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WO2013131363A1 - Appareil et procédé de mise en œuvre de zone de stockage sécurisée - Google Patents

Appareil et procédé de mise en œuvre de zone de stockage sécurisée Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2013131363A1
WO2013131363A1 PCT/CN2012/081767 CN2012081767W WO2013131363A1 WO 2013131363 A1 WO2013131363 A1 WO 2013131363A1 CN 2012081767 W CN2012081767 W CN 2012081767W WO 2013131363 A1 WO2013131363 A1 WO 2013131363A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
data
area
identity authentication
memory
memory controller
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2012/081767
Other languages
English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
邵通
Original Assignee
Shao Tong
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Shao Tong filed Critical Shao Tong
Priority to CN201280071278.7A priority Critical patent/CN104169894A/zh
Publication of WO2013131363A1 publication Critical patent/WO2013131363A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
    • G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
    • G06F12/1416—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by checking the object accessibility, e.g. type of access defined by the memory independently of subject rights
    • G06F12/1425—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by checking the object accessibility, e.g. type of access defined by the memory independently of subject rights the protection being physical, e.g. cell, word, block
    • G06F12/1433—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by checking the object accessibility, e.g. type of access defined by the memory independently of subject rights the protection being physical, e.g. cell, word, block for a module or a part of a module

Definitions

  • the invention belongs to the field of information security.
  • the present invention relates to an apparatus and method for implementing a secure storage area. Specifically, it relates to an apparatus and method for how to hide or compatible identity authentication using a secure storage area.
  • USB disk storage Due to the portability and convenience of use, USB disk storage has received widespread attention and use. However, portability brings problems that are easy to lose. Therefore, how to use technical means to secure the information stored on the USB disk becomes an important issue.
  • the secure area 122 when used for storage, the information stored in the secure area 122 can also be encrypted and decrypted when read out; this method is called medium encryption.
  • the essence of this scheme is that when the memory controller 11 verifies by the identity authentication device 111 that the PIN code received from the computer 2 is correct, the use or transparent use of the secure area 122 (write encryption, read decryption) is opened.
  • computer 2 is also referred to as the host computer of memory 1.
  • the prior art problem with concealment is that a user who illegally obtains the memory can be sure whether the memory has a hidden area or a secure area.
  • a memory with a security zone you need to hide the fact that there is a security zone to improve security.
  • a further requirement is that there is a need for an information hiding memory with a secure hidden area;
  • At the software level there is no reliable way to detect if the memory has this hidden function.
  • This is a new information security issue and a technical issue that needs to be addressed.
  • the memory must have more than two areas.
  • the Patriot L8250 security U disk is implemented in exactly the same way as Figure 1; it has a security zone and a public zone.
  • the technical solution to be solved can be borrowed from the undisclosed "value-driven bomb” conceived by the inventors to hide the technical solution of attacking the computer system.
  • the "value-driven bomb” technical solution is simply that the internal logic of the computer CPU can be designed not to pass the privileged instruction to make the CPU enter the privilege level; or the CPU can analyze the data used by the CPU, and directly enter after satisfying the specific requirements. Privilege level. For example, if you extract a "good day” MP3 song from the CPU, the CPU enters the privilege level. So, it is a "value” driver. Something that was originally CPU was decompressed, but after encountering a specific "value", it entered the privilege level.
  • the "value-driven bomb” technology concept can be used for information security, especially in the field of information hiding. From hidden attacks to hidden protection.
  • the background art related to the present invention has an information setting technique.
  • the BIOS of a PC personal computer has a CMOS setting function.
  • the BIOS program When the PC is turned on, press the F2 key to enter the CMOS setup program.
  • the user can use the BIOS program to set various functions and status of the PC. For example, the order in which the hardware is booted, the time of the PC, the power-on password, and the configuration of various hardware.
  • a CMOS file is a configuration file. From a macro perspective, the value of a CMOS file is used to change the function or state of the computer. Configuring CMOS data is the PC itself.
