WO2009071345A1 - Central control unit for a plurality of assistance systems provided in a motor vehicle, and motor vehicle - Google Patents
Central control unit for a plurality of assistance systems provided in a motor vehicle, and motor vehicle Download PDFInfo
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- WO2009071345A1 WO2009071345A1 PCT/EP2008/058716 EP2008058716W WO2009071345A1 WO 2009071345 A1 WO2009071345 A1 WO 2009071345A1 EP 2008058716 W EP2008058716 W EP 2008058716W WO 2009071345 A1 WO2009071345 A1 WO 2009071345A1
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- control unit
- central control
- assistance systems
- sensor information
- motor vehicle
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- 230000007613 environmental effect Effects 0.000 claims description 12
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 3
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Classifications
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W50/02—Ensuring safety in case of control system failures, e.g. by diagnosing, circumventing or fixing failures
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W50/02—Ensuring safety in case of control system failures, e.g. by diagnosing, circumventing or fixing failures
- B60W50/0205—Diagnosing or detecting failures; Failure detection models
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W50/04—Monitoring the functioning of the control system
- B60W50/045—Monitoring control system parameters
Definitions
- Central control unit for several provided in a motor vehicle assistance systems and motor vehicle
- the invention relates to a central control unit for a plurality of assistance systems provided in a motor vehicle and to a motor vehicle equipped with this control unit.
- the central control device according to the preamble of claim 1 is a common control device for several, each individually and independently working assistance systems, of which at least one assistance system is equipped with environmental sensors for detecting the vehicle environment.
- the central control unit is connected to the individual assistance systems and is set up to receive and evaluate sensor information from the assistance systems and to return status and / or control commands to the assistance systems.
- Motor vehicles are increasingly being equipped with assistance systems, to which, according to the invention, in particular comfort-oriented driver assistance systems, electronically controllable brake assistance systems, in particular with an emergency brake tenzsystem and telematics systems optionally with an automatic emergency call function include, in addition to on-board sensors for detecting the vehicle speed including environmental sensors.
- environmental sensors can be, for example, radar sensors, cameras, LIDAR sensors (Light Detection And Ranging), which detect the backscattering of emitted light pulses.
- environment sensors are also understood to mean telematics systems which transmit sensor information of adjacent motor vehicles or other devices (for example, barks at the roadside) in a Car2Car or Car2x communication.
- Previously known driver assistance systems FAS or DAS - Driver Assistance System
- emergency braking systems such as the described in WO 2004/085220 Al APIA system
- telematics systems such as from DE 10 2005 037 155 Al known emergency call system or from DE 10 2004 017 602 Al known Car2x system
- DE 10 2005 037 155 Al known emergency call system or from DE 10 2004 017 602 Al known Car2x system
- DE 10 2005 037 155 Al known emergency call system or from DE 10 2004 017 602 Al known Car2x system
- SIL Safety Integrity Level
- SIL3 Safety Integrity Level
- WO 2005/044652 A1 discloses a brake assistant for motor vehicles, in which, in addition to a control device for preparing or initiating an emergency braking, an evaluation device is provided for detecting the driver's braking request, which includes the signals of an environment sensor in its evaluation and evaluates.
- the decisive factor is that emergency braking is only initiated if it is also possible to draw conclusions about the driver's braking request.
- this is disadvantageous since still the far more accidents are based on misjudgments of the driver.
- this system can not necessarily and fully initiate emergency braking when the driver Assessment of the system does not share and, for example, from overestimation of his driving skills, the motor vehicle accelerated even further.
- WO 2004/085220 A1 describes an electronic control system for a vehicle and a method for determining at least one driver-independent intervention in a vehicle system.
- the intervention is implemented as time-limited and / or intensity-limited autonomous braking intervention, whereby here too the driver's intention and a determination of the potential danger for the activation, conditional release or blocking of agency interventions leads.
- a central electronic control system is proposed, which is connected to many autonomously operating assistance systems that collects sensor data and returns request commands to the individual assistance systems when a dangerous situation is detected. These request commands relate to both passive and active safety and can be used by a brake or emergency brake assist system to initiate pre-braking ("prebrake").
- the object of the present invention is therefore to propose a possibility with which safety-relevant interventions in the driving dynamics of the vehicle can be realized by acting on assistance systems with a stronger intervention intensity and / or a longer or unlimited intervention duration.
- a motor vehicle to be equipped with driver assistance, braking or emergency braking and / or telematics systems that allow largely autonomous intervention in the vehicle dynamics.
- the common central to the assistance systems control unit has a security control unit which is adapted to non-redundant sensor information of the individual assistance systems by means of analytical redundancies different from the Central control unit received sensor information to u berüber- check.
- a security control unit which is adapted to non-redundant sensor information of the individual assistance systems by means of analytical redundancies different from the Central control unit received sensor information to u berüber- check.
- This is based on the knowledge that even data supplied by non-redundant sensors can be checked for their reliability by establishing logical relationships in the form of analytical redundancies, so that after successful verification, these sensor data can be assumed to be secure.
- the sensor data can be checked by data from other sensors and / or the determined sensor data of a non-redundant sensor placed in a temporal context.
- the latter is particularly possible with camera shots that extract, for example, from a snapshot of certain sensor information that can be checked again on the basis of a time later taken camera recording. If the camera information is, for example, a vehicle in front, it can be checked by means of speed information whether the camera image recorded later in time and which identifies the same preceding vehicle agrees with the acquired sensor knowledge. If so, the data can be considered safe. Corresponding analytical redundancies can be achieved in addition to the aforementioned example also by many other sensor information, which are set in relation to each other. As a result, originally non-redundant or safe sensor data can be classified as safe after a check and classified as relevant and safe sensor data according to the requirements of the standard IEC 61508 according to the safety integrity level SIL3.
- non-redundant sensor information is plausible in the security control unit after a successful verification of the analytical redundancies.
- the correspondingly marked sensor information then complies with the SIL3 standard.
- the analytical redundancy is checked as described above, in particular by comparison with other sensor information. If redundant and safe sensor information is already available, for example from a SIL3 sensor, it will be plausible immediately and without comparison with other sensor data.
- the plausibility check can be indicated by additional information in the sensor data, for example by an identifier, which can also allow a conclusion to be drawn on the plausibility-carrying out body and / or the data used for the plausibility check.
- all or selected non-redundant sensor information from environmental sensors with the goal of plausibility checking can preferably be checked in the security control unit.
- the sensor information of the environment sensors play a particularly important role, especially with regard to safety-relevant and dynamic driving interventions in the motor vehicle system.
- non-redundant sensor information from an environment sensor can be checked in the security control unit exclusively by sensor information from another environment sensor, which is preferably displayed by the central control unit on another signal path and / or in another Form of writing the environment interpretation were obtained.
- sensor information from another environment sensor which is preferably displayed by the central control unit on another signal path and / or in another Form of writing the environment interpretation were obtained.
- the different description forms can be, for example, different target lists or partially preprocessed object lists, which were created on the basis of the individual sensor information.
- a safety card (SafetyMap)
- the security card at least consists of a navigation map with security-related attributes and preferably stored directly in the central control unit and updated as appropriate in accordance with the information available.
- the central control unit can be set up to generate control commands based on the plausibilized sensor information, in particular plausible sensor information from environmental sensors, and report back to the assistance systems, whereby these control commands can bring about a safety-relevant intervention in the vehicle, without the need for an explicit or implicitly derived driver's consent.
- These safety-relevant interventions in the vehicle are not necessarily limited in their intensity or duration, so that, for example, in the presence of correspondingly safe and dundanter sensor information from environmental sensors fully automatic emergency braking of the motor vehicle can be performed.
- control command would thus be an unlimited and / or unconditional emergency brake command to a brake assist system.
- the present invention is not limited to control commands to a brake assist system.
- Other control commands with a likewise safety-relevant intervention in the motor vehicle can be an automatic intervention in a driver assistance system, optionally in the context of an automatic lane check, an automatic distance control, or an automated emergency call transmission in a telematics emergency call system.
- the control commands can also represent plausible warnings in a Car2Car or Car2x communication, which were generated by third-party systems, for example other motor vehicles, in a plausible manner and interpreted as safe and relevant sensor information of an environmental sensor without their own plausibility check.
- the assistance systems connected to the control unit can preferably be a comfort-oriented driver assistance system, a brake assistance system optionally with emergency brake function, a telematics system optionally with emergency call function and / or any control device, for example an airbag control, which also perform their function independently without the common central control unit can and work autonomously.
