+

WO2004036493A2 - Carte d'acces destinee a controler une autorisation d'acces a un systeme de securite - Google Patents

Carte d'acces destinee a controler une autorisation d'acces a un systeme de securite Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2004036493A2
WO2004036493A2 PCT/EP2003/011353 EP0311353W WO2004036493A2 WO 2004036493 A2 WO2004036493 A2 WO 2004036493A2 EP 0311353 W EP0311353 W EP 0311353W WO 2004036493 A2 WO2004036493 A2 WO 2004036493A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
security
data
access
card
access card
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2003/011353
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
WO2004036493A3 (fr
Inventor
Volker Budde
Original Assignee
Volker Budde
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Volker Budde filed Critical Volker Budde
Priority to AU2003280369A priority Critical patent/AU2003280369A1/en
Publication of WO2004036493A2 publication Critical patent/WO2004036493A2/fr
Publication of WO2004036493A3 publication Critical patent/WO2004036493A3/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards

Definitions

  • the invention relates to an access card and a method for checking access authorization to a security system and the use of an additional security card in connection with an access card.
  • Chip cards Commercial access cards are known as so-called chip cards, on which a variety of information can be stored and which can be implemented as a credit card, as a patient card, as a membership card of associations and clubs, as a keyless go card, as a telephone card or as a cash card.
  • other applications for such access cards or chip cards are known, in which technical devices are to be protected by entering a secret number, a code word or a combination of both, such as Computers, terminals, lap-tops, cell phones, access to areas prohibited to unauthorized persons, immobilizers for motor vehicles and much more. These items are referred to below as devices.
  • the known access cards or chip cards are characterized, among other things, by the fact that the information stored on them, either directly via electrical contacts or by special reading devices without contact over a certain distance, as a rule under two meters, can be read.
  • These contactlessly readable cards require transponders for the radio transmission of energy, clock and data, the energy being emitted by the reading device.
  • the card does not have its own energy source and is therefore referred to as a passive card.
  • a commercially available chip card has, for example, a memory chip on which the information and data are stored, and a coil connected to the memory chip, in which a voltage is induced by an alternating magnetic field, whereby the memory chip is activated.
  • the coil also serves as an antenna for sending data to the reader. Due to the high storage capacity of these cards, it is also possible to integrate several functions on one chip card, that is, to replace several cards with a single chip card.
  • Access card or chip card unusable as soon as the PIN of the authorized person is no longer known.
  • DE 100 09 057 AI is an access control device with at least one
  • Key unit with a lock system and with a monitoring system known, which communicates with the lock system and which checks the access authorization to the security object.
  • the access authorization can be done via the key unit and additionally can be checked with a separate operator identification.
  • This operator identification can take place on the basis of biometric data recorded by a fingerprint reading device or by means of an operator code entered in a mobile phone, the operator identification being transmitted to the lock system and checked by the latter.
  • the use of fingerprint readers requires additional installation effort and is associated with high costs.
  • a disadvantage of the access control device by means of the transmission of an operator code by mobile phone is that this solution requires a functioning radio telephone network and fails in areas without network coverage.
  • AI is a method for
  • Theft protection of motor-driven motor vehicles is known, in which, in addition to an electronic key, an electronic vehicle registration document is provided, by means of which the authorized person can be checked.
  • This electronic vehicle registration certificate is provided in addition to the electronic key.
  • the electronic vehicle registration document can be designed as a (processor) chip card, as a transponder or as a remote control and is directly connected to one or more system components of the anti-theft system via an interface (reader) installed in the motor vehicle.
  • the access authorization is checked in that a key code from the electronic key and a secret code from the electronic vehicle registration document are transmitted directly to a control unit present in the motor vehicle.
  • a wirelessly and contactlessly readable identification tag for storing information is known, by means of which information and / or franking data assigned to a postal item can be stored and which can be arranged on a postal item.
  • the identification mark can be designed as a surface wave filter.
  • DE 199 23 983 AI discloses a method for remote access control to the interior and / or for activating operating functions of a motor vehicle.
  • Several access code transmitters and a transmitter / receiver unit are provided for sending out an interrogation signal and for receiving access code signals.
  • the access code transmitters process access code signals with different spreading sequences by means of spread spectrum processing.
  • the access code signals processed in this way are despread again with a corresponding inverse spreading sequence.
  • This method also has the disadvantage that there is no protection against misuse by lost or stolen access code transmitters.
  • Another common method of protecting the chip cards and devices described above against misuse is protection by secret numbers and / or code words which are entered via a keyboard on a reading device and / or are written by hand in the form of signatures on receipts. Protection through the use of a secret number (code number) is limited, since this number is entered on the readers and devices in the "Semi-public" takes place and can therefore be spied on relatively easily. Furthermore, cardholders and device users often write down secret numbers and carry them with or in the vicinity of the chip cards, especially when using several cards or devices with different secret numbers at the same time. Protection against misuse by means of a signature on printed receipts is also very limited due to the negligent control of the sales staff. If a chip card is used as a keyless go card or as access authorization, for example, it is not protected against misuse in the event of loss or theft. Only after the loss has been reported to the responsible authorities can further misuse be prevented by blocking the card via the reading stations.
