WO2006002601A1 - Procede pour l'etablissement de la connexion de session par les utilisateurs de reseau local sans fil - Google Patents
Procede pour l'etablissement de la connexion de session par les utilisateurs de reseau local sans fil Download PDFInfo
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- WO2006002601A1 WO2006002601A1 PCT/CN2005/000987 CN2005000987W WO2006002601A1 WO 2006002601 A1 WO2006002601 A1 WO 2006002601A1 CN 2005000987 W CN2005000987 W CN 2005000987W WO 2006002601 A1 WO2006002601 A1 WO 2006002601A1
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- Prior art keywords
- session connection
- session
- connection
- user
- authentication
- Prior art date
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- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 87
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0892—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities by using authentication-authorization-accounting [AAA] servers or protocols
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/08—Access security
- H04W12/082—Access security using revocation of authorisation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W76/00—Connection management
- H04W76/10—Connection setup
- H04W76/15—Setup of multiple wireless link connections
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W76/00—Connection management
- H04W76/30—Connection release
- H04W76/34—Selective release of ongoing connections
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
- H04W84/10—Small scale networks; Flat hierarchical networks
- H04W84/12—WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a connection establishment technology in a wireless local area network (WLAN), and more particularly to a method for restricting a WLAN user from establishing multiple session connections in a WLAN.
- WLAN wireless local area network
- Wireless LAN includes many different technologies.
- IEEE 802.11b which uses the 2.4GHz band and the highest data transmission rate of 11Mbps.
- the IEEE 802.11g and Bluetooth technologies are also used. Among them, 802.11g has a maximum data transmission rate of 54Mbps.
- Other new technologies such as IEEE 802.11a and ETSI BRAN Hiperlan2 use the 5GHz band and the maximum transmission rate is 54Mbps.
- WLANs are used to transport Internet Protocol (IP) packet data packets.
- IP Internet Protocol
- the specific WLAN access technology used is transparent to the upper layer IP.
- the basic structure is to use the access point (AP) to complete the wireless access of the user terminal, and to form an IP transmission network through network control and connection of the connected devices.
- AP access point
- the user terminal can be connected to the Internet (Internet), the intranet (Intranet) through the WLAN access network, and can also access the home network of the 3GPP system via the WLAN access network.
- Internet Internet
- Intranet intranet
- WLAN access network access network connection of the 3GPP system, specifically, when the WLAN user terminal accesses locally, it is connected to the home network of 3GPP via the WLAN access network, as shown in FIG.
- FIG. 1 and FIG. 2 are schematic diagrams showing the networking structure of the WLAN system interworking with the 3GPP system in the case of roaming and non-roaming.
- the 3GPP system mainly includes a Home Subscriber Server (HSS)/Home Location Register (HLR), a 3GPP AAA server, a 3GPP AAA proxy, a WAG, a packet data gateway, and an offline charging system ( Offline Charging System and Online Billing System (OCS).
- HSS Home Subscriber Server
- HLR Home Location Register
- 3GPP AAA server a 3GPP AAA proxy
- WAG a packet data gateway
- OCS Offline Charging System and Online Billing System
- OCS Offline Charging System and Online Billing System
- the 3GPP AAA server is responsible for authenticating, authorizing, and charging the user, collecting and transmitting the charging information sent by the WLAN access network to the charging system;
- the packet data gateway is responsible for the user data from the WLAN access network to the 3GPP.
- the charging system mainly receives and records the user charging information transmitted by the network, and further includes the OCS instructing the network to periodically transmit the online charging information according to the cost of the online charging user, and performing statistics and control.
- the WLAN user terminal when the WLAN user terminal wants to directly access the Internet/Intranet, after the user terminal completes the access authentication and authorization through the WLAN access network and the AAA server (AS), the user terminal can access through the LAN access network. Intemet/Intranet.
- the WLAN user terminal also wants to access the 3GPP packet switched (PS) domain service
- the WLAN 3GPP IP access (WLAN 3GPP IP Access) service may be further requested from the 3GPP home network, that is, the WLAN user terminal initiates to the AS of the 3GPP home network.
- the WLAN 3GPP IP access service authorization request, the AS of the 3GPP home network performs service authentication and authorization for the service authorization request.
- the AS sends an access permission message to the user terminal, and the user terminal can establish a tunnel with the PDG. , can access the 3GPP PS domain service.
- the offline charging system and OCS are based on the network of the user terminal.
- the billing information is recorded.
- the user terminal can apply to the 3GPP home network to access the Internet/Intranet through the 3GPP access network.
- the user terminal needs to initiate a service authorization process to the 3GPP home network through the 3GPP access network, and the process is also performed on the user terminal and the AS of the 3GPP home network. After the authorization is successful, after the user terminal establishes a tunnel between the WAG and the PDG in the 3GPP access network, the user terminal can access the 3GPP PS-domain service of the home network.
- the authentication and authorization process of the WLAN user accessing the network is as shown in FIG. 3, and includes the following steps:
- Steps 301-302 The current LAN user terminal establishes a wireless connection with the WLAN access network according to the procedure specified by the 3GPP protocol; and then initiates an access authentication process between the current WLAN user terminal and the 3GPP AAA server, where the access authentication is scalable.
