WO2006035501A1 - 秘匿通信システム - Google Patents
秘匿通信システム Download PDFInfo
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- WO2006035501A1 WO2006035501A1 PCT/JP2004/014250 JP2004014250W WO2006035501A1 WO 2006035501 A1 WO2006035501 A1 WO 2006035501A1 JP 2004014250 W JP2004014250 W JP 2004014250W WO 2006035501 A1 WO2006035501 A1 WO 2006035501A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- rlc
- data
- pdu
- processing
- concealment
- Prior art date
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- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 title claims description 43
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 198
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims description 112
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 45
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 abstract description 48
- 238000013523 data management Methods 0.000 abstract description 31
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 abstract description 26
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 abstract description 24
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 34
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 22
- 238000004422 calculation algorithm Methods 0.000 description 20
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 6
- 239000000284 extract Substances 0.000 description 5
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000006872 improvement Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000003672 processing method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000006978 adaptation Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000000969 carrier Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000007796 conventional method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000003247 decreasing effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002250 progressing effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- the present invention relates to secret communication between a radio network controller and a mobile device in a CDMA system.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an overview of the current 3GPP system.
- Wireless network controller 102_0 Interfacing with 102_n is the interface between Iu and the wireless network controller 102 0-l 02 n and the wireless network controller 102 0-l 02 n is the interface between Iur and the wireless network controller 102_0 —
- the interface between 102_n and base station 103_0—103_n is called Iub, and the interface between base station 103_0—103_n and mobile station 105 is called Uu.
- KASUMI is a 64-bit input and 64-bit block encryption that uses a 128-bit secret key (CK) and other secret parameters to perform encryption.
- CK secret key
- FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a typical protocol stack in the 3GPP system.
- the protocol stack has a physical layer (PHY), a transport network layer (TNL), and a radio network layer (RNL) from the lower layer.
- the Transport Network Layer further consists of Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) and ATM Adaptation Layer 2 (AAL2). Also, Radio Network Layeri, Frame Protocol (FP), Medium Access Control (MAC), Radio Link Control (RLC), and Radio Resource Control (RRC).
- ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode
- AAL2 ATM Adaptation Layer 2
- RRC Radio Network Layeri
- FP Frame Protocol
- MAC Medium Access Control
- RLC Radio Link Control
- RRC Radio Resource Control
- FIG. 3 and FIG. 4 are diagrams showing a data format exchanged between the mobile device and the wireless network control device.
- Figure 3 shows the RLC layer data format.
- Figure 3 (a) shows the PS call data format
- Figure 3 (b) shows the CS call data format.
- PS calls data consists of a header part and a payload part.
- the PDU is generated by dividing the upper layer SDU data in the power header part, the sequence number indicating the number of SDU data stored in the PDU data, and the Acknowledge message on the receiving side.
- a Polling bit for requesting a page and a Header Extension indicating whether or not the length indicator next to the header continues is stored.
- the payload portion the length of the end of the data in the payload, or the portion of the payload where the pad is provided, etc. This includes extension data, padding, etc. that indicate whether the force data is repeated.
- the CS call data passes through the RLC layer as it is, so it does not have a header and consists only of data and padding.
- the target range of confidential processing in PS calls is the payload part (excluding the header) of the RLC-PDU
- the target range of confidential processing in CS calls is the entire RLC-PDU (MAC-SDU) and Become.
- CS call data is sent to the Iub transmission line, it is formatted in the format shown in Fig. 4 by the FP layer.
- the CFN in the header corresponds to the sequence number of the header in Fig. 3 (a) and is the sequence number of the Iub-FP frame.
- the secret calculation is realized by software processing.
- the power of concealed computation processing can be realized with dedicated hardware.Effects of time lag such as data transfer time to dedicated hardware and waiting time until computation results are returned, flexible response to specification changes, Considering that complicated parameter management must be performed by software, processing is implemented by software. For these reasons, in the current 3GPP system, it is necessary to repeatedly perform the complex calculation of the power KASUMI algorithm that performs the confidential processing by software, and all the data to be concealed is used for the confidential calculation processing. For this reason, it is necessary to transfer data between the processor and the memory. This increases the processing load of the processing function unit, and it is difficult to increase the throughput of the confidential processing.