  • the invention provides an access card for checking access authorization to a security system, with a memory area in which reference data are permanently stored, with a receiving unit, via which security data can be received from a transmitting unit of a separately designed security card, with a processing unit, which the reference data and the safety data to
  • the access card being clearly identifiable within the security system on the basis of the identification data, and with an external interface for outputting the identification data to the security system.
  • the access card can be used to check the access authorization to a security system simply and effectively by receiving the security data sent by a separate security card from the receiving unit of the access card and processing it in a suitable manner by the processing unit of the access card. Depending on the result of this processing, identification data are output to the security system by the external interface.
  • Security system is provided to bring the security system into radio range and to switch it on according to the activation option carried out in each case via the magnetic, electromagnetic or electrical field, via a signal received by the receiving unit or via a switch.
  • the access control then takes place fully automatically.
  • the radio range depends on the performance of the respective transmitter unit. A radio range of a few meters is generally sufficient.
  • the access card comprises an inductive energy absorption unit.
  • the receiving unit and / or the processing unit can preferably be activated by a current flow in the inductive energy absorption unit.
  • a Access cards of this type can be used to implement the principle of "passive entry” or “passive go”, which is based on the fact that the access cards are activated when the security system is approached and then send the identification data to the security system after the security data and reference data have been processed appropriately.
  • the access card comprises an integrated energy source, in particular a battery or a foil battery.
  • a switch is preferably provided, via which the receiving unit and / or the processing unit can be activated.
  • the switch can be a mechanical switch or an electronic one
  • Switch be formed. With a mechanical switch, the user can activate it manually. With an electronic switch, the activation by an optical or electrical signal on the part of the security system can take place automatically as soon as the user approaches the security system.
  • connection contacts can be designed in the usual way as a contact field, onto which needle-shaped contacts on the part of the security system are placed as soon as the access card is inserted into a card slot provided for this purpose.
  • the external interface is designed as a wireless transmission unit.
  • the receiving unit is designed as a frequency receiver.
  • the received security data are comparable with the stored reference data and that if the security data match the reference data, the security data can be forwarded to the external interface as identification data.
  • the processing unit carries out a simple comparison operation, the security data being "passed through” to the security system if they match.
  • the processing unit is designed in such a way that the received security data are comparable with the stored reference data and that if the security data match, the
  • Reference data stored in the memory area can also be forwarded to the external interface.
  • the processing unit also only performs a simple comparison operation. If there is a match, however, separate identification data are used, which are also stored in the memory area of the access card.
  • the processing unit is designed such that the received security data can be processed with the stored reference data using identifiable security algorithms to form identification data and to the external interface are forwardable.
  • the processing unit performs a linking operation between the security data and the reference data, whereby the identification data is generated as a new data record.
  • the identification data are therefore neither permanently stored on the security card nor on the access card.
  • the access card has a
  • Surface wave filter comprises, wherein on the surface wave filter, the receiving unit is formed by an input converter, the memory area and the processing unit by a coded delay line and the external interface by an output converter.
  • a surface wave filter usually consists of a piezo element, on which an electromagnetic wave is converted into an electroacoustic wave by an input transducer and, if necessary, is converted back into an electromagnetic wave by an output transducer.
  • the reference data can be encoded by so-called taps on a transit time path over which the electroacoustic wave travels and is encoded before the conversion back into an electromagnetic wave takes place at the output transducer.
  • the memory area and the processing unit are designed on a microcontroller.
  • a security system also comprises an interface unit for reading in identification data via the external interface Access card according to the invention and an evaluation unit for checking an access authorization based on the read identification data.
  • a use of a security card according to the invention also exists in connection with an access card according to the invention for checking an access authorization to a security system, the security card having a memory area on which security data is permanently stored, and a transmission unit via which the security data can be sent to the access card.
  • a method according to the invention for checking access authorization to a security system comprises the following steps:
  • step b) receiving the security data transmitted in step b) by a receiving unit of an access card
  • step d) generating identification data by processing the security data received in step c) with reference data stored on the access card
  • step e) transmitting the identification data to the security system via an external interface of the access card, f) reading in the identification data sent out in step e) by an interface unit of the security system, and
  • access card and first chip card and the terms security card and second chip card are used interchangeably below.