- the central control unit preferably has a dual-core processor architecture. This enables redundant signal processing.
- the central control unit can have scalable computing resources, in particular modularly scalable memory (RAM / ROM) and / or processor sizes.
- the central control unit is also easily adaptable to future, new tasks.
- such a customer or third-party software can be easily integrated into the central control unit.
- the functionality and the hardware to be integrated can also be integrated in the control unit of the brake assist system (ESP system), in particular if primarily an emergency braking system is to be implemented.
- ESP system brake assist system
- the invention relates to a motor vehicle having assistance systems, in particular comfort-oriented driver assistance systems, brake or emergency braking assistance systems and / or telematics systems, wherein the force vehicle is equipped with the above-described common control unit for the assistance systems.
- GCC Global Chassis Controler
- APIA Driver Assistance and braking systems
- a central control unit for the holistic detection of the vehicle environment, the vehicle dynamics and for determining the control interventions as well as the integration of vehicle inertial sensor technology for active and passive safety systems, which meets the high safety requirements of the IEC 61508 standard. Due to the scalable architecture of the control unit, this be adapted to the respective existing tasks.
- FIG. 1 shows schematically an inventive central control device for several provided in a motor vehicle assistance systems.
- the central control unit 1 is connected to a plurality of assistance systems, which operate individually and independently.
- assistance systems a driver assistance system 2, a brake assist system 3, which also takes over the function of an emergency braking assistance system, and a telematics system 4 is provided, for example, to send emergency calls as Ecall system and / or communication with others Road users (Car2Car communications) or roadside infrastructure (Car2Infrastructure communications).
- Assistance system 5 or control unit airbag control units, control units for other active or passive security elements, electronic control systems or the like may be connected to the central control unit 1.
- a bidirectional communication option is provided between the assistance systems 2, 3, 4, 5 and the central control unit 1, so that the central control unit 1 can receive, in particular, sensor information data from the assistance systems 2, 3, 4, 5 and, for example, send control commands back to them.
- the driver assistance system 2 is equipped with three ambient sensors, not shown, for detecting the vehicle surroundings, which are a radar sensor, a camera and a LIDAR sensor which detects the light reflected by an upper surface of a transmitted light pulse / burst.
- These environmental sensors allow the assistance systems to actively assist the driver of the motor vehicle.
- Radar sensors detect, for example, the distance to vehicles in front.
- Camera sensors can be used for lane detection, light detection in the dark, traffic sign recognition or vehicle detection.
- each of these environmental sensors does not generate secure and redundant data, especially because the analysis and recognition of data is often associated with certain uncertainties and misinterpretations of the data can not be excluded.
- a technical malfunction of individual sensors is possible. For example, the camera located behind the windshield may temporarily fail if the windshield is frosted or fogged.
- the security control unit 6 is set up to check the non-redundant sensor information of the individual assistance systems 2, 3, 4, 5 by means of analytical redundancies of various sensor information obtained from the central control unit.
- the sensor information used for the logical check can be sensor information of other sensors connected to the assistance systems 2, 3, 4, 5, in particular of the environment sensors.
- sensors 7, 8 can be directly connected to the control unit 1, which transmit information about the vehicle dynamics or the airbag system to the central control unit 1, for example.
- sensors 7, 8 can be connected directly to the central control unit 1 and either used as additional information for the analytical redundancies or even be checked.
- the direct integration of sensors 7, 8 in the central control unit 1 also has the advantage that in Compared to separate sensor clusters for example, the brake or ESP system and the airbag costs can be saved.
- An example of such an analytical redundancy check could be that the image information of a camera confirms the measurement data of a beam sensor (radar, lidar), i. form redundant information in the sense of SIL3
- this reduces the error rate and, on the other hand, increases the intervention strength of the autonomous interventions and increases the duration of the interventions.
- the tested sensor information is considered redundant and safe. They are then plausibilized by the security control unit 6 or the central control unit 1. For this purpose, a corresponding identifier can be added to the sensor data.
- plausibilized sensor data are sent to the individual assistance systems 2, 3, 4, 5, provided that the relevant assistance system 2, 3, 4, 5 evaluates this data.
- the plausibilized sensor information of the environment sensors are supplied to the brake assist system 3, which then builds on this information in a conventional manner then initiates an automatic emergency braking, if the sensor information of the environment sensors and optionally further sensor information that makes plausible by the central control unit 1 indicate a dangerous situation that requires emergency braking. Since emergency braking then takes place on the basis of plausible sensor information that corresponds to safety level SIL3, emergency braking does not have to be actively confirmed by the driver, nor does the system inevitably restrict braking time or braking intensity.
- the assistance systems are enabled by the present invention proposed plausibility check on unsafe and redundant sensor information in the situation to exercise safety-related interventions in the driving dynamics of the motor vehicle, the overall safety in traffic is increased, as just serious dangerous situations, recognized by the sensors undoubtedly can be countered in a positive way.
- the central control unit can have interfaces for a mobile radio communication 9, a telematics communication 10 with the environment of the motor vehicle, for a satellite navigation 11 and for a safety map (SafetyMap) 12, with a safety device.
- health card can also be integrated directly into the central control unit 1 and there is immediately updated based on the information available.
- the function of automatic assistance systems present in a motor vehicle can be considerably expanded because the competencies of the assistance systems can be extended as a whole by the plausibility check of safety-relevant sensor information.
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- Regulating Braking Force (AREA)
- Traffic Control Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The invention relates to a central control unit (1) for a plurality of assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5) provided in a motor vehicle, each operating individually and of which at least one assistance system (2, 3, 4, 5) is equipped with environment sensors. The central control unit (1) is connected to the individual assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5) and designed to obtain sensor information from the assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5) and to analyze the same, and to report back status and/or control commands to the assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5). In order to also be able to make safety-related interventions into the driving dynamics using the assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5), the invention proposes that the central control unit (1) have a safety control unit (6) that is designed to check non-redundant sensor information of the individual assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5) by means of analytic redundancies of different sensor information obtained from the central control unit (1).
Description
Zentrales Steuergerät für mehrere in einem Kraftfahrzeug vorgesehene AssistenzSysteme und KraftfahrzeugCentral control unit for several provided in a motor vehicle assistance systems and motor vehicle
Die Erfindung betrifft ein zentrales Steuergerät für mehrere in einem Kraftfahrzeug vorgesehene Assistenzsysteme sowie ein mit diesem Steuergerät ausgerüstetes Kraftfahrzeug. Das zentrale Steuergerät gemäß dem Oberbegriff des Anspruchs 1 ist ein gemeinsames Steuergerät für mehrere, jeweils einzeln und autark arbeitende Assistenzsysteme, von denen mindestens ein Assistenzsystem mit Umfeldsensoren zur Erfassung des Fahrzeugumfelds ausgestattet ist. Das zentrale Steuergerät ist mit den einzelnen Assistenzsystemen verbunden und dazu eingerichtet, Sensorinformationen von den Assistenzsystemen zu erhalten und auszuwerten sowie Status- und/oder Steuerbefehle an die Assistenzsysteme zurückzumelden .The invention relates to a central control unit for a plurality of assistance systems provided in a motor vehicle and to a motor vehicle equipped with this control unit. The central control device according to the preamble of claim 1 is a common control device for several, each individually and independently working assistance systems, of which at least one assistance system is equipped with environmental sensors for detecting the vehicle environment. The central control unit is connected to the individual assistance systems and is set up to receive and evaluate sensor information from the assistance systems and to return status and / or control commands to the assistance systems.
Kraftfahrzeuge werden zunehmend mit Assistenzsystemen ausgestattet, zu denen erfindungsgemäß insbesondere komfortorientierte Fahrerassistenzsysteme, elektronisch steuerbare Bremsassistenzsysteme insbesondere mit einem Notbremsassis-
tenzsystem und Telematiksysteme gegebenenfalls mit einer automatischen Notruffunktion gehören, die neben fahrzeugeigenen Sensoren zur Erfassung der Fahrzeuggeschwindigkeit u.a. auch Umfeldsensoren aufweisen. Derartige Umfeldsensoren können beispielsweise Radarsensoren, Kameras, LIDAR- Sensoren (Light Detection And Ranging) sein, welche die Rückstreuung ausgesendeter Lichtpulse detektieren. Als Umfeldsensoren werden im Rahmen der Erfindung auch Telematiksysteme verstanden, die Sensorinformationen benachbarter Kraftfahrzeuge oder sonstiger Einrichtungen (bspw. Barken am Straßenrand) in einer Car2Car- bzw. Car2x-Kommunikation übermitteln .Motor vehicles are increasingly being equipped with assistance systems, to which, according to the invention, in particular comfort-oriented driver assistance systems, electronically controllable brake assistance systems, in particular with an emergency brake tenzsystem and telematics systems optionally with an automatic emergency call function include, in addition to on-board sensors for detecting the vehicle speed including environmental sensors. Such environmental sensors can be, for example, radar sensors, cameras, LIDAR sensors (Light Detection And Ranging), which detect the backscattering of emitted light pulses. In the context of the invention, environment sensors are also understood to mean telematics systems which transmit sensor information of adjacent motor vehicles or other devices (for example, barks at the roadside) in a Car2Car or Car2x communication.
