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WO1996008092A1 - Circuit de protection electronique garantissant l'utilisation d'un logiciel itinerant selon une licence accordee - Google Patents

Circuit de protection electronique garantissant l'utilisation d'un logiciel itinerant selon une licence accordee Download PDF

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Publication number
WO1996008092A1
WO1996008092A1 PCT/US1995/011136 US9511136W WO9608092A1 WO 1996008092 A1 WO1996008092 A1 WO 1996008092A1 US 9511136 W US9511136 W US 9511136W WO 9608092 A1 WO9608092 A1 WO 9608092A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
integrated circuit
circuit component
hardware agent
agent
hardware
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US1995/011136
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Derek L. Davis
Original Assignee
Intel Corporation
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Intel Corporation filed Critical Intel Corporation
Priority to JP50959896A priority Critical patent/JP4294728B2/ja
Priority to EP95933027A priority patent/EP0780039A4/fr
Priority to RU97105403A priority patent/RU2147790C1/ru
Priority to AU35832/95A priority patent/AU3583295A/en
Publication of WO1996008092A1 publication Critical patent/WO1996008092A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
    • G06F21/109—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM] by using specially-adapted hardware at the client
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
    • G06F21/445—Program or device authentication by mutual authentication, e.g. between devices or programs
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
    • G06Q20/355—Personalisation of cards for use
    • G06Q20/3552—Downloading or loading of personalisation data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
    • G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
    • G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
    • G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
    • G06F12/1408—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by using cryptography
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2211/00—Indexing scheme relating to details of data-processing equipment not covered by groups G06F3/00 - G06F13/00
    • G06F2211/007—Encryption, En-/decode, En-/decipher, En-/decypher, Scramble, (De-)compress
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2103—Challenge-response
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2153—Using hardware token as a secondary aspect
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/101—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying security measures for digital rights management
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to licensing software. More particularity, the present invention relates to an apparatus and method for transferring access privileges for executing a licensed software program from an authorized node having a first hardware agent to a non-authorized node having a second hardware agent without violating a specific-user license.
  • a "user-specific” license generally permits a predetermined number of individuals to operate a particular software program in a specific manner at any given time.
  • the license is associated with the select number of individuals and not to certain nodes.
  • a "node” is defined as an hardware product having "intelligence” such as a computer, printer, facsimile machine and the like, preferably including the present invention.
  • a paramount problem associated with user-specific software licenses is that it indirectly encourages unauthorized usage and /or copying of the licensed software which erodes potential licensing revenue for software developers.
  • a dongle is a physical hardware device that is packaged with the licensed software program when initially purchased. It typically couples to a parallel port of a node e.g., a personal computer. At various times during execution, the licensed software program of interest will transmit an authorization message (referred to as a "challenge") to an active device employed within the dongle.
  • the active device within the dongle processes the challenge using secret information (hereinafter referred to as a "valid license token”) stored internally within the dongle and generates a return message (referred to as a "response").
  • the software program compares this response to an expected response and permits further execution only if these responses are identical.
  • the dongles ensure compliance with the user-specific license, it affords a number of disadvantages.
  • One disadvantage is that the dongle must be physically delivered to the customer.
  • content distribution systems for electronic delivery of software
  • the dongle as a physical device, still requires the traditional distribution methodology with its associated costs.
  • the customer would have to endure the onerous task of (i) directly obtaining the dongle at a chosen location and thereafter attaching the dongle to the node before being able to use the licensed software program, or (ii) ordering the licensed software program prior to its intended use so that the content distributor has time to mail the dongle to the customer. In any event, the dongle impedes the efficiency and appealability of content distribution.
  • Another disadvantage is that the removal and attachment of the dongle is a time-consuming process. In a time-sensitive business, the exchange of the dongle effects the overall performance of the business. A further disadvantage is continual removal and attachment of the dongle increases the likelihood of the dongle becoming damaged and non-functional, requiring the business to await the new dongle before being able to use the software application again.
