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WO2001043369A2 - Reseau prive utilisant une infrastructure de reseau public - Google Patents

Reseau prive utilisant une infrastructure de reseau public Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2001043369A2
WO2001043369A2 PCT/US2000/042728 US0042728W WO0143369A2 WO 2001043369 A2 WO2001043369 A2 WO 2001043369A2 US 0042728 W US0042728 W US 0042728W WO 0143369 A2 WO0143369 A2 WO 0143369A2
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
nodes
node
sending
network
communications
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2000/042728
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO2001043369A3 (fr
Inventor
Germano Caronni
Amit Gupta
Tom R. Markson
Sandeep Kumar
Christoph L. Schuba
Glenn C. Scott
Original Assignee
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Sun Microsystems, Inc. filed Critical Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Priority to AU43120/01A priority Critical patent/AU4312001A/en
Publication of WO2001043369A2 publication Critical patent/WO2001043369A2/fr
Publication of WO2001043369A3 publication Critical patent/WO2001043369A3/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/0272—Virtual private networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/46—Interconnection of networks
    • H04L12/4641—Virtual LANs, VLANs, e.g. virtual private networks [VPN]
    • H04L12/4675—Dynamic sharing of VLAN information amongst network nodes
    • H04L12/4679—Arrangements for the registration or de-registration of VLAN attribute values, e.g. VLAN identifiers, port VLAN membership