Bisher bekannte Fahrerassistenzsysteme (FAS bzw. DAS - Driver Assistance System) , Notbremssysteme, wie beispielsweise das in der WO 2004/085220 Al beschriebene APIA- System, und/oder Telematiksysteme, wie das aus der DE 10 2005 037 155 Al bekannte Notrufsystem oder das aus der DE 10 2004 017 602 Al bekannte Car2x-System, dienen dabei nicht ausschließlich der Fahrerinformation, sondern leiten teilweise selbsttätig Eingriffe in das Fahrzeugsystem ein, die unter dem Sicherheitsaspekt in eine kritische Kategorie eingestuft werden. Hierfür gibt es einzuhaltende Sicherheitsbestimmungen .Previously known driver assistance systems (FAS or DAS - Driver Assistance System), emergency braking systems, such as the described in WO 2004/085220 Al APIA system, and / or telematics systems, such as from DE 10 2005 037 155 Al known emergency call system or from DE 10 2004 017 602 Al known Car2x system, do not serve exclusively the driver information, but partially initiate automatic interventions in the vehicle system, which are classified under the safety aspect in a critical category. There are safety regulations to be followed for this.
Einschlägig ist insbesondere die Norm IEC 61508, welche vier diskrete Sicherheitsintegrationsstufen (SIL, Safety Integrity Level) definiert. Diese Stufen geben Höchstgrenzen für eine mittlere Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Ausfalls der Sicherheitsfunktionen bei Anforderung und die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines gefahrbringenden Ausfalls pro Stunde sowie
bestimmte Hardware-Fehlertoleranzen an. Entsprechend der vorgenannten Norm müssen beispielsweise Notbremseingriffe in das Fahrzeugsystem mindestens den Anforderungen der kritischen Kategorie SIL3 genügen, welche das Vorliegen sicherer und redundanter Informationen zur Entscheidungsgrundlage fordert.Particularly relevant is the standard IEC 61508, which defines four discrete safety integration levels (SIL, Safety Integrity Level). These levels give upper limits for an average probability of failure of safety functions on demand and the probability of dangerous failure per hour as well certain hardware fault tolerances. According to the aforementioned standard, for example, emergency braking interventions in the vehicle system must at least meet the requirements of the critical category SIL3, which requires the presence of reliable and redundant information on the decision basis.
Typische Umfeldsensoren, die im Zusammenhang mit den vorgeschriebenen Assistenzsystemen eingesetzt werden, erfüllen diese Anforderungen an die Redundanz gemäß der Stufe SIL3 jedoch nicht und sind meist nur entsprechend der Stufe SIL2 ausgelegt. Damit dürfen durch diese Umfeldsensoren gewonnene Daten nicht zur alleinigen Grundlage für den vollautomatischen Bremseingriff in ein Fahrzeugsystem oder sonstige sicherheitsrelevante Eingriffe gemacht werden. Auf Grundlage dieser Umfeldsensoren können also der Sicherheitsstufe SIL3 unterliegende Eingriffe nicht beliebig durchgeführt werden .However, typical environmental sensors used in conjunction with the required assistance systems do not meet these requirements for redundancy according to SIL3 and are usually designed only to SIL2. Thus, data obtained by these environment sensors may not be used as the sole basis for the fully automatic brake intervention in a vehicle system or other safety-relevant interventions. On the basis of these environment sensors, interventions subject to the security level SIL3 can not be carried out arbitrarily.
Dies soll nachfolgend am Beispiel automatischer Bremseingriffe zur Reduktion des Anhalteweges des Kraftfahrzeugs beschrieben werden. So ist beispielsweise aus der WO 2005/044652 Al ein Bremsassistent für Kraftfahrzeuge bekannt, bei dem neben einer Steuereinrichtung zur Vorbereitung oder Einleitung einer Notbremsung auch eine Bewertungseinrichtung zur Erkennung des Bremswunsches des Fahrers vorgesehen ist, die bei ihrer Bewertung die Signale einer Umfeldsensorik mit aufnimmt und auswertet. Entscheidend ist, dass eine Notbremsung nur dann eingeleitet wird, wenn auch auf einen Bremswunsch des Fahrers rückgeschlossen werden. Dies ist jedoch nachteilig, da nach wie vor die
weitaus meisten Unfälle auf Fehleinschätzungen des Fahrers beruhen. Auch wenn die Sensorik der in dem Fahrzeug vorhandenen Assistenzsysteme daher objektiv eine Situation erkennen kann, in der eine Notbremsung die einzig sinnvolle Reaktion zur Vermeidung eines Unfalls oder Minderung der Unfallfolgen ist, kann dieses System die Notbremsung nicht unbedingt und uneingeschränkt einleiten, wenn der Fahrer die Einschätzung des Systems nicht teilt und beispielsweise aus Überschätzung seines fahrerischen Könnens das Kraftfahrzeug sogar noch weiter beschleunigt.This will be described below using the example of automatic braking interventions to reduce the stopping distance of the motor vehicle. For example, WO 2005/044652 A1 discloses a brake assistant for motor vehicles, in which, in addition to a control device for preparing or initiating an emergency braking, an evaluation device is provided for detecting the driver's braking request, which includes the signals of an environment sensor in its evaluation and evaluates. The decisive factor is that emergency braking is only initiated if it is also possible to draw conclusions about the driver's braking request. However, this is disadvantageous since still the far more accidents are based on misjudgments of the driver. Therefore, even if the sensor system of the assistance systems present in the vehicle can objectively recognize a situation in which emergency braking is the only sensible reaction to avoid an accident or reduce the consequences of an accident, this system can not necessarily and fully initiate emergency braking when the driver Assessment of the system does not share and, for example, from overestimation of his driving skills, the motor vehicle accelerated even further.
Die WO 2004/085220 Al beschreibt ein elektronisches Steuersystem für ein Fahrzeug und ein Verfahren zum Ermitteln mindestens eines vom Fahrer unabhängigen Eingriffs in ein Fahrzeugsystem. Der Eingriff ist als zeitlich und/oder in der Intensität begrenzter autonomer Bremseneingriff realsi- siert, wobei auch hier der Fahrerwunsch und eine Ermittlung des Gefahrenpotenzials zur Freischaltung, bedingten Freischaltung oder Sperrung von Stelleingriffen führt. Dazu wird ein zentrales elektronisches Steuersystem vorgeschlagen, welches mit vielen autonom arbeitenden Assistenzsystemen verbunden ist, das Sensordaten sammelt und Anforderungsbefehle an die einzelnen Assistenzsysteme zurückmeldet, wenn eine Gefahrensituation erkannt wird. Diese Anforderungsbefehle betreffen sowohl die passive als auch die aktive Sicherheit und können von einem Brems- beziehungsweise Notbremsassistenzsystem zum Einleiten einer Vorbremsung ("prebrake") herangezogen werden.WO 2004/085220 A1 describes an electronic control system for a vehicle and a method for determining at least one driver-independent intervention in a vehicle system. The intervention is implemented as time-limited and / or intensity-limited autonomous braking intervention, whereby here too the driver's intention and a determination of the potential danger for the activation, conditional release or blocking of agency interventions leads. For this purpose, a central electronic control system is proposed, which is connected to many autonomously operating assistance systems that collects sensor data and returns request commands to the individual assistance systems when a dangerous situation is detected. These request commands relate to both passive and active safety and can be used by a brake or emergency brake assist system to initiate pre-braking ("prebrake").
