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WO2002086845A1 - Procede de controle de contenu, dispositif de fourniture de contenu et dispositif de controle de contenu - Google Patents

Procede de controle de contenu, dispositif de fourniture de contenu et dispositif de controle de contenu Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2002086845A1
WO2002086845A1 PCT/JP2001/007556 JP0107556W WO02086845A1 WO 2002086845 A1 WO2002086845 A1 WO 2002086845A1 JP 0107556 W JP0107556 W JP 0107556W WO 02086845 A1 WO02086845 A1 WO 02086845A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
content
unique information
information
monitoring
monitoring target
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/JP2001/007556
Other languages
English (en)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
Hideto Yamakawa
Original Assignee
U's Communications Corp.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by U's Communications Corp. filed Critical U's Communications Corp.
Publication of WO2002086845A1 publication Critical patent/WO2002086845A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
    • G06F16/90—Details of database functions independent of the retrieved data types
    • G06F16/95—Retrieval from the web
    • G06F16/958—Organisation or management of web site content, e.g. publishing, maintaining pages or automatic linking

Definitions

  • Content monitoring method Content providing device, and content monitoring device
  • the present invention particularly relates to a technique for monitoring electronic information content provided on a Web page and detecting tampering.
  • Falsification of content is performed by a malicious Internet user illegally invading a web server or the like of a company or the like, and rewriting the content of a file constituting the content. For this reason, in addition to observing the content displayed on the web browser, the system administrator etc. confirms whether the content has been tampered with, and the system administrator etc. does not change the content file time stamp or the content file size. This is done by examining whether or not. Disclosure of the invention
  • An object of the present invention is to provide a technology that allows a third party other than the content provider to monitor the content and detect tampering.
  • the unique information based on the content can be, for example, a file size of the content file, a hash value such as a time stamp, or the like. Also, the unique information can be added to the content by encrypting it using, for example, a public key method.
  • An apparatus for providing electronic information content is an apparatus for providing electronic information content
  • Storage means for storing information for identifying the content to be monitored and information for decoding the unique information of the content in association with each other;
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram for explaining an example of a network system to which the present invention is applied.
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram for explaining a functional configuration of the content providing apparatus 10.
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram for explaining the functional configuration of the content monitoring device 20.
  • FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining an example of the data structure of the content management database 14.
  • FIG. 5 is a diagram for explaining an example of the data structure of the monitoring database 23.
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart for explaining a process in which the content providing apparatus 10 adds monitoring information to the monitoring target content.
  • FIG. 7 is a flowchart for explaining a process in which the content monitoring device 20 monitors the monitoring target content.
  • FIG. 8 is a diagram for explaining an example of a content file.
  • FIG. 8A shows an example of a content file before the monitoring information is added
  • FIG. 8B shows an example of the monitoring information. Shows an example of a content file after ".”
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram for explaining an example of a network system to which the present invention is applied.
  • a content providing device 10 a content monitoring device 20, and a plurality of content browsing devices 50 (only one is shown in this diagram) are connected via a computer network 60.
  • the computer network 60 can be typically the Internet, but the present invention is not limited to this.
  • the content providing device 10 is a device that has a Web Serno function and provides electronic information content on a Web page.
  • Electronic information content refers to information such as characters and images displayed on the web page, computer programs and other information that can be obtained from the web page, whether paid or free. It shall be.
  • the content monitoring device 20 is a device that monitors the content provided by the content providing device 10 via the computer network 60 and detects whether the content has been tampered with.
  • the content browsing device 50 is a terminal device used by an unspecified number of users of the computer network 60, and has a Web browser function. The user can access the content providing device 10 using the web browser function of the content browsing device 50 and browse the content provided by the content providing device 10.
  • the present embodiment relates to a technology for detecting, when a malicious user alters the content provided by the content providing device 1 ⁇ using the content browsing device 50, the alteration.
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram for explaining a functional configuration of the content providing apparatus 10.
  • the content providing device 10 includes a web server control unit 11, a monitoring information processing unit 12, a network interface unit 13, and a content management database 14. And a content file storage unit 15.
  • the configuration of the content providing device 1 ⁇ is not limited to this.
  • the web server control unit 11 uses the content providing device 10 as a web server.