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to data processing systems and. more particularly, to a private network using a public-network infrastructure.
  • network a private network with lease lines, dedicated channels, and network connectivity devices, such as routers, switches, and bridges.
  • network connectivity devices such as routers, switches, and bridges.
  • geometrically restrictive refers to the requirement that if a user is not physically located such that they can plug their device directly into the enterprise network, the user
  • VPN virtual private network
  • Fig. 1 depicts a VPN 100, where ente ⁇ rise network 102 is connected to the Internet 104 via firewall 106. By using VPN 100.
  • a remote device D, 108 may communicate with ente ⁇ rise network 102 via Internet 104 and firewall 106.
  • D, 108 may be plugged into an Internet portal virtually anywhere within the world and make use of the resources on ente ⁇ rise network 102.
  • D, 108 utilizes a technique known as tunneling to
  • end points e.g., D, 108 and VPN software 109
  • the packets may be encrypted at their origin and decrypted at their
  • FIG. 2A depicts a packet 200 with a source Internet protocol (IP)
  • IP Internet protocol
  • the tunneling technique forms a new packet 208 out of packet 200 by encrypting it and adding both a new source IP address 210 and a new destination IP address
  • remote device D, 108 may communicate and utilize the resources of the ente ⁇ rise network 102 in a secure manner.
  • VPNs alleviate the problem of geographic restrictiveness, they impose
  • remote device D 108 wants to communicate with remote device D 2 1 10, D, sends a packet using tunneling to VPN software 109, where the packet is decrypted and then transferred to the ente ⁇ rise network 102. Then, the ente ⁇ rise network 102 sends the packet to VPN
  • nodes of the private network are not geographically restricted in that they can be connected to the private network from virtually any portal to the Internet in the world.
  • a method in a public network. This method establishes in the public network a private network containing at least three nodes such that each node communicates in a secure manner by using an encryption key shared by the at least three nodes and by using
  • this method sends communications among the three nodes in the secure manner by using the shared encryption key and the encryption algorithm.
  • a method is provided in a public network. This method
  • this method sends communications between the at least three nodes over the one channel.
  • a method is provided in a public network. This
  • each of the plurality of nodes having a security manager, each of the plurality of nodes having a key for use with an
  • a computer is connected to a public network infrastructure over which a private network operates.
  • the private network has a plurality of nodes, and the computer comprises a memory and a processor.
  • the memory contains one of the plurality of nodes for communicating over the private network.
  • the memory also contains a security layer that receives from the one node communications containing internal addresses that are suitable for use in communicating within the private network, that translates the internal addresses into external addresses that are suitable for use in communicating over the public-network infrastructure, that encrypts the communications, and that transmits the communications over the public network to destinations of the communications.
  • the processor runs the one node and the security layer.
  • Fig. 1 depicts a conventional virtual private network (VPN) system
  • Fig. 2A depicts a conventional network packet
  • Fig. 2B depicts the packet of Fig. 2A after it has been encrypted in accordance with
  • Fig. 3 depicts a data processing system suitable for use with methods and systems consistent with the present invention
  • Fig. 4 depicts the nodes depicted in Fig. 3 communicating over multiple channels
  • Fig. 5 depicts two devices depicted in Fig. 3 in greater detail
  • Figs. 6A and 6B depict a flow chart of the steps performed when a node joins a VPN in a manner consistent with the present invention
  • Fig. 7 depicts a flow chart of the steps performed when sending a packet from a node of the VPN in a manner consistent with the present invention
  • Fig. 8 depicts a flow chart of the steps performed when receiving a packet by a node of the VPN in a manner consistent with the present invention.
  • Fig. 9 depicts a flow chart of the steps performed when logging out of a VPN in a manner consistent with the present invention.
  • the organization may have the infrastructure maintained for them by one or more
  • Supemet is not geographically restrictive, so a user may plug their device into the Internet
  • Fig.3 depicts a data processing system 300 suitable for use with methods and systems consistent with the present invention.
  • Data processing system 300 comprises a number of
  • computers 302-312 connected to a public network, such as the Internet 314.
  • a Supernet's infrastructure uses components from the Internet because devices 302, 304, and 312 contain nodes that together form a Supernet and that communicate by using the infrastructure of the Internet.
  • These nodes 316, 318, 320, and 322 are communicative entities (e.g., processes) running within a particular device and are able to communicate among themselves as well as access the resources of the Supernet in a secure manner.
  • the nodes 316, 318, 320, and 322 serve as end points for the communications, and no other processes or devices that are not part of the Supernet are able to communicate with the Supernet's nodes or utilize the Supernet's resources.
  • the Supernet also includes an administrative node 306 to administer to the needs of the Supernet It should be noted that since the nodes of the Supernet rely on the Internet for
  • the device can be plugged into an Internet portal and the node running on that
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • IPX Internet Protocol