  • the patented method does not include security means such as identity authentication, and anyone can set it up.
  • security means such as identity authentication
  • the most important point is that, like the CMOS settings of the PC, this setting can only be effective once when the USB flash drive is initialized; it cannot be changed or set after the USB flash drive enters the normal use state.
  • the difference from the PC CMOS setting is that the configured data comes from the host computer.
  • the host computer When the host computer uses these memories, it usually sends commands and then the memory responds; these commands are generally specified by the protocol of the external interface of the memory, or some special commands designed by the designer of the memory, called private commands;
  • the data in the read/write memory is a command from the host computer to read and write the address, and then the memory CPU dominates the reading and writing of the data of the storage medium, and transmits the data to (read) the host computer through the interface, or receives the upper computer. Data is written to the storage medium. That is, the host computer is MASTER (HOST), and the memory is SLAVE (DEVICE).
  • the external interface of the memory it can be divided into a U disk, an SD card, a SATA hard disk, an ATA hard disk, a TF card, an MMC card, and the like.
  • the DDR RAM memory memory
  • the basic function is also to read data through the address; however, there is basically no CPU-like independent computing capability chip inside it, and generally there is no programming chip for computing power in DDR RAM. Possible and necessary. Therefore, the memory in the specification of the present invention specifically means that in this type of memory, it has a CPU that operates independently, a corresponding software and a storage medium that runs on the CPU.
  • the CPU is simply referred to as a disk control or disk control chip, which we call a memory controller; the corresponding software running on the CPU is generally called disk control software or disk control firmware, or directly referred to as firmware.
  • the meaning of curing is not that it cannot be modified, but generally does not need to be modified.
  • the identity authentication device means that the device or person requesting the authentication exchanges data with the identity authentication device, so that the identity authentication device confirms that the device or person requiring authentication has special data or knowledge, and then gives the authentication result.
  • These exchanged data conform to certain protocols, called authentication protocols.
  • authentication protocols In the authentication protocol, there is a zero-knowledge authentication protocol that does not disclose information.
  • a relatively simple authentication protocol is the PIN authentication protocol.
  • the user has a PIN code, and the identity authentication device also has the same PIN code, or a converted PIN code (the cryptographic term is called salt).
  • the authentication process is that the user transmits the PIN code to the identity authentication device; then the identity authentication device compares and receives the PIN code and the identity authentication device.
  • the PIN code (or the transformed PIN code) stored in the middle gives the authentication result; the authentication is unanimously passed, and the inconsistent authentication fails. That is, the PIN code identity authentication device includes: a stored PIN code and a device for comparing the PIN code. Obviously, the PIN code authentication device may also include means for PIN code conversion.
  • an authentication protocol such as the "challenge-answer" mode. That is, the identity authentication device generates a random number and transmits it to the user; the user calculates the response number according to the random number, and transmits the response number back to the identity authentication device; the identity authentication device determines whether the random number is consistent or related according to the number of responses; Pass the relevant certification, otherwise it will not pass the certification. In fact, the identity authentication device can completely predict the correct number of responses, so the final step of this type of protocol is similar to PIN code identity authentication, which is to compare the user response data with the data in the identity authentication device; consistently or transformed to pass the authentication.
  • the PIN code identity authentication device in the present invention includes all of the types of identity authentication devices, which perform response comparisons in the last step of the protocol, and determine the authentication result based on the result of the comparison.
  • a normal memory (such as a USB flash drive) has only one zone, which we call a public zone.
  • a public zone can be multiple public areas. Public areas can also require identity authentication before they can be used.
  • the requirement of the invention is to add a security zone to the existing memory.
  • the security zone can be a logical area, a volume, a directory, a file, etc.; for convenience in the present invention, the security zone is a logical area or a logical disk.
  • the host computer uses the memory, it is a completely normal normal memory, that is, only the public area. This creates technical problems and how to solve the technical problems of using the safe area.