  • the dongle although the license is directed toward individuals, the dongle generally is attached to the node. Thus, if the user travels to another machine (e.g., a personal computer located at his or her home), he or she is precluded from using the licensed software program unless the user has possession of the dongle.
  • another machine e.g., a personal computer located at his or her home
  • a cryptographic device with the functionality of an electronic dongle as an integrated circuit component internally implemented within a node. Accordingly, it is an object of the present invention to provide the cryptographic device as an integrated circuit component including a memory element for internally storing a unique digital certificate for use in remotely authenticating the integrated circuit component.
  • It is another object of the present invention is to provide an integrated circuit component capable of internally generating a unique public /private key pair and storing at least the private key thereby preventing its usage outside the integrated circuit component.
  • Yet another object of the present invention is to provide an integrated circuit component for internally storing the public key of an entity in order to enable secured communications with another similar integrated circuit components verified or fabricated by the entity.
  • Another object of the present invention is to provide an integrated circuit component for providing a roving software license without requiring continual physical manipulations of hardware.
  • the integrated circuit component generally referred to as a hardware agent, comprising a processing unit for performing operations for identification purposes and a memory element including (i) non- volatile memory for storing a unique public /private key pair, (ii) a digital certificate for verifying the authenticity of the key pair and (iii) a public key of a chosen entity (preferably the manufacturer of the integrated circuit component) for enabling communication between the integrated circuit component and other similar components fabricated by the manufacturer.
  • the non-volatile memory also may be used for storing cryptographic algorithms.
  • the integrated circuit component further includes volatile memory for storage of information processed by the processing unit, an interface in order to receive information in encrypted or decrypted format from and /or transmit information to other similar component(s) via a communication bus and a random number generator for producing the unique public/private key pair.
  • Figure 1 is a block diagram illustrating a bidirectional symmetric key encryption and decryption process.
  • Figure 2 is a block diagram illustrating a bidirectional asymmetric key encryption and decryption process.
  • Figure 3 is a block diagram illustrating a digital certification process from a trusted authority.
  • Figure 4 is a block diagram of a computer system incorporating an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 6 is a flowchart illustrating the method for implementing pair and digital certificate into an integrated circuit component.
  • Figures 7A- 7C are flowcharts illustrating the operations of a first hardware agent establishing communications with a second hardware agent in order to transfer a valid license token between the second hardware agent having licensed privileges and the first hardware agent.
  • the present invention relates to an apparatus and method for enabling a roving software license to be transferred between appropriately configured hardware agents thereby eliminating the need for a distributable physical hardware device.
  • numerous details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. However, it is apparent to one skilled in the art that the present invention may be practiced through many different embodiments than that illustrated without deviating from the spirit and scope of the present invention. In other instances, well-known circuits, elements and the like are not set forth in detail in order to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the present invention.
  • a “key” is an encoding and /or decoding parameter for a conventional cryptographic algorithm. More specifically, the key is a sequential distribution ("string") of binary data being “n” bits in length, where "n” is an arbitrary number.
  • a “message” is generally defined as information (e.g., encrypted keys address and data) being transferred in a sequence of bus cycles. The information may include a challenge or a return response.
  • a "digital certificate” is defined as any information pertaining to an entity initiating communications, typically its public key, encrypted through use of a private key by a widely published trusted authority (e.g., bank, governmental entity, trade association, etc.).
  • a “digital signature” is similar to a digital certificate but is used for authentication of the message itself, not the sender.
  • cryptographic technology operates in accordance with one of two conventional techniques; namely, symmetric key cryptography or asymmetric (or public) key cryptography or a combination of these cryptographic technologies.
  • SK symmetric secret key
  • DES Data Encryption Algorithm
  • the original message 5 is (i) encrypted at the first node 10, (ii) transmitted from the first node 10 to the second node 15 through a public domain 25 such as a telephone lines and the like and (iii) decrypted at the second node 15.