- the lack of processing capability of the concealment function unit is one factor that increases the number of facilities.
- the number of users is not large, and there is no service application using packet communication, so the data throughput required for the system is high. It has not reached a major problem.
- the 3GPP system operates as a system with a high security level, and the encryption function for data (secret function) plays a central role in its security function.
- Data encryption involves complicated arithmetic processing due to its nature.
- the current 3GPP system has a bottleneck in its ability to perform computation processing by software.
- the confidential processing time is the processing time ratio per RLC-SDU. From the actual measurement results, it is known that about 40% of the processing time of the system is devoted to the processing.
- KASUMI's computation processing time may be shortened. Since an external bus is used for memory access, the number of bus accesses hinders improvement in confidential processing throughput.
- Patent Document 1 discloses a technique for dividing image data, encrypting initial data, and converting the remaining data for transmission in a data transfer of a fatimile apparatus.
- Patent Document 2 discloses a technique for encrypting a part of a data frame!
- Patent Document 1 Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 9-149265
- Patent Document 2 JP-A-10-66157
- the problem of the present invention is that the 3GPP concealment processing function unit improves concealment processing throughput, which is a bottleneck for improving data throughput, and does not reduce the security level. Is to provide a system.
- a further problem of the present invention is to realize such a system without relying on an increase in the number of facilities and an improvement in device performance.
- the secret communication system of the present invention is a secret communication system for concealing communication between a base station capable of terminating a radio protocol and a mobile station that transmits and receives radio waves in the same manner as a radio network control device capable of terminating a radio protocol. And determining means for determining whether or not concealment processing is necessary for the data to be transmitted and received, and limiting the data range subject to concealment processing of the data according to the determination of the determination means, and for the data in the limited range And partial encryption means for performing only encryption.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an overview of a current 3GPP system.
- FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a typical protocol stack in a 3GPP system.
- FIG. 3 This is a diagram showing the format of RLC-PDU that is subject to concealment processing in the 3GPP system.
- FIG. 4 is a diagram showing the Iub-FP frame format of a CS call.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram for explaining an RLC processing procedure in a PS call.
- FIG. 6 is a diagram showing the configuration and operation on the transmission side of the concealment function unit.
- FIG. 7 is a diagram showing the configuration and operation on the receiving side of the concealment function unit.
- FIG. 8 is a diagram showing an example of a confidential parameter management table in the confidential management unit.
- FIG. 9 is a diagram showing an outline of a processing flow in a secret function unit.
- FIG. 10 is a diagram showing an outline of a processing flow in a secret function unit.
- FIG. 11 is a processing flow of the confidentiality management unit.
- FIG. 12 is a diagram showing a specific configuration of an example of a method for performing a concealment process.
- FIG. 13 is a diagram showing a specific configuration of another example of a method for performing a concealment process.
- the system according to the embodiment of the present invention is configured with a radio network controller and a mobile device, and in order to ensure security on the radio transmission path, to the radio network controller and data transferred over the air to the mobile device System that has a function to perform confidential processing, and has a reception processing unit, a data management unit, a data buffer, a confidential calculation processing unit, and a confidential management unit in the confidential function unit. Equipped with a function to extract information, a function to maintain and manage received data, a function to realize a confidential calculation, and a function to determine the data range that is the target of the confidential calculation to perform efficient confidential processing It is characterized by being able to.
- the reception processing unit requires a confidentiality management unit for the data internal power to the received data. It has a function of extracting necessary information and notifying the confidential management unit of appropriate information.
- the data management unit transfers the data held in the data buffer to the secret calculation processing unit.
- the data buffer has a function of holding and managing data before the confidential processing and data after the confidential processing is performed.
- the secrecy calculation processing unit has a function of executing a secrecy calculation process on the data received from the data management unit using the secrecy parameter instructed by the secrecy management unit.
