | 2011-05-05 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. | Procédé et système pour gérer la sécurité dans un système de communication mobile |
CN102224721A (zh) * | 2008-12-03 | 2011-10-19 | 松下电器产业株式会社 | 向访问网络链接或移交时的安全隧道建立 |
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CN102224721A (zh) * | 2008-12-03 | 2011-10-19 | 松下电器产业株式会社 | 向访问网络链接或移交时的安全隧道建立 |
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US10485035B2 (en) | 2015-04-28 | 2019-11-19 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Adaptive peer status check over wireless local area networks |
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