  • the security system for the use of contactless and non-contact-readable chip cards in the function as credit, money or membership cards and in further applications comprises a first access card in the function of a credit, money or membership card, and an additional security card, the access card being filled with the information required for the relevant purpose, with a security code consisting of numbers, letters, other characters or their combinations and possibly with personal identification data of the holder and the security card with the same security code and, if applicable with the same personal identification data as on the access card.
  • the security system is intended to protect technical devices, in particular computers, terminals, mobile telephones, access devices from protected rooms and motor vehicles with keyless-go functions, these devices having a security code and may be provided with personal identification data and the security card may have the same security code and possibly the same personal identification data as the technical devices.
  • the reading stations on the access card and the technical devices either radiate permanently or, in particular, triggered briefly by a reading process, an electric field.
  • the security card sends the security code or defined parts thereof as a signal to the access card the moment it is placed in the electromagnetic field of a reading station / device.
  • the access card receives the signal with the security code or a defined part of it when it is placed in the same electromagnetic field as the security card, compares this security code or the defined part thereof with its own code and If there is a match, it sends the information stored for the relevant purpose to the reader, which then triggers the desired process.
  • the security card can be integrated into mobile telephones, watches, pocket calculators, pocket computers, electronic calendars or other electrical devices which are constantly carried along.
  • the transfer function of the security code is triggered by existing or additional switches on these devices.
  • the transmission is triggered when the security card is integrated into mobile telephones or electronic calendars by entering the codes of these devices again.
  • the transmission range of the security card is limited to such an extent that the access card or a device can no longer receive the signal if it is removed from the second chip card over a certain distance, usually a few meters.
  • the security code is already in the production of the
  • Security card or written in a separate operation on the security card before delivery to the user.
  • the numbers, letters, other characters or their combinations of the security code are not registered.
  • the personal identification data are only read out in a separate device when they are acquired by the owner.
  • the data required for the relevant purpose and the personal identification data are read out when the access cards are issued by the issuing offices, in particular by banks, by health insurance companies, by associations, by associations or by companies and when the devices are installed.
  • the security code is transmitted in a device secured against unauthorized access from the security card to the access card or to the devices without the security code being registered in any way.
  • the security code can only be transmitted once to the access card. The card is then blocked for further transmissions.
  • the security card is designed in the form of a coil-chip unit as a neck or bracelet, in particular integrated in a jewelry band.
  • the security code is automatically deleted when the security card is in the form of captive necklaces or bracelets if the tape is cut or torn.
  • certain health-relevant data are stored on the security card and can be read directly in the event of accidents by emergency services by means of reading stations specially equipped for this purpose.
  • Fig. 1 shows a schematic diagram of the invention
  • Fig. 2 is a block diagram of a first
  • FIG. 3 a block diagram of a second
  • Embodiment of a security system with an access card and with a security card and an electronic lock system Embodiment of a security system with an access card and with a security card and an electronic lock system.
  • Fig. 1 shows a schematic representation of a security system for the protection of chip cards in the event of loss and theft and for the protection of electronic devices against unauthorized use.
  • chip card 111 and a security card 109 is described in the lower section of FIG. 1.
  • the chip card 111 is also referred to below as an access card.
  • manufacture of the chip card 111 and the security card 109 is described in the upper area of FIG. 1.
  • the first chip card 111 or the devices are protected by a second chip card - hereinafter referred to as the security card 109 - which has the sole purpose of activating the actual card / device for use with a defined signal. Due to the short range of the said signal (a few meters), the chip card III / the device can no longer be used if it is removed beyond the range of the security chip 109. The chip card 111 is therefore unusable in the event of loss or theft and the devices are not functional in the absence of the authorized device user.
  • the security card 109 either consists of the second chip card 109 described above, which, however, should be carried separately from the first card 111 (shirt pocket, special pocket in clothing, etc.), or of a security chip 109 worn on a neck or bracelet. Its function can also in one Mobile phone, a wristwatch or in other constantly carried devices can be integrated (see below).
  • Chip card III / devices and security card 109 are provided with a common code, consisting of numbers, letters, other characters or their combination with one another, which is unknown to anyone, not even the holder of the security card 109.
  • the Lesestati 'on the smart card or the device 111 generate an electric field by means of which the security card 109 is activated and its code or a defined part of it to the smart card lll / the device transmits (step 110). These compare it with their own code and, if the code is identical, pass the information stored on it to the reading station / device. If the two code numbers do not match or if the security card is too far away or does not exist at all, the information on the chip card 111 is not released or the device is not activated.
  • the electrical field with which the transmission of the code is triggered can be generated briefly by the reading process in the reading device or by actuating any function of the device and thus the transmission of the code can be triggered.
