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WO1999003246A2 - Procedes et dispositif servant a accroitre la securite d'une cle secrete dans une table de consultation, afin de rendre plus surs les messages telephoniques sans fil - Google Patents

Procedes et dispositif servant a accroitre la securite d'une cle secrete dans une table de consultation, afin de rendre plus surs les messages telephoniques sans fil Download PDF

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Publication number
WO1999003246A2
WO1999003246A2 PCT/US1998/007404 US9807404W WO9903246A2 WO 1999003246 A2 WO1999003246 A2 WO 1999003246A2 US 9807404 W US9807404 W US 9807404W WO 9903246 A2 WO9903246 A2 WO 9903246A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
message
cmea
iteration
offset
tbox
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US1998/007404
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO1999003246A3 (fr
Inventor
Mark H. Etzel
Robert John Frank
Daniel Nelson Heer
Robert John Mcnelis
Semyon B. Mizikovsky
Robert John Rance
R. Dale Shipp
Original Assignee
Lucent Technologies Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Lucent Technologies Inc. filed Critical Lucent Technologies Inc.
Priority to JP50065999A priority Critical patent/JP3459074B2/ja
Priority to EP98954922A priority patent/EP0935859A2/fr
Priority to KR1019980711021A priority patent/KR100576530B1/ko
Publication of WO1999003246A2 publication Critical patent/WO1999003246A2/fr
Publication of WO1999003246A3 publication Critical patent/WO1999003246A3/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to wireless telephone cryptography. More particularly, the invention relates to an improved security cryptosystem for rapid and secure encryption in a wireless telephone system without requiring large amounts of additional system resources.
  • Wireless telephony uses messaging for several purposes including, for example, conveying status information, reconfiguring operating modes, handling call termination, and conveying system and user data such as a subscriber's electronic serial number and telephone number, as well as conversations and other data transmitted by the user.
  • wireless telephone serving stations i.e., base stations
  • wireless telephone serving stations must transmit and receive messages via signals over the air, regardless of the physical location of the subscribers.
  • the base station must be able to send and receive messages to and from a subscriber anywhere, the messaging process is wholly dependent on signals received from and sent to the subscriber equipment. Because the signals are transmitted over the air, they can be intercepted by an eavesdropper or interloper with the right equipment. If a signal is transmitted by a wireless telephone in plaintext, a danger exists that an eavesdropper will intercept the signal and use it to impersonate a subscriber, or to intercept private data transmitted by the user. Such private data may include the content of conversations. Private data may also include non-voice data transmitted by the user such as, for example, computer data transmitted over a modem connected to the wireless telephone, and may also include bank account or other private user information transmitted typically by means of keypresses. An eavesdropper listening to a conversation or intercepting non- voice data may obtain private information from the user.
  • the message content of an unencrypted telephone signal i.e., plaintext signal
  • plaintext signal is relatively easily intercepted by a suitably adapted
  • an interloper can interject himself into an established connection by using a greater transmitting power, sending signals to the base station, and impersonating a party to the conversation.
  • Reeds describes a cryptographic process known as the CMEA ("Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm”) process.
  • CMEA Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm
  • tbox function Central to the operation of the CMEA is the tbox function, which expands a secret key into a secret lookup table. Beginning with an initial index, key material is combined with table material in multiple iterations to generate a secret lookup table. Once the table is generated, octets of the key are applied to octets of a message according to an algorithm described below, and the resulting value is used as an index to the lookup table.
  • the tbox function can be implemented either as a function call or as a static memory-resident table. The table's purpose, when implemented as in the latter case, is to allow significant speed-up of encryption for a given security level.
  • the present invention provides an additional degree of security to cryptographic algorithms such as CMEA through modified use of the tbox function.
  • the improved use of the tbox function improves CMEA, and can be implemented to operate quickly and efficiently in a small computer such as is commonly used in a mobile wireless transceiver.
  • An improved use of the tbox function according to the present invention may suitably employ offsets to permute inputs to the tbox function. Each offset is created using two secret values and an external cryptosync value.
  • the secret values may be generated by any of a number of techniques commonly known in the art.
  • the external cryptosync value used to encrypt a first message of a call is an initialization vector. For subsequent messages, the external cryptosync value is the first two octets of ciphertext from a previously encrypted message.
  • first through fourth offsets are created.
  • Each offset preferably uses a 15-bit secret value, a 16-bit secret value, and an external cryptosync value.
  • Each offset uses a different pair of secret values.
  • the secret values may be generated by any of a number of techniques commonly known in the art.
  • the first and second offsets are applied to the inputs to the tbox function during a first iteration of the CMEA process, and the third and fourth offsets are applied to the inputs to the tbox function during a second iteration of the CMEA process.
