WO2009157032A2

WO2009157032A2 - Electronic seal

Info

Publication number: WO2009157032A2
Application number: PCT/IT2009/000268
Authority: WO
Inventors: Giuseppe Fazio; Daniele Sacerdoti
Original assignee: Giuseppe Fazio; Daniele Sacerdoti
Priority date: 2008-06-24
Filing date: 2009-06-18
Publication date: 2009-12-30
Also published as: ITRM20080329A1; WO2009157032A3

Abstract

A seal formed by a physical element that can be characterized through electronically detectable parameters, parameters that vary their values after the violation of the seal. An example that can be find in the description chapter is an "Appropriate Seal" implemented using a particular kind of adhesive tape (Electronic Sealing Tape) that contains a particular dosage of glues. This tape, when applied to an element, it is impossible to remove without altering the electrical characteristics of some materials appropriately placed on the tape or in the tape. An electronic device (SC) capable of "reading" continuously the electrical characteristics of the materials of the Seal and capable of communicating with an electronic seal external terminal system, eventually in contactless mode. An Electronic Seal External Terminal System (ESET) used for the interaction with the Seal Controller.

Description

TITLE OF INVENTION: "ELECTRONIC SEAL" DESCRIPTION

The invention we are proposing is composed by 3 different items that combined together and used in specific operative procedures compose can provide "seal services" to different users. Part of the items indicated in this document are commercially available but not yet used in combination with the other to provide the global functionalities we aim to provide with this invention

Characteristic unique of the system that we intend to patent is his very reliable capabilities to detect seal tampering attempts.

The possibilities to verify the status of the seal in quick automated manner, the low cost against the traditional lead seal are granted if the items and procedures described in the documents are followed together.

The following description is formed by four separate sections:

A. In the first it is described the component "Appropriate Seal" implemented using the "Electronic Sealing Tape".

B. In the second it is described the electronic subsystem named "Seal Controller".

C. In the third it is described the electronic subsystem named "Electronic Seal External Terminal System". _<

D. In the fourth are described the use procedures.

A- APPROPRIATE SEAL - ELECTRONIC SEALING TAPE

A schema of a prototype of the Electronic Sealing Tape can be found in Fig. 1. Fig. 1 is a bottom view of the Electronic Sealing Tape, and it shows the layers that form the

Electronic Sealing Tape:

A. Final protective coating. B. Conductive strip.

C. Intermediate insulating layer.

D. Insulating surface contact.

E. Resistive strips.

A transversal section of the Electronic Sealing Tape can be found in the Fig. 2, in which the layers are labelled as in Fig. 1 with the addition of layer F that represents the sealed container.

If we imagine an adhesive tape in which the glue is sturdier than the structure of the tape itself, we can say that, in such situation, it is very difficult, if not impossible, removing the tape without destroying it after the first placement.

So we can imagine depositing one or more conductive strips (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 E), extremely fragile, on the bottom adhesive section. We imagine executing the deposition through the use of a technique that makes impossible the exact prediction of the characteristics of the conductive strips (Example: conductor formed by elements such as a strip of coal powder). In this way it is impossible to state a priori the exact final value of resistance (and/or the value of other electrical parameters such as capacitance, inductance, etc.) that we will obtain at the extreme position of the obtained strip.

During the deposition of the glue, as an additional caution, we can alternate sections in which the graphite of the conductive strip is more hardly glued to the tape and sections in which the glue is stronger towards the surface of the element on which the seal is applied. This modality of glue deposition makes easier the possibility of destruction of the strips in case of unauthorized access.

As another additional caution it is possible the placement of the above mentioned resistive strips using random paths towards the borders of the adhesive tape and eventually can be put more strips under the tape itself (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 E).

It's obvious that it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, altering or replacing the tape without causing a variation of the electrical characteristics of the conductive strip made in such way.

Obviously if the surface of the element that must be sealed is conductive it will be necessary the placement, between the conductive strip and the element, of an additional extremely fragile insulating tape (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 D) glued using a glue extremely strong towards the container, and instead using the above mentioned differential gluing system (high adhesive sections alternated with low adhesive sections) towards the tape/conductive strip block. This layer must be fragile for avoiding the removal of the entire sealing tape without altering the electrical characteristics of the inner elements of the tape.