  • X.25 Internet Protocol
  • ATM Internet Protocol
  • RF communication cellular comm ⁇ nication
  • satellite links satellite links
  • land-based links such as RF link, cellular comm ⁇ nication, satellite links, or land-based links.
  • a Supemet includes a number of channels that its nodes 316-322 can communicate over.
  • a "channel" refers to a collection of virtual links through the public- network infrastructure that connect the nodes on the channel such that only these nodes can communicate over it.
  • a node on a channel may send a message to another node on that channel, known as a unicast message, or it can send a message to all other nodes on that
  • channel 1 402 connects node A 316 and node C 320
  • channel 2404 connects node B 318, node C 320, and node D 322.
  • Each Supernet has any number of preconfigured channels over which the nodes on that channel can communicate.
  • the channels are dynamically defined.
  • channel 1 402 may be configured to share a file system as part of node C 320 such that node A 316 can utilize the file system of node C in a secure manner.
  • node C 320 serves as a file system manager by receiving file system requests (e.g.. open, close,
  • node C 320 stores the data in an
  • channel 2 404 may be configured
  • nodes B 318 and C 320 send code
  • a Supernet provides a number of features to ensure secure and robust communication among its nodes.
  • the system provides authentication and admission control so that
  • the Supernet provides communication security services so that the sender of a
  • the system provides key management to reduce the possibility
  • the system does so by providing one key per channel and by changing the key for a channel whenever a node joins or leaves the channel.
  • the system may use a different
  • the system provides address translation in a transparent manner. Since the Supernet is a private network constructed from the infrastructure of another network, the Supemet has its own internal addressing scheme, separate from the addressing scheme of the underlying public network. Thus, when a packet from a Supemet node is sent to another Supernet node, it travels through the public network. To do so, the Supe et performs
  • an operating system-level component treats a Supemet node running on a device differently than it treats other processes on that device.
  • Supemet node (i.e., a security layer in a protocol stack) recognizes that a Supemet node is part of a
  • Supemet and therefore, it enforces that all communications to and from this node travel through the security infrastructure of the Supemet such that this node can communicate with other members of the Supemet and that non-members of the Supemet cannot access this node. Additionally, this operating system-level enforcement of node compartmentalization allows more than one Supemet node to run on the same machine, regardless of whether the nodes are from the same Supemet, and allows nodes of other networks to run on the same
  • Fig. 5 depicts administrative machine 306 and device 302 in greater detail, although the other devices 304 and 308-312 may contain similar components.
  • components including a memory 502, 504; secondary storage 506, 508: a central processing
  • CPU central processing unit
  • Memory 504 of administrative machine 306 includes the S ASD process 540, VARPD
  • CPU 512 is capable of running in at
  • CPU 512 executes programs running in user mode, it prevents them from directly manipulating the hardware components, such
  • Memory 504 also contains a VARPDB 551 and a TCP/IP protocol stack 552 that are executed by CPU 512
  • TCP/IP protocol stack 552 contains a TCP/UDP layer 554 and an IP layer 556, both of which are standard layers well known to those of ordinary skill in the art.
  • Secondary storage 508 contains a configuration file 558 that stores various configuration-related information (described below) for use by SASD 540.
  • S ASD 540 represents a Supemet: there is one instance of an SASD per Supemet, and it both authenticates nodes and authorizes nodes to join the Supemet.
  • VARPD 548 has an associated component, VARPDB 551, into which it stores mappings of the internal Supemet addresses, known as a node IDs, to the network addresses recognized by the public-network infrastructure, known as the real addresses.
  • the "node ID" may include the following: a
  • Supemet ID (e.g., Ox 123 ), reflecting a unique identifier of the Supemet, and a virtual address, comprising an IP address (e.g., 10.0.0.1 ).
  • the "real address" is an IP address (e.g., 10.0.0.2) that is globally unique and meaningful to the public-network infrastructure.
  • one VARPD ns on each machine, and it may play two roles. First, a VARPD may act as
  • each VARPD assists in address translation for the nodes on its machine. In this role, the VARPD stores into its associated
  • VARPDB the address mappings for its nodes, and if it needs a mapping that it does not have
  • KMS 550 performs key management by generating a new key every time a node joins
  • a system administrator creates a configuration file 558 that
  • This file may specify: (1) the Supemet name, (2) all of the channels in the Supemet, (3) the nodes that communicate over each channel, (4) the address of the KMS for each channel, (5) the address of the VARPD that acts as the server for the Supemet, (6) the user IDs of the users who are authorized to create Supemet nodes, (7) the authentication mechanism to use for each user
  • this information may be retrieved from other sources, such as databases or interactive configurations.
  • the configuration file After the configuration file is created, it is used to start a Supernet. For example, when starting a Supemet, the system administrator first starts SASD. which reads the
  • VARPD on the administrator's machine, indicating that it will act as the server for the
  • Memory 502 of device 302 contains SNIogin script 522, SNlogout script 524,
  • VARPD 526 VARPD 526, KMC 528, KMD 530, and node A 522, all running in user mode.