  • the existing conventional memory U disk is the memory 1 of FIG. 1 for canceling the identity authentication device 111 and the security area 122.
  • the method of implicitly giving the identity authentication data in the process of normal memory operation should be adopted; and after the identity authentication data passes the identity authentication, the hidden zone is opened for use.
  • Identity authentication is performed according to the order in which the upper computer reads and writes the sector address data of the common area of the memory.
  • the order can constitute authentication data, that is, "address value drive”. That is to say, the memory controller receives the read/write sector address data required by the host computer, and determines whether the order of the read/write address data satisfies the requirements of the identity authentication data and performs identity authentication while the read/write command is normally completed.
  • the solution generally requires special memory sector read/write software to enable reading and writing of these areas, the presence or absence of the read/write software may also indicate whether the memory has a security zone.
  • the corresponding reading and writing software must be developed according to different computer operating systems, otherwise it can not be used, and there is also a problem that compatibility is not ideal. That is, the solution is a technical solution for information hiding security zones, and there is great progress in hiding and compatibility compared with the prior art, but it is not the best solution.
  • a better method is to read the special sector of the common area or check the data of the special sector written by the host computer in the public area. For example, reading or checking the data written by the upper computer to the directory area in the file system of the storage common area; if the data contained in a file name (or directory name) in the directory area meets the data required for identity authentication, Identity authentication can be implemented; for example, if a file name (or directory name) is used as the PIN code, the memory controller can check the file name (or directory name) in the directory that meets the PIN code required by the security zone authentication. Authentication.
  • the method of inputting the authentication data is relatively simple and normal, and meets the requirements of the hidden identity authentication; that is, the host computer creates a file (or directory name) of a file name that satisfies the identity authentication requirement in the root directory area of the file system of the storage common area. To hide the identity authentication data or PIN code.
  • An apparatus for implementing a secure storage area comprising: a memory controller; a common area; at least one security area; an identity authentication device matching the security zone; wherein, when the memory controller checks operation data for the public zone, There is data conforming to the identity authentication requirements of the identity authentication device that matches the security zone, and the memory controller opens the use of the security zone; wherein the memory controller checks operational data for the public zone, including but not limited to: write data to the public zone Data read from the public area, existing data in the common area, data in the normal operation command of the public area (for example, address data in the read/write sector command), check on the status of the common area or the memory controller Data, etc.; that is, all data that the memory controller can obtain from the host computer and can check.
  • the security zone includes but is not limited to: a logical area, volume, directory, file Wait.
  • the memory controller checks the operation data for the common area, and may check the write data to the common area, or may check the data read from the public area, or may check the existing data of the public area, or may be The data in the normal operation command of the upper computer to the public area.
  • the identity authentication device matching the security zone is a PIN code authentication device, and when the memory controller checks the write data to the common area, the read data, the existing data, or the data in the normal operation command of the upper computer to the public area, The PIN code that matches the authentication device or the PIN code that is consistent after the conversion is included, and the memory controller uses the open security zone;
  • the memory controller also has cascaded trigger means for checking write data to a common area or data read from a public area;
  • the identity authentication device that matches the security zone is a PIN code authentication device.
  • the memory controller checks the data of the file system directory area of the public area, it finds that the PIN code that matches the authentication device or the PIN code that is consistent after the conversion is included.
  • the memory controller can be reset before it can be checked accordingly;
  • a method of using a secure storage area comprising: a memory controller checking operational data for a public area; and using an open security area when the operational data of the public area is authenticated by the identity;
  • the memory controller checks operational data for the common area, including but not limited to: write data to the public area, data read from the public area, existing data in the public area, data in normal operation commands to the public area (eg, , the address data in the read/write sector command), the data for checking the status of the common area or the memory controller, etc.; that is, all the data that the memory controller can obtain from the host computer and can check.
  • the security zone includes but is not limited to: a logical area, volume, directory, file, etc.