- the authentication protocol (EAP) is performed, that is, the interaction between the EAP request and the EAP response message between the current WLAN user terminal and the 3GPP AAA server.
- Steps 303-304 After receiving the access authentication request, the 3GPP AAA server determines whether there is authentication information for the current WLAN user terminal, and if not, obtains the authentication information of the current WLAN user terminal from the HSS, for example, : Authentication quintuple/triple. Moreover, if the user subscription information of the current WLAN user terminal does not exist in the 3GPP AAA server, for example, the authorization information and the user temporary identifier are also obtained from the HSS. That is to say, if the 3GPP AAA server does not have user information itself, it needs to be obtained from the HSS.
- Step 305 The 3GPP AAA server may send the policy execution information to the WAG in the public land mobile network (VPLMN) that the current WLAN user terminal roams. This step is optional.
- VPN public land mobile network
- Step 306 If the authentication and the authorization are successful, the 3GPP AAA server sends an access-access message to the WLAN access network, and the EAP Success message is included in the message.
- the success message carries the connection authorization information, for example: Access filtering rules, tunnel genus Sex and so on.
- Step 307. ⁇ After receiving the allowed access message, the WLAN access network sends an authentication success message EAP Success to the current WLAN user terminal.
- Step 308 If the current WLAN user terminal does not have registration information for the access authentication 3GPP AAA server currently provided in the HSS, the 3GPP AAA server that provides authentication for the current WLAN user terminal is registered in the HSS, and the registration message is based on the user. Temporary identification to identify users.
- the current specification and process does not involve the provision of services by multiple AAA servers in the home network. If the user has already connected to an AAA server, how to ensure continued connection to the AAA server when the next authentication is initiated. solution. Then, when a AAA server in a home public land mobile network (HPLMN) network can provide services for WLAN users, after a user accesses the AAA server 1 for the first time, the next authentication or access may be sent. The AAA server 2, and the AAA server 2 will re-interact with the HSS to request the user's subscription data from the HSS. In this way, multiple session connections are established for the same user, which not only causes user data to be dispersed, but also cannot be centrally managed; and it occupies a large amount of system resources.
- HPLMN home public land mobile network
- the main purpose of the present invention is to provide a method for a WLAN user to establish a session connection, which can prevent multiple linger connections from being established by the same WLAN user, thereby ensuring that user data is not dispersed, and that the device is simple, convenient, and flexible.
- a method for establishing a session connection by a wireless local area network user comprising:
- the AAA server that performs access authentication on the user determines whether the current authentication corresponds to a new session. Connection, if not, end the current processing flow; otherwise, perform step b;
- the AAA server determines, according to the network configuration rule and/or the user subscription information, whether the current connection limit of the current user is exceeded after the current new connection is completed, and if not, the current processing flow is ended; if yes, then Determine which session connection you want to delete.
- the determining of the step a is specifically: determining whether the MAC address of the user equipment carried in the AAA server, or the WLAN access network identifier information, or the VPLMN identity information in the current authentication process is different from the existing session connection.
- step b Determine to delete the existing session connection.
- the determining, in the step b, the session connection that needs to be deleted further includes: the network determining whether the currently existing session connection still exists, and if yes, rejecting the new session establishment request corresponding to the current authentication; otherwise, deleting the existing session Connect, allowing new session connections to be accessed.
- the method further includes: rejecting the new session establishment request corresponding to the authentication, and returning to the user the failure reason that the new connection exceeds the limit.
- the determining whether the current connection exists or not further includes: the AAA server initiating a re-authentication process to the existing session connection, or sending test signaling requesting the user terminal to return a response.
- the session connection that needs to be deleted is determined in step b: the network determines whether the existing connection is still present, if not, deletes the existing session connection, and allows the new session connection to access; Then, the access priority of the session connection is compared according to the identification information of the session connection, and it is determined whether the priority of the session connection is low. If yes, the existing session connection is deleted; if not, the corresponding authentication is rejected. New session establishment request.
- the determining whether the current session connection exists further includes: the AAA server initiating a re-authentication process to the existing session connection, or sending test signaling requesting the user terminal to return a response.
- the session connection determined to be deleted in step b is: Delete a session connection that has not been responded to or has the longest response time in the existing session connection.
- the method further includes: the AAA server initiating a re-authentication process to the existing session connection, or sending the requesting user The terminal returns a test signal for the response, confirming that there is a response to the session connection.
- the session connection determined to be deleted in step b is: According to the deletion carried in the session establishment request The session ID deletes an existing session connection. If the deleted session identifier indicates that the session connection is to be deleted, the specified existing session connection is deleted according to the deleted session identifier.
- the method further includes: the AAA server initiating a re-authentication process to the existing session connection, or sending a test signaling requesting the user terminal to return a response, confirming whether the existing session connection is responsive, deleting the currently unresponsive or The one session connection that has not responded the longest.
- the session connection determined to be deleted in step b is: The network determines the session connection to be deleted according to the user configuration command.