  • Encrypted text is decrypted according to the teachings of the present invention by introducing ciphertext and reversing and inverting the steps applied to encrypt plaintext.
  • an apparatus according to the present invention generates text and supplies it to an I/O interface which identifies it as generated text and supplies the text and the identification to an encryption/decryption processor, which in turn encrypts the text and supplies it to a transceiver for transmission.
  • the apparatus receives a transmission via the transceiver, the transmission is identified as incoming ciphertext, and the ciphertext and the identification are supplied to the encryption/decryption processor which decrypts the ciphertext and supplies it as text to the I/O processor for routing to its destination.
  • Fig. 1 is a flowchart illustrating aspects of a prior art CMEA key generation process and its utilization in a CMEA based implementation of encryption;
  • Fig. 2 is a flowchart illustrating a CMEA encryption method employing a tbox function wherein the tbox function includes a tbox lookup with the inputs to the tbox function permuted by first and second offsets in accordance with the present invention
  • Fig. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an enhanced CMEA encryption method employing multiple CMEA iterations, each CMEA iteration employing a tbox function wherein the tbox function includes a tbox lookup with the inputs to the tbox function are permutated by first and second offsets during the first CMEA iteration, and by third and fourth offsets during the third and fourth iterations in accordance with the present invention
  • Fig. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a method in accordance with the present invention of decrypting ciphertext encrypted by an enhanced CMEA process
  • Fig. 5 is a diagram illustrating an encrypting/decrypting telephone employing enhanced CMEA encryption according to the present invention. Detailed Description
  • Fig. 1 is a flowchart illustrating a prior art method 100 using a CMEA key for encryption of certain critical user data which may be transmitted during a call.
  • the CMEA key is used to create a secret array, tbox(z), of 256 bytes.
  • the tbox function may be implemented as a function call. This reduces the use of RAM, but increases processing time by roughly an order of magnitude.
  • tbox in systems which implement tbox as a static table rather than as a function call, the static tbox table is derived.
  • the tbox table is derived as follows: For each z in the range 0 ⁇ z ⁇ 256, tbox(z) - C(((C(((C(((C((z XOR k0)+kl)+z)XOR k2)+k3)+z)XOR k4)+k5)+z)XOR k6)+k7)+z, where "+” denotes modulo 256 addition, "XOR” is the is the bitwise boolean Exclusive-OR operator, "z" is the function argument, k0,.
  • .,k7 comprise the eight octets of the CMEA key, and C( ) is the outcome of a Cellular Authentication, Voice Privacy and Encryption (CAVE) 8-bit table look-up.
  • CAVE Cellular Authentication, Voice Privacy and Encryption
  • CMEA comprises three successive stages, each of which alters each byte string in the data buffer.
  • steps 106, 108 and 110 first, second and third stages of the CMEA process are respectively performed, as will be described herein.
  • the first stage (I) of CMEA is as follows:
  • the final or third stage (III) of CMEA is the decryption that is inverse of the first stage:
  • the above described CMEA process is self-inverting. That is, the same steps applied in the same order are used both to encrypt plaintext and to decrypt ciphertext. Therefore, there is no need to determine whether encryption or decryption is being carried out.
  • an encryption system improves the use of the tbox function by permuting the inputs to the tbox function by secret offsets.
  • the improved use of the tbox function is preferably employed as part of an enhanced CMEA, or ECMEA, process, in which the message is subjected to two iterations of the CMEA process.
  • Fig. 2 is a flowchart showing an encryption process 200 including improved use of the tbox function according to one aspect of the present invention.
  • each use of the tbox function is subjected to a permutation of the tbox function inputs using secret offsets.
  • the plaintext is introduced into the encryption process.
  • the static tbox table is derived.
  • a set of secret values K,- K 4 is generated for use in generating the secret offsets.
  • K, i odd are 15-bit values and Kj, i even, are 16-bit values.
  • the set of secret values may be generated using any of a number of techniques commonly known in the art. All the secret values K,-K 4 are preferably generated for each wireless telephone call and are preferably constant throughout the call.
  • the CMEA function includes a tbox function, wherein inputs to the tbox function are subjected to a permutation employing secret offsets developed using encrypted text from a previous message. Each tbox function input is subjected to a permutation to produce a permutation result.
  • a tbox function input is defined as x, for example, the permutation result is the value of (((x ⁇ offsetl) + offset2) mod 256).
  • the tbox inputs effectively result is subjected to the tbox function.
  • the function used is tbox (((x ⁇ offsetl) + offset2) mod 256).
  • Offsetl and offset2 are preferably secret 8-bit values. A new set of secret offset values is preferably created for each message of a wireless call.
  • the CT n _, values are the first two octets of the (n-l)th ciphertext message and CT 0 is preferably replaced by a secret 16-bit initialization value for the first message of the call.
  • mod 64K is to be understood to mean mod (65,536), following conventional computer science terminology.
  • Offsetl n and offset2 n are each 8-bit values. The permutation of the tbox inputs effectively causes the location of the tbox entries to shift with each message, greatly increasing the difficulty of an attack.
  • the final ciphertext is produced.
  • Fig. 3 is a flowchart showing an encryption process 300 including improved use of the tbox function according to a further aspect of the present invention.