Auch bei diesem System besteht jedoch das Problem, dass die Zuverlässigkeit der verwendeten Sensordaten zur Ermittlung
der Stelleingriffe und die Komplexität der Situation bei fahrdynamischen Eingriffen in das Fahrzeug keine autonomen Eingriffe zulassen, weil die Vorgaben der entsprechenden Sicherheitsstufe nicht eingehalten werden können. Daher können die aus dem Gefahrenrechner ermittelten Stelleingriffe nur nach einer Bewertung in einer Arbitriereinheit mit dem in dem Fahrerwunschmodul ermittelten Fahrerwunsch in eingeschränktem Umfang realisiert werden. Insbesondere dürfen ausgelöste Bremseingriffe des Systems aufgrund der nicht-redundanten Sensorkonfigurationen nicht beliebig durchgeführt werden, sondern müssen in der Intensität und/oder in der Eingriffsdauer beschränkt werden.However, even with this system, there is a problem that the reliability of the sensor data used for the determination The regulatory interventions and the complexity of the situation in driving dynamics interventions in the vehicle do not allow autonomous interventions, because the specifications of the corresponding security level can not be met. Therefore, the determining actions determined from the danger computer can only be realized to a limited extent after a rating in an arbitration unit with the driver request ascertained in the driver request module. In particular, triggered brake interventions of the system due to the non-redundant sensor configurations may not be performed arbitrarily, but must be limited in intensity and / or duration of intervention.
Aufgabe der vorliegenden Erfindung ist es daher, eine Möglichkeit vorzuschlagen, mit der sicherheitsrelevante Eingriffe in die Fahrdynamik des Fahrzeugs durch Einwirkung auf Assistenzsysteme mit stärkerer Eingriffsintensität und/oder längerer beziehungsweise unbeschränkter Eingriffsdauer realisiert werden können. Insbesondere soll ein Kraftfahrzeug mit Fahrerassistenz-, Brems bzw. Notbrems- und/oder Telematiksystemen ausgestattet werden, die weitgehend autonome Eingriffe in die Fahrdynamik zulassen.The object of the present invention is therefore to propose a possibility with which safety-relevant interventions in the driving dynamics of the vehicle can be realized by acting on assistance systems with a stronger intervention intensity and / or a longer or unlimited intervention duration. In particular, a motor vehicle to be equipped with driver assistance, braking or emergency braking and / or telematics systems that allow largely autonomous intervention in the vehicle dynamics.
Erfindungsgemäß wird diese Aufgabe durch ein zentrales Steuergerät mit den Merkmalen des Anspruchs 1 gelöst.According to the invention this object is achieved by a central control device having the features of claim 1.
Dabei ist vorgesehen, dass das für die Assistenzsysteme gemeinsame, zentrale Steuergerät eine Sicherheitskontrolleinheit aufweist, welche dazu eingerichtet ist, nicht-redundante Sensorinformationen der einzelnen Assistenzsysteme mittels analytischer Redundanzen verschiedener, von dem
zentralen Steuergerät erhaltener Sensorinformationen zu ü- berprüfen. Dem liegt die Erkenntnis zugrunde, dass auch von nicht-redundanten Sensoren gelieferte Daten durch das Herstellen logischer Relationen in Form analytischer Redundanzen auf ihre Zuverlässigkeit überprüft werden können, so- dass nach einer erfolgreichen Überprüfung diese Sensordaten als sicher angenommen werden können. Dazu können die Sensordaten durch Daten anderer Sensoren überprüft und/oder die ermittelten Sensordaten eines nicht-redundanten Sensors in einen zeitlichen Kontext gestellt werden.It is provided that the common central to the assistance systems control unit has a security control unit which is adapted to non-redundant sensor information of the individual assistance systems by means of analytical redundancies different from the Central control unit received sensor information to u berüber- check. This is based on the knowledge that even data supplied by non-redundant sensors can be checked for their reliability by establishing logical relationships in the form of analytical redundancies, so that after successful verification, these sensor data can be assumed to be secure. For this purpose, the sensor data can be checked by data from other sensors and / or the determined sensor data of a non-redundant sensor placed in a temporal context.
Letzteres ist insbesondere bei Kameraaufnahmen möglich, die beispielsweise aus einer Momentaufnahme eine bestimmte Sensorinformation extrahieren, die anhand einer zeitlich später erfolgten Kameraaufnahme noch einmal überprüft werden kann. Handelt es sich bei der Kamerainformation beispielsweise um ein vorausfahrendes Fahrzeug, kann anhand von Geschwindigkeitsinformationen überprüft werden, ob das zeitlich später aufgenommenen Kamerabild, welches das gleiche vorausfahrende Fahrzeug identifiziert, mit den gewonnenen Sensorerkenntnissen übereinstimmt. Ist dies der Fall, können die Daten als sicher eingestuft werden. Entsprechende analytische Redundanzen können neben dem vorerwähnten Beispiel auch durch viele andere Sensorinformationen erreicht werden, die in Zusammenhang miteinander gesetzt werden. Hierdurch können ursprünglich nicht-redundante beziehungsweise sichere Sensordaten nach einer Überprüfung als sicher eingestuft werden und entsprechend den Bestimmungen der Norm IEC 61508 als relevante und sichere Sensordaten gemäß der Sicherheitsintegritätsstufe SIL3 eingestuft werden.
Vorteilhafterweise werden nicht-redundante Sensorinformationen in der Sicherheitskontrolleinheit nach einer erfolgreichen Überprüfung der analytischen Redundanzen plausibi- lisiert. Die entsprechend gekennzeichneten Sensorinformationen entsprechen dann dem SIL3-Standard. Zur Plausibilisie- rung erfolgt die Überprüfung der analytischen Redundanz wie zuvor beschrieben insbesondere durch einen Vergleich mit anderen Sensorinformationen. Sofern bereits redundante und sichere Sensorinformationen vorliegen, die beispielsweise von einem SIL3-Sensor stammen, werden diese unmittelbar und ohne Vergleich mit anderen Sensordaten plausibilisiert . Die Plausibilisierung kann durch eine Zusatzinformation in den Sensordaten, beispielsweise durch eine Kennung, angezeigt werden, die auch einen Rückschluss auf die die Plausibilisierung durchführende Stelle und/oder die zur Plausibilisierung herangezogenen Daten erlauben kann.The latter is particularly possible with camera shots that extract, for example, from a snapshot of certain sensor information that can be checked again on the basis of a time later taken camera recording. If the camera information is, for example, a vehicle in front, it can be checked by means of speed information whether the camera image recorded later in time and which identifies the same preceding vehicle agrees with the acquired sensor knowledge. If so, the data can be considered safe. Corresponding analytical redundancies can be achieved in addition to the aforementioned example also by many other sensor information, which are set in relation to each other. As a result, originally non-redundant or safe sensor data can be classified as safe after a check and classified as relevant and safe sensor data according to the requirements of the standard IEC 61508 according to the safety integrity level SIL3. Advantageously, non-redundant sensor information is plausible in the security control unit after a successful verification of the analytical redundancies. The correspondingly marked sensor information then complies with the SIL3 standard. For plausibility checking, the analytical redundancy is checked as described above, in particular by comparison with other sensor information. If redundant and safe sensor information is already available, for example from a SIL3 sensor, it will be plausible immediately and without comparison with other sensor data. The plausibility check can be indicated by additional information in the sensor data, for example by an identifier, which can also allow a conclusion to be drawn on the plausibility-carrying out body and / or the data used for the plausibility check.
Insbesondere können in der Sicherheitskontrolleinheit vorzugsweise alle oder ausgewählte nicht-redundante Sensorinformationen von Umfeldsensoren mit dem Ziel der Plausibilisierung überprüft werden. Die Sensorinformationen der Umfeldsensoren spielen gerade im Hinblick auf sicherheitsrelevante und fahrdynamische Eingriffe in das Kraftfahrzeugsystem eine besonders wichtige Rolle.In particular, all or selected non-redundant sensor information from environmental sensors with the goal of plausibility checking can preferably be checked in the security control unit. The sensor information of the environment sensors play a particularly important role, especially with regard to safety-relevant and dynamic driving interventions in the motor vehicle system.