  • a public domain 25 such as a telephone lines and the like
  • this technique is difficult to support with a large number of users because it requires prior establishment of secret keys ("SK").
  • asymmetric key technique employs two separate keys (referred to as a "public key” and “private key”) being used separately for encryption and decryption purposes.
  • a "public” key 16 of the key pair of the second node 15 (labeled "PUK2") is stored in and generally used by the first node 10 to encrypt an original message 30 under an asymmetric "RSA" algorithm well known in cryptography.
  • a public and private key pair 11 and 12 of the first node 10 (labeled "PUK1" and "PRK1”) are further stored in the first node 10.
  • a "private" key 17 of the key pair of the second node 15 (labeled "PRK2") is exclusively known and used by the second node 15 for many purposes, including to decrypt the encrypted message 35 from the first node 10 under the RSA algorithm as shown in Figure 2.
  • PRK2 the key pair of the second node 15
  • this technique is susceptible to attempts by an illegitimate entity (e.g., commercial spy) to impersonate a legitimate entity (e.g., employee, joint-venturer, etc.) by sending fraudulent messages to another legitimate entity for the purpose of disrupting work flow or obtaining confidential information.
  • illegitimate entity e.g., commercial spy
  • impersonate a legitimate entity e.g., employee, joint-venturer, etc.
  • additional protocols are commonly used to authenticate a message and legitimize the entity sending the message.
  • Authentication of the sender is a problem when communications are initially established between previously unknown parties. This problem is commonly avoided by incorporating a digital certificate 45 within a transmission message 50.
  • the digital certificate 45 is issued by a mutually trusted authority 55 (e.g., a bank, governmental entity, trade association, etc.) by encrypting a public key of the node initiating the communications ("PUK1") 11 with a signature statement (labeled "SM") 58 with a private key (“PRKTA”) 57 of the trusted authority 55 so that fraudulent attempts to use PUK2 16 will simply result in an unreadable response to the transmission message by its recipient.
  • a mutually trusted authority 55 e.g., a bank, governmental entity, trade association, etc.
  • PRKTA private key
  • the selected trusted authority 55 depends on the parties involved. For example, two individuals employed by the same business could both trust the certificates issued by a corporate security office of the business. Employees of two independent business entities, however, would require not only the certificates from the respective security offices, but also the certificates from, for example, some industry trade organization that certifies such business entities.
  • the original message 40 is encrypted using a symmetric secret key (“SK") 60 via the DES algorithm to form the encrypted message 65 which is input into the transmission message 50 along with the digital certificate 45.
  • the original message 40 also undergoes a hash algorithm 70 (e.g., "MD5") to form a transmitted message digest 75.
  • the transmitted message digest 75 is further encrypted using a private key of the first node (“PRKl”) 12 to form a digital signature 80 which is input into the transmission message 50.
  • PRKl private key of the first node
  • the symmetric key (“SK”) 60 is encrypted with a public key of the second node (“PUK2”) 16 under the RSA algorithm resulting in "SKenc” 85 and further input to the transmission message 50.
  • the second node 15 decrypts the SK en c 85 with its private key (“PRK2”) 17 and the digital certificate 45 with a published public key (“PUBTA”) of the trusted authority 55 to obtain SK 60 and PUK1 11.
  • PRK2 private key
  • PUBTA published public key
  • These SK and PUK1 keys 60 and 11 are used to decrypt the encrypted original message 65 and the digital signature 80 to retrieve the transmitted message digest 75 and the original message 40, respectively.
  • the original message 40 then undergoes a hash algorithm 85, identical to that performed in the first node 10.
  • the results (referred to as a "received message digest") 90 are compared to the transmitted message digest 75. If the transmitted message digest 75 is identical to the received message digest 90, communications are maintained between these legitimate nodes.