  • the CMEA function In order to achieve added security for messages, it is preferable to employ two iterations of the CMEA function, employing first and second keys. Each iteration of the CMEA function employs an improved use of the tbox function according to the present invention. Each iteration of the CMEA function employs a different pair of secret offsets for permutation of the inputs to the tbox function.
  • the plaintext is introduced into the encryption process.
  • the static tbox table is derived.
  • a set of secret values K,-K 8 is generated for use in generating the secret offsets.
  • K j , i odd, are 15-bit values and Kj, i even, are 16-bit values.
  • the set of secret values may be generated using any of a number of techniques commonly known in the art. All the secret values K,-K 8 are preferably generated for each wireless telephone call and are preferably constant throughout the call.
  • the plaintext is subjected to a first iteration of a modified CMEA process, using a first CMEA key.
  • the use of the tbox function employed in the first iteration of the CMEA process is enhanced by permutation of the tbox inputs by first and second secret offsets.
  • Each tbox function input is first subjected to a permutation to produce a permutation result. If a tbox function input is x, for example, the permutation result is the value of (((x ⁇ offsetl) + offset2) mod 256). The permutation result is subjected to the tbox function. Thus, for each tbox input x, the function used is tbox (((x ® offsetl) + offset.2) mod 256).
  • the first iteration is completed, and an intermediate ciphertext is produced.
  • the intermediate ciphertext is subjected to a second iteration of the modified CMEA process, using a second CMEA key.
  • the use of the tbox function in the second iteration process is enhanced by permutation of the tbox inputs by third and fourth secret offsets.
  • Each tbox function input is first subjected to a permutation to produce a permutation result. If a tbox function input is x, for example, the permutation result is the value of (((x ⁇ offset3) + offset4) mod 256). The permutation result is subjected to the tbox function.
  • Offsetl, offset2, offset3, and offset4 are preferably each 8-bit values.
  • a new set of secret offset values is preferably created for each message of a wireless telephone call.
  • CT n _, values are the first two octets of the (n-l)th ciphertext message, and CT 0 is preferably replaced by a 16-bit secret initialization value for the first message of the call.
  • mod 64K is again to be understood to mean mod (65,536), following conventional computer science terminology.
  • the use of first and second offset values for the first iteration of the CMEA function, and third and fourth offset values for the second iteration of the CMEA function causes the location of the tbox entries to shift not merely with each message, but also for each iteration of the encryption of a single message.
  • the final ciphertext is produced
  • improved use of the tbox function according to the present invention may be employed in any application of the CMEA process and will enhance the security of the process
  • the enhanced CMEA process described in connection with the discussion of Fig. 3 adds further security and is preferred.
  • the encryption system shown in Fig. 3 requires the successive application of two keys, it is not self-inverting. That is, the same operations applied in the same order will not either encrypt plaintext or decrypt ciphertext. Therefore, a separate decryption process is necessary, as described below.
  • Fig. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a decryption process 400 according to another aspect of the present invention. Essentially, the steps illustrated in Fig. 4 are followed, but in the reverse of the order shown in Fig. 3.
  • ciphertext is introduced to the decryption process.
  • the ciphertext is subjected to a first iteration of the CMEA process, with inputs to the tbox function being permuted by offset3 and offset4, as discussed above in connection with the discussion of Fig. 3.
  • the key used for this first iteration is the second CMEA key.
  • an intermediate ciphertext is produced.
  • the intermediate ciphertext is subjected to a second iteration of the CMEA process, with inputs to the tbox function being permuted by offsetl and offset2, as discussed above in connection with the discussion of Fig. 3.
  • the key used for this second iteration is the first CMEA key.
  • plaintext is produced as an output.
  • the first through the fourth offsets are as discussed above in connection with Fig. 3.
  • Fig. 5 is a diagram showing a wireless telephone set 500 equipped to perform message transmission and encryption/decryption according to the present invention, with facilities both for recognizing whether a message needs to be encrypted or decrypted, and for performing the appropriate encryption or decryption.
  • the telephone set 500 includes a transceiver 502, an input/output (I/O) interface 504, an encryption/decryption processor 506, and a key generator 508.
  • the key generator 508 receives and employs stored secret data for key generation.
  • Stored secret data is preferably stored in nonvolatile memory 510 such as an EEPROM or a Flash memory.
  • the key generator also generates secret values used to produce offsets.
  • Kj, i odd are 15-bit values
  • Kj, i even are 16-bit values.
  • the key generator may be designed to generate secret values K,-K 8 using any of a number of techniques commonly known in the art.
  • a set of secret values K r K 8 is preferably generated for each wireless telephone call, and the values K,-K 8 are preferably held constant throughout the call.
  • the key generator 508 stores the generated keys and secret values K,-K 8 in memory 512.
  • the encryption/decryption processor also includes memory 514 for storage of keys received from the key generator 508, an initialization value used in production of offsets, ciphertext message octets used to produce the offsets, and a static tbox table which may be generated and used if it is desired to implement the tbox function as a static table.