  • the memory controller checks the operation data for the common area, and may check the write data to the common area, or may check the data read from the public area, or may check the existing data of the public area, or may be Data in the normal operation command of the public area
  • the memory controller checks the write data to the common area or the data read from the common area, using a cascade trigger;
  • the memory controller checks that the operation data for the common area is performed when the memory controller is initialized; Further, the memory controller checks that the operation data for the common area is data of the public area file system directory area, and the data includes the existing data or the write data of the upper computer;
  • the memory controller checks the operation data of the common area to check the existing file data of the file in the public area, the write data of the upper computer to the memory, or the data read by the upper computer from the memory;
  • the memory controller checks that the operational data for the common area is all types of data obtained by checking the memory controller;
  • all types of data obtained by the memory controller include write data of the host computer to the memory, read data, state exchange data, address data in the read/write command, and data in a normal operation command of the common area;
  • identity authentication is PIN code authentication
  • the public area here is not an area where data cannot be hidden. Just for the convenience of description, it means that it is not the same area as the safe area. If the public area and the security area are in the same logical disk, it only means that they do not belong to the same logical area, folder or file.
  • the public area 121 has no functions such as read/write restrictions and media encryption, and the security area 122 needs to be authenticated by the identity authentication device 111 before it can be used normally;
  • Figure 2 shows a schematic view of a preferred embodiment 1, 4;
  • Figure 3 is a schematic view showing a preferred embodiment 2
  • Fig. 4 is a view showing a preferred embodiment 3.
  • a secure storage area device is shown as "secure memory 1" in FIG.
  • a device for secure memory 1 comprising: a memory controller 11; a common area 121; a security area 122; an identity authentication device 111 matching the security zone; a memory external interface 110; 11 is connected to the common area 121 and the secure area 122, and is connected to the computer 2 through the memory external interface 110; wherein, when the memory controller 11 checks the write data of the computer 2 to the common area 121 through the memory interface 110 (eg, directory data) It is found that there is data conforming to the identity authentication request of the identity authentication device 111 matching the security zone, and the memory controller 11 opens the use of the security zone 122, that is, the computer 2 can read and write the security zone.
  • the memory controller 11 checks the write data of the computer 2 to the common area 121 through the memory interface 110 (eg, directory data) It is found that there is data conforming to the identity authentication request of the identity authentication device 111 matching the security zone, and the memory controller 11 opens the use of the
  • the identity authentication device 111 is a PIN code identity authentication device.
  • the data required for the identity authentication of the identity authentication device 111 matching the security zone is the file name (or directory name) data in the root directory area of the public zone file system, and the data is used as the PIN code for identity authentication. It is apparent that as long as a certain file name (or directory name) is authenticated by the PIN code of the identity authentication device 111 in the root directory area, the memory controller 11 opens the use of the secure area 122 to the computer 2. Of course, the use of the open security zone 122 can use the public zone 121 at the same time, so that a logical disk must be added. You can also use the public area temporarily when using the security zone.
  • the identity authentication device 111 matching the security zone is a PIN code authentication device, and the legal PIN code is PSWD.TXT to further illustrate Embodiment 1.
  • a file named PSWD.TXT can be written by the computer 2 (or host computer) to the root directory of the secure memory 1 public area 121 file system; the computer 2 will be based on the public area 121 of the secure memory 1.
  • the file system specifies that the file name named PSWD.TXT and other related data are written to the root directory area of the public area 121 of the secure memory 1; the memory controller 11 obtains the root directory area according to the file system specification of the public area.
  • the memory controller 11 can obtain the names of all the files written in the root directory by checking the data written in the root directory area of the file system of the public area 121 of the secure memory 1, including the name of the PSWD.TXT file; The memory controller 11 sends all the obtained file names in the root directory to the identity authentication device 111 matching the security zone for identity authentication. Obviously, this also has the file name PSWD.TXT; since the file name of PWSD.TXT is bound to be It is sent to the identity authentication device 111 that matches the security zone, so the identity authentication device 111 However it will pass authentication; the memory controller 11 in accordance with the authentication result of the authentication device 111, 122 open the safe areas. Of course, the memory controller 11 also performs the same operation when writing a normal normal root file file, but since there is no PSWD.TXT file, it does not pass authentication; this is like writing a root directory file normally.