Um ein besonders hohes Maß an Sicherheit zu erhalten, können in der Sicherheitskontrolleinheit nicht-redundante Sensorinformationen eines Umfeldsensors ausschließlich durch Sensorinformationen eines anderen Umfeldsensors überprüft werden, die vorzugsweise durch das zentrale Steuergerät auf einem anderen Signalpfad- und/oder in einer anderen Be-
Schreibungsform der Umfeldinterpretation erhalten wurden. Durch einen anderen Signalpfad beispielsweise in einem Fahrzugbussystem werden systematische Signalbeeinflussungen weitestgehend ausgeschlossen. Die unterschiedlichen Beschreibungsformen können beispielsweise verschiedene Ziellisten oder teilweise vorverarbeitete Objektlisten sein, die aufgrund der einzelnen Sensorinformationen erstellt wurden .In order to obtain a particularly high level of security, non-redundant sensor information from an environment sensor can be checked in the security control unit exclusively by sensor information from another environment sensor, which is preferably displayed by the central control unit on another signal path and / or in another Form of writing the environment interpretation were obtained. By a different signal path, for example in a Fahrzugbussystem systematic signal interference are largely excluded. The different description forms can be, for example, different target lists or partially preprocessed object lists, which were created on the basis of the individual sensor information.
Eine weitere Möglichkeit der Überprüfung in der Sicherheitskontrolleinheit liegt darin, dass vorzugsweise alle oder ausgewählte, nicht-redundante Sensorinformationen mittels einer Sicherheitskarte (SafetyMap) analysiert werden, wobei die Sicherheitskarte wenigstens aus einer Navigationskarte mit sicherheitsrelevanten Attributen besteht und vorzugsweise direkt in dem zentralen Steuergerät gespeichert und entsprechend den vorliegenden Informationen gegebenenfalls aktualisiert wird.Another possibility of checking in the security control unit is that preferably all or selected, non-redundant sensor information by means of a safety card (SafetyMap) are analyzed, the security card at least consists of a navigation map with security-related attributes and preferably stored directly in the central control unit and updated as appropriate in accordance with the information available.
Um die Sensordaten nach der Plausibilisierung zu verwerten, kann das zentrale Steuergerät dazu eingerichtet sein, auf Basis der plausibilisierten Sensorinformationen, insbesondere plausibilisierter Sensorinformationen von Umfeldsensoren, Steuerbefehle zu erzeugen und an die Assistenzsysteme zurückzumelden, wobei diese Steuerbefehle einen sicherheitsrelevanten Eingriff in das Fahrzeug bewirken können, ohne dass hierfür eine explizite oder implizit abgeleitete Zustimmung des Fahrers benötigt wird. Diese sicherheitsrelevanten Eingriffe in das Fahrzeug sind auch in ihrer Intensität oder Dauer nicht zwangsläufig begrenzt, sodass beispielsweise bei Vorliegen entsprechend sicherer und re-
dundanter Sensorinformationen von Umfeldsensoren eine vollautomatische Notbremsung des Kraftfahrzeugs durchgeführt werden kann.In order to utilize the sensor data after the plausibility check, the central control unit can be set up to generate control commands based on the plausibilized sensor information, in particular plausible sensor information from environmental sensors, and report back to the assistance systems, whereby these control commands can bring about a safety-relevant intervention in the vehicle, without the need for an explicit or implicitly derived driver's consent. These safety-relevant interventions in the vehicle are not necessarily limited in their intensity or duration, so that, for example, in the presence of correspondingly safe and dundanter sensor information from environmental sensors fully automatic emergency braking of the motor vehicle can be performed.
In diesem Fall wäre der Steuerbefehl also ein unbeschränkter und/oder unbedingter Notbremsbefehl an ein Bremsassistenzsystem. Natürlich ist die vorliegende Erfindung nicht auf Steuerbefehle an ein Bremsassistenzsystem beschränkt. Andere Steuerbefehle mit einem ebenfalls sicherheitsrelevanten Eingriff in das Kraftfahrzeug können ein automatischer Eingriff in ein Fahrerassistenzsystem, gegebenenfalls im Rahmen einer automatischen Spurprüfung, einer automatischen Abstandshaltung, oder eine automatisierte Notrufabsendung in einem Telematik-NotrufSystem sein. Auch können die Steuerbefehle plausibilisierte Warnungen in einer Car2Car- oder Car2x-Kommunikation darstellen, die von fremden Systemen, beispielsweise anderen Kraftfahrzeugen, plau- sibilisiert erzeugt wurden und ohne eigene Plausibilitäts- prüfung als sichere und relevante Sensorinformationen eines Umgebungssensors interpretiert werden. Auch diese als sicher und redundant eingestuften Daten können gegebenenfalls unmittelbar entsprechende Eingriffe durch Fahrzugassistenz- systeme bewirken. Die vorgenannten Anwendungsfälle stellen jedoch nur Beispiele dar, in denen die vorliegende Erfindung genutzt werden kann, und sind keineswegs als abzählende Aufzählung zu verstehen. Der Einsatz des erfindungsgemäßen Steuergeräts beziehungsweise des auf diesen ablaufenden erfindungsgemäßen Verfahrens zur Erzeugung eines Notbremsbefehls durch ein Bremsassistenzsystem stellt jedoch eine wichtige Anwendung dar.
Die an das Steuergerät angeschlossenen Assistenzsysteme können vorzugsweise ein komfortorientiertes Fahrerassistenzsystem, ein Bremsassistenzsystem gegebenenfalls mit Notbremsfunktion, ein Telematiksystem gegebenenfalls mit Notruffunktion und/oder ein beliebiges Steuergerät, beispielsweise eine Airbag-Steuerung, sein, die ihre Funktion auch eigenständig ohne das gemeinsame, zentrale Steuergerät ausführen können und insoweit autonom arbeiten.In this case, the control command would thus be an unlimited and / or unconditional emergency brake command to a brake assist system. Of course, the present invention is not limited to control commands to a brake assist system. Other control commands with a likewise safety-relevant intervention in the motor vehicle can be an automatic intervention in a driver assistance system, optionally in the context of an automatic lane check, an automatic distance control, or an automated emergency call transmission in a telematics emergency call system. The control commands can also represent plausible warnings in a Car2Car or Car2x communication, which were generated by third-party systems, for example other motor vehicles, in a plausible manner and interpreted as safe and relevant sensor information of an environmental sensor without their own plausibility check. These data, which are classified as safe and redundant, may also directly effect corresponding interventions by the driving assistance assistance systems. However, the above applications are only examples in which the present invention may be used, and are by no means to be construed as enumeration enumeration. However, the use of the control device according to the invention or running on this process according to the invention for generating an emergency braking command by a brake assist system is an important application. The assistance systems connected to the control unit can preferably be a comfort-oriented driver assistance system, a brake assistance system optionally with emergency brake function, a telematics system optionally with emergency call function and / or any control device, for example an airbag control, which also perform their function independently without the common central control unit can and work autonomously.
Um auch intern redundant aufgebaut zu sein, weist das zentrale Steuergerät vorzugsweise eine dual-core Prozessor- Architektur auf. Diese ermöglicht eine redundante Signalverarbeitung.In order to be internally redundant, the central control unit preferably has a dual-core processor architecture. This enables redundant signal processing.
Ferner kann das zentrale Steuergerät skalierbare Rechenressourcen aufweisen, insbesondere modular skalierbare Speicher (RAM/ROM) und/oder Prozessorgrößen. Dadurch ist das zentrale Steuergerät auch einfach an zukünftige, neue Aufgaben anpassbar. Beispielsweise kann so eine Kunden- oder Third-Party-Software einfach in das zentrale Steuergerät integriert werden. In einem Extremfall bei kleinen Systemausprägungen kann die Funktionalität und die zu integrierende Hardware auch in das Steuergerät des Bremsassistenzsystems (ESP-System) mitintegriert werden, insbesondere wenn vorrangig ein Notbremssystem realisiert werden soll.Furthermore, the central control unit can have scalable computing resources, in particular modularly scalable memory (RAM / ROM) and / or processor sizes. As a result, the central control unit is also easily adaptable to future, new tasks. For example, such a customer or third-party software can be easily integrated into the central control unit. In an extreme case with small system characteristics, the functionality and the hardware to be integrated can also be integrated in the control unit of the brake assist system (ESP system), in particular if primarily an emergency braking system is to be implemented.
Ferner bezieht sich die Erfindung auf ein Kraftfahrzeug mit Assistenzsystemen, insbesondere komfortorientierten Fahrerassistenzsystemen, Brems- beziehungsweise Notbremsassistenzsystemen und/oder Telematiksystemen, wobei das Kraft-
fahrzeug mit dem vorbeschriebenen gemeinsamen Steuergerät für die Assistenzsysteme ausgestattet ist.Furthermore, the invention relates to a motor vehicle having assistance systems, in particular comfort-oriented driver assistance systems, brake or emergency braking assistance systems and / or telematics systems, wherein the force vehicle is equipped with the above-described common control unit for the assistance systems.