  • the telephone set 500 also includes a message generator 516, which generates messages to be encrypted by the encryption/decryption processor 506 and transmitted by the transceiver 502.
  • the message is transmitted from message generator 516 to the I/O interface 504.
  • the I/O interface 504 identifies the message as an internally generated message to be encrypted and transmits the message, along with the identification, to the encryption/decryption processor 506.
  • the encryption/decryption processor 506 receives one or more keys from the key generator 508, which it then uses to encrypt the message.
  • the encryption decryption processor 506 receives two keys from the key generator 508, which are then employed to perform two-iteration CMEA encryption employing an improved use of the tbox function as described above in connection with Figs 2 and 3.
  • the encryption/decryption processor 506 When the encryption/decryption processor 506 receives a plaintext message from the message generator 516, the message is subjected to a first iteration of a modified CMEA process, using a first CMEA key received from the key generator 508.
  • the inputs to the tbox function in the first iteration process are subjected to a permutation; the function used is tbox (((x ⁇ offsetl) + offset2) mod 256).
  • tbox (((x ⁇ offsetl) + offset2) mod 256).
  • an intermediate ciphertext is produced and stored in memory 514.
  • the intermediate ciphertext is then subjected to a second iteration of the modified CMEA process, using a second CMEA key.
  • Offsetl, offset2, offset3, and offset4 are preferably each 8-bit values.
  • a set of offset values is preferably created for each message of a wireless telephone call.
  • CT n .j values are the first two octets of the (n-l)th ciphertext message, and CT 0 is preferably replaced by a 16-bit secret initialization value for the first message of the call.
  • mod 64K is again to be understood to mean mod (65,536), following conventional computer science terminology.
  • the use of first and second offset values for the first iteration of the CMEA function, and third and fourth offset values for the second iteration of the CMEA function causes the location of the tbox entries to shift not merely with each message, but also for each iteration of the encryption of a single message.
  • a final ciphertext is produced and stored in memory 514, and also routed to the I/O interface 504 and to the transceiver 502 for transmission.
  • the transceiver 502 passes it to the I/O interface 504.
  • the I/O interface identifies the message as an encrypted message, and passes this identification, along with the message, to the encryption/decryption processor 506.
  • the encryption/decryption processor 506 receives one or more keys from the key generator 508 and decrypts the message, preferably using a two-iteration CMEA decryption process as described in connection with Fig. 4.
  • the encryption/decryption processor 506 When the encryption/decryption processor 506 receives ciphertext from the I/O interface 504, the ciphertext is subjected to a first iteration of the modified CMEA process, with the inputs to the tbox function being subject to a permutation using offset3 and offset4. The key used for this first iteration is the second CMEA key. An intermediate ciphertext is produced and stored in memory 514. Next, the intermediate ciphertext is subjected to a second iteration of the modified CMEA process, with the inputs to the tbox function being subject to a permutation using offsetl and offset2. The key used for this second iteration is the first CMEA key. Finally, the encryption/decryption processor 506 produces plaintext as an output and passes the message back to the I/O interface 504, where it is then routed for its ultimate use.
  • the telephone set may be designed to implement the tbox as a function or as a static table.
  • Implementation of tbox as a static table requires increased memory but provides greater speed. It is also possible to design the telephone set 500 to implement a single-iteration CMEA process using a tbox function in which the inputs to the tbox function are subjected to a permutation using offsetl and offset2.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention porte sur une amélioration concernant l'utilisation d'une fonction de boîte t permettant d'effectuer un cryptage à l'aide d'un algorithme de cryptage de messages cellulaires (CMEA). Des décalages se produisent qui sont destinés à l'application de la fonction de boîte t à un message, au moyen de valeurs secrètes et d'octets de messages préalablement cryptés. On utilise ces décalages pour permuter le message pour pouvoir lui appliquer la fonction de boîte t. Pour le premier message d'un appel, les octets de messages préalablement cryptés sont remplacés par une valeur de démarrage. Dans un système mettant en oeuvre une seule itération de cryptage CMEA, des premier et second décalages se produisent. Dans un système mettant en oeuvre deux itérations de cryptage CMEA, des premier, second, troisième et quatrième décalages se produisent, les premier et second décalages étant utilisés dans la première itération de cryptage CMEA, et les troisième et quatrième décalages étant utilisés dans la seconde itération de cryptage CMEA.
PCT/US1998/007404 1997-04-14 1998-04-13 Procedes et dispositif servant a accroitre la securite d'une cle secrete dans une table de consultation, afin de rendre plus surs les messages telephoniques sans fil WO1999003246A2 (fr)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP50065999A JP3459074B2 (ja) 1997-04-14 1998-04-13 無線電話メッセージのセキュリティを改善するためのルックアップテーブルへの秘密鍵の強化されたセキュリティ拡張の方法および装置
EP98954922A EP0935859A2 (fr) 1997-04-14 1998-04-13 Procedes et dispositif servant a accroitre la securite d'une cle secrete dans une table de consultation, afin de rendre plus surs les messages telephoniques sans fil
KR1019980711021A KR100576530B1 (ko) 1997-04-14 1998-04-13 무선전화메시지들에대한보안성개선을위해룩업테이블의비밀키의개선된보안성을확장하기위한방법및장치

