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WO2009000111A1 - Procédé servant à authentifier deux entités, dispositif électronique correspondant et système - Google Patents

Procédé servant à authentifier deux entités, dispositif électronique correspondant et système Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2009000111A1
WO2009000111A1 PCT/CN2007/002010 CN2007002010W WO2009000111A1 WO 2009000111 A1 WO2009000111 A1 WO 2009000111A1 CN 2007002010 W CN2007002010 W CN 2007002010W WO 2009000111 A1 WO2009000111 A1 WO 2009000111A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
authentication information
information item
nonce value
message
entity
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2007/002010
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Ganda Wijaya
Original Assignee
Gemalto Sa
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Gemalto Sa filed Critical Gemalto Sa
Priority to PCT/CN2007/002010 priority Critical patent/WO2009000111A1/fr
Publication of WO2009000111A1 publication Critical patent/WO2009000111A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/12—Transmitting and receiving encryption devices synchronised or initially set up in a particular manner
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless

Definitions

  • the invention relates, in a general manner, to a method for authenticating two entities which have to communicate with each other.
  • the invention also relates to an electronic device for authenticating an external entity
  • the invention relates to an electronic system comprising one electronic portable device for authenticating a host device cooperating with it,
  • the present invention relates to a method for authenticating two entities, for example when a synchronization protocol for data communication is utilized for communication of data between e.g. a client and a server.
  • SyncML a standardized synchronization protocol
  • a standard is notably defined by "SyncML Specification” accessible on the site of the "Open Mobile Alliance", at the following Internet address: http ://www.openmobilealliance.org/tech/affiliates/syncml/syncmlindex.html.
  • the SyncML Specification specifies notably an authentication protocol that can be used for both client and server authentication. It is possible for a server to start a synchronization session by sending a notification message from the server to a client.
  • the notification message includes a so-called server digest, as an authentication information item.
  • the digest is generally a result from an encryption algorithm that has been executed by using a nonce value.
  • the word "nonce” is a single number to be used only once by an entity involved within a communication for one and the same session of communication.
  • the client has to authenticate the server before launching an exchange of data to be shared by the client and the server. To do this, the client generates a client digest by executing the encryption algorithm by using a client nonce value.
  • the client compares the server digest with the client digest. If the client digest and the server digest are different due to the fact that the nonce values are different, then the authentication fails on the client side. Since the authentication has failed, the client does not launch any synchronization session.
  • a major disadvantage of the SyncML authentication protocol just described hereinabove is that, in such a case, the exchange of data between the client, as one entity, and the server, as another entity, is stopped.
  • the invention eliminates such a major disadvantage by providing a method for authenticating two entities that have to exchange data.
  • an entity that receives, within a message, another entity digest based on an originator nonce value, sends back to the originator, another message that includes a recipient nonce value to be used for authenticating the originator of the first message. More particularly, the invention is a method for authenticating two entities.
  • a first entity sends to a second entity a first message comprising at least one authentication information item, as a first authentication information item.
  • the first authentication information item depends on at least a first nonce value.
  • the second entity sends to the first entity a second message, as a response to the first message.
  • the second message comprises a second nonce value to be used by the first entity to determine another authentication information item, as a second authentication information item.
  • the principle of the invention is, therefore, that a recipient of the first message sends to its originator another message indicating a recipient nonce value to be used to execute an authentication algorithm.
  • the recipient of the first message may play any role and be either a client or a server.
  • the originator of the first message may be respectively either a server or a client.
  • the two entities will use one and the same nonce value, the one provided by the recipient of the first message, to calculate an authentication result on both sides. Consequently, the authentication results obtained on both sides are identical and allow to continue the communication between the two involved entities, since the authentication is successful. For instance, the two entities are then permitted to launch a synchronization session.
  • the invention is an electronic device for authenticating another external device.
  • the device comprises communication and processing means.
  • the device comprises means for receiving a first message that includes at least one authentication information item, as a first authentication information item.
  • the first authentication information item depends on at least a first nonce value.
  • the communication and processing means of the device are configured to send to the external device, as a response to the first message, a second message that comprises a second nonce value to be used by the external device to determine another authentication information item, as a second authentication information item.
  • it can be a user device like, for example, a mobile telephone, a PDA (acronym for Personal Digital Assistant), a personal computer, or a mobile laptop.
  • the invention is a system comprising one portable device for authenticating a host device.
  • the host device cooperates with the portable device.
  • the host device comprises a communication interface for communicating with the portable device.
  • the host device comprises communication and processing means.
  • the host device comprises means for receiving from the portable device a first message which comprises at least one authentication information item, as a first authentication information item.
  • the first authentication information item depends on at least a first nonce value.
  • the communication and processing means of the host device are configured to send to the portable device a second message, as a response to the first message.
  • the second message comprises a second nonce value to be used by the portable device to determine another authentication information item, as a second authentication information item.
  • a host device it can be, for example, a mobile telephone, a PDA, a personal computer, or a mobile laptop.