An additional layer of conductive material (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 B) shall be placed above the before mentioned tape. Finally there will be a final insulating layer for the protection of the tape (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 A).

Eventually a similar structure can be obtained through the stacking of various kinds of tapes implementing one or more of the layers described above, reminding that the layer identified by the D letter is necessary only if the surface of element that must be sealed is conductive.

Similar performances can be obtained using a different number of the layers and/or layers with different composition, but the showed concepts must always be followed.

It is obvious that if a tape made using the described techniques is applied and then the final resistance of the incorporated resistive strips (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 E) is measured, so it is extremely improbable that the tape could be altered or substituted using equivalent resistances avoiding the activation of a repetitive and continuous resistance measurement system and the consequent alarm production.

It is even more improbable the execution of such an unauthorized alteration if other characteristics of the applied tape would be measured, characteristics like the capacitance between the conductive strips (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 E) and the conductive layer (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 B) or also other parameters like inductance, etc.

Extensions of this system could be implemented inserting in the tape other electronic components which parameters should be continuously monitored, elements like active components, etc.

B- SEAL CONTROLLER (SC)

The apparatus is formed by an electronic device that can generate random parameters

(or ciphering keys); that can exchange information with an external ESET systems; that can continuously measure the electric parameters of the above mentioned Appropriate

Seal; that can memorize the generated random parameters; that can record, if necessary, other information like the number of received interrogations, the time of such interrogations and the time of the initial seal, etc.

How the apparatus works:

After the turning on or the Reset the apparatus waits for some seconds and then waits the recognition of a "stationary" situation of the measure of the monitored electrical parameters for some seconds. The stationary situation means that the physical placement of the "Appropriate Seal" is completed.

The device waits and expects an "activate Seal" command by the ESET control terminal, a command that is received only if the parameters' stationary measurement conditions are verified.

After the command acknowledgement, if the tape parameters are stationary, specific random codes are produced and sent to the ESET system (or produced by the ESET system and acquired by the SC). The sending action will not be repeated until the next

"activate Seal" command, in which case the parameters will be obviously new and related to the next sealing operation, because of the breaking of the previous seal. If the

SC has an internal clock (optional) or it is able to receive the information from the ESET system then it will be possible to record the time of the sealing operation.

So in the apparatus the ciphering/deciphering random codes are recorded (some of them are copied and sent to the ESET system) and eventually additional information like the sealing time.

The measurement parameters¹ values are recorded in the apparatus when they are measured after the receiving of the activation command.

After the activation and the information exchange with the terminal, the device monitors continuously the control parameters, revealing their main variations. If the values differ from the recorded values the apparatus detects the intrusion attempt and erases definitively all the internal memory cells in which the precedent codes were stored (seal breaking).

The external interrogation of the seal state is made sending to the SC an appropriate command through the ESET system, using the random codes produced in the sealing phase (the produced codes¹ number and use modes can be several, and they can be generated by different objects (ESET system or SC); it is possible the generation of two copies of public and private keys: on the SC will there be a personal private key (called

PKPRSC) and a public key (called PKPUSTE) related to the second private key (called

PKPRSTE) that will be stored in the ESET system together with the ESET public key

(called PKPUSC); it is possible the circulation of the PKPUSC on the reading points and the use of the PKPUSC for the reading of the sealing time that is ciphered using the

PKPRSC; it is possible to use the other couple of keys for authorizing the commands received by the SC, authorizing them only if they are detected as ciphered using the

PKPRSTE).

Answering the interrogation the E.S. system can give information that grant the seal integrity, like:

1. sealing time and date; 2. number of previous interrogations;

3. ciphered integrity code that must be deciphered using the PKPUSC.

The integrity code can be an unique code or can vary for each external interrogation and it is generated as a ciphering made through PKPRSC.

The evolution of the integrity codes and of the other information can descends from additional necessities tied to the recording of other information that support the tracking of travelling goods, tied to the verification of interrogations made by security services that perform periodical inspections for detecting intrusions in places, etc. or tied to the monitoring of "inspection" attempts to the device made by third parts for verifying how it works.