- the confidentiality management unit includes a control unit and a confidentiality parameter management table therein, and the control unit conceals the data held in the data buffer based on the information notified from the reception processing unit. It has a function to determine whether processing has been executed or not and notify the data management unit of the result.
- the confidential parameter management table in the confidential management unit holds / manages confidential parameters for each data and has a function of notifying the confidential calculation processing unit of appropriate confidential parameters.
- the RLC-PDU format is shown in Fig. 4, and the Iub-FP frame format of the CS call is shown.
- the RLC protocol is a protocol for communication between a radio network controller and a mobile device.
- the RLC protocol is a protocol for communication between a radio network controller and a mobile device.
- all of the confidentiality processing implementations are set.
- Concealment processing is performed on the RLC-PDU by the transmission side device, and concealment cancellation processing is performed on the received RLC-PDU by the reception side device.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram for explaining the RLC processing procedure in a PS call.
- the RLC protocol of the transmitting device divides the RLC-SDU into PDU lengths that are set in advance, and RLC headers are used for each divided data. A RLC-PDU is generated.
- the concealment processing unit performs concealment processing on the payload portion of the RLC-PDU using different concealment parameters for each RLC-PDU.
- the RLC protocol of the receiving device that received the concealed RLC-PDU is
- RLC-PDU data and assemble RLC-SDU. Therefore, if one or more data of RLC-PDU divided from one RLC-SDU is not correctly transmitted / received by the transmitting side device, the RLC-SDU can be accurately restored. Can not.
- SN Sequence Number
- included in the RLC header is also used as the concealment parameter used for concealment processing of PS calls. SN is incremented for each RLC-PDU, and a different value is assigned.
- the method of the embodiment of the present invention focuses on the data unit of RLC-SDU, and in the case of a PS call.
- RLC-SDU is divided into multiple RLC-PDUs and transmitted / received, and SN and CFN power LC-PDUs used as concealment parameters, or different values are assigned for each Iub-FP frame
- this feature is used to reduce the load on the confidential processing unit by limiting the confidential processing range while maintaining the confidentiality of RLC-SDU.
- FIG. 6 is a diagram showing the configuration and operation on the transmission side of the concealment function unit
- FIG. 7 is a diagram showing the configuration and operation on the reception side of the concealment function unit.
- the wireless network control device and the concealment function unit 110 in the mobile device include a reception processing unit 111, a data management unit 116, a data buffer 112, a concealment calculation processing unit 113, a concealment management unit 114, and a transmission processing unit 115.
- a reception processing unit 111 receives a reception signal from the base station.
- the reception processing unit 111 receives an RLC-PDU, extracts information necessary for the confidentiality processing and the necessity of the confidentiality processing from the RLC-PDU, and sends the contents to the confidentiality management unit. Notify.
- Information necessary for determining whether or not the confidential processing is necessary is a sequence number CN, CFN, Length Indicator, or the like, as will be described later.
- the data management unit 116 delivers the data held in the data buffer 112 to the cipher operation processing unit 113 or the transmission processing unit 115 in accordance with an instruction from the cipher management unit 114.
- the data buffer 112 is a buffer for storing RLC-PDUs, and has a function of holding / managing RLC-PDUs received by the reception processing unit 111.
- the concealment calculation processing unit 113 uses the concealment parameter instructed from the concealment management unit 114 to perform concealment processing using the KASUMI algorithm on the data passed from the data management unit 116.
- the secret management unit 114 includes a control unit 114 1 and a secret parameter management table 114 2 therein.
- the control unit 1141 determines whether or not the confidential processing needs to be performed on the RLC-PDU held by the data management unit 116, and notifies the data management unit 116 of the determination result. Furthermore, when the confidential processing is performed as a result of the confidential processing execution determination, an appropriate confidential parameter is read from the confidential parameter management table 114-2 for the RLC-PDU and notified to the confidential calculation processing unit.
- the confidential parameter management table 1142 holds confidential parameter information set in advance for each RLC entity for each RLC entity.
- the transmission processing unit 115 receives the unprocessed RLC-PDU passed from the data management unit 116 and the post-confidential RLC-PDU passed from the encryption operation processing unit 113. Sent to the next layer.