  • this check can be started only when the computer 2 writes the root directory to save the workload of the memory controller 11. Further, the memory controller 11 can also cause the PSWD.TXT file to be deleted in accordance with the provisions of the common area file system to prevent the PIN code from being leaked. That is to say, if the file or directory name of the directory area is read and read, the PIN code is given in a hidden manner. It is generally required that after using this PIN code, the PIN code should be cancelled; the essence is to delete or modify the file name or directory as the PIN code.
  • the user wants to change the password of PSWD.TXT to the 123456.TXT password.
  • the file with the file name of 123456.SET can be written first in the root directory of the file system of the public area 121 of the secure memory 1; then the computer 2 (or the host computer) is directed to the root directory of the file system of the secure memory 1 public area 121.
  • the computer 2 writes the name to the root directory area of the public area 121 of the secure memory 1 according to the definition of the common area 121 file system of the secure memory 1.
  • the data of the root directory area of the system can get the names of all the files written in the root directory, including the name of the PSWD.TXT file; the memory controller 11, sends the file names of all the obtained root directories to the identity matching the security zone.
  • the authentication device 111 performs identity authentication. Obviously, there is also a file name of PSWD.TXT. Since the file name of PWSD.TXT is necessarily sent to the identity authentication device 111 matching the security zone, the identity authentication device 111 must pass the identity authentication.
  • the memory controller 11 searches the root directory area for the file with the suffix ".SET" according to the result of the authentication by the authentication of the identity authentication device 111; when it finds that there is a file with the file name of 123456.SET, the memory control The device 11 changes the PIN code or the authentication for authentication in the identity authentication device 111 that matches the security zone.
  • the PIN code is 123456.TXT. This completes the replacement of the PIN code.
  • the hidden core problem is the identification of where and how to obtain the data required for authentication. It can be solved by checking the file name or directory name data of the directory area used in Embodiment 1, or other means can be used. Such as: data written to the public area, data read from the public area, status check of the public area or the memory controller, and the like.
  • the security zone 122 to be presented in the form of a logical disk. That is, the hidden disk is presented in the form of a logical disk. It is also possible to display two logical disks first, one of which is a public area and the other is a security zone; when it is not authenticated, security is not readable and writable; after authentication, the use of the security zone is directly opened. In this way, it is possible to use two zones at the same time, but the advantage of hiding the security zone is lost.
  • the user usage of this embodiment is: inserting a USB flash drive on the computer; using a computer to create a PIN code file on the root directory of the USB flash drive, is to create a file named PSWD.TXT; since PSWD.TXT is the security zone PIN code And passed the identity certification.
  • the computer can then use the security zone. That is, the security disk can be used on the computer.
  • a method of using a secure storage area comprising: a storage controller checking for a public The operational data of the zone; the use of the open security zone when the operational data of the public zone passes the identity authentication. It is the core of this method to check the use of "normal" data in public areas to achieve the use of open or secure areas after hidden or compatible authentication.
  • the operation data for the public area is checked, including but not limited to: write data to the public area, data read from the public area, existing data of the public area, data of status check of the public area or the memory controller, etc.; That is, it includes all the data that the memory controller can get from the host computer.
  • the security zone includes but is not limited to: a logical area, a volume, a directory, a file, etc. For security and convenience, checking the operational data for the public area may be performed when the memory controller is initialized. This also reduces the difficulty and strength of the memory controller.
  • a method of using a secure storage area comprising the steps of: entering initialization after power-on; reading data of a root directory area in a public area file system; providing all file names (or directory names) of the root directory area as a PIN code
  • the PIN code identity authentication device performs identity authentication; if there is a file name (or directory name) authenticated by the PIN code identity authentication device, it means that the authentication is performed, the open security zone is read and written (used); if there is not one in the root directory
  • the file name (or directory name) can be authenticated by the identity authentication device as the PIN code, and the authentication is not performed. Only the public area is read and written (used).