- the session connection that needs to be deleted in step b is: The network determines whether all the existing session connections still exist, and if there is a session connection, the session connection that does not exist currently is deleted, and the new session connection is allowed. Enter; if all session connections exist, the new session establishment request corresponding to this authentication is rejected.
- the determining whether the current session connection exists further includes: the AAA server initiating a re-authentication process to the existing session connection, or sending test signaling requesting the user terminal to return a response.
- the session connection that needs to be deleted is determined in step b as follows: First, the new session establishment request is authenticated, and after the new session establishment request authentication succeeds, the session connection with the lowest access priority in the existing session connection is deleted.
- the session connection that needs to be deleted in step b is: The network determines whether all the existing session connections still exist, and if there is a session connection, the session connection that does not exist currently is deleted, and the new session connection is allowed. Enter; if all session connections exist, determine the session connection to be deleted based on the attribute information in the user session identification information.
- the attribute information in the user session identifier information is: an access priority of the session connection.
- the session connection that is determined to be deleted in step b may also be: determining the session connection to be deleted according to the over-limit deletion policy customized by the user subscription.
- step b it is determined that the existing session connection is deleted, and after the new session establishment request authentication is successful, the deletion of the existing session connection is completed; or, in step b, it is determined that the new session establishment request is rejected, and the authentication is completed. The new session establishment request is rejected before or during the authentication process.
- the method for establishing a session connection by the WLA user provided by the present invention, if the AAA server performs the access authentication, finds that: the current authentication corresponding to the tongue connection is a new tongue connection different from the existing tongue connection, then the AAA server is The normal access authentication process is performed within the allowed range. If the allowed range is exceeded, the AAA server determines the session connection that needs to be rejected or canceled, and then completes the subsequent session connection rejection or cancellation process according to the decision result. In this way, each user can be guaranteed to be served by only one AAA server, so as to avoid the decentralization of user data and the waste of system resources, and ensure centralized management of data.
- the AAA server of the present invention only needs to determine whether the user information or the network information carried in the current authentication request is the same as the corresponding information stored in the current authentication request, thereby determining whether to establish multiple different session connections for the same user, which is simple and convenient. , neither increase the load of the HSS nor complicate the access authentication process. Moreover, the present invention can adopt different schemes to achieve the purpose of avoiding the establishment of multiple WLAN session connections by the same WLAN user terminal, and achieve more flexibility. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a network structure in which a LAN system communicates with a 3GPP system;
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a networking structure of a WLAN operation network
- FIG. 3 is a flow chart of authentication and authorization of a WLAN user terminal in a prior art
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a process according to a first embodiment of the present invention
- Figure 5 is a flow chart showing the processing of the second embodiment of the present invention.
- Figure 6 is a flowchart of processing according to a fifth embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 7 is a flow chart showing the processing of the sixth embodiment of the present invention. Mode for carrying out the invention
- the core idea of the present invention is: In the process of accessing the authentication interaction of the WLAN user terminal, the AAA server determines whether the authentication corresponds to a new session connection. If it is a new session, it is necessary to further determine whether adding a new tongue exceeds the network to the user ⁇ The limit of the tongue connection, if exceeded, requires a decision to delete an old session connection or reject a new session establishment request. If it is determined that the new session establishment request is rejected, the rejection operation may be performed before the authentication or during the authentication process; if it is determined to delete the old session connection, the deletion process is performed after the new session connection authentication is passed. In this way, only one AAA server can be guaranteed to provide access authentication services for each WLAN user terminal.
- the AAA server determines whether the current authentication process corresponds to a new connection, which is a user equipment MAC address, or WLAN access network identification information, or VPLMN identification information carried by the AAA server according to the WLA user authentication process to the AAA server.
- a new connection which is a user equipment MAC address, or WLAN access network identification information, or VPLMN identification information carried by the AAA server according to the WLA user authentication process to the AAA server.
- any of the information is different, indicating that the corresponding session connection is different.
- the information may be carried by the user terminal through the authentication signaling, or may be carried by the network access server (NAS) through the AAA signaling to the AAA server, or may be obtained by the AAA server through one or more interactions with the user terminal.
- NAS network access server
- a decision interaction process can be initiated as needed, wherein it is determined that the session connection to be deleted is selected from the old session connection.
- the determination determines whether the new session exceeds the network-to-user connection limit, primarily based on network configuration and/or decision rules. Decision rules can be classified into three cases based on network configuration or user subscription information:
- the network does not allow the user to establish multiple connections, or does not allow multiple connections based on the user's subscription information, that is, only one connection is allowed for the user.
- decision rules there are three types of decision rules: 1 The session connection to be deleted is the old session connection; 2 The network first interacts with the old session connection to verify that it still exists, and if so, rejects the new connection and prompts the user to fail.
- the network first interacts with the old session connection to verify that it still exists, If ⁇ exists, according to the identification information of the connection of the tongue, the access priority of the current request for the new tongue connection is compared with the access priority of the old session connection, and the session connection with the lower priority is denied, for example: If the requested new session connection access priority is low, the new session establishment request is rejected.
- the network allows the user to establish multiple connections.