- a certain integer N is determined between the radio network controller and the mobile station, and only when the SN number in the RLC header is divisible by N, concealment processing is performed on the RLC-PDU.
- A) shows a specific configuration. The part of the RLC-PDU that has no
- the wireless network control device and the mobile device have a list table of SN numbers to be concealed, and only when the numbers in the table match the SN numbers of the RLC-PDU To perform concealment processing. Since the length of the SDU is not constant, an SN number that can be concealed at least once for one RLC-SDU is estimated based on experience.
- Figure 12 (B) shows the specific configuration. The part of the RLC-PDU that has been tapped and processed is concealed.
- Figure 12 (C) shows the specific configuration.
- the part of the RLC-PDU that has been tapped and processed is concealed. 4.
- a method of performing concealment processing only when the RLC-PDU power is the last of the RLC-SDU.
- Figure 12 (D) shows the specific configuration. The part of the RLC-PDU that has been tapped and processed is concealed.
- the Polling bit in the RLC-PDU is confirmed, and only when the RLC-PDU corresponds to the final PDU of the RLC-SDU, concealment processing is performed on the RLC-PDU.
- the Polling bit is 1, it is a force that requests the receiver to send back an Acknowledge message. Since this is included in the final PDU, whether the Polling bit is 1 or not determines whether it is the final PDU. be able to.
- FIG. 13 (1) shows a specific configuration. The hatched part of the RLC-PDU is concealed.
- Concealment processing is performed only on the valid data part in RLC-PDU (the part where LI, Padding, etc. are removed from the payload part).
- RLC-PDUs RLC headers, RLC-PDUs with only LI and Padding
- Figure 13 (E) shows the specific structure. The hatched part of the RLC-PDU is concealed. ing.
- a certain integer N is determined between the radio network controller and the mobile device
- Concealment processing is performed only for the first N bits of the payload part (excluding the RLC header) in the RLC-PDU.
- Figures 13 (F) to (H) show the specific configuration.
- the hatched part of the RLC-PDU is concealed.
- a certain integer N is determined between the radio network controller and the mobile station, and only when it is divisible by the CFN numbering power in the Iub-FP header, the RLC-PDU stored in the Iub-FP To perform concealment processing.
- the Iub -Concealment is performed for RLC-PDUs stored in the FP.
- the methods described in items 1 to 6 above are methods that use SN, LI, Polling bit, etc. in RLC-PDU, and are therefore effective only for PS calls.
- Sections 9 and 10 are methods that use CFN etc. in Iub-FP, and are effective only for CS calls.
- the following methods can be considered as a method for synchronizing these parameters and methods between the radio network controller and the mobile station.
- RRC SECURITY MODE which is the security setting command at the RRC layer currently specified by 3GPP
- a command to set parameters for encryption processing and encryption method is newly added to COMMAND. Then, the RRC SECURITY MODE COMMAND parameter and encryption method setting command are issued from the radio network controller, and the RRC SECURITY MODE COMMAND COMPLETE message indicating that the setting has been made is received from the mobile station. Therefore, the setting of the concealment process is performed between the wireless network control device and the mobile device.
- the reception processing unit 111 extracts information necessary for performing the confidentiality processing determination from the received RLC-PDU according to the method for determining the confidentiality processing determination, and notifies the confidentiality management unit 114 of the information. At the same time, the RLC-PDU is stored in the data buffer 112.
- the RLC-PDU is stored in the data buffer 112.
- the control unit 1141 in the confidentiality management unit 114 determines whether or not the RLC-PDU is subjected to the confidential processing.
- the control unit 1141 in the concealment management unit 114 compares the information related to the RLC-PDU notified from the reception processing unit 111 with the conditions for determining the concealment processing range determined in advance. It is determined whether or not the RLC-PDU is concealed, and the result is notified to the data management unit 116.
- the control unit 114 1 in the concealment management unit 114 uses the concealment parameter management table 114 2 to execute the RLC-PDU. -Extract the confidential parameters necessary for performing the confidential processing on the PDU, and notify the confidential calculation processing unit 113 of the confidential parameters.