  • USB flash drive Secure Memory 1 consisting of a Z8HM2 chip (memory controller 11) and a MT29F32G08BA memory chip (4G, storage medium 12).
  • the storage space of the memory chip (MT29F32G08BA) of the USB flash drive is divided into two areas, a common area 121 (1G) and a security area 122 (3G).
  • the public area is formatted as a FAT16 file system and the security area is formatted as a FAT32 file system.
  • the format and standards of the FAT16 and FAT32 file systems are not described here.
  • the U disk control program in the Z8HM2 After powering up the U disk of the present invention, the U disk control program in the Z8HM2 first enters the initialization program module of the chip; in the initialization program module, the U disk control program is calculated according to the standard specification of the public area 121 file system (FAT16).
  • the location of the root directory of the public area in the memory chip (MT29F32G08BA); read the data of the root directory sector stored in the memory chip (MT29F32G08BA); then the U disk control program, all file names in the root directory of the file system (or directory name) is compared with the pre-stored PIN code (the file name is submitted as a PIN code to the PIN code identity authentication device 111 for identity authentication); if equal (the existence of a certain file name is authenticated by the PIN code identity authentication device 111, it indicates By authentication), the read/write function (use) of the open security zone 122; if none of the file names (or directory names) in the root directory are equal (as the PIN code does not pass the identity authentication of the identity authentication device 111), the authentication is not passed.
  • Open only public areas 121 read and write (use); then the U disk control program enters the wait state, waits for the USB command issued by the computer, and performs corresponding work according to the command; when the computer 2 connected to the U disk issues an inquiry according to the USB protocol, the U disk has When several logical disks (LUNs) and types are used, the U disk control program performs corresponding data echo according to the initialization result. If there is no identity authentication, the answer is only one LUN. At this time, the computer 2 considers that the U disk has only one logical disk. After passing the identity authentication, the U disk controller answers that there are 2 LUNs. At this time, the computer 2 considers that the U disk has 2 logical disks; and displays two drive letters, that is, the public area 121 and the security area 122. At the same time, the reading and writing and other operations of these two areas are opened.
  • LUNs logical disks
  • the above process is the work of the U disk initialization module. Then, the U disk controller enters the working module and waits. When the computer connected to the USB flash drive 2 issues a command according to the USB protocol format, the USB flash drive responds to the execution.
  • the U disk control program also has the function of checking the boundary according to the command of the computer to read and write the U disk, so that the USB command for reading and writing the public area cannot take the method of reading and writing across the boundary, and the data of the security zone is read to provide better security.
  • the user usage of this embodiment is: inserting a USB flash drive on the computer; using the operating system on the computer to create a PIN code file on the root directory of the USB flash drive (in the first embodiment, the file named PSWD.TXT is created); U disk; Insert U disk, because PSWD.TXT is the PIN code of the security zone, and passed the identity authentication.
  • the computer can then use the security zone. That is, you can see 2 mobile hard disks on the computer 2: security disk and security disk.
  • the PIN code can also be replaced by the method in Embodiment 1.
  • the file system of the security zone has nothing to do with the embodiment, that is, it can be any file system that can be used by the upper computer.
  • the core of identity authentication based on directory data in the public area is that the firmware of the memory controller must be able to analyze the directory data of the public zone, ie the firmware must be compatible with the file system.
  • the corresponding U disk public area file system includes but is not limited to FAT12, VFAT, FAT16, FAT32, CDFS, NTFS.
  • the corresponding file system includes but is not limited to EXT2, EXT3, JFS, NFS, RAMFS HPFS, CRAMFS FAT12, VFAT, FAT16, FAT32.
  • the USB flash drive may be a flash disk, a CF card, an MMC card, an SM card, an SD card, etc., but is not limited to the above mobile storage device.