  • a portable device can be any electronic device comprising at least a microprocessor and comprising at least one memory or being connected to one memory.
  • the portable electronic device is intended to cooperate with a host device to execute a function on behalf of the host device.
  • it can constitute a token, a dongle of the USB (acronym for "Universal Serial Bus") type, or any other electronic support that may have different forms.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a simplified diagram of an embodiment of an electronic system comprising a mobile phone and a SIM card and being adapted to provide authentication according to the invention
  • FIG. 2 is a flow chart of an exemplifying method for authenticating two entities comprised within the system of figure 1 ;
  • Figure 3 illustrates a message flow between a client and a server, as the two entities implementing the method for authenticating of figure 2.
  • FIG. 1 shows an electronic system 10 comprising a mobile telephone 12, as the electronic user apparatus, and a SIM (acronym for "Subscribed Identity Module”) card 14 or the like, as a local server.
  • SIM an electronic system 10 comprising a mobile telephone 12, as the electronic user apparatus, and a SIM (acronym for "Subscribed Identity Module") card 14 or the like, as a local server.
  • the SIM card 14 is inserted within the mobile telephone 12.
  • the microprocessor controls and communicates with all the components of the SIM card 14, such as the memories to read them and possibly write into them.
  • the SIM card 14 communicates with the mobile phone 12 via a bidirectional way 13 through a contact interface (not shown) of the type ISO 7816 (for « International Standard Organization »).
  • the mobile telephone 12 has also a contact interface of the type ISO 7816 to cooperate with the SIM card 14.
  • the mobile phone 12 has an antenna 11 to communicate over the air 15 through a telecommunication network 16 to a distant server 17.
  • the telecommunication network 16 is adapted to implement a 2G
  • Acronym for a second generation network i.e. GSM for "Global System for Mobile communications" mode
  • 3G acronym for a third generation network, i.e.
  • UMTS for "Universal Mobile Telephone System” mode and/or CDMA (acronym for a "Code Division Multiple Access”).
  • Other distant servers (not shown) can be accessible through other links.
  • a server within a PC is accessible from the phone through a short range radiofrequency link, like Bluetooth, or a server within another mobile phone through an infrared interface.
  • the mobile phone 12 includes a microprocessor and volatile and non volatile memories (not shown).
  • a user accesses to the mobile telephone 12 through a man machine interface, in order to be able to exploit, at least in part, one or several services accessible from the SIM card 14 through the mobile telephone 12.
  • the user may interact with the man machine interface and operate the mobile phone 12.
  • the man machine interface comprises a display 18, a keypad 19, a loudspeaker
  • the mobile phone 12 is adapted to communicate data to the SIM card 14, as a local server, and to the distant server 17, by using the standardized synchronization protocol such as "SyncML".
  • the data thus exchanged provide interoperable service enablers working across countries, operators and mobile terminals.
  • Data that may be concerned may be of any type, and notably including phone book, contacts, emails and agenda.
  • the mobile phone 12 and the SIM card 14 provide both an authentication function.
  • client and server are adapted to implement a single authentication algorithm known as MD5 (acronym for
  • the authentication algorithm has, as input, an own nonce, as one parameter, to calculate one corresponding digest.
  • the digest is, as known per se, an encrypted data constituted by the result of a hash of the user name, his password and the nonce.
  • the encrypted data includes 16 bytes of hexadecimal data.
  • the nonce is a pseudo-random, or the like, to be used only once by the entity that implements the invention method for authenticating the correspondent entity before exchanging data within a single communication session.
  • the SIM card 14 should share the same nonce value with the mobile phone 12.
  • a distant server (not shown) that is controlled by an operator provides, through the telecommunication network, on the one hand, the SIM card 14 with a nonce value, and on the other hand, the mobile phone 12 with a nonce value.
  • the SIM card 14 and the mobile phone 12 are configured through a Device Management, as known per se.
  • the authentication algorithm of the SIM card 14 has a SIM card nonce value, as a first nonce value
  • the authentication of the mobile phone 12 has the mobile phone nonce value, as a second nonce value, different from the first nonce value
  • a further exchange of data between the mobile phone 12 and the SIM card 14 may be stopped.
  • the microprocessor of the mobile phone 12 is configured to generate and provide the SIM card 14 with the mobile phone nonce value.
  • the mobile phone 12 and the SIM card 14 share one and the same nonce value, namely the mobile phone nonce value, which is to be used by MD5. Therefore, MD5 issues then one and the same result, the mobile phone digest, allowing thus the involved entities to successfully pass the authentication.
  • the microprocessor of the mobile phone 12 is configured to generate and provide the SIM card 14 with a status code.
  • the status code has a value indicating that an error has occurred and the nature of the error obtained on the mobile phone side. For example, the mobile phone 12 is busy or the mobile phone 12 does not understand the notification message, and, in particular, the SIM card digest based on the SIM card nonce value or that the user of the mobile phone 12 rejects the SIM card digest, and therefore, the SIIVl card nonce value, or that the mobile phone 12 has failed to generate a mobile phone digest based on the mobile phone nonce value.
  • another entity like, for example a server (not shown) accessible from the mobile phone 12 through the telecommunication network 16, generates the mobile phone nonce value and provides the mobile phone 12 through the telecommunication network 16 with the mobile phone nonce value.
  • the microprocessor of the mobile phone 12 is configured to receive from the identified external entity any mobile phone nonce value to be used.
  • a server is preferably dedicated to the generation of mobile phones' nonce values for mobile phones that are managed and controlled by one operator. This server is directly or indirectly controlled by the operator.
  • Such exchange of data allow to update data related to programs, and/or to applications supported by the SIM card 14, and/or to parameters for configuring the SIM card 14, and/or to a content to be stored within the SIM card 14.
  • FIG. 2 shows an exemplary embodiment of the invention method 20 for client authentication before exchanging data between a client, such as the mobile phone 12, and a local server, such as the SIM card 14.
  • the invention method 20 includes different steps that are further described in an exemplary embodiment without limiting the scope of the invention.
  • the mobile phone has 22 a mobile phone nonce value, and based on the mobile phone nonce value, generates a corresponding mobile phone digest by using MD5. Then, the mobile phone receives 24 from the SIM card an initialization or notification message, in order to establish a connection between the mobile phone and the local server.