  • the advantage of this alternative is that the transmission of the code is only triggered when it is needed and not always during the random passage at a reading station or a device.
  • Security card 109 for chip card 111 both cards can simultaneously send the security code to the reading station / device, which makes the further processing of the process dependent on the identity of the two codes.
  • the security card 109 When using a reading station that transmits the data of the chip card 111 not contactlessly, but via electrical contacts and the device cannot emit an electrical field, the security card 109 must be an active card that is integrated with a card body
  • Energy source e.g. is equipped with a foil battery.
  • This security card 109 must be used when using a switching function, e.g. be activated by a flat keyboard switch and at that moment transmits the code to the chip card 111.
  • a switching function e.g. be activated by a flat keyboard switch and at that moment transmits the code to the chip card 111.
  • the security card 109 is integrated into a cell phone, battery-operated watch, etc., the function must be triggered by existing or additional switches. The energy required is then taken from the energy sources of the mobile phone or the watch.
  • the security card 109 In order to avoid a common loss or theft of the chip card 111 and the security card 109, the security card 109 should be carried separately from the chip card 111 or the devices. It is advisable to transport them in separate, possibly lockable pockets on clothing. Optimal protection is provided if the security card 109 is designed in the form of a captive arm or collar that is worn on the body in the long term. In this case, the bracelet or collar forms the coil through which the voltage is induced. The security chip is attached to it. As a further security, the circuit on the security card 109 can be designed in such a way that the code is immediately and permanently deleted when the coil is cut.
  • This security chip 109 which is to be worn permanently, can be designed, among other things, in the form of individual jewelry (chain, link band, etc.). If the security card 109 is integrated in a mobile phone, it can be used as additional security the signal to activate is given by entering the PIN number of the mobile phone again.
  • the security cards 109 are produced separately and completely independently of the normal chip cards (method steps 101 and 105).
  • the security codes to be stored on it are organized according to a chaotic system, e.g. by means of a random generator, without a registration taking place, which suggests a later holder of the security card. Continuous registration can be carried out to avoid double assignment of security codes.
  • the security code is transmitted to the various chip cards 109, 111 of the owner at the chip card issuing offices, e.g. at the banks for issuing credit and cash cards, at the
  • Health insurance companies for patient cards, for companies and authorities for cards for access authorization (process steps 102 and 106).
  • the transfer to the devices is usually carried out by the device distributors and network operators by authorized persons
  • Administrator rights preferably directly after the installation of the electronic devices (step 103).
  • the transmission is carried out by means of specially secured devices which only transmit the code to the card / device in question, without having to register the code and the card holder.
  • the security card 109 can be in addition to the security code when handing over to the future cardholder personal identification data (e.g. last name, first name, date of birth, place of birth) of the owner are registered
  • personal identification data e.g. last name, first name, date of birth, place of birth
  • Step 105 In addition to the data relevant for the purpose of the card, the same personal data of the owner can also be recorded on the chip card 111
  • Method steps 103 and 104 show the installation of the electrical devices and the storage of the personal data of the owner of the chip card 111 on the electrical devices.
  • the personal identification data can then be compared before the code is transmitted (method step 107). Only if they match is the
  • the chip card 111 can be designed such that a code can only be transferred once from a security card 109 to the chip card 111 and can then no longer be overwritten. Overwriting can also be prevented with this.
  • data can be loaded directly onto the security card 109 for certain purposes, such as access rights to companies, buildings, parking lots or certain rooms, or usage rights for buses, trains, mountain railways, ski lifts etc. or the usage rights of computers, PCs, notebooks and Cell Phones (Step 106).
  • important personal, health-relevant and other data which are important in the case of accidents and injuries, for example, can be stored on the security card 109 (method step 106) and then by emergency services using special data
  • Reading stations that can only read this data can be called up.
  • FIG. 2 shows a block diagram of a first exemplary embodiment of a security system with an access card 210 and with a security card 200 and an electronic lock system 220.
  • the access card 210 comprises a first energy unit 211, a first micro-controller 212 and a first RF
  • the first micro-controller 212 is connected to the first energy unit 211 and comprises a memory area and a processing unit, which are not shown separately in FIG. 2. On the
  • the processing unit is able to receive data from the first RF transmission and reception unit 213, to transmit data for transmission to the first RF transmission and reception unit 213, to read data from the memory area and also to read the reference data read from the memory area to check security data received from the security card 200 and to process it for identification data.
  • the access card 210 can be uniquely identified by the electronic lock system 220 on the basis of this identification data.
  • the security card 200 has a second energy unit 201, a second micro-controller 202 and via an RF transmission unit 203.
  • the second microcontroller 202 is connected to the second energy unit 201 and is divided into a memory area and a control unit for reading out the memory area, which are not shown separately in FIG. 2.
  • the control unit can be of a very simple design. It is sufficient if it is able to read out the memory area.
  • Security data is permanently stored in the memory area.
  • Both the memory area of the first microcontroller 212 and the memory area of the second microcontroller 202 can be present as non-rewritable read-only memory.