  • the computer system 100 comprises a plurality of bus agents including a host processor 105, a memory device 110, an input/output (“I/O") controller 115 and a cryptographic device referred to as a "hardware agent" 120.
  • the plurality of bus agents are coupled together through a system bus 130 which enables information to be communicated between these bus agents.
  • the I/O controller 115 is an interface between an I/O bus 135 and the system bus 130 which provides a communication path (i.e., gateway) for transferring information between components coupled to the system bus 130 or the I/O bus 135.
  • the I/O bus 135 transfers information into and from at least one peripheral device in the computer system 100 including, but not limited to a display device 140 (e.g., cathode ray tube, liquid crystal display, etc.) for displaying images; an alphanumeric input device 145 (e.g., an alphanumeric keyboard, etc.) for communicating information and command selections to the host processor 105; a cursor control device 150 (e.g., a mouse, trackball, touch pad, etc.) for controlling cursor movement; a mass data storage device 155 (e.g., magnetic tapes, hard disk drive, floppy disk drive, etc.) for storing information; an information transceiver device 160 (fax machine, modem, scanner etc.) for transmitting information from the computer system 100 to another device and for receiving information from another device; and a hard copy device 165 (e.g., plotter, printer, etc.) for providing a tangible, visual representation of the information.
  • a display device 140 e.g., cath
  • the hardware agent 120 is coupled to the system bus 130 establishing a communication path with the host processor 105 as well as the memory and I/O controllers (not shown).
  • the hardware agent 120 comprises a single integrated circuit in the form of a die 121 (e.g., a micro-controller) encapsulated within an integrated circuit component package 122, preferably hermetically, to protect the die 121 from damage and harmful contaminants.
  • the die 121 comprises a processing unit 123 coupled to a memory element 124, a bus interface 125 and a number generator 126.
  • the bus interface 125 enables communication from the hardware agent 120 to another device (e.g., the host processor, another hardware agent in another device, etc.).
  • the processing unit 123 performs computations internally within a secured environment within the die 121 to confirm a valid connection with an authorized receiver. Such computations include executing certain algorithms and protocols, activating circuitry (e.g., the number generator 126 being preferably random in nature) for generating a device-specific public /private key pair and the like.
  • the processing unit 123 is placed within the die 121 to prevent access of the private key through virus attack, which is a common method of disrupting a computer system to obtain its private key and other information.
  • the memory element 124 includes a non-volatile memory element 127, such as flash memory, which stores appropriate cryptographic algorithms such as "RSA” and "DES", the public/private key pair 127a, a digital certificate for verifying the authenticity of the key pair (labeled "DC") 127b and a public key of the manufacturer of the integrated circuit component (“PUKM”) 127c for enabling communication between the integrated circuit component and another similar device fabricated by the manufacturer (discussed in more detail in Figure 6).
  • This non- volatile memory 127 is used primarily because it retains its contents when supply power is discontinued.
  • the memory unit 124 further includes random access memory (“RAM”) 128 in order to store certain results from the processing unit 123.
  • RAM random access memory
  • the hardware agent 120 is implemented as a peripheral device on the system bus 130 for greater security, it is contemplated that the hardware agent 130 could be implemented in several other ways at the PC platform level such as, for example, as a disk controller or PCMCIA card to automatically decrypt and /or encrypt information being inputted and outputted from a hard disk. Another alternative implementation would be for the hardware agent to be one component of a multi-chip module including the host processor as discussed below. Furthermore, even though the hardware agent is described in connection with PC platforms, it is contemplated that such hardware agent could be implemented within node such as a fax machine, printer and the like or on a communication path between a computer and the I/O peripheral device.
  • Step 100 the die of the hardware agent is manufactured according to any conventional well-known semiconductor manufacturing technique.
  • Step 105 the die is encapsulated within a semiconductor package so as to form the hardware agent itself.