- the concealment calculation processing unit 113 performs concealment calculation processing using the KASUMI algorithm on the designated data sent from the data management unit 116.
- the parameter notified from the secret management unit 113 is used as a secret parameter such as a secret key necessary for the secret calculation processing.
- the cipher operation processing unit 113 stores the data after the cipher process in the data buffer 112 via the data management unit 116.
- This section describes the processing for transmitting RLC-PDUs stored in the data buffer.
- the method for determining the confidential processing range and the parameter value for the determination are as follows.
- the method for determining the concealment processing range during call connection and the parameter value for the determination can be changed.
- FIG. 6 and FIG. 7 show an embodiment of a radio network controller for realizing the present invention and a concealment processing unit in a mobile station.
- the concealment processing unit 110 is shown in FIG. A reception processing unit 111, a data management unit 116, a data buffer 112, a secret management unit 114, a secret calculation processing unit 113, and a transmission processing unit 115.
- FIG. 6 and FIG. 7 also show the data flow.
- the data is input to the reception processing unit 111 via the RRC processing unit and the RLC processing unit.
- the reception processing unit 111 information for determining the presence or absence of the confidential processing such as LI is extracted from the RLC-PDU before the confidential processing, which is the input data, and sent to the confidential management unit 114.
- the data body is input to the data management unit 116.
- the data body is stored in the data buffer 112 via the data management unit 116.
- the security management unit 114 determines whether or not to execute the security process, an instruction to that effect is input to the data management unit 116, and when the security process is performed, parameters for the security process are set.
- the information is input to the confidential calculation processing unit 1 13.
- the data management unit 116 receives an instruction from the cipher management unit 114 that data should be concealed, the data management unit 116 reads the data from the data buffer 112 and passes it to the cipher operation processing unit 113.
- the data management unit 116 does not read data from the data buffer 112 when the confidential processing is not performed.
- the concealment calculation processing unit 113 conceals the data and returns it to the data management unit 116.
- the data management unit 116 stores the confidential data in the data buffer 112.
- the data that has been concealed or the data that has not been concealed is read from the data notifier 112 by the data management unit 116, sent to the transmission processing unit 115, and the RLC after the concealment processing is sent to the FP processing unit. -Passed as a PDU.
- FIG. 7 shows the data flow on the receiving side.
- the data management unit 116 When the RLC-PDU that has been subjected to the confidential processing of the FP processing unit is input to the reception processing unit 111, information for determining the presence / absence of the confidential processing is transmitted to the confidential management unit 114.
- the data body is stored in the data buffer 112 via the data management unit 116.
- the data management unit 116 receives an instruction to the effect that the data has been concealed from the concealment management unit 114, the data is read from the data buffer 112 and sent to the concealment calculation processing unit 113.
- Concealment parameters are sent from the concealment management unit 11 4 to the concealment operation processing unit 113, and after the concealment operation processing unit 113 removes the data from the concealment process, the data management unit 116 displays the data that has been deciphered in the data buffer. Store in 112. After that, the deciphered data or the strong data that has not been concealed is read from the data buffer 112, and is sent to the RLC processing unit via the transmission processing unit 115 as an unconfide
- FIG. 8 is a diagram showing an example of a confidential parameter management table in the confidential management unit.
- An area to store the secret key (CK), COUNT (HFN + RLC SN (CFN)), BEARER, and DIRECTION is prepared for each call.
- the secret key is given from an upper layer, and a different value is set for each RLC entity.
- COUNT is composed of HFN (20 bits) + RLC SN (12 bits) force.
- RLC TM CS call
- HFN 24 bits + CFN (8 bits) force is also configured. Only the initial value is given from the upper layer, and HFN is incremented by 1 every time RLC SN or CFN goes around. The RLC SN is incremented every RLC-PDU. CFN is incremented in units of 10ms.
- BEARER uses RB Identity included in "RRC RADIO BEARER SETUP" and the like transmitted and received between the radio network controller and the mobile device.