Mit der Erfindung lassen sich die Ansätze zu einer globalen Fahrzeugsteuerung (GCC, Global Chassis Controler) aller fahrzeugdynamischen Systeme (längs-, quer-, und vertikale Stabilisierung) und die Ansätze für Fahrerassistenz- und Bremssysteme, wie APIA, die sicherheitsrelevante Eingriffe vornehmen, sowie telematikbasierte Systeme in einem zentralen Steuergerät umsetzen, das die Anforderungen an eine SIL3-fähige Architektur erfüllt.With the invention, the approaches to a global vehicle control system (GCC, Global Chassis Controler) of all vehicle dynamic systems (longitudinal, transverse, and vertical stabilization) and the approaches for driver assistance and braking systems, such as APIA, make the safety-related interventions, and Implement telematics-based systems in a central control unit that meets the requirements of a SIL3-capable architecture.
Da in dieser SIL3-fähigen Architektur die einzelnen Sensorsignale, die nicht-redundant sind (z.B. die durch ein TeIe- matiksystem mit Car2Car oder Car2Infrastruktur (Car2x) -Kommunikation gewonnen Sensordaten) , untereinander plausibili- siert werden, können im Vergleich zu den einzeln für sich arbeitenden Assistenzsystemen stärkere und zeitlich unbeschränkte Systemeingriffe in das Kraftfahrzeug realisiert werden, insbesondere Notbremseingriffe auf Basis von durch Telematiksysteme oder Umfeldsensorik mit erhöhter Reichweite und vergrößerter Zuverlässigkeit zur Verfügung gestellter Informationen.Since in this SIL3-capable architecture the individual sensor signals, which are non-redundant (eg the sensor data obtained by a telematics system with Car2Car or Car2Infrastructure (Car2x) communication), are plausibilized among one another working assistance systems stronger and unrestricted system interventions are realized in the motor vehicle, in particular emergency braking interventions based on information provided by telematics systems or environment sensors with increased range and increased reliability.
Damit wird also ein zentrales Steuergerät zur ganzheitlichen Erfassung des Fahrzeugumfelds, der Fahrzeugeigendynamik und zur Ermittlung der Stelleingriffe sowie der Integration von Fahrzeuginertialsensorik für aktive und passive Sicherheitssysteme bereitgestellt, die die hohen Sicherheitsanforderungen der Norm IEC 61508 erfüllt. Durch die skalierbare Architektur des Steuergerätes kann dieses fle-
xibel an die jeweils existierenden Aufgaben angepasst werden .Thus, a central control unit is provided for the holistic detection of the vehicle environment, the vehicle dynamics and for determining the control interventions as well as the integration of vehicle inertial sensor technology for active and passive safety systems, which meets the high safety requirements of the IEC 61508 standard. Due to the scalable architecture of the control unit, this be adapted to the respective existing tasks.
Weitere Vorteile, Merkmale und Anwendungsmöglichkeiten der vorliegenden Erfindung ergeben sich auch aus der nachfolgenden Beschreibung eines Ausführungsbeispiels und der Zeichnung. Dabei bilden alle beschriebenen und/oder bildlich dargestellten Merkmale für sich oder in beliebiger Kombination den Gegenstand der vorliegenden Erfindung, auch unabhängig von ihrer Zusammenfassung in den Ansprüchen oder deren Rückbezügen.Further advantages, features and applications of the present invention will become apparent from the following description of an embodiment and the drawing. All described and / or illustrated features alone or in any combination form the subject matter of the present invention, also independent of their summary in the claims or their back references.
Die einzige Fig. 1 zeigt schematisch eine erfindungsgemäßes zentrales Steuergerät für mehrere in einem Kraftfahrzeug vorgesehene Assistenzsysteme.The only Fig. 1 shows schematically an inventive central control device for several provided in a motor vehicle assistance systems.
Das zentrale Steuergerät 1 ist mit mehreren Assistenzsystemen verbunden, die jeweils einzeln und autark arbeiten. In dem dargestellten Beispiel sind als Assistenzsysteme ein Fahrerassistenzsystem 2, ein Bremsassistenzsystem 3, welches auch die Funktion eines Notbremsassistenzsystems übernimmt, und ein Telematik-System 4 vorgesehen, das zum Absenden von Notrufen beispielsweise als Ecall-System ausgebildet ist und/oder einer Kommunikation mit anderen Verkehrsteilnehmern (Car2Car-Kommukikationen) oder mit am Straßenrand vorhandener Infrastruktur (Car2Infrastruktur- Kommunikationen) dient. Als weiteres Assistenzsystem 5 beziehungsweise Steuergerät können Airbagsteuergeräte, Steuergeräte für sonstige aktive oder passive Sicherheitselemente, elektronische Steuersysteme oder dergleichen an das zentrale Steuergerät 1 angeschlossen sein.
Zwischen den Assistenzsystemen 2, 3, 4, 5 und dem zentralen Steuergerät 1 ist eine bidirektionale Kommunikationsmöglichkeit vorgesehen, sodass das zentrale Steuergerät 1 insbesondere Sensorinformationsdaten von den Assistenzsystemen 2, 3, 4, 5 erhalten und beispielsweise Steuerungsbefehle and diese zurücksenden kann.The central control unit 1 is connected to a plurality of assistance systems, which operate individually and independently. In the illustrated example are as assistance systems a driver assistance system 2, a brake assist system 3, which also takes over the function of an emergency braking assistance system, and a telematics system 4 is provided, for example, to send emergency calls as Ecall system and / or communication with others Road users (Car2Car communications) or roadside infrastructure (Car2Infrastructure communications). As a further assistance system 5 or control unit, airbag control units, control units for other active or passive security elements, electronic control systems or the like may be connected to the central control unit 1. A bidirectional communication option is provided between the assistance systems 2, 3, 4, 5 and the central control unit 1, so that the central control unit 1 can receive, in particular, sensor information data from the assistance systems 2, 3, 4, 5 and, for example, send control commands back to them.
Das Fahrerassistenzsystem 2 ist mit drei nicht dargestellten Umfeldsensoren zur Erfassung des Fahrzeugumfelds ausgestattet, bei denen es sich um einen Radarsensor, eine Kamera und einen LIDAR-Sensor handelt, der das von einer O- berfläche reflektierte Licht eines ausgesendeten Lichtpulses / Burst detektiert. Diese Umfeldsensoren ermöglichen es den Assistenzsystemen, den Fahrer des Kraftfahrzeugs aktiv zu unterstützen. Mittels Radarsensoren wird beispielweise der Abstand zu vorausfahrenden Fahrzeugen erfasst. Kamerasensoren können der Fahrspurerkennung, einer Lichtdetektie- rung im Dunkeln, einer Verkehrszeichenerkennung oder einer Fahrzeugdetektion dienen. Jeder dieser Umgebungssensoren erzeugt jedoch keine sicheren und redundanten Daten, insbesondere weil die Auswertung und Erkennung von Daten häufig mit gewissen Unsicherheiten verbunden ist und Fehlinterpretationen der Daten nicht ausgeschlossen werden können. Außerdem ist ein technischer Funktionsausfall einzelner Sensoren möglich. So kann beispielsweise die hinter der Windschutzscheibe angeordnete Kamera zeitweise ausfallen, wenn die Windschutzscheibe vereist oder beschlagen ist.The driver assistance system 2 is equipped with three ambient sensors, not shown, for detecting the vehicle surroundings, which are a radar sensor, a camera and a LIDAR sensor which detects the light reflected by an upper surface of a transmitted light pulse / burst. These environmental sensors allow the assistance systems to actively assist the driver of the motor vehicle. Radar sensors detect, for example, the distance to vehicles in front. Camera sensors can be used for lane detection, light detection in the dark, traffic sign recognition or vehicle detection. However, each of these environmental sensors does not generate secure and redundant data, especially because the analysis and recognition of data is often associated with certain uncertainties and misinterpretations of the data can not be excluded. In addition, a technical malfunction of individual sensors is possible. For example, the camera located behind the windshield may temporarily fail if the windshield is frosted or fogged.