- the decision rules are as follows: 1
- the session connection to be deleted is one of the old session connections, and the session with no response or the longest response time is preferentially removed. connection.
- the old connection can be confirmed by activity to confirm whether the current session exists.
- the so-called activity refers to whether a certain session is in an active state.
- the so-called confirmation is: a confirmation is initiated for a session that does not dynamically interact beyond a certain time limit, for example
- the re-authentication process is initiated, which may be fast re-authentication, or a simple signaling interaction to indicate that the other party still exists.
- a user When a user initiates a new session authentication, it directly carries the identifier of the session to be deleted. At this time, the network deletes the old session according to the identifier. Here, you can directly identify a session connection to be deleted; or you can only identify the old session to be deleted, and the AAA server selects based on activity confirmation or priority comparison.
- the network initiates signaling interaction with the user, and requires the user to decide a session connection to be deleted. In this interaction, a password or other authentication measure may be required for the selected permission to ensure that the user has the right to delete other session connections. 4 The network first interacts with the old connection to verify whether it still exists. If the old session connection does not exist, delete the session connection that does not exist and access the new session connection.
- the new session establishment request is rejected and the user is prompted to fail because the new connection exceeds the limit.
- the new session connection is authenticated first. After the new session connection is successfully authenticated, the lowest priority among the existing old tongue connections is deleted. 6
- the network first interacts with the old connection, ⁇ does it still exist, if there is no existing connection in the old session connection, delete the connection that does not exist, and access the new session connection; if the old session connection exists, Then, according to the attribute in the user session identification information, the session to be deleted is decided. For example, if the VPLMN2 of the new session connection has a lower priority than the VPLMN1 of the old session connection, the new session establishment request is rejected, and the new session connection authentication succeeds. After that, delete the lowest priority session connection in the old session connection.
- the user subscribes to select a custom over-limit deletion policy, for example: if the old session connection is activated, the new session connection is rejected; or the parameters are selected according to activity, session connection time, and the like. Delete the old session connection; or judge the session connection priority according to the set parameters.
- the above solution is mainly applicable to:
- the network can ensure that for one WLAN user, only one AAA server provides access authentication and authorization services, and the AAA server completes the judgment process of multiple session connection authentication.
- Embodiment 1 :
- This embodiment is a judging logic in an enhanced function AAA server, that is, a judgment is made in the AAA server whether there are multiple session connections for the same user to ensure that only one AAA server provides services for the current user. In this embodiment, it is first determined whether to delete a new session connection, and then whether to authenticate the new session connection.
- the process of determining the AAA server in this embodiment includes the following steps: Steps 401 to 404: In the process of access authentication interaction of the WLAN user terminal, the AAA server that performs the access authentication for the user who initiated the authentication request is determined. Whether the currently requested authentication corresponds to a new session connection. If not, the normal authentication process is continued, the current judgment process is ended, and the success or failure result is returned to the user terminal that initiated the authentication request after the access authentication is completed; If the new session is connected, step 405 is performed;
- Step 405 The AAA server determines, according to the network configuration rule or/and the user subscription information, whether the session connection of the user that initiated the authentication exceeds the network connection limit of the user after the new session connection authentication is passed, and if not, the process ends.
- the current processing flow continue the normal authentication process, that is, perform steps 403 to 404; if exceeded, initiate a decision interaction process, that is, perform steps 406-410;
- Step 406 410 Determine whether to reject the new authentication connection of the current authentication. If yes, reject the new session establishment request according to the decision result, and end the current processing; otherwise, determine whether the authentication is successful, and if the authentication is unsuccessful, return the access to the user. The result of the authentication failure, the current processing flow is ended; if the authentication is successful, the old session connection to be deleted is determined: If there are multiple old session connections, then the session connection to be deleted is determined, and then after the new session connection authentication is successful, according to Decision result deletion In addition to the selected old session connection.
- the decisions, specific processes and rules mentioned in steps 406 and 409 are as follows:
- the re-authentication process is initiated on the old connection, which may be fast re-authentication, or a test signaling of the single-tray requires the user terminal to respond. If the authentication succeeds or the test signaling is responded, it indicates that the old connection is activated. Otherwise, it indicates that the old session connection has disappeared, and the residual information needs to be cleared by the deletion process.
- the authentication of the new session connection continues to be successfully completed; if the decision result is that the existing old connection is active, then according to the priority reference data set by the session identification parameter Determine the priority of the new session connection and all the old session connections, and select the lowest priority connection. If the new authentication ⁇ connection is selected, the authentication is rejected, that is, the new session establishment request is rejected; An old session connection is sent, and after the new connection is successfully authenticated, the deletion process of the selected old session connection is initiated.
- the session identification parameters are: a VPLMN identity, a WLA access network identity information, a user MAC address, and the like.
- This embodiment is a judging logic in another enhanced function AAA server, that is, a judgment is made in the AAA server whether there are multiple connections for the same user to ensure that only one AAA server provides services for the current user. .
- the decision deletes an old session connection, so the new session connection is directly authenticated.