- FIG. 9 and FIG. 10 are diagrams showing an outline of the processing flow in the concealment function unit.
- FIG. 9 is a diagram of the transmission process.
- the reception processing unit extracts information necessary for determining whether or not the received RLC-PDU power is concealed, notifies the concealment management unit of the information, and stores the RLC-PDU in the data buffer.
- the confidentiality management unit determines whether or not confidentiality processing is necessary based on the notified information, and notifies the data management unit of the determination result. As a result of this determination, when the confidential processing is performed, the confidential processing procedure is performed and the confidential processing is performed.
- the RLC-PDU is stored again in the data buffer.
- the RLC-PDU that has been determined to be concealed and has been concealed, and the RLC-PDU that has been determined not to be concealed are transmitted to the next layer by the transmission processing unit.
- FIG. 10 is a diagram of the reception process.
- Figure 9 shows almost the same data flow except that the signal is subject to deciphering. That is, the reception processing unit extracts information necessary for determining whether or not the received RLC-PDU power is concealed, notifies the concealment management unit of the information, and stores the RLC-PDU in the data buffer. The confidentiality management department uses the notified information Then, it is determined whether or not the confidentiality cancellation process is necessary, and the determination result is notified to the data management unit. As a result of this determination, when performing the deciphering process, the deciphering process procedure is performed, and the RLC-PDU after the deciphering process is performed is stored again in the data buffer.
- the RLC-PDU for which the deciphering process has been determined to be necessary and the deciphering process has been completed, and the RLC-PDU for which the deciphering process has been determined to be unnecessary are transmitted to the next layer by the transmission processing unit.
- the concealment condition is set during communication and the concealment parameter and the concealment processing method are changed, the concealment is further improved.
- FIG. 11 is a processing flow of the confidentiality management unit.
- Steps S10 and S11 are processing at the time of connection setting.
- the confidential parameter is received in step S10
- the confidential parameter management table is updated in step S11. This processing is performed as appropriate.
- Steps S12 to S17 are processes at the time of data reception.
- step S12 information for knowing whether the RLC-PDU is to be concealed or whether it is concealed, for example, the sequence number SN is received.
- step S13 it is determined whether or not the RLC-PDU is to be concealed or whether concealment processing has been performed.
- step S14 the determination result is notified to the data management unit, and in step S15, the process branches depending on the determination result of the presence / absence of confidentiality. If the concealment process has not been performed, the process returns to step S12. If concealment processing has been performed, concealment parameters are extracted from the concealment parameter management table in step S16, concealment parameters are notified to the concealment calculation processing unit in step S17, and the process returns to step S12.
- the strength of the 3GPP system is a high level of security.
- 3GPP concealment processing using a complex arithmetic algorithm and complex encryption parameter configuration It is carried out. Meanwhile, improving security level In order to perform complex concealment processing, the concealment function becomes a bottleneck for improving the processing throughput of the concealment processing end devices (wireless network control devices and mobile devices).