  • the essence of the method of the present invention is that the data of the directory area is used as a PIN code to be provided to the identity authentication device; after the identity authentication, the use of the security zone is opened. Further, a plurality of security zones may be set; each security zone has a corresponding identity authentication method and device. Simply, they can all be PIN code authentication devices. In this way, the directory area data is checked, and the corresponding security zone is opened according to the corresponding PIN code authentication result. This increases the security scheme that implements multiple security zones, and achieves the hiding of the number of security zones. Embodiment 3 details the technical solution.
  • a device using a secure area is as described in connection with the secure memory 1 of FIG. Shown.
  • the secure area 121 corresponds to the identity authentication device 111; the secure area 122 corresponds to the identity authentication device 112.
  • the identity authentication devices 111 and 112 are both PIN code authentication devices, that is, the identity authentication devices 111 and 112 store PIN codes or PIN codes after salting.
  • the memory controller 11 checks the write data to the common area 123, it is found that there is data conforming to the identity authentication request of the identity authentication device 111 matching the secure area 121, the memory controller 11 opens the use of the secure area 121; when the memory is controlled When the device 11 checks the write data or the existing data to the common area 123, it is found that there is data conforming to the identity authentication request of the identity authentication device 112 matching the secure area 122, and the memory controller 11 opens the use of the secure area 122.
  • the data "when the memory controller 11 checks the write data or the existing data to the common area 123" in this embodiment may also be a file directory name or file name data.
  • the method of Embodiment 1 can also be adopted to replace the PIN: After passing the identity authentication, search for the root directory; look for the file with the suffix ".SET" to replace the PIN code.
  • the scenario shows the case of only two security zones, and it is clear that the authentication scheme applies to more than two security zones. For example, 5 security zones, so there are corresponding 5 PIN code authentication devices. This allows multiple security zones to be hidden, and there is no way for an attacker to confirm the actual number of security zones. Regarding the situation of multiple security zones, we will not go into details.
  • the security zone 121 may be opened by using the file name PIN code of the public zone, and then the security zone 122 may be opened by the file name PIN code of the security zone 121. This way, you can hide more safely.
  • this hidden method is to achieve multi-identity hidden authentication. It is a matter of course to choose a safe area based on the results of the certification. Of course, a more advanced identity authentication protocol such as zero-knowledge authentication can be used to implement multi-identity concealment authentication.
  • a device for using a secure area is as shown in the associated secure memory 1 of Figure 2.
  • the secure area 122 corresponds to the identity authentication device 111.
  • the identity authentication device 111 is a PIN code authentication device, that is, the identity authentication device 111 stores a PIN code or a salted PIN code.
  • the memory controller 11 checks the write data to the common area 123, it is found that there is data conforming to the identity authentication request of the identity authentication device 111 matching the secure area 122, and the memory controller 11 opens the use of the secure area 122.
  • the write data here can be the content written in the file.
  • directly checking the write data of all files is a very time consuming task and has no practical value.
  • a hardware engine can be used to speed up this inspection.
  • a more feasible approach is to check using the hardware of the cascade trigger. For example, suppose the cascade trigger of the memory controller It is Ql, Q2, Q3 and Q4; these four triggers constitute a cascade trigger device; we need to check whether there are 01H, 53H, 67H, 23H, 12H PIN code data sequences in all written data.
  • the hardware sets the Q1 flip-flop; when the Q1 flip-flop is set, checks the data that is subsequently written; if the data to be subsequently written is 53H, the Q2 flip-flop is set, otherwise the Q1 is reset. Trigger; When the Q1 and Q2 flip-flops are set, the data to be written is checked; if the data to be subsequently written is 67H, the Q3 flip-flop is set, otherwise the Q1 and Q2 flip-flops are reset. When the Ql, Q2, and Q3 flip-flops are set, the data that is subsequently written is checked.
  • the Q4 flip-flop is set, otherwise the Ql, Q2, and Q3 flip-flops are reset.