  • the control for the function is performed. Specifically, in response to a request from a Web browser, a process for transmitting contents such as an HTML (Hypertext Markup Language) file and an image file using HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) is performed. Furthermore, by providing an extension function called Common Gateway Interface (CGI), it is possible to provide interactive content.
  • CGI Common Gateway Interface
  • the content file storage unit 15 stores an HTML file, an image file, and the like for constituting the content provided by the content providing device 10 in a URL.
  • Web server control unit 10 receives a transmission request for the content whose URL is specified from the Web browser, the Web server control unit 10 obtains the file associated with the URL from the content file storage unit 15 and, as a response to the transmission request, Send to browser.
  • the monitoring information processing unit 12 performs a process of adding information for falsification monitoring to the content file stored in the content file storage unit 15.
  • the monitoring information processing unit 12 includes a hash value calculation unit 12a, a monitoring information generation unit 12b, and a monitoring information addition unit 12c.
  • the hash value calculation unit 12a refers to the monitored content file and calculates a hash value of the data based on the content file (hereinafter, also simply referred to as “content file hash value”).
  • the data based on the content file can be, for example, a file size. When a content file is tampered with, the file size is also generally changed. can do.
  • a hash function for calculating a hash value MD5, MASH, SHA-1 and the like are standard, but are not limited to these.
  • the data size based on the content file used to calculate the hash value is not limited to the file size.
  • data on file modification date and time, file name, etc. may be used.
  • the hash By using the value, the data amount of the tamper monitoring information is compressed, and the tamper monitoring process is performed efficiently.However, it is not always necessary to use the hash value in determining the identity of the content. .
  • the file size itself may be used for content file identity determination.
  • the monitoring information generation unit 12b performs a process of generating monitoring information by encrypting the hash value generated by the hash value calculation 12a.
  • the encryption method is arbitrary, but in this embodiment, a public key encryption method is used.
  • a public key and the secret key used for the public key cryptosystem for example, a public key and a secret key issued by a certificate issuing device 30 of a certificate authority, which is a third party, can be used.
  • the monitoring information generator 12b encrypts the hash value using a secret and a secret key.
  • the encrypted hash value is referred to as monitoring information.
  • the content providing device 10 stores and manages the public key and the private key issued by the certificate issuing device 30 in the content management database 14.
  • FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining an example of the data structure of the content management database 14.
  • the content management database 14 manages the content URL 14a, the public key 14b, the secret key 14c, and the storage location 14d as one record.
  • the content URL 14a stores an address on the combination network 60 for identifying the content file. If the content file is an image file, etc., and is linked from an HTML file, etc., and displayed on the Web page, store the URL of the link source.
  • the public key 14b and the secret key 14c store keys used for encryption and decryption in the public key cryptosystem.
  • the storage location 14 d stores information for specifying the storage location of the content file in the content providing device 10.
  • the storage location of the content file can be specified by, for example, a predetermined path and file name in the content file storage unit 15. In the example of this figure, a public key and a secret key are set for each content file. However, a common public key and a secret key may be used for all or some of the content files. Good.
  • the monitoring information adding unit 1 2c stores the command generated by the monitoring information generating unit 1 2b.
  • the file monitoring information is added to the content file or the link source content file of the call.
  • the specific processing contents of the monitoring information adding unit 12c will be described later.
  • the network interface unit 13 performs processing for controlling transmission and reception of data via the computer network 60.
  • a general information processing device including a central processing unit, a main storage device, an input / output processing device, an auxiliary storage device, and the like, for example, a server computer can be used.
  • the information processing device implements the above-described monitoring information processing unit 12 and the like by the central processing unit and the like performing processing in accordance with a predetermined combination program stored in the main storage device. It will be able to function as 0.
  • a computer program for causing the information processing device to function as the content providing device 10 can be distributed by recording it on a portable recording medium such as a CD-ROM. Then, by storing this recording medium in, for example, an auxiliary storage device, it can be installed in the information processing device. Also, for example, it can be installed via a computer network 60 or the like.
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram for explaining a functional configuration of the content monitoring device 20.
  • the content monitoring device 20 includes a content monitoring control unit 21, a network interface unit 22, and a monitoring database 23.
  • the configuration of the content monitoring device 20 is not limited to this.
  • the content monitoring control unit 21 monitors the content provided by the content providing apparatus 10 for falsification, for example, at a predetermined time interval or according to a predetermined monitoring schedule or the like.