  • the hardware agent is placed onto a certification system which establishes an electrical and mechanical coupling between the hardware agent and the certification system (Step 110).
  • the certification system comprises a carrier coupled to a printed circuit board for generating and receiving electrical signals for certification of the hardware agent.
  • the certification system further comprises a storage device (e.g., a database) of previously generated public keys to guarantee unique key generation.
  • the certification system supplies power to the hardware agent which powers the random number generator enabling it to generate a device- specific public /private key pair internally within the hardware agent (Step 115).
  • the public key of the public/private key pair is transmitted to the certification system (Step 120).
  • the public key is compared with those previously generated public keys from previously manufactured hardware agents being stored in the storage device (Step 125).
  • the hardware agent is signaled by the certification system to generate another such public /private key pair (Step 135) and continue this process from Step 120 to ensure that each public /private key pair is unique.
  • the storage device is updated with this unique public key (Step 140).
  • the certification system creates a unique device certificate verifying the authenticity of the key pair (hereinafter referred to as the "authentication device certificate").
  • the authentication device certificate will include at least the public key of the device "digitally signed” with the secret private manufacturing key (i.e. in general terms, encrypting the public key of the device with the manufacturer's private key).
  • This authentication device certificate along with the manufacturer's generally known public key are input to the hardware agent (Step 150) and the hardware agent permanently programs the unique public /private key pair, the authentication device certificate and the manufacturer's public key into its non- volatile memory (Step 155).
  • the public key of another entity may be used in lieu of the manufacturer requiring modification of the authentication device certificate as well.
  • the hardware agent is physically unique and is now capable of securely establishing communications with another hardware agent.
  • the hardware agent After the hardware agent is constructed, it is implemented into an electronic device such as the computer system illustrated in Figure 4. This is accomplished by establishing a secure communication path between the licenser and the hardware agent through authentication procedures such as challenge /response as well as any other well- known procedures. After the communication path is secure, the valid license token is downloaded into flash memory of the hardware agent through the secure communication link. It is further contemplated that the license token may be incorporated within multiple hardware agents to exist in either a "valid" or "invalid” state whereby the license token is validated or invalidated rather than being transferred between hardware agents.
  • Step 200 a communication link is established between a "non-authorized" first node (i.e., a node not currently permitted to operate a licensed software application) incorporating a first hardware agent and an authorized second node incorporating a second hardware agent which is authorized to operate the licensed software application.
  • This communication link may be established through any conventional means such as modems, networks, etc.
  • the first hardware agent outputs a message including its unique authentication device certificate to the second hardware agent (Step 205).
  • the second hardware agent decrypts the authentication device certificate with the manufacturer's public key (“PUKM”) to obtain the public key of the first hardware agent (Step 210). Thereafter, in Steps 215-220, operations similar to those discussed in Steps 205-210 are also conducted so that the first agent obtains the public key (“PUK2") of the second hardware agent.
  • PUKM manufacturer's public key
  • Step 225 and 230 using the derived public key of the first hardware agent, the second hardware agent encrypts a challenge message according to a chosen cryptographic algorithm (e.g., RSA) and transmits the challenge message to the first hardware agent.
  • a chosen cryptographic algorithm e.g., RSA
  • the first hardware agent decrypts the challenge message with its private key (“PRKl") and generates a response message by encrypting the decrypted challenge message with the public key of the second hardware agent (“PUK2”) and transmits the response message to the second hardware agent.
  • PRKl private key
  • PKA2 public key of the second hardware agent
  • the second hardware agent decrypts the response with its private key (PUK1") as previously determined through decryption of the previously transmitted manufacturer's device certificate (Step 245).
  • Step 250 the second hardware agent compares the original challenge message to the decrypted response message and if not identical, the communications are terminated (step 255). Otherwise, in Steps 260- 290, a challenge /response procedure similar to Steps 225-260 is conducted to verify that the second hardware agent is in fact receiving the information transmitted from the first hardware agent. Successful completion of these steps (225-290) assures that both hardware agents are authentic and communications between them are secure (Step 295).