  • the notification message contains different information items, among which there is an authentication information item constituted by one SIM card digest.
  • the SIM card digest has been calculated by using three parameters, namely a username, a corresponding password, and a SIM card nonce. The SIM card has previously generated a SIM card nonce value.
  • the mobile phone has failed to generate the SIM card digest due to the used nonce value, namely the SIM card nonce value is therefore different from the mobile phone nonce value.
  • the mobile phone nonce value should have been equal to the SIM card nonce value further to a mobile phone initialization.
  • a mobile phone 10 initialization results from a bootstrap, a manual input, or a message originating from the SIM card, or the like.
  • the mobile phone nonce value has been lost due, for example, to the erasure of a mobile phone memory that stores the mobile phone nonce value, or the like.
  • another error is that the mobile phone is busy, for instance, the phone book of the mobile phone is being modified by its user.
  • the error is that the mobile phone does not understand the notification message, or the mobile phone user rejects the notification message due, for example, to a roaming.
  • the mobile phone as client, sends 28 to the
  • SIM card as local server, in response to the notification message, the mobile phone nonce value.
  • the mobile phone nonce value is encrypted.
  • the SIM card receives the mobile phone nonce value.
  • the SIM card 25 knows that it has to use the received mobile phone nonce value to generate a corresponding authentication result.
  • the SIM card implements the MD5 with the mobile phone nonce value and generates 210 a corresponding digest, the mobile phone digest.
  • the mobile phone digest is therefore also obtained on the SIM card side.
  • the SIM card and the mobile phone share one and the same digest, namely the mobile phone's one based on the mobile phone nonce value.
  • the SIM card sends 212 to the mobile phone another notification message, as second notification message, including another digest.
  • Such a digest is equal to the mobile phone digest, since it is calculated by using the mobile phone nonce value.
  • the mobile phone receives the latter notification message.
  • a synchronization process between the authenticated mobile phone and SIM card may be initialized.
  • the mobile phone sends to the SIM card a message, in order to indicate that the mobile phone has authenticated the SIM card.
  • Figure 3 shows a message flow 30 between the mobile phone, as client 32, and the SIM card, as local server 34.
  • the message flow 30 is the one relating to the situation where the client authenticates the server using a MD5 authentication process. In such a situation, the server challenges the client.
  • a similar message flow is obtained when the client challenges the server i.e. the roles of the server and the client are reversed.
  • the originator of the messages described herein under in relation with the situation where the server challenges the client is the server or the client, the originator respectively becomes the client or the server.
  • the server authenticates the client.
  • the server 34 sends to the client 32 a first message constituted by a notification message 36.
  • the entity which sends the notification message 36 challenges the recipient.
  • the notification message 36 comprises notably a notification package and a server digest calculated notably from a server nonce value.
  • the notification package contains data for identifying the server 34.
  • the client 32 After the receiving of the first message, the client 32 compares the server digest and the client digest. When the client digest and the server digest are different, the client 32 sends to the server 34 a response message 38.
  • the response message 38 includes a status code and/or a client nonce value.
  • the status code indicates an error type, whereas the client nonce value is to be used in order to authenticate the client.
  • the client may previously ask for a user confirmation. If the client user does not agree to send the response message 38, then the client shall not send the response message 38 to the server. Accordingly, the synchronization session shall not start.
  • the client 32 sends to the server 34 the response message 38 through a predetermined communication way.
  • the server 34 receives then the client nonce value.
  • the server 34 must then use the client nonce value to calculate another server digest by implementing MD5.
  • the calculation on both sides allows to generate a common authentication result, namely the client digest.
  • one dedicated separated message is used for each of the two parameters.
  • the client 32 sends to the server 34, on the one hand, a first response message including the sole status code, and on the other hand, a second response message including the sole client nonce value.
  • the server 34 sends 310 to the client 32 a new notification message with the right digest based on the right nonce value, namely the client nonce value. It is to be noted that the server 34 may not send any new notification message including a digest when the status code indicates that the client user rejects to start the synchronization session.
  • the client 32 receives the latter notification message and detects the identity of the digests. Due to the identity of the authentication calculation results on both sides, the authentication successfully passes.
  • the synchronization session is allowed to be launched.
  • either the client 32 or the server 34 sends to the other entity a corresponding message accompanied with a data to be shared between the client and the server.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé (20) servant à authentifier deux entités, une première entité (34) envoyant à une deuxième entité (32) un premier message (36) comprenant au moins un élément d'informations d'authentification, en tant que premier élément d'informations d'authentification, ledit premier élément d'informations d'authentification dépendant d'au moins une première valeur de circonstance. Selon l'invention, ladite deuxième entité envoie (38) à ladite première entité un deuxième message, en tant que réponse audit premier message, ledit deuxième message comprenant une deuxième valeur de circonstance devant être utilisée par ladite première entité pour déterminer un autre élément d'informations d'authentification, en tant que deuxième élément d'informations d'authentification. L'invention concerne également un dispositif électronique correspondant (12) pour authentifier un dispositif externe (14) et un système (10) comprenant un dispositif portable (14) servant à authentifier un dispositif hôte (12) et ledit dispositif hôte coopérant avec ledit dispositif portable.
PCT/CN2007/002010 2007-06-27 2007-06-27 Procédé servant à authentifier deux entités, dispositif électronique correspondant et système WO2009000111A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/CN2007/002010 WO2009000111A1 (fr) 2007-06-27 2007-06-27 Procédé servant à authentifier deux entités, dispositif électronique correspondant et système