  • the content monitoring control unit 21 includes a content acquisition unit 21a, a content 'monitoring information separation unit 21b, a monitoring information decryption unit 21c, a hash value calculation unit 21d, and a hash. It is configured to include a value comparison unit 21 e.
  • the content acquisition unit 21a refers to the monitoring database 23 to specify the monitoring target content, and via the computer network 60, monitors the monitoring target content. 'To get.
  • FIG. 5 is a diagram for explaining an example of the data structure of the monitoring database 23.
  • the monitoring database 23 manages the monitoring target content URL 23 a, the public key 23 b, and the monitoring history 23 c as one record.
  • the monitored content URL 23 a stores the URL of the content to be monitored.
  • the public key 23 b stores the public key applied to the content set in the public key 14 b of the content management database 14.
  • the monitoring result 23 stores the monitoring result (whether or not tampered) of the monitoring target content.
  • the monitoring result 23 can store a history of the monitoring result by storing the monitoring date and time 23 c1 and the result 23 c2 in association with each other.
  • the content / monitoring information separation unit 21b separates the acquired monitoring target content into a content part and a monitoring information part. That is, in the present embodiment, monitoring information is added to the content file to be monitored by the monitoring information processing unit 12 of the content providing apparatus 10.
  • the content-'monitoring information separation unit 2 lb extracts the added monitoring information and separates it into a content part and a monitoring information part.
  • the monitoring information decryption unit 21c decrypts the separated monitoring information using the public key 23b recorded in the monitoring database 23. That is, the separated monitoring information is obtained by encrypting the hash value of the content file by the monitoring information processing unit 12 of the content providing apparatus 10.
  • the monitoring information decryption unit 21c decrypts the monitoring information by using the public key corresponding to the secret key used for the encryption, thereby obtaining the hash value of the content file at the time when the monitoring information is generated. Can be obtained.
  • the hash value calculation unit 2Id calculates an overnight hash value based on the separated content. This makes it possible to obtain the hash value of the content file at the time of monitoring.
  • the hash value calculation method used by the hash value calculation unit 21 d is the same as the hash value calculation method used by the hash value calculation unit 12 a of the content providing device 10.
  • the hash value comparison unit 21 e transmits the monitoring information acquired by the monitoring information decoding unit 21 c.
  • the hash value of the content file at the time of generation is compared with the hash value of the content file at the monitoring time obtained by the hash value calculation unit 21d. If they match, it is determined that the content file has not been tampered with, and if they do not match, it is determined that the content file has been tampered with.
  • the hash value comparison unit 21e records this determination result in the monitoring result 23c of the monitoring database 23. ,
  • the network interface section 22 performs processing for controlling transmission and reception of data via the computer network 60.
  • a general information processing device including a central processing unit, a main storage device, an input / output processing device, an auxiliary storage device, and the like can be used as the content monitoring device 20. Further, the information processing device can function as the content monitoring device 20 by executing a predetermined computer program.
  • the content providing device 10 records, in the content management database 14, information on the content file to be monitored among the content files stored in the content file storage unit 15.
  • the content URL 14a of the monitored content, the public key 14b and the private key 14c obtained from the certificate issuing device 30, and the storage location 14d are stored on a content management data base. Record in 14. If the content file to be monitored is an image file or the like and is displayed on a web page linked from an HTML file or the like, the URL of the link source is changed to the content UR L 14 a as described above. To be stored.
  • the content monitoring device 20 is notified of the content URL recorded in the content management database 14 and the public key.
  • the content monitoring device 20 records the notified content URL and the public key in the monitoring target content URL 23 a of the monitoring data base 23 and the public key 23 b.
  • the process for setting the content to be monitored ends.
  • a process in which the content providing apparatus 10 adds monitoring information to the monitoring target content will be described. This process is basically performed when the content to be monitored is created or modified. That is, whether or not the content has been falsified is determined based on the content at the time of performing this processing, based on whether or not the content has been changed.
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart for explaining this processing.
  • the hash value calculation unit 12 a of the information processing unit 12 refers to the storage location 14 d of the content management database 14 and refers to the monitoring target recorded in the content file storage unit 15.
  • the content file 150 is obtained (S101). Then, the hash value of the content file 150 is calculated by a predetermined hash value calculation method (S102).
  • the monitoring information generation unit 12 b acquires the secret and secret key 14 c corresponding to the content file 150 from the content management database 14. Then, monitoring information is generated by encrypting the calculated hash value using the secret key 14c (S103). By encrypting the hash value as monitoring information in this way, the falsification of the hash value itself can be prevented.
  • the monitoring information adding unit 12c attaches the generated monitoring information to the content or the content that is a link source of the content ;!] (S104). This processing will be described below.