  • Step 300 the first hardware agent queries the second hardware agent as to whether it has possession of a valid license token (Step 300). If the system incorporating the second hardware agent does not have the valid license token (Step 305), communications between the hardware agents are terminated (Step 310). However, if the system incorporating the second hardware agent has the valid license token, it transmits a message to the first hardware agent accordingly (Step 315).
  • the first hardware agent Upon receiving this message, the first hardware agent initiates a transfer request of the valid license token allowing the first hardware agent to operate the licensed software application (Step 320).
  • the second hardware agent responds to the transfer request by transferring the valid license token causing it to lose its license privileges (Step 325).
  • the first hardware agent receives the valid license token and stores the token within the its non-volatile memory and thereafter, it would transmit a message to the second hardware agent that it has received the valid license token enabling its copy of the licensed software (Step 330). At this point, communications would be terminated (Step 335).
  • each hardware agent Concurrently with the communication between the first and second hardware agents, each hardware agent would store the contents of its transmissions in non-volatile memory as an audit log. Thus, in case communications are disconnected after the second hardware agent disabled its copy but before the first hardware agent enabled its copy, both hardware agents could review the audit logs after communications are re-connected to determine which hardware agent (if any) has authorization to operate the licensed software application.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
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  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Technology Law (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un circuit intégré permettant de faire respecter les termes d'une licence, par la transmission à distance des droits d'accès autorisant l'exécution d'un logiciel sous licence à un autre circuit similaire. Ce circuit intégré comprend une mémoire rémanente pour mémoriser une paire de clés uniques (11, 12), un élément d'authentification (80) et une clé publique (16) du fabricant, en même temps que des algorithmes cryptographiques, un processeur pour exécuter les algorithmes cryptographiques afin de traiter l'information introduite dans le circuit intégré et pour transmettre l'information traitée dans une mémoire non rémanente, et un générateur de nombres aléatoires pour produire la paire de clés uniques dans le circuit intégré.
PCT/US1995/011136 1994-09-07 1995-09-01 Circuit de protection electronique garantissant l'utilisation d'un logiciel itinerant selon une licence accordee WO1996008092A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP50959896A JP4294728B2 (ja) 1994-09-07 1995-09-01 ハードウェア・エージェントに対するロビング・ソフトウェア・ライセンス
EP95933027A EP0780039A4 (fr) 1994-09-07 1995-09-01 Circuit de protection electronique garantissant l'utilisation d'un logiciel itinerant selon une licence accordee
RU97105403A RU2147790C1 (ru) 1994-09-07 1995-09-01 Передача лицензии на программное обеспечение для элемента аппаратного обеспечения
AU35832/95A AU3583295A (en) 1994-09-07 1995-09-01 Roving software license for a hardware agent

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US08/303,084 1994-09-07
US08/303,084 US5473692A (en) 1994-09-07 1994-09-07 Roving software license for a hardware agent

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO1996008092A1 true WO1996008092A1 (fr) 1996-03-14

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Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US1995/011136 WO1996008092A1 (fr) 1994-09-07 1995-09-01 Circuit de protection electronique garantissant l'utilisation d'un logiciel itinerant selon une licence accordee

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (2) US5473692A (fr)
EP (1) EP0780039A4 (fr)
JP (1) JP4294728B2 (fr)
AU (1) AU3583295A (fr)
RU (1) RU2147790C1 (fr)
WO (1) WO1996008092A1 (fr)

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JP4294728B2 (ja) 2009-07-15
RU2147790C1 (ru) 2000-04-20
US5473692A (en) 1995-12-05
US5568552A (en) 1996-10-22
AU3583295A (en) 1996-03-27
JPH10507324A (ja) 1998-07-14
EP0780039A1 (fr) 1997-06-25

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