Aus diesem Grund ist es entsprechend der Norm zur funktionalen Sicherheit IEC 61508 nicht zulässig, dass derartige
Sensoren, die keine sicheren und redundanten Informationen liefern und damit nicht der Sicherheitsstufe SIL3 angehören, als Grundlage für automatische und selbsttätige Eingriffe in die Fahrdynamik eines Kraftfahrzeugs verwendet werden, insbesondere wenn der Fahrer die durch das Assistenzsystem vorgeschlagene Reaktion nicht bestätigt oder der durch das Assistenzsystem eingeleitete Eingriff nicht in der Dauer oder Intensität begrenzt ist.For this reason, according to the standard for functional safety IEC 61508, it is not allowed for such Sensors that do not provide safe and redundant information and thus do not belong to the security level SIL3 be used as a basis for automatic and automatic intervention in the driving dynamics of a motor vehicle, especially if the driver does not confirm the proposed by the assistance system response or initiated by the assistance system Intervention is not limited in duration or intensity.
Um die durch die Umfeldsensoren des Fahrerassistenzsystems 2 gewonnenen Sensorinformationen zu überprüfen, werden diese daher gemäß in dem erfindungsgemäß vorgeschlagenen Verfahren an das zentrale Steuergerät 1 übertragen und dort in einer Sicherheitskontrolleinheit 6 ausgewertet. Die Sicherheitskontrolleinheit 6 ist dazu eingerichtet, die nichtredundanten Sensorinformation der einzelnen Assistenzsysteme 2, 3, 4, 5 mittels analytischer Redundanzen verschiedener, von dem zentralen Steuergerät erhaltener Sensorinformationen zu überprüfen. Die zur logischen Überprüfung herangezogenen Sensorinformationen können Sensorinformationen anderer an die Assistenzsysteme 2, 3, 4, 5 angeschlossener Sensoren, insbesondere der Umfeldsensoren, sein. Ferner können an das Steuergerät 1 unmittelbar Sensoren 7, 8 angeschlossen sein, die dem zentralen Steuergerät 1 beispielsweise Informationen über die Fahrzeugdynamik oder das Air- bagsystem übermitteln. Natürlich können auch andere Sensoren unmittelbar an das zentrale Steuergerät 1 angeschlossen sein und entweder als Zusatzinformationen für die analytischen Redundanzen herangezogen beziehungsweise selbst überprüft werden. Die direkte Integration von Sensorik 7, 8 in das zentrale Steuergerät 1 hat ferner den Vorteil, dass im
Vergleich zu separaten Sensorclustern für beispielsweise das Brems- bzw. ESP-System und den Airbag Kosten gespart werden können.In order to check the sensor information obtained by the environment sensors of the driver assistance system 2, they are therefore transmitted to the central control device 1 in accordance with the method proposed according to the invention and evaluated there in a safety control unit 6. The security control unit 6 is set up to check the non-redundant sensor information of the individual assistance systems 2, 3, 4, 5 by means of analytical redundancies of various sensor information obtained from the central control unit. The sensor information used for the logical check can be sensor information of other sensors connected to the assistance systems 2, 3, 4, 5, in particular of the environment sensors. Furthermore, sensors 7, 8 can be directly connected to the control unit 1, which transmit information about the vehicle dynamics or the airbag system to the central control unit 1, for example. Of course, other sensors can be connected directly to the central control unit 1 and either used as additional information for the analytical redundancies or even be checked. The direct integration of sensors 7, 8 in the central control unit 1 also has the advantage that in Compared to separate sensor clusters for example, the brake or ESP system and the airbag costs can be saved.
Ein Beispiel für eine solche analytische Redundanz-Prüfung könnte sein, daß die Bildinformationen einer Kamera die Meßdaten eines Strahlsensors (Radar, Lidar) bestätigen, d.h. eine redundante Information im Sinne SIL3 fähig bildenAn example of such an analytical redundancy check could be that the image information of a camera confirms the measurement data of a beam sensor (radar, lidar), i. form redundant information in the sense of SIL3
(Sensorfusion) . Diese Daten können nun aber auch durch De- justage fehlerhafte Werte liefern. Diese Dejustage kann jedoch erfindungsgemäß z.B. mit Hilfe von Fahrdynamiksensorik(Sensor fusion). However, these data can also deliver erroneous values through de-adjustment. However, this misalignment can be achieved according to the invention e.g. with the help of driving dynamics sensors
(Vertikalbeschleunigung und/oder Ausfederwege eines Luftfahrwerks oder einer geregelten Chassis) abgesichert werden - also der über die Kamera ermittelte Horizont mit der sen- sierten Lage des Chassis plausibilisiert und geprüft werden .(Vertical acceleration and / or rebound travel of an air suspension or a controlled chassis) - ie the horizon determined by the camera with the sensed position of the chassis must be checked for plausibility and checked.
Damit läßt die Fehlerrate zum einen reduzieren und zu anderen die Eingriffstärke der autonomen Eingriffe erhöhen sowie die Zeitdauer der Eingriffe steigern.On the one hand, this reduces the error rate and, on the other hand, increases the intervention strength of the autonomous interventions and increases the duration of the interventions.
Wenn die analytische Redundanz-Prüfung erfolgreich abgeschlossen wurde, gelten die geprüften Sensorinformationen als redundant und sicher. Sie werden dann durch die Sicherheitskontrolleinheit 6 beziehungsweise das zentrale Steuergerät 1 plausibilisiert. Hierzu kann den Sensordaten eine entsprechende Kennung hinzugefügt werden.If the analytical redundancy check has been successfully completed, the tested sensor information is considered redundant and safe. They are then plausibilized by the security control unit 6 or the central control unit 1. For this purpose, a corresponding identifier can be added to the sensor data.
Diese plausibilisierten Sensordaten werden den einzelnen Assistenzsystemen 2, 3, 4, 5 zugesandt, sofern das betreffende Assistenzsystem 2, 3, 4, 5 diese Daten auswertet.
In einem häufigen Anwendungsfall werden die plausibilisier- ten Sensorinformationen der Umfeldsensoren dem Bremsassistenzsystem 3 zugeleitet, das aufbauend auf diesen Informationen in an sich bekannter Weise dann eine automatische Notbremsung einleitet, wenn die Sensorinformationen der Umfeldsensoren sowie gegebenenfalls weitere Sensorinformationen, die durch das zentrale Steuergerät 1 plausibilisiert wurden, eine Gefahrensituation anzeigen, die eine Notbremsung erforderlich macht. Da die Notbremsung dann auf der Grundlage plausibilisierter Sensorinformationen erfolgt, die der Sicherheitsstufe SIL3 entsprechen, muss die Notbremsung weder durch den Fahrer aktiv bestätigt werden noch findet zwangsläufig eine Beschränkung der Bremsdauer oder Bremsintensität durch das System statt.These plausibilized sensor data are sent to the individual assistance systems 2, 3, 4, 5, provided that the relevant assistance system 2, 3, 4, 5 evaluates this data. In a frequent application, the plausibilized sensor information of the environment sensors are supplied to the brake assist system 3, which then builds on this information in a conventional manner then initiates an automatic emergency braking, if the sensor information of the environment sensors and optionally further sensor information that makes plausible by the central control unit 1 indicate a dangerous situation that requires emergency braking. Since emergency braking then takes place on the basis of plausible sensor information that corresponds to safety level SIL3, emergency braking does not have to be actively confirmed by the driver, nor does the system inevitably restrict braking time or braking intensity.
Indem die Assistenzsysteme durch die erfindungsgemäß vorgeschlagene Plausibilisierung an sich nicht sicherer und redundanter Sensorinformationen in die Lage versetzt werden, selbsttätig sicherheitsrelevante Eingriffe in die Fahrdynamik des Kraftfahrzeugs auszuüben, wird die Sicherheit im Verkehr insgesamt erhöht, da gerade schwerwiegende Gefahrensituationen, die anhand der Sensorik unzweifelhaft erkannt werden können, in positiver Weise entgegengetreten werden kann.By the assistance systems are enabled by the present invention proposed plausibility check on unsafe and redundant sensor information in the situation to exercise safety-related interventions in the driving dynamics of the motor vehicle, the overall safety in traffic is increased, as just serious dangerous situations, recognized by the sensors undoubtedly can be countered in a positive way.