  • a content file can be distinguished into a text-based file described in HTML or the like and a file recorded in binary or the like of image data.
  • most text-based files allow monitoring information to be added to the file without affecting the display format of the web browser.
  • a file recorded in binary or the like may be affected by the addition of monitoring information in the file, such as a distorted image displayed on a web browser.
  • the first method is to add content monitoring information to the content file.
  • This method uses text-based It is preferable to apply this to a content file to which monitoring information can be added without affecting the display form of the web browser, such as files.
  • the second method is to add the content monitoring information to the link tag of the link source content file of the content.
  • This method applies to files other than those to which the first method applies. Which method is to be applied can be determined for each file type in advance.
  • monitoring information may be added to the content file by using a so-called digital watermarking technique. In this case, a method of adding monitoring information can be selected based on whether or not a digital watermark can be embedded.
  • FIG. 8 is a diagram for explaining an example of a content file.
  • FIG. 8A shows an example of a content file before the monitoring information is added.
  • FIG. 8B shows an example of the content file before the monitoring information is added. The example of the content file after addition is shown.
  • the portions indicated by * and * 2 are the portions added as monitoring information.
  • * Indicates monitoring information for this content file. In this diagram, it may be the monitoring information of this content file! --Content- 1 ""> The monitoring information “YYYYYYYYY” is added.
  • *? Is monitoring information of “sample.gif”, which is an image file linked from this content file. In other words, since it is not desirable to add monitoring information in the image file “sample.gif”, this monitoring 'f helmet bulletin' is included in the evening instructing a link to “sample.gif”. Has been added.
  • monitoring information “XXXXXXX” of "sample.g” is added.
  • This monitoring information “XXXXXXX” is information generated from the hash value of “sample.gif” and the secret key.
  • the monitoring information adding unit 12c adds the generated monitoring f green information to the content or the content of the link source of the content. Then, the content file 150 ′ to which the monitoring information has been added is stored in the content file storage unit 15 (S 105), and the process of adding the monitoring information to the monitoring target content ends.
  • a process in which the content monitoring device 20 monitors the monitoring target content will be described. This process is performed periodically, for example, every 5 minutes or 10 minutes, or according to a predetermined monitoring schedule. In this way, for example, by performing monitoring processing at intervals of 5 minutes, it is possible to quickly detect when content has been tampered with. By performing falsification processing such as stopping the Web server function and restoring contents, damage due to falsification can be reduced.
  • FIG. 7 is a flowchart for explaining a process in which the content monitoring device 20 monitors the monitoring target content.
  • the content acquisition unit 21 a of the content monitoring control unit 21 refers to the monitoring target content UR L 23 a of the monitoring database 23, and monitors the content file 150 5 via the computer network 60.
  • the content 'monitoring information separation unit 2 lb converts the acquired content file 150' into content 150 a and monitoring information 150 b Separation (S202): 0
  • This separation processing is performed, for example, by using the code indicating the monitoring information added by the monitoring information adding unit 12c of the content providing apparatus 10 as the key to the content 150a. And monitoring information 150b.
  • the monitoring information decryption unit 21c refers to the public key 23b of the monitoring database 23 to decrypt the separated or obtained monitoring information 150c (S204). .
  • the hash value 152b of the content file to be monitored at the time when the monitoring information is generated is acquired.
  • the hash value comparison unit 21e compares the hash value 152a of the content file at the time of monitoring with the hash value 152b of the monitoring target content file at the time of generating the monitoring information (S2 0 5). And two houses If the menu values match, it is determined that the content file has not been tampered with; otherwise, it is determined that the content file has been tampered with. Thus, when the content file has been tampered with, it can be detected via the computer network 60 that the content file has been tampered with.
  • the hash value comparison unit 21 e records this determination result in, for example, the monitoring result 23 c of the monitoring data base 23 together with the monitoring date and time, and ends the process of monitoring the monitoring target content.
  • the present invention is not limited to the above embodiment.
  • the content monitoring device 20 monitors one content providing device 10
  • the content monitoring device 20 can also monitor a plurality of content providing devices.
  • a plurality of content providing devices are monitored by the same processing as described above, and the content is tampered with. Can be detected.
  • the content monitoring device 20 sends the expired public key and a new public key to the content monitoring device 20. If the hash values do not match regardless of which key is used to perform decryption, it may be determined that tampering has been performed. : As described above, according to the present invention, a third party other than the content provider can monitor the content via the convenience network and detect tampering.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Data Mining & Analysis (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Information Retrieval, Db Structures And Fs Structures Therefor (AREA)