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Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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EP04788316A EP1796412A4 (en) | 2004-09-29 | 2004-09-29 | CONCEALMENT COMMUNICATION SYSTEM |
PCT/JP2004/014250 WO2006035501A1 (ja) | 2004-09-29 | 2004-09-29 | 秘匿通信システム |
JP2006537603A JP5033424B2 (ja) | 2004-09-29 | 2004-09-29 | 秘匿通信システム |
US11/710,511 US20070201424A1 (en) | 2004-09-29 | 2007-02-26 | Secure communication system |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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PCT/JP2004/014250 WO2006035501A1 (ja) | 2004-09-29 | 2004-09-29 | 秘匿通信システム |
Related Child Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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US11/710,511 Continuation US20070201424A1 (en) | 2004-09-29 | 2007-02-26 | Secure communication system |
Publications (1)
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WO2006035501A1 true WO2006035501A1 (ja) | 2006-04-06 |
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PCT/JP2004/014250 WO2006035501A1 (ja) | 2004-09-29 | 2004-09-29 | 秘匿通信システム |
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Country | Link |
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US (1) | US20070201424A1 (ja) |
EP (1) | EP1796412A4 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP5033424B2 (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2006035501A1 (ja) |
Cited By (8)
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JP2010541463A (ja) * | 2007-10-17 | 2010-12-24 | エルジー エレクトロニクス インコーポレイティド | Hsdpa又はhsupaを用いたcsサービス提供方法 |
US8320918B2 (en) | 2007-09-28 | 2012-11-27 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Method for reselecting a cell and detecting whether a terminal is stationary in mobile telecommunications system |
US8432811B2 (en) | 2007-09-28 | 2013-04-30 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Method of performing uplink time alignment in wireless communication system |
US8619760B2 (en) | 2007-10-17 | 2013-12-31 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Method of providing circuit switched (SC) service using high-speed downlink packet access (HSDPA) or high-speed uplink packet access (HSUPA) |
US8670377B2 (en) | 2008-01-04 | 2014-03-11 | Lg Electronics Inc. | HARQ operation method for retransmitted data |
US8768383B2 (en) | 2007-09-13 | 2014-07-01 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Method for providing control information using the paging procedure |
JP2014165894A (ja) * | 2013-02-28 | 2014-09-08 | Hitachi Ltd | 部分暗号による通信保護システム及び方法 |
US9066290B2 (en) | 2008-01-07 | 2015-06-23 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Method for reconfiguring time alignment timer |
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US7869590B2 (en) * | 2005-04-12 | 2011-01-11 | Broadcom Corporation | Method and system for hardware accelerator for implementing f9 integrity algorithm in WCDMA compliant handsets |
ATE410874T1 (de) * | 2005-09-20 | 2008-10-15 | Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd | Vefahren und vorrichtung zur packetsegmentierung und verknüpfungssignalisierung in einem kommunikationssystem |
US8031689B2 (en) * | 2007-05-18 | 2011-10-04 | Innovative Sonic Limited | Method and related apparatus for handling re-establishment of radio link control entity in a wireless communications system |
JP2009044693A (ja) * | 2007-08-10 | 2009-02-26 | Fujitsu Ltd | 送信方法、送信装置、およびコンピュータプログラム |
US20150092696A1 (en) * | 2012-05-21 | 2015-04-02 | Nokia Corporation | Method and apparatus for managing radio bearer for user equipment |
US20150245214A1 (en) * | 2014-02-21 | 2015-08-27 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Enhanced polling for security mode procedures |
US11470473B2 (en) * | 2019-01-18 | 2022-10-11 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Medium access control security |
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Cited By (8)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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US8768383B2 (en) | 2007-09-13 | 2014-07-01 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Method for providing control information using the paging procedure |
US8320918B2 (en) | 2007-09-28 | 2012-11-27 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Method for reselecting a cell and detecting whether a terminal is stationary in mobile telecommunications system |
US8432811B2 (en) | 2007-09-28 | 2013-04-30 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Method of performing uplink time alignment in wireless communication system |
JP2010541463A (ja) * | 2007-10-17 | 2010-12-24 | エルジー エレクトロニクス インコーポレイティド | Hsdpa又はhsupaを用いたcsサービス提供方法 |
US8619760B2 (en) | 2007-10-17 | 2013-12-31 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Method of providing circuit switched (SC) service using high-speed downlink packet access (HSDPA) or high-speed uplink packet access (HSUPA) |
US8670377B2 (en) | 2008-01-04 | 2014-03-11 | Lg Electronics Inc. | HARQ operation method for retransmitted data |
US9066290B2 (en) | 2008-01-07 | 2015-06-23 | Lg Electronics Inc. | Method for reconfiguring time alignment timer |
JP2014165894A (ja) * | 2013-02-28 | 2014-09-08 | Hitachi Ltd | 部分暗号による通信保護システム及び方法 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20070201424A1 (en) | 2007-08-30 |
EP1796412A1 (en) | 2007-06-13 |
JP5033424B2 (ja) | 2012-09-26 |
EP1796412A4 (en) | 2011-11-23 |
JPWO2006035501A1 (ja) | 2008-05-15 |
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