- the process of determining the AAA server in this embodiment includes the following steps: Steps 501 to 504: The description is the same as that of the first embodiment.
- Steps 505 to 508 determining whether the user connection exceeds the network connection restriction to the user after the new connection is passed. If not, the user does not perform special processing, and the normal authentication process is continued, that is, steps 503 to 504 are performed; , after the new session connection is successfully authenticated, if there is only one existing session connection, delete the existing session connection and access the new session connection. Otherwise, Initiating a decision interaction process, prioritizing the old session connection: determining the priority of the new session connection and all the old session connections according to the priority reference data set by the session identification parameter, selecting the session connection with the lowest priority, and initiating the pair The deletion of the selected old session connection.
- the session identification parameters are: VPLMN identity, "WLAN access network identification information, user MAC address, and the like.
- Embodiment 3 is a diagrammatic representation of Embodiment 3
- step 302 in the processing flow shown in FIG. 3, combines the interaction flow shown in FIG. 3 with the processing steps of the core idea of the present invention, mainly involving changes in steps 302, 303, and 304, and the other steps are substantially unchanged.
- the main modification of step 302 is:
- the AAA server determines whether the current authentication corresponds to the new session connection. If it is a new session connection, it is necessary to determine whether the new session connection limit is exceeded after the new connection is added. You will need to decide on a session connection to delete or reject a new session establishment request. If a new session establishment request needs to be rejected, the rejection can be made before or during the authentication process; if the old session connection needs to be deleted, the deletion should be made after the authentication of the new session connection is passed.
- Step 302 is actually a decision process, and the specific decision interaction process is exactly the same as the description of steps 406-410 in the first embodiment.
- the main modification to steps 303 and 304 is: through the interaction between the AAA server and the HSS, ensuring that only one AAA server provides services for the same user, that is, preventing the same user from establishing contact with multiple AAA servers at the same time, thereby avoiding The same user accesses authentication from multiple AAA servers.
- the HSS is added to the AAA server that is currently acquiring the user information.
- the HSS checks whether it has the AAA registration of the WLAN user, if it does not exist. Then, the original normal process is continued; if yes, it is determined according to the AAA identifier whether the registered AAA server is the same AAA server as the currently requested AAA server, and if it is the same AAA server, the original normal flow is also continued. If the same AAA server is not used but the HSS determines to select the AAA server that is currently requesting the request, the original normal process is also continued. Only in step 308 or after step 308, the information related to deleting the registered AAA server and the current WLAN user needs to be added. The steps to connect.
- the HSS If it is not the same AAA server and the HSS determines to use the registered AAA server, the HSS returns the address of the registered AAA server to the currently requesting AAA server, and the currently requesting AAA server forwards the access authentication request to the registered AAA server. Step 303 and subsequent steps continue to be completed by the registered AAA server.
- Embodiment 4 is a diagrammatic representation of Embodiment 4:
- This embodiment is also based on the processing flow shown in FIG. 3, and combines the interaction flow shown in FIG. 3 with the processing steps of the core idea of the present invention, mainly involving the change of step 302, and the change of step 302 is the same as that of the third embodiment, and the other The steps are basically unchanged.
- the steps 303 and 304 are not required to be modified, but the network pre-configuration and the planning of the authentication route are added, and the user is routed to a specific AAA server according to different user identification features.
- the AAA server itself may be combined through multiple AAA server entities. Multiple AAA server entities are backed up to each other to ensure disaster tolerance and load sharing, but only appear as an AAA server.
- the mentioned user identity may be the user's NAI, temporary username or permanent username.
- This embodiment is an application of the method of the present invention in the WLAN access authentication process of the EAP-AKA, and the basic process of the EAP-AKA authentication is specified in the specification.
- This embodiment mainly describes how to ensure that only one AAA server serves one user at the same time when the process is run in the WLAN-3GPP interactive operation network. As shown in FIG. 6, the method in this embodiment includes the following steps:
- Step 601 ⁇ The WLAN user terminal and the WLAN access network are established according to the WLAN technical specifications. Wireless connections.
- Step 602 The WLAN access network sends a user name request signaling EAP Request/Identity to the WLAN user terminal, and the encapsulation protocol of the EAP content depends on a specific technical protocol adopted by the WLAN.
- the message includes the identity of the LAN user terminal itself, which uses the Network Access Identifier (NAI) defined by the IETF specification RPC 2486, which may be the temporary identity assigned at the time of the previous authentication or the permanent identity IMSI.
- NAI Network Access Identifier
- RPC 2486 the temporary identity assigned at the time of the previous authentication or the permanent identity IMSI.
- the method of constructing the NAI format by IMSI is defined in detail in the EAP/AKA specification, and will not be described here.
- Step 604 According to the domain name of the NAI, the authentication message initiated by the WLAN user terminal is routed to the appropriate 3GPP AAA server.
- the AAA agents there may be one or more AAA agents in the route (omitted in the figure), and the Diameter referral method can be used to find and determine the AAA server route; the AAA server route can also be determined through the configuration data.
- Step 605 After receiving the EAP Response/Identity message including the user identifier, the 3GPP AAA server further includes a LAN access network identifier, a VPLMN identifier, and a MAC address of the WLAN user terminal.