  • the security card 200 and the access card 210 are designed in such a way that they can be activated by a magnetic alternating field of the lock system 220 on the part of a receiver coil (not shown in more detail).
  • the energy units 201 and 211 can each consist of a foil battery.
  • the electronic lock system 220 comprises a second RF transmission and reception unit 221 and an evaluation DSP 222. In addition, the electronic lock system 220 generates an alternating magnetic field with which the security card 200 and the access card 210 can be activated.
  • the access card 210 and the security card 200 are outside the inductive alternating field of the electronic lock system 220. Then the access card 210 and the security card 200 are inserted into the magnetic alternating field of the electronic lock system 220 moves in such a way that the access card 210 and the security card 200 are within radio range of one another.
  • the micro-controllers 202 and 212 are activated together with the energy units 201 and 211 by the alternating magnetic field.
  • the second micro-controller 202 of the security card 200 then reads the security data from its memory area and transmits it to the RF transmission unit 203, which transmits the security data.
  • This security data is received by the first RF transmitting and receiving unit 213 of the access card 210 and forwarded to the processing unit of the first microcontroller 212.
  • the processing unit then reads out the reference data stored in the memory area of the first microcontroller 212 and compares this reference data with the received security data for agreement.
  • the processing unit forwards the security data as identification data to the first RF transmission and reception unit 213, which sends this identification data to the third RF transmission and
  • Receiving unit 221 of the lock system 220 sends.
  • Security data obviously do not match the reference data and consequently do not activate access to the electronic lock 220 either.
  • the processing unit of the first microcontroller 212 it is possible in this case for the processing unit of the first microcontroller 212 to generate identification data and to forward them to the electronic lock 220, from which the electronic lock 220 can recognize that they do not permit access authorization.
  • these identification data are received by the second RF transmission and reception unit 221 of the electronic lock system 220 and forwarded to the evaluation DSP 222, which processes this Identification data checked for correctness.
  • the electronic lock system 220 opens an access lock of a door or gives access to a one secured by the electronic lock system 220
  • Free object for example on a computer system, on a notebook or on a mobile phone. If this identification data does not have this data pattern or does not correspond to the stored identification data, access or access is denied.
  • the RF transmitter units 203 and 213 must be designed so that their frequencies do not interfere.
  • the RF reception unit 221 is only tuned to receive the frequencies transmitted by the RF transmission unit 213.
  • FIG. 3 shows a block diagram of a second exemplary embodiment of a security system with an access card 310 and with a security card 300 as well an electronic lock system 320.
  • a significant difference between the second exemplary embodiment and the first exemplary embodiment is that the access card 310 is designed as a surface wave filter.
  • the security card 300 consists of an energy unit 301, a data unit 302 and a transmission unit 303.
  • the energy unit consists of an inductive antenna which, when approaching the security system 320, is actuated in a manner not shown with an inductive 125 kHz alternating signal and absorbs energy in this way. In this way, the security card 300 is activated and sends out the security data stored in the data unit 302 via the transmission unit 303.
  • the access card 310 has a surface acoustic wave filter, which consists of an input converter 314, a coded delay line 315 and an output converter 316.
  • the input converter 314 first converts the electromagnetic wave emitted by the security card into an electro-acoustic wave which propagates on the piezoelectric substrate of the surface acoustic wave filter.
  • the electroacoustic wave is in this case passed over the coded delay line 315 and coded in the process by the correspondingly set taps.
  • the taps shown in the runtime segment 315 correspond, for example, to the coding scheme 1-1-0-1-0-0.
  • After the electroacoustic wave has left the coded delay line 315 it is converted again into an electromagnetic wave via the output converter 316.
  • the input converter 314 works as a receiving unit and is able to receive the security data transmitted by the security card without further energy supply.
  • the coded runtime segment 315 functions both as a storage area for the reference data and as
  • the reference data are determined by the local arrangement of the taps and are thus stored, while the safety data received by the input converter 314 are processed simply by encoding or modulating the electroacoustic wave corresponding to the safety data by the set taps of the runtime path 315.
  • the output converter 316 finally provides the external one
  • the electromagnetic wave received via the receiving antenna 321 contains the identification data, which can finally be checked for authenticity in the evaluation unit 322.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne une carte d'accès destinée à contrôler une autorisation d'accès à un système de sécurité. L'invention vise à mettre en oeuvre une carte d'accès permettant de réaliser un contrôle sûr et simple d'une autorisation d'accès à un système de sécurité. A cet effet, ladite carte d'accès comporte une zone de mémoire dans laquelle des données de référence sont enregistrées en continu, une unité de réception permettant de recevoir des données de sécurité provenant d'une unité d'émission d'une carte de sécurité séparée, une unité de traitement transformant les données de référence et les données de sécurité en données d'identification, la carte d'accès pouvant être identifiée de façon univoque au sein du système de sécurité par l'intermédiaire des données d'identification, et une interface extérieure destinée à émettre les données d'identification vers le système de sécurité.
PCT/EP2003/011353 2002-10-14 2003-10-14 Carte d'acces destinee a controler une autorisation d'acces a un systeme de securite WO2004036493A2 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU2003280369A AU2003280369A1 (en) 2002-10-14 2003-10-14 Access card for testing access authorisation to a security system