The reason why it is useful the generation of different integrity codes at each interrogation is that is necessary avoiding possible "pirate" records of the data interchange made for wrong objectives like frauds.

If the clock is present the use of the time and date for the integrity code generation avoids any attempt of using "pirate" records between the E. S. and the terminal. This features comes from the fact that the only way for generating the correct code at the control time is through the use of the starting ciphered codes, the time and the calculation algorithm. Other previously generated codes, at the changing of the control time becomes in this way automatically inactive.

Other device's refinements can consists in mechanisms like codes and internal information' cancellation after a certain number of integrity checks or after a determined time without integrity checks or other again depending on the use and the elaboration capabilities of the SC.

Another caution can be used realizing the registers, in which the system memorize the random codes, used as fundamental elements for the generation of the integrity codes, in dynamic memory cells, so any malfunction of the system will lead to the automatic, irreversible destruction of the codes. The solution of the use of dynamic memory cells for the codes storage must include, obviously, a "refresh" system of the stored information, and if the refresh is conditioned by the tape's parameters invariance verification we will obtain an higher "security" level for the apparatus.

The SC system is realized in a very compact way and it has the terminals for the measure of the "Appropriate Seal" on the top side, so the correct connection of the tape will result simplified.

The electrodes may be realized for piercing automatically the lower insulating layers of the tape.

If dimensions and placement are accurately selected, the tape itself can connect the SC system to the container and can contemporaneously build the correct contact.

The system is realized in the way in which the tape can entirely cover the E.S. system for automatically protecting it against intrusion attempts.

If the "Appropriate Seal" is made by the "Electronic Sealing Tape" it can be useful the construction of appropriate tools for the cutting of the tape, tools able to remove the last section of the paths or of the conducting layer.

The SC system can also provide, in a non-ciphered way, an identification number that can be used for following the containers' handling and for identifying more easily the container which seal must be checked for integrity.

The SC system can be realized as an automatic alarm generator in case of seal breaking.

C - ELECTRONIC SEAL EXTERNAL TERMINAL SYSTEM (ESET System)

The ESET system is used in the sealing phase, in the seal verification, when information must be added to the SC (for travelling goods, for example).

It is formed by a terminal, a video interface (LCD) or equivalent, a system of communication with SC, eventually by a system of net communication. It gives the "sealing'Vreset command, receives or sends the ciphering words to the SC, the sealing or reading time, other useful information.

During the seal status interrogation it reads information like the sealing date and the number of previous interrogations and the integrity code.

It has a memory in which random codes can be stored and it has a software similar to the software with which the SC can generate the integrity code from the random codes.

It can have a net linking for receiving form the net itself, in a ciphered way, the codes generated in the sealing phase and recorded by another terminal.

D - USE PROCEDURES

After the application of the SC system to the element that must be sealed (envelope, box, container, door, car, etc.) the "Appropriate Seal" placement occurs. If for example the Electronic Sealing Tape is used the SC system must be covered with the tape and the correct contacts between the resistive and conductive paths and the appropriate parameters' measure electrodes placed on the top side of the SC system must be assured . If the conductive shield is made with a second tape then the tape must be applied also to it.

The SC system is started and contemporaneously the random parameters (or ciphering keys) are generated and also the time is recorded on SC and ESET systems.

These values are communicated using a safe and ciphered way to the subjects in charge of the receiving and control or in charge of the tracking (in case of travelling goods).

When the seal is opened or verified eventual unauthorized access or service information are verified.

The integrity code can be provided different for each individual reading for avoiding its detection through pirate devices and its reproduction through a false seal.

If the "Appropriate Seal" is made with "Electronic Sealing Tape" that works on resistive parameters then two different placement approaches can be adopted:

- the first, that is better for smaller elements, consists in the complete wrapping of the element through the tape. In this case it is convenient the monitored parameters' verification using connections at the extreme positions of the tape.

- The second, better if the tape is applied only on an area that can be opened of the element, consists in the use of the Sealing Tape in which two "resistive strips" are short-circuited a the extreme position opposite to the side in which the SC system is applied.

In this case the short circuit can be realized using custom-made appropriate adhesives glued on the container surface, adhesives that have on the top side two terminals that creates the short circuit on a tape placed above them.