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US4305697P 1997-04-14 1997-04-14
US60/043,536 1997-04-14

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WO1999003246A2 true WO1999003246A2 (fr) 1999-01-21
WO1999003246A3 WO1999003246A3 (fr) 1999-03-25

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Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2000077596A1 (fr) * 1999-06-09 2000-12-21 Cloakware Corporation Codage de logiciel resistant a la fraude
WO2003007608A1 (fr) * 2001-07-09 2003-01-23 Amino Holdings Limited Procede de cryptage de film cinematographique et appareil a securite variable
WO2003041442A1 (fr) * 2001-11-05 2003-05-15 Qualcomm Incorporated Procede et appareil destines a l'integrite de message dans un systeme de communication amcr
WO2007031894A2 (fr) * 2005-09-15 2007-03-22 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Procede et systeme cryptographiques ameliores

Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5159634A (en) * 1991-09-13 1992-10-27 At&T Bell Laboratories Cryptosystem for cellular telephony

Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5159634A (en) * 1991-09-13 1992-10-27 At&T Bell Laboratories Cryptosystem for cellular telephony

Cited By (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2000077596A1 (fr) * 1999-06-09 2000-12-21 Cloakware Corporation Codage de logiciel resistant a la fraude
WO2003007608A1 (fr) * 2001-07-09 2003-01-23 Amino Holdings Limited Procede de cryptage de film cinematographique et appareil a securite variable
WO2003041442A1 (fr) * 2001-11-05 2003-05-15 Qualcomm Incorporated Procede et appareil destines a l'integrite de message dans un systeme de communication amcr
EP1973370A3 (fr) * 2001-11-05 2008-11-12 Qualcomm Incorporated Procédé pour transfert souple dans un système de communication CDMA
EP2229017A1 (fr) * 2001-11-05 2010-09-15 Qualcomm Incorporated Station mobile
US7873163B2 (en) 2001-11-05 2011-01-18 Qualcomm Incorporated Method and apparatus for message integrity in a CDMA communication system
WO2007031894A2 (fr) * 2005-09-15 2007-03-22 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Procede et systeme cryptographiques ameliores
WO2007031894A3 (fr) * 2005-09-15 2007-11-01 Koninkl Philips Electronics Nv Procede et systeme cryptographiques ameliores

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