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE10247901.1 2002-10-14
DE10247901 2002-10-14

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2004036493A2 true WO2004036493A2 (fr) 2004-04-29
WO2004036493A3 WO2004036493A3 (fr) 2004-07-29

Family

ID=32102756

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/EP2003/011353 WO2004036493A2 (fr) 2002-10-14 2003-10-14 Carte d'acces destinee a controler une autorisation d'acces a un systeme de securite

Country Status (2)

Country Link
AU (1) AU2003280369A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2004036493A2 (fr)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102005014518A1 (de) * 2005-03-30 2006-10-12 Siemens Ag Anordnung sowie Verfahren zur Bereitstellung einer Authentifizierungsfunktion an einer Authentifizierungseinrichtung
EP1814057A1 (fr) * 2004-10-08 2007-08-01 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Systeme d'authentification

Family Cites Families (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
BR9402670A (pt) * 1993-07-06 1995-06-06 At & T Corp Invólucro portátil para cartão de dados
JPH0897777A (ja) * 1994-09-22 1996-04-12 Tokai Rika Co Ltd 携帯形通信装置及び信号伝送システム
CH690048A5 (fr) * 1995-11-28 2000-03-31 C Sam S A En Formation C O Jue Dispositif de sécurité commandant l'accès à un ordinateur ou à un terminal de réseau.
DE19802526B4 (de) * 1998-01-26 2006-02-09 Robert Bosch Gmbh Vorrichtung zur Kontrolle der Zugangsberechtigung
FI990695L (fi) * 1999-03-29 2000-09-30 Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd Elektronisen rahan siirtäminen
DE19954821A1 (de) * 1999-11-13 2001-05-23 Daimler Chrysler Ag Schmuckstück
FR2805065A1 (fr) * 2000-02-11 2001-08-17 Stella Lecteur de carte a puce de type visionneuse comprenant des moyens d'emission-reception de donnees sans contact