  • the Ql, Q2, Q3, and Q4 flip-flops are set, check the data that is subsequently written. If the data to be written next is not 12H, reset the Ql, Q2, Q3, and Q4 flip-flops; if the data to be written next is 12H, Indicates that the PIN code data sequence of 01H, 53H, 67H, 23H, 12H appears in the write data, and the memory controller 11 opens the use of the security zone 122. Any data mismatch will necessarily reset all triggers, and the write sequence check must be restarted. This realizes the work of judging whether there are 01H, 53H, 67H, 23H, 12H PIN code data sequences from all the written data, and realizes identity authentication.
  • the hardware that implements the above functions is very simple, so checking all the write data of the host computer to implement identity authentication is a technically fully implementable technical solution. For example, it is possible to write an MP3 song containing identity authentication data to the public area of the secure memory for identity authentication and use of an open secure area.
  • identity authentication can be implemented when the host computer reads the file containing the identity authentication data in the public area of the secure memory. For example, a song of a specific MP3 stored in a secure memory is played to implement identity authentication.
  • the essence of the invention is to use the various data of the public area to achieve identity authentication, and then open the use of the security zone.
  • the public area data that can be used is not limited to the data of the root directory, but also the data of a specific subdirectory, or the file name in a specific directory, or a file in a specific directory. Content, or even a specific version of a particular singer's song in a particular directory.
  • the specified data of any public area can be used as the identity authentication data for identity authentication; and the use of open security zones after authentication.
  • the data of any public area also includes any normal data for the operation of the public area, such as copying a specific song to the public area, the memory controller can check the written data of the song, such as the file path stored, the song title, The content of the song and so on. These data can be used as data for identity authentication.
  • the above method is described by using the PIN code authentication identity authentication device and the public zone directory area data for identity authentication. It also illustrates how to check the contents of the public area file to read and write, to illustrate the method of the present invention.
  • the present invention is not limited to use only one security zone; nor is it limited that the public zone and the security zone must be in different file systems; the undefined security zone must be a logical zone, which may be a volume, a directory, a file, etc.; Only use PIN code authentication; it is not limited to use only public area directory data for identity authentication; nor is it limited to use only the read and write data of the memory for identity authentication; nor is it limited to U disk, obviously can also be applied to TF card , SD card, memory in the phone, hard disk, and memory in the computer.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

L'objectif de la présente invention est de pourvoir à un appareil et un procédé de mise en œuvre d'une mémoire sécurisée. Une zone sécurisée existe dans une mémoire sécurisée, de sorte qu'un utilisateur non informé ne peut pas obtenir d'informations indiquant si la mémoire contient une zone cachée. De plus, des données d'exploitation normales sur une zone publique sont adoptées pour ouvrir et utiliser la zone cachée. Le procédé peut protéger la sécurité d'informations dans la mémoire, peut améliorer la capacité de protection de la confidentialité de la mémoire, et peut être largement appliqué à diverses mémoires telles qu'une carte SD, une carte TF, un téléphone mobile et un disque dur d'ordinateur. En même temps, étant donné que le procédé est indépendant du système d'exploitation, le procédé peut être compatible avec tout dispositif qui peut utiliser ces mémoires.
PCT/CN2012/081767 2012-03-09 2012-09-21 Appareil et procédé de mise en œuvre de zone de stockage sécurisée WO2013131363A1 (fr)

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US10073661B2 (en) * 2016-07-20 2018-09-11 Atmel Corporation Security extensions for non-volatile memory

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CN101276432A (zh) * 2008-05-20 2008-10-01 普天信息技术研究院有限公司 一种存储卡及其实现数字内容保护的方法
CN101308475A (zh) * 2008-07-15 2008-11-19 中兴通讯股份有限公司 安全移动存储系统及其使用方法
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CN101308475A (zh) * 2008-07-15 2008-11-19 中兴通讯股份有限公司 安全移动存储系统及其使用方法
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