Abstract

Selon l'invention, un dispositif de fourniture de contenu (10) servant à fournir un contenu sur une page Web crée des informations de contrôle d'après le contenu d'un fichier de contenu et place ces informations dans le fichier de contenu. Un dispositif de contrôle de contenu (20) obtient du dispositif de fourniture de contenu (10) le fichier de contenu à contrôler, extrait les informations de contrôle et crée un autre ensemble d'informations de contrôle d'après le contenu du fichier de contenu. Par comparaison des ensembles d'informations, il est possible de déterminer si le fichier de contenu est falsifié. Une tierce partie autre que le fournisseur de contenu contrôle ainsi le contenu par l'intermédiaire d'un réseau informatique de façon à détecter une modification éventuelle.
PCT/JP2001/007556 2001-04-19 2001-08-31 Procede de controle de contenu, dispositif de fourniture de contenu et dispositif de controle de contenu WO2002086845A1 (fr)

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JP2001120892A JP2002318726A (ja) 2001-04-19 2001-04-19 コンテンツ監視方法、コンテンツ提供装置およびコンテンツ監視装置
JP2001-120892 2001-04-19

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Cited By (6)

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US7607176B2 (en) * 2004-11-12 2009-10-20 International Business Machines Corporation Trainable rule-based computer file usage auditing system
WO2011158182A1 (fr) * 2010-06-15 2011-12-22 Scientific Games Holdings Limited Système et procédé permettant de gérer la diffusion de contenu et mesurer l'engagement
US8187087B2 (en) 2007-12-26 2012-05-29 Scientific Games Holdings Limited System and method for collecting and using player information
US8435119B2 (en) 2007-12-26 2013-05-07 Scientific Games Holdings Limited User-controlled sweepstakes entries
WO2013097742A1 (fr) * 2011-12-30 2013-07-04 北京奇虎科技有限公司 Procédés et dispositifs pour identifier une page web trafiquée et identifier un site web piraté
US10165130B2 (en) 2014-02-13 2018-12-25 Emerge Print Management, Llc System and method for the passive monitoring and reporting of printer-related data on USB cables

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JP2011101192A (ja) * 2009-11-05 2011-05-19 Nippon Telegr & Teleph Corp <Ntt> 伝送装置及び伝送方法

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Cited By (13)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7607176B2 (en) * 2004-11-12 2009-10-20 International Business Machines Corporation Trainable rule-based computer file usage auditing system
US8821295B2 (en) 2007-12-26 2014-09-02 Scientific Games Holdings Limited User-controlled sweepstakes entries
US8187087B2 (en) 2007-12-26 2012-05-29 Scientific Games Holdings Limited System and method for collecting and using player information
US8277324B2 (en) 2007-12-26 2012-10-02 Scientific Games Holdings Limited System and method for collecting and using player information
US8360870B2 (en) 2007-12-26 2013-01-29 Scientific Games Holdings Limited System and method for collecting and using player information
US8435119B2 (en) 2007-12-26 2013-05-07 Scientific Games Holdings Limited User-controlled sweepstakes entries
US8512150B2 (en) 2007-12-26 2013-08-20 Scientific Games Holdings Limited System and method for collecting and using player information
US8641519B2 (en) 2007-12-26 2014-02-04 Scientific Games Holdings Limited System and method for collecting and using player information
US9084931B2 (en) 2007-12-26 2015-07-21 Scientific Games Holdings Limited System and method for collecting and using player information
US9180362B2 (en) 2007-12-26 2015-11-10 Scientific Games Holdings Limited System and method for collecting and using player information
WO2011158182A1 (fr) * 2010-06-15 2011-12-22 Scientific Games Holdings Limited Système et procédé permettant de gérer la diffusion de contenu et mesurer l'engagement
WO2013097742A1 (fr) * 2011-12-30 2013-07-04 北京奇虎科技有限公司 Procédés et dispositifs pour identifier une page web trafiquée et identifier un site web piraté
US10165130B2 (en) 2014-02-13 2018-12-25 Emerge Print Management, Llc System and method for the passive monitoring and reporting of printer-related data on USB cables

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