- Step 606 The 3GPP AAA server uses the user as a candidate for EAP-AKA authentication according to the received identifier. Then, the 3GPP AAA server checks whether there is an authentication tuple (Authentication Vectors) that the user does not use. If not, the HSS is sent to the HSS. The /HLR requests to obtain the authentication tuple, and a comparison table between the temporary identifier and the IMSI is needed. The 3GPP AAA server may also use the current user as a candidate: the server first obtains the unused authentication tuple, and based on the obtained authentication tuple, for example, obtains the UMTS authentication tuple, and then determines whether to use the user as the EAP- Candidate for AKA certification.
- an authentication tuple Authentication Vectors
- the HSS/HLR After the HSS/HLR receives the request, if it is checked that another 3GPP AAA server has been registered as the service AAA of the user, and the HSS/HLR confirms that the registered AAA server is working properly, the HSS/HLR will The address of the registered AAA server notifies the 3GPP AAA server that is currently requesting to obtain the authentication tuple, and then requests 3GPP to obtain the authentication tuple.
- the AAA server transfers the authentication message to the registered 3GPP AAA server as a PROXY proxy or REDIRECTION proxy. After this step, the registered 3GPP AAA server acts as a 3GPP AAA server serving the current user.
- Step 607 The 3GPP AAA server sends an EAP Request/AKA Identity message to request the user identity again, and the request is sent because the intermediate node may change or replace the user identifier received in the EAP Response/Identit message, but if the EAP Response/Identity is determined.
- the user ID in the message cannot be changed, and the corresponding processing steps can also be omitted by the home operator.
- Steps 608 to 609 The WLAN access network forwards the EAP Request/AKA Identity message to the WLAN user terminal.
- the WLAN user terminal responds with a user ID that is identical to the EAP Response/Identity. .
- Step 610 The WLAN access network forwards the EAP Response/AKA Identity message to the 3GPP AAA server, and the 3GPP AAA server uses the user identifier received by the message to perform authentication. If the user IDs are inconsistent, the user subscription information and authentication tuple previously obtained from the HSS/HLR are invalid and should be re-applied. That is, the process of requesting the authentication tuple in step 606 is repeated before step 611.
- the process of identifying the re-request should be performed before the user subscription information and authentication information are obtained.
- the protocol design of the Wx interface may not allow the above four steps to be performed before the required user subscription information is downloaded to the 3GPP AAA server.
- Step 611 The 3GPP AAA server checks whether the user subscription information required for WLAN access is already available. If there is no such information, it should be obtained from the HSS; then the 3GPP AAA server checks whether the user is authorized to use the WLAN access service.
- this step is after step 606, in practical applications, this step can be performed at any position prior to step 614.
- Step 612 Deriving a new key letter from the integrity key (IK) and the encryption key (CK)
- the specific content is specified in the specification.
- the key information is required by EAP-AKA. Of course, more key information may be generated to provide security or integrity protection for WLAN access. .
- a new pseudonym may also be selected and protected with key information generated by EAP-AKA.
- Step 613 The 3GPP AAA server sends the following information to the WLAN access network in the EAP Request/AKA-Challenge message: RAND, AUTN, a message authentication code (MAC, Message Authentication Code), and two user identifiers (if any), where The two identifiers refer to protected pseudonyms and/or re-authentication IDs.
- Whether to send the re-authentication identifier depends on whether the 3GPP operator's operation rules allow the re-authentication mechanism, that is, the AAA server decides whether to include the re-authentication identifier according to the operator's rules, thereby determining whether to allow or disallow the re-authentication process.
- Step 614 The WLAN access network sends an EAP Request/A A-C allenge message to the WLAN user terminal.
- Step 615 The WLA user terminal runs the UMTS algorithm on the USIM, and the USIM- ⁇ positive AUTN is correct to authenticate the network. If the AUTN is incorrect, the WLAN user terminal rejects the authentication process. If the number of sequences is not synchronized, the WLAN user terminal initiates a synchronization process, which is described in detail in the specification and is not described in detail here. If the AUTN is correct, the USIM calculates RES, IK and CK.
- the WLAN user terminal calculates other new key information according to the newly calculated I and CK of the USIM, and uses the key information to check the obtained MAC.
- the WLAN user terminal stores the pseudonym for later authentication.
- Step 616 The WLA user terminal calculates a new MAC value covering the EAP message by using the new key information, and the WLAN user terminal sends an EAP Response/A A-Challenge message including the calculated RES and the newly calculated MAC value to the WLAN. Access Network.
- Step 617 The WLA access network forwards the EAP Response/AKA-Challenge information to 3GPP AAA server.
- Step 618 The 3GPP AAA server checks the obtained MAC and compares the XRES with the obtained RES.
- Step 619 If all the checks pass, the 3GPP AAA server sends an authentication success message EAP Success to the WLAN access network. If some new keys are prepared for WLAN access layer security and integrity protection, the 3GPP AAA server takes these The key information is included in the AAA layer protocol message carrying the EAP information, that is, not included in the signaling of the EAP layer. The WLAN access network stores these keys for communication with the authenticated WLAN user terminal.