  • Memory 502
  • TCP/IP protocol stack 534 and VARPDB 536 running in kernel mode.
  • SNIogin 522 is a script used for logging into a Supemet. Successfully executing this script results in a Unix shell from which programs (e.g., node A 522) can be started to run within the Supemet context, such that address translation and security encapsulation is performed transparently for them and all they can typically access is other nodes on the
  • a parameter may be passed into SNIogin 522 that indicates a particular process to be automatically run in a Supemet context.
  • SNIogin 522 indicates a particular process to be automatically run in a Supemet context.
  • SNlogout 524 is a script used for logging out of a Supemet. Although both SNIogin 522 and SNlogout 524 are described as being scripts, one skilled in the art will appreciate that their processing may be performed by another form of software.
  • VARPD 526 performs address translation between node IDs and real addresses.
  • KMC 528 is the key management component for each node that receives updates whenever
  • KMD 530 receives requests from SNSL 542 of the TCP IP protocol stack 534 when a packet is received and accesses the appropriate KMC for the destination node to retrieve the
  • Node A 532 is a Supemet node running in a Supemet
  • TCP/IP protocol stack 534 contains a standard TCP/UDP layer 538.
  • an inner IP layer 540 and an outer IP layer 544 layers (an inner IP layer 540 and an outer IP layer 544), and a Supemet security layer (SNSL) 542, acting as the conduit for all Supemet communications.
  • SNSL Supemet security layer
  • IP layer 540 and outer IP layer 544 may share the same instance of the code of an IP layer.
  • SNSL 542 performs security functionality as well as address translation. It also caches the
  • SNSL 542 checks its cache first, and if it is not found, it requests KMD 530 to contact the appropriate KMC to retrieve the appropriate channel key.
  • Two IP layers 540, 544 are used in the TCP/IP protocol stack 534 because both the internal addressing scheme and the
  • IP-based external addressing scheme
  • inner IP layer 540 receives the packet from TCP UDP layer 538 and processes the packet with its node ID address before passing it to the SNSL layer 542, which encrypts it, prepends the real source IP address and the real destination IP address, and then passes the encrypted packet
  • SNSL 542 utilizes VARPDB 536 to perform address translation.
  • VARPDB stores all of the address mappings encountered thus far by SNSL 542. If SNSL 542 requests a mapping that VARPDB 536 does not have, VARPDB communicates w ith the VARPD 526 on the local machine to obtain the mapping. VARPD 526 will then contact the VARPD that acts as the server for this particular Supemet to obtain it.
  • Figs. 6A and 6B depict a flow chart of the steps performed when a node joins a Supemet.
  • the first step performed is that the user invokes the SNIogin script and enters the Supemet name, their user ID, their password, and a requested virtual address (step 602).
  • this information depends on the particular authentication mechanism used.
  • the SNIogin script performs a handshaking with SASD to authenticate this information.
  • the user may request a particular virtual address to be used, or alternatively, the SASD may select one for them.
  • processing ends. Otherwise,
  • SASD creates an address mapping between a node ID and the real address (step 606).
  • SASD concatenates the Supemet ID with the virtual address to create the node ID, obtains the real address of the SNIogin script by querying network services in a well-known manner, and then registers this information with the
  • VARPD that acts as the server for this Supemet. This VARPD is identified in the configuration file.
  • SASD After creating the address mapping, SASD informs the KMS that there is a new
  • channel key for use in encrypting traffic on this particular channel (step 610).
  • KMS sends the key ID and the node key to SASD and distributes the channel key to all
  • KMCs on the channel as a new key because a node has just been added to the channel.
  • SASD receives the key ID and the node key from KMS and returns it to SNIogin (step 612).
  • SNIogin After receiving the key ID and the node key from SASD, SNIogin starts a KMC for this node and transmits to the KMC the node ID, the key ID, the node key, the address of the VARPD that acts as the server for this Supemet, and the address of KMS (step 614).
  • the KMC then registers with the KMD indicating the node it is associated with, and KMC registers with
  • KMS for key updates (step 616).
  • KMC When registering with KMS, KMC provides its address so that it can receive updates to the channel key via the Versakey protocol.
  • the Versakey protocol is described in greater detail in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication. Vol. 17, No. 9, 1999, pp. 1614-1631.
  • the KMC After registration, the KMC will receive key updates whenever a channel key changes on one of the channels that the node communicates over.
  • SNIogin configures SNSL (step 618 in Fig. 6B). In this step. SNIogin indicates which encryption algorithm to use for this channel and which authentication algorithm to
  • any of a number of well-known encryption algorithms may be used, including the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple-DES, the International Data
  • RC4 and RC5 from RSA Inco ⁇ orated may be used as well as Blowfish from
  • any of a number of well-known authentication algorithms may be used, including Digital Signatures, Kerberos, Secure Socket Layer (SSL), and MD5, which is
  • SNIogin invokes an operating system call, SETVIN, to cause the SNIogin script to run in a Supemet context (step 620).
  • SETVIN operating system call
  • each process has a data structure known as the "proc structure" that contains the process ID as well as a pointer
  • the channel IDs indicating the channels over which the
  • step 622 the SNIogin script spawns a Unix shell from which programs can be run by the user. All of these programs will thus run in the Supemet context until the user runs the SNlogout script.