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/CN2007/002010 WO2009000111A1 (fr) 2007-06-27 2007-06-27 Procédé servant à authentifier deux entités, dispositif électronique correspondant et système

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2009000111A1 true WO2009000111A1 (fr) 2008-12-31

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PCT/CN2007/002010 WO2009000111A1 (fr) 2007-06-27 2007-06-27 Procédé servant à authentifier deux entités, dispositif électronique correspondant et système

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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2012011359A1 (fr) 2010-07-22 2012-01-26 日本碍子株式会社 Article moulé et procédé de production d'un article moulé

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6064741A (en) * 1995-04-13 2000-05-16 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method for the computer-aided exchange of cryptographic keys between a user computer unit U and a network computer unit N
CN1802017A (zh) * 2005-07-15 2006-07-12 华为技术有限公司 一种防止重放攻击的认证方法
WO2006094838A1 (fr) * 2005-03-11 2006-09-14 Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Terminal assiste par reseau permettant d'etablir une cle sim/uicc
US20060285684A1 (en) * 2001-07-30 2006-12-21 Rogaway Phillip W Method and apparatus for facilitating efficient authenticated encryption

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6064741A (en) * 1995-04-13 2000-05-16 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method for the computer-aided exchange of cryptographic keys between a user computer unit U and a network computer unit N
US20060285684A1 (en) * 2001-07-30 2006-12-21 Rogaway Phillip W Method and apparatus for facilitating efficient authenticated encryption
WO2006094838A1 (fr) * 2005-03-11 2006-09-14 Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Terminal assiste par reseau permettant d'etablir une cle sim/uicc
CN1802017A (zh) * 2005-07-15 2006-07-12 华为技术有限公司 一种防止重放攻击的认证方法

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2012011359A1 (fr) 2010-07-22 2012-01-26 日本碍子株式会社 Article moulé et procédé de production d'un article moulé

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