- Step 620 The WLAN access network uses the EAP Success message to notify the WLAN user terminal that the authentication is successful. At this point, the EAPAKA interaction is successfully completed, and both the WLAN user terminal and the WLAN access network have shared key information generated during the interaction.
- Step 621 The 3GPP AAA server compares the MAC address, the VPLMN identifier, and the WLAN access network identifier information of the user in the authentication interaction with the information corresponding to the currently running session user. If the information is consistent with the running session, the authentication is performed. The process is associated with the currently running WLAN session and does not require any processing for the session.
- the 3GPP AAA server determines that the authentication process is to establish a new WLAN session, and the 3GPP AAA server will have more users. Whether the WLAN session is allowed or whether the maximum number of LAN tongues exceeds the limit determines whether to initiate the process of aborting an existing WLAN session.
- This step is actually a judgment and decision process.
- the specific decision interaction process is exactly the same as the description of step 406 410 in the first embodiment.
- the decision rule adopted may also be based on whether the network allows the user to establish multiple connections and select a corresponding processing mode. Complete the operation of rejecting a new session connection request or deleting an old session connection.
- the authentication process may fail at any stage, for example: due to MAC authentication failure, or the LAN user terminal fails to respond after the network sends a request message.
- EAP AKA procedure is aborted, and the transmission failure notification information you want to HSS / HLR 0
- Example VI
- This embodiment is an application of the method of the present invention in the WLA access authentication process of the EAP-SIM, and the basic procedure specification of the EAP-SIM authentication is specified in detail.
- This embodiment mainly describes how to ensure that only one AAA server is a user's monthly service when the process is running in the WLAN-3GPP interactive operation network. As shown in FIG. 7, the method of this embodiment includes the following steps: Wireless connection.
- Step 702 The WLAN access network sends a user name request signaling EAP Request/Identity to the WLAN user terminal, and the encapsulation protocol of the EAP content depends on a specific technical protocol adopted by the WLAN.
- Step 703 The WLAN user terminal returns a username response message EAP Response/Identity, where the message includes the identity of the WLAN user terminal, and the identifier adopts a network access identifier (NAI) defined by the IETF specification RFC 2486, where the NAI may be Temporary identification assigned at the time of secondary authentication, or permanent identification of IMSI.
- NAI network access identifier
- the method of constructing the NAI format by the MSI is defined in detail in the EAP/SIM specification, and will not be described here.
- Step 704 According to the domain name of the NAI, the authentication message initiated by the WLAN user terminal is routed to the appropriate 3GPP AAA server.
- the AAA agents there may be one or more AAA agents in the route (omitted in the figure), and the Diameter referral method can be used to find and determine the AAA server route; the AAA server route can also be determined through the configuration data.
- Step 705 After receiving the EAP Response/Identity message containing the user identifier, the 3GPP AAA server further includes the WLAN access network identifier, the VPLMN identifier, and the MAC address of the WLAN user terminal.
- Step 706 The 3GPP AAA server uses the user as a candidate for EAP-SIM authentication according to the received identifier, and then the 3GPP AAA server sends an EAP Request/SIM-Start to the WLAN.
- the 3GPP AAA server re-requests the user identity, and the request is made because the intermediate node may change or replace the user's received in the EAP Response/Identity message.
- the corresponding processing step can be ignored by the home operator.
- the 3GPP AAA server may also use the current user as a candidate: the server first obtains the unused authentication tuple, and based on the obtained authentication tuple, for example, obtains the GSM authentication tuple, and then decides whether to use the user as the EAP- A candidate for SIM authentication.
- Steps 707 to 708 The WLAN access network sends the EAP Request/SIM-Staxt information to the LAN user terminal; the WLAN user terminal selects a new random number NONCE-MT, and the random number is used for the network authentication.
- the WLAN user terminal responds with a user ID identical to that in the EAP Response/Identity. Contains NONCE-MT and user ID.
- Step 709 The WLAN access network sends the EAP Response/SIM-Start information to the 3GPP AAA server, and the 3GPP AAA server will use the user identifier received by the message to perform authentication, if the user identifier and EAP Response/SIM in the EAP Response/Identit If the user IDs in Start are inconsistent, the user subscription information and authentication tuples previously obtained from the HSS/HLR are invalid and should be re-applied.
- Step 710 The 3GPP AAA server checks whether there are N unused authentication tuples of the user, and if so, the N GSM witnesses are used to generate a key information that is consistent with the length of the EAP-AKA; If there are no N authentication tuples, a set of authentication tuples needs to be obtained from the HSS/HLR. In this case, a temporary relationship identifier and an IMSI comparison relationship table are needed.
- the HSS/HLR After receiving the request, if the HSS/HLR checks that another 3GPP AAA server has been registered as the service AAA of the user, and the HSS/HLR confirms that the registered AAA server is working properly, the HSS HLR will The address of the registered AAA server notifies the 3GPP AAA server that is currently requesting to obtain the authentication tuple. Then, the 3GPP AAA server requesting to obtain the authentication tuple transfers the authentication message to the already-proxy agent or the REDIRECTION agent. Registered 3GPP AAA server. After this step, the registered 3GPP AAA server acts as a 3GPP AAA server serving the current user.