A variant of this second case consists in the realization of Sealing Tapes of fixed length with the two "resistive strips" short-circuited at one of the extreme positions.

Another variant consists in the substitution of the short circuit with resistors of high enough resistance placed at regular intervals alongside the tape. This solution makes look the circuit, if electrically inspected from the extreme position at which the SC system is attached, as a cascade of resistive rings. If the number of rings is low the tampering of any of them can be revealed at the extreme position at which the SC system is attached. This solution allows the use of a continuous tape and besides the length of the tape can be simply decided cutting it when it must be applied.

The placement of the Sealing Tape using the two above described modalities, ring or open circuit, may require the two different kinds of SC systems for the electrodes placement.

CONCLUSIONS

We described a system formed by several interoperating elements that can grant performances inclusive of but better (further information checks and memorization are possible) than the performances offered before by sealing-wax systems or similar.

This system allows an easy application for every type of container from small envelopes for documents to large containers to houses, to doors, etc.

The described systems gives an answer to the growing security requests in various areas.

The functioning is based on the deposition of a structure, that must be applied on the container that must be sealed, in which there are materials that have electrical characteristics that vary in an evident fashion after even a very small attempt of detachment between the structure itself and the application surface, the variation of this electrical characteristics is monitored by an electronic system, which in case of a significative variation erases random codes stored in it (seat opening).

An example structure has been designed using a simple and cheap multi-layer adhesive tape, that destroys itself after every tampering attempt.

We designed the SC electronic system in a way in which it can be placed under the tape for defending also itself against tampering attempts.

An hypothesis of example of the seal integrity codes has been made using particular care, in fact the codes vary from time to time and accordingly with the time, and so they can't be cloned after eventual "pirate" recordings of the seal integrity interrogations.

We showed, for demonstration purposes, possible use procedures.

The objective of having a low-cost system simply usable even by non-specialist staff has been pursued using particular care.

Claims

CLAIMS"ELECTRONIC SEAL" system,

1. "ELECTRONIC SEAL" system described in its components and implementation variants in the present document;

2. Electronic seal based on the joint use of H/W and S/W techniques and continuous measurement of environmental parameters for the control of the burglary attempt for making certain the integrity (or the not integrity) of the seal itself and so the opening (or not) of the element to which the seal is applied.

3. The use of "random codes" placed on the seal that, once erased, after a detected burglary, are no more present in the seal itself and so they can't be absolutely detected anymore.

4. Continuously measurement of the electrical parameters of the seal for avoiding the possible substitution of the seal using elements with the same electrical characteristics without the detection by the electronic systems and the consequent deletion of the codes of the claim 3.

5. Measurement of electrical parameters like resistance, capacitance and inductance of the Appropriate Seal for verifying the tampering of the Appropriate Seal itself used for the use described in the precedent claim;

6. Coding variable at every System status interrogation realized through an apposite algorithm that uses the hidden codes and eventually the time for protecting the message against undesired recordings and for providing information about the "life" of the element of the Electronic seal for the use in the context of the precedent claim;

7. Definitive deletion of one or more internal codes and eventual other data stored in case of Appropriate Seal breaking and/or when interrogation or reading attempts occur that aren't considered acceptable for representing the situation in the context of the precedent claim;

8. Memorization of codes and other eventual internal data on dynamic memories which refresh is conditioned by the invariance of the electrical parameters of the electronic sealing tape in the context of systems of the precedent claim;

9. Appropriate Seal formed by Electronic Sealing Tape that incorporates strips of a material that can be electrically monitored (resistance, capacitance, inductance ) and conductive surfaces that can be used in the electronic seal system of the previous claims or in other security systems;

10. Placement of the SC electronic system under the Appropriate Seal (Electronic Sealing Tape) for automatically protecting it against possible burglaries in contexts of the previous claim;

11. Different glue dosage for the various sections and layers of the tape of the previous claims for having the certainty of altering the components and materials of which electrical and non electrical parameters are measured in case of burglary attempt for the purposes of the previous claims;

12. Measurement of electrical parameters, of active elements embedded in Tapes or in adhesive surfaces for verifying the tampering of packages, envelopes, etc. for various containers for the use for the purposes of the previous claims.