  • Fig. 7 depicts a flow chart of the steps performed when sending a packet from node
  • processing is policy driven such that either authentication, encryption, both, or neither may
  • the first step performed is for the SNSL layer to receive a packet originating from node A via the TCP/UDP layer and the inner IP layer (step 702).
  • the packet contains
  • the SNSL layer then accesses the VARPDB to obtain the address mapping between the source node ID and the source real address as well as the destination node ID and the destination real address (step 704). If they are not contained in the VARPDB because this is the first time a packet has been sent from this node or sent to this destination, the VARPDB accesses the local VARPD to obtain the
  • the VARPD on the local machine contacts the VARPD that acts as the server for the Supemet to obtain the appropriate address mapping.
  • the SNSL layer determines whether it has been configured to communicate over the appropriate channel for this packet (step 706). This configuration occurs when SNIogin runs, and if the SNSL has not been so configured, processing ends. Otherwise, SNSL obtains the channel key to be used for this channel (step 708).
  • the SNSL maintains a local cache of keys and an indication of the channel to which each key is associated. Each channel key is time stamped to expire in ten seconds, although this time is configurable by the administrator. If there is a key located in the cache for this
  • SNSL obtains the key. Otherwise, SNSL accesses KMD which then locates the
  • step 710 When encrypting the packet, the source node ID, the destination node
  • ID and the data may be encrypted, but the source and destination real addresses are not, so
  • the SNSL layer After encrypting the packet, the SNSL layer authenticates the sender to verify that it
  • the SNSL layer uses the MD5 authentication protocol, although one skilled in the art will
  • the SNSL layer passes the packet to the IP layer where it is then sent to the destination node in accordance with known techniques associated with the IP protocol (step 714).
  • Fig. 8 depicts a flow chart of the steps performed by the SNSL layer when it receives
  • the first step performed by the SNSL layer is to receive a packet from the network (step 801). This packet contains a real source address and a real destination address that are not encrypted as well as a source node ID, a destination node ID. and data that are encrypted. Then, it determines whether it has been configured to communicate on this
  • the SNSL layer obtains the appropriate key as previously described (step
  • step 806 After decrypting the packet, the SNSL layer authenticates the sender and
  • the innermost layer for delivery to the appropriate node (step 810).
  • IP layer uses the destination node ID to deliver the packet.
  • Fig. 9 depicts a flow chart of the steps performed when logging a node out of a Supemet.
  • the first step performed is for the user to ran the SNlogout script and to enter a node ID (step 902).
  • the SNlogout script requests a log out from SASD (step 904).
  • SASD Upon receiving this request, SASD removes the mapping for this node from the VARPD that acts as the server for the Supemet (step 906). SASD then informs KMS to cancel the registration of the node, and KMS terminates this KMC (step 908). Lastly, KMS generates a new channel key for the channels on which the node was communicating (step 910) to provide greater security.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne des procédés et des systèmes constituant un Supernet, réseau privé élaboré à partir d'éléments d'infrastructure de réseau public. Les noeuds de Supernet peuvent être situés sur virtuellement tout dispositif du réseau public (par exemple, Internet), et leur communication, ainsi que la mise en application de leurs ressources, s'effectuent de façon sécurisée. De ce fait, les utilisateurs de Supernet conservent leurs propres infrastructures de réseau en tant que partie de l'infrastructure du réseau public, tandis qu'ils profitent d'un niveau de sécurité semblable à celui d'un réseau privé. De plus, les noeuds de Supernet ne sont pas limités géographiquement, c'est-à-dire qu'ils peuvent être connectés à Supernet depuis virtuellement tout portail d'Internet dans le monde.
PCT/US2000/042728 1999-12-10 2000-12-11 Reseau prive utilisant une infrastructure de reseau public WO2001043369A2 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU43120/01A AU4312001A (en) 1999-12-10 2000-12-11 Private network using a public-network infrastructure

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US45804099A 1999-12-10 1999-12-10
US09/458,040 1999-12-10

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Publication Number Publication Date
WO2001043369A2 true WO2001043369A2 (fr) 2001-06-14
WO2001043369A3 WO2001043369A3 (fr) 2002-07-11

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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP1424825A1 (fr) * 2002-11-26 2004-06-02 Swisscom AG Procédé et appareil pour l'implémentation d'un réseau virtuel privé entre des terminaux d'un réseau

Family Cites Families (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5548646A (en) * 1994-09-15 1996-08-20 Sun Microsystems, Inc. System for signatureless transmission and reception of data packets between computer networks
US5572528A (en) * 1995-03-20 1996-11-05 Novell, Inc. Mobile networking method and apparatus
US6061346A (en) * 1997-01-17 2000-05-09 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Secure access method, and associated apparatus, for accessing a private IP network

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP1424825A1 (fr) * 2002-11-26 2004-06-02 Swisscom AG Procédé et appareil pour l'implémentation d'un réseau virtuel privé entre des terminaux d'un réseau

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WO2001043369A3 (fr) 2002-07-11

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