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP1814057A1 (fr) * 2004-10-08 2007-08-01 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Systeme d'authentification
EP1814057A4 (fr) * 2004-10-08 2009-07-01 Panasonic Corp Systeme d'authentification
DE102005014518A1 (de) * 2005-03-30 2006-10-12 Siemens Ag Anordnung sowie Verfahren zur Bereitstellung einer Authentifizierungsfunktion an einer Authentifizierungseinrichtung

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
AU2003280369A1 (en) 2004-05-04
AU2003280369A8 (en) 2004-05-04
WO2004036493A3 (fr) 2004-07-29

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
EP1929673B1 (fr) Procede et systeme de transmission de signaux d'identification
EP0159539B1 (fr) Système de cartes à circuit intégré
DE102008008307B3 (de) Vorrichtung zum Aktivieren und Deaktivieren einer Zugangskontrolleinrichtung
DE19618144C1 (de) Karte mit Fingerabdruck
EP0671528A1 (fr) Serrure électronique codée destinée en particulier à dèsactiver l'immobilisateur d'un véhicule à moteur
DE102014001224A1 (de) Verfahren zur personenselektiven Zutrittskontrolle
DE4102816A1 (de) Kommunikationseinrichtung
DE69519616T2 (de) Tragbares Kommunikationsgerät und eine IC-Karte dafür
DE102010064257A1 (de) Funkschlüssel mit Sicherheitselement und Antennenanordnung
EP1054796B1 (fr) Dispositif de securite pour la protection globale d'objets avec des composants electroniques
DE4311385C2 (de) Identifikationskarte
WO2020058059A1 (fr) Système d'accès et procédé de vérification d'accès
DE19604206A1 (de) Transponder zum Übertragen insbesondere sicherheitstechnisch relevanter Daten zu einem Basisgerät
WO2004036493A2 (fr) Carte d'acces destinee a controler une autorisation d'acces a un systeme de securite
EP2040225B1 (fr) Enveloppe électronique destinée à garantir l'accès à une zone à l'aide d'une carte
EP2544154A1 (fr) Transmetteur d'identification mobile qui peut prendre un état normal et un état sécurisé
DE102015222235B4 (de) Tragbare Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Aktivieren oder Deaktivieren eines Kraftfahrzeugs
DE102005003647A1 (de) Identifizierungssystem
DE10315845B4 (de) System, Systemkomponenten und Verfahren zur Abwicklung eines hermetisch validierbaren Datentransfers
EP1253559A2 (fr) Porte-carte et procédé pour combiner la carte d'identification d'entreprise et la fonction clé
WO2002050781A2 (fr) Procede de controle de pieces d'identite
DE20306923U1 (de) Sichern von Systemen gegen manipulatives Ansprechen
DE19852018C2 (de) Verfahren zur Sicherung eines elektronisch codierten Schlüssels, insbesondere Fahrzeugschlüssels, vor unbefugter Benutzung, sowie elektronisch codierter Schlüssel
DE10252580A1 (de) System und Verfahren zur Durchführung eines Datentransfers insbesondere zur Autorisierungserkennung
DE19523654A1 (de) Verfahren, Schaltungsanordnung und Abfragesystem zur fälschungssicheren Geräteidentifikation

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AK Designated states

Kind code of ref document: A2

Designated state(s): AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY BZ CA CH CN CO CR CU CZ DE DK DM DZ EC EE EG ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NI NO NZ OM PG PH PL PT RO RU SC SD SE SG SK SL SY TJ TM TN TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VC VN YU ZA ZM ZW

AL Designated countries for regional patents

Kind code of ref document: A2

Designated state(s): GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZM ZW AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IT LU MC NL PT RO SE SI SK TR BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GQ GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application
WWE Wipo information: entry into national phase

Ref document number: 2004544212

Country of ref document: JP

WPC Withdrawal of priority claims after completion of the technical preparations for international publication

Ref country code: WO

NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: JP

WWW Wipo information: withdrawn in national office

Country of ref document: JP

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase
点击 这是indexloc提供的php浏览器服务，不要输入任何密码和下载