Ferner kann das erfindungsgemäße zentrale Steuergerät Schnittstellen für eine Mobilfunkkommunikation 9, eine Te- lematik-Kommunikation 10 mit der Umgebung des Kraftfahrzeugs, für eine Satellitennavigation 11 und für eine Sicherheitskarte (SafetyMap) 12 aufweisen, wobei eine Sicher-
heitskarte auch unmittelbar in das zentrale Steuergerät 1 mitintegriert sein kann und dort anhand der vorliegenden Informationen unmittelbar aktualisiert wird.Furthermore, the central control unit according to the invention can have interfaces for a mobile radio communication 9, a telematics communication 10 with the environment of the motor vehicle, for a satellite navigation 11 and for a safety map (SafetyMap) 12, with a safety device. health card can also be integrated directly into the central control unit 1 and there is immediately updated based on the information available.
Mit dem erfindungsgemäßen zentralen Steuergerät 1 beziehungsweise einem mit diesem Steuergerät 1 ausgerüsteten Fahrzeug kann die Funktion automatischer in einem Kraftfahrzeug vorhandene Assistenzsysteme erheblich erweitert werden, weil durch die Plausibilisierung sicherheitsrelevanter Sensorinformationen die Kompetenzen der Assistenzsysteme insgesamt ausgedehnt werden können.
With the central control unit 1 according to the invention or a vehicle equipped with this control unit 1, the function of automatic assistance systems present in a motor vehicle can be considerably expanded because the competencies of the assistance systems can be extended as a whole by the plausibility check of safety-relevant sensor information.
Bezugszeichenliste :List of reference numbers:
1 zentrales Steuergerät1 central control unit
2 Fahrerassistenzsystem2 driver assistance system
3 Brems-/Notbremsassistenzsystem3 Brake / Emergency Brake Assist System
4 Telematiksystem4 telematics system
5 Assistenzsystem/Steuergerät5 assistance system / control unit
6 Sicherheitskontrolleinheit6 security control unit
7 Sensor7 sensor
8 Sensor8 sensor
9 Schnittstelle für Mobilfunkkommunikation9 Interface for mobile radio communication
10 Schnittstelle für Telematikkommunikation10 interface for telematics communication
11 Schnittstelle für Satellitennavigation11 Interface for satellite navigation
12 Schnittstelle für eine Sicherheitskarte
12 Interface for a security card
Claims
1. Zentrales Steuergerät für mehrere in einem Kraftfahrzeug vorgesehene Assistenzsysteme (2, 3, 4, 5), die jeweils einzeln arbeiten und von denen mindestens ein Assistenzsystem (2, 3, 4, 5) mit Umfeldsensoren ausgestattet ist, wobei das zentrale Steuergerät (1) mit den einzelnen Assistenzsystemen (2, 3, 4, 5) verbunden und dazu eingerichtet ist, Sensorinformationen von den Assistenzsystemen (2, 3, 4, 5) zu erhalten und auszuwerten sowie Status- und/oder Steuerbefehle an die Assistenzsysteme (2, 3, 4, 5) zurückzumelden, dadurch kennzeichnet, dass das zentrale Steuergerät (1) eine Sicherheitskontrolleinheit (6) aufweist, welche dazu eingerichtet ist, nicht-redundante Sensorinformationen der einzelnen Assistenzsysteme (2, 3, 4, 5) mittels analytischer Redundanzen verschiedener, von dem zentralen Steuergerät (1) erhaltener Sensorinformationen zu überprüfen.1. Central control unit for several provided in a motor vehicle assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5), each working individually and of which at least one assistance system (2, 3, 4, 5) is equipped with environmental sensors, wherein the central control unit ( 1) is connected to the individual assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5) and is set up to receive and evaluate sensor information from the assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5) and to send status and / or control commands to the assistance systems (2 , 3, 4, 5), characterized in that the central control unit (1) has a security control unit (6) which is adapted to non-redundant sensor information of the individual assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5) by means of analytical redundancies various, from the central control unit (1) obtained to verify sensor information.
2. Zentrales Steuergerät nach Anspruch 1, dadurch kennzeichnet, dass in der Sicherheitskontrolleinheit (6) nichtredundante Sensorinformationen nach einer erfolgreichen Überprüfung der analytischen Redundanzen plausi- bilisiert werden.2. Central control unit according to claim 1, characterized in that non-redundant sensor information in the security control unit (6) are plausibilized after a successful verification of the analytical redundancies.
3. Zentrales Steuergerät nach Anspruch 1 oder 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass in der Sicherheitskontrolleinheit (6) nichtredundante Sensorinformationen von Umfeldsensoren ü- berprüft werden.3. Central control unit according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that non-redundant sensor information from environment sensors is checked in the safety control unit (6).
4. Zentrales Steuergerät nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, dadurch kennzeichnet, dass in der Sicherheitskontrolleinheit (6) nichtredundante Sensorinformationen eines Umfeldsensors durch Sensorinformationen eines anderen Umfeldsensors überprüft werden, die vorzugsweise durch das zentrale Steuergerät (1) auf einem anderen Signalpfad und/oder in einer anderen Beschreibungsform der Umfeldinterpretation erhalten wurden.4. Central control unit according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that in the security control unit (6) nichtredundante sensor information of an environment sensor are checked by sensor information of another environmental sensor, preferably by the central control unit (1) on a different signal path and / or in a other description of the environment interpretation.
5. Zentrales Steuergerät nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, dadurch kennzeichnet, dass in der Sicherheitskontrolleinheit (6) nichtredundante Sensorinformationen mittels einer Sicherheitskarte überprüft werden, wobei die Sicherheitskarte wenigstens aus einer Navigationskarte mit sicherheitsrelevanten Attributen besteht und in dem zentralen Steuergerät gespeichert wird.5. Central control unit according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that non-redundant sensor information is checked by means of a security card in the security control unit (6), wherein the security card at least consists of a navigation map with security-relevant attributes and is stored in the central control unit.
6. Zentrales Steuergerät nach einem der Ansprüche 2 bis 5, dadurch kennzeichnet, dass in dem zentralen Steuergerät (1) auf der Basis plausibilisierter Sensorinformationen, insbesondere plausibilisierter Sensorinformationen von Umfeldsenso- ren, Steuerbefehle erzeugt und an die Assistenzsysteme (2, 3, 4, 5) zurückgemeldet werden, wobei die Steuerbefehle einen sicherheitsrelevaten Eingriff in das Fahrzeug bewirken können.6. Central control unit according to one of claims 2 to 5, characterized indicates that in the central control unit (1) on the basis of plausible sensor information, in particular plausibilized sensor information from environment sensors ren, generates control commands and returned to the assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5), wherein the control commands can cause a safety-relevant intervention in the vehicle.
7. Zentrales Steuergerät nach Anspruch 5, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der Steuerbefehl ein unbeschränkter und/oder unbedingter Notbremsbefehl an ein Bremsassistenzsystem (3) ist.7. Central control unit according to claim 5, characterized in that the control command is an unrestricted and / or unconditional emergency brake command to a brake assist system (3).
8. Zentrales Steuergerät nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, dadurch kennzeichnet, dass die Assistenzsysteme (2, 3, 4, 5) ein komfortorientiertes Fahrerassistenzsystem (2), ein Bremsassistenzsystem (3), ein Telematiksystem (4) und/oder ein Steuergerät (5) sind.8. Central control unit according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5) a comfort-oriented driver assistance system (2), a brake assist system (3), a telematics system (4) and / or a control device (5 ) are.
9. Zentrales Steuergerät nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, dadurch kennzeichnet, dass das zentrale Steuergerät (1) eine dual-core Prozessor-Architektur aufweist.9. Central control unit according to one of the preceding claims, characterized indicates that the central control unit (1) has a dual-core processor architecture.
10. Zentrales Steuergerät nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, dadurch kennzeichnet, dass das zentrale Steuergerät (1) skalierbare Rechenressourcen, insbesondere modular skalierbare Speicher und/oder Prozessorgrößen, aufweist. 10. Central control unit according to one of the preceding claims, characterized indicates that the central control unit (1) scalable computing resources, in particular modular scalable memory and / or processor sizes having.
11. Kraftfahrzeug mit Assistenzsystemen (2, 3, 4, 5), insbesondere einem komfortorientierten Fahrerassistenzsystem (2), Bremsassistenzsystem (3) und/oder Telema- tiksystem (4) , dadurch kennzeichnet, dass das Kraftfahrzeug ein gemeinsames Steuergerät (1) für die Assistenzsysteme (2, 3, 4, 5) nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 9 aufweist. 11. Motor vehicle with assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5), in particular a comfort-oriented driver assistance system (2), brake assist system (3) and / or telematics system (4), characterized in that the motor vehicle is a common control unit (1) for the assistance systems (2, 3, 4, 5) according to one of claims 1 to 9.
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