- this step is after step 709, in actual operation, this step may be performed at any position before step 712, for example: after step 705.
- Step 711 The 3GPP AAA server checks whether the user subscription information required for WLAN access is already available. If there is no such information, it should be obtained from the HSS; then the 3GPP AAA server checks whether the user is authorized to use the WLAN access service.
- this step is after step 710, in actual operation, this step can be performed at any position prior to step 718.
- Step 712 Deriving new key information by using NONCE-MT and N Kc, the specific content is specified in the specification, and the key information is required by EAP-SIM. Of course, there may be more key information. It is generated to provide security or integrity protection for WLAN access.
- a new pseudonym and/or re-authentication identifier may be selected and protected with key information generated by EAP-SIM, such as: encryption and integrity protection.
- a message authentication code can be calculated by using the key obtained by EAP-SIM to cover the entire EAP message and used to perform network authentication values.
- the 3GPP AAA server sends the following information to the WLAN access network in the EAP Request/S-Challenge message: RA D, AUTN, a message authentication code (MAC), and two user identities (if any), where the two user identities are Refers to the protected name and/or Re-authentication ID.
- Whether to send the re-authentication identifier depends on whether the 3GPP operator's operation rules allow the re-authentication mechanism, that is, the AAA server decides whether to include the re-authentication identifier according to the operator's rules at any time, thereby determining whether to allow or disallow the re-authentication process.
- Step 713 The WLA sends an EAP Request/SM-Challenge message to the WLAN user terminal.
- Step 714 The WLAN user terminal runs N times of the GSMA3/A8 algorithm in the SIM, and runs once for each received RAND, and the calculation generates N SRES and Kc values.
- the WLAN user terminal calculates other key information according to N Kc keys and NONCE-MT.
- the WLAN user terminal calculates a MAC for network authentication using the newly obtained key information, and checks whether it is the same as the received MAC. If the MAC is incorrect, the network authentication fails, and the WLAN user terminal cancels the authentication process. When the MAC is correct, the WLAN user terminal will continue to authenticate the interaction process.
- the WLAN user terminal overwrites each EAP message associated with the N SRES responses with new key information to calculate a new MAC.
- the WLAN user terminal stores the pseudonym for later authentication.
- Step 715 The WLAN user terminal sends an EAP Response/SIM-Challenge message including the newly calculated MAC to the WLAN access network.
- Step 716 The WLAN access network sends an EAP Response/SIM-Challenge message to the 3GPP AAA server.
- Step 717 The MAC obtained by the 3GPP AAA server checks whether it is the same as the one stored by itself.
- the key information is included in the AAA layer protocol message carrying the EAP information, that is, not included in the signaling of the EAP layer.
- the WLAN access network stores these keys for communication with the authenticated WLAN user terminal.
- Step 719 The WLAN access network uses the EAP Success message to notify the WLAN user terminal that the authentication is successful. At this point, the EAP SM interaction is successfully completed, and both the WLAN user terminal and the WLAN access network have shared key information generated in the interaction.
- Step 720 The 3GPP AAA server compares the MAC address of the user in the authentication interaction, the VPLMN identity, and the identifier information of the WLAN access network with the information corresponding to the currently running user, if the information is consistent with the running session, The authentication process is associated with the currently running WLAN session and does not require any processing for the session. If the user's MAC address or VPLMN identity or WLAN access network capability information is different from the current WLAN, the 3GPP AAA server determines that the authentication process is to establish a new WLAN session. The 3GPP AAA server decides whether to initiate the process of suspending the existing WLAN session according to whether the user's multiple WLAN sessions are allowed or whether the maximum number of WLAN sessions exceeds the limit.
- This step is actually a judgment and decision process.
- the specific decision interaction process is exactly the same as the description of steps 406-410 in the first embodiment.
- the decision rules used may also be based on whether the network allows the user to establish multiple connections and select the corresponding processing method. , complete the operation of rejecting a new session connection request or deleting an old session connection.
- the authentication process may fail at any stage, for example: due to MAC authentication failure, or "the WLAN user terminal does not respond to failure after the network sends the request message, etc. In this case, the EAP SIM process will be aborted. And send a notification of the failure to the HSS/HLR
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Abstract
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-
2005
- 2005-07-05 WO PCT/CN2005/000987 patent/WO2006002601A1/fr active Application Filing
-
2007
- 2007-01-05 US US11/649,841 patent/US20080026724A1/en not_active Abandoned
Patent Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2003088578A1 (fr) * | 2002-04-18 | 2003-10-23 | Nokia Corporation | Procede, systeme et dispositif de selection de service par le biais d'un reseau local sans fil |
CN1490984A (zh) * | 2002-10-14 | 2004-04-21 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种无线局域网终端在线实时检测方法 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20080026724A1 (en) | 2008-01-31 |
CN1310476C (zh) | 2007-04-11 |
CN1645826A (zh) | 2005-07-27 |
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