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WO1996000951A1 - Dispositif et procede de detection de tentatives frauduleuses dirigees contre des lecteurs de cartes de telephone du type a circuit integre - Google Patents

Dispositif et procede de detection de tentatives frauduleuses dirigees contre des lecteurs de cartes de telephone du type a circuit integre Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO1996000951A1
WO1996000951A1 PCT/EP1995/002460 EP9502460W WO9600951A1 WO 1996000951 A1 WO1996000951 A1 WO 1996000951A1 EP 9502460 W EP9502460 W EP 9502460W WO 9600951 A1 WO9600951 A1 WO 9600951A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
card
laminae
chip
signal
contacts
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP1995/002460
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Massimo Mondardini
Original Assignee
Urmet S.P.A. Costruzioni Elettro-Telefoniche
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Urmet S.P.A. Costruzioni Elettro-Telefoniche filed Critical Urmet S.P.A. Costruzioni Elettro-Telefoniche
Priority to AU29247/95A priority Critical patent/AU2924795A/en
Publication of WO1996000951A1 publication Critical patent/WO1996000951A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K7/00—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
    • G06K7/0013—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by galvanic contacts, e.g. card connectors for ISO-7816 compliant smart cards or memory cards, e.g. SD card readers
    • G06K7/0086—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by galvanic contacts, e.g. card connectors for ISO-7816 compliant smart cards or memory cards, e.g. SD card readers the connector comprising a circuit for steering the operations of the card connector
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K7/00—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
    • G06K7/0013—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by galvanic contacts, e.g. card connectors for ISO-7816 compliant smart cards or memory cards, e.g. SD card readers
    • G06K7/0021—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by galvanic contacts, e.g. card connectors for ISO-7816 compliant smart cards or memory cards, e.g. SD card readers for reading/sensing record carriers having surface contacts
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K7/00—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns
    • G06K7/0013—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by galvanic contacts, e.g. card connectors for ISO-7816 compliant smart cards or memory cards, e.g. SD card readers
    • G06K7/0086—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by galvanic contacts, e.g. card connectors for ISO-7816 compliant smart cards or memory cards, e.g. SD card readers the connector comprising a circuit for steering the operations of the card connector
    • G06K7/0091—Methods or arrangements for sensing record carriers, e.g. for reading patterns by galvanic contacts, e.g. card connectors for ISO-7816 compliant smart cards or memory cards, e.g. SD card readers the connector comprising a circuit for steering the operations of the card connector the circuit comprising an arrangement for avoiding intrusions and unwanted access to data inside of the connector

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a device and a method for detecting attempts at fraud in readers of the integrated-circuit type telephone cards, commonly known by the term "chip-cards" which will be used hereinafter.
  • Chip-card readers are provided with so-called “pin” reading contacts which, when the card is inserted into the slot of the reader, lower onto corresponding laminae associated with the integrated circuit, or chip, of the card to establish an electrical connection between said chip and the circuits associated with the reader, in order to allow bidirectional transfer of data from the chip to the circuits of the reader and vice versa.
  • a generic chip-card can be altered and provided with a bundle of leads, each connected to a respective contact of the chip, which are laid along the card or are recessed flush in appropriate slots milled therein, are guided out of the reader slot, and are connected to auxiliary devices that are adapted for example to memorize the data exchanged between the card and the circuits of the reader, in order to reproduce them on counterfeit cards or to alter the dialog data, for example by- giving the reader a false indication that deletion has occurred or, as mentioned above, to simulate, towards the telephone set, the behaviour of a chip-card. Disclosure of the Invention.
  • the aim of the present invention is to eliminate these attempts at fraud by means of a device that is associated with the slot of the reader, is adapted to detect the presence of said bundle of leads, and has the specific features stated in the appended claims.
  • the invention is based on the concept of sending, to each pin of the reading contacts, preferably in a periodic manner, an oscillating test signal having for example frequencies of a few tens of kHz; of irradiating with said signal a pair of oppositely arranged metallic laminae located adjacent to said reading contacts but electrically separated therefrom, the card being tested inside the slot arranging itself between said laminae; and of detecting, by means of an amplifier and rectifier circuit, the signal received by said laminae, which varies significantly whether in the absence or in the presence of said bundle of leads arranged on the card for fraudulent purposes and is much stronger when they are present due to the greater irradiating effect produced by said leads, the test signal also flowing therethrough.
  • figure 1 is a block diagram of the device according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, shown in the configuration for reading a genuine chip-card
  • figure 2 is a view of a detail of figure 1, illustrating the device in the configuration for reading a chip-card that has been tampered with for fraudulent purposes. Ways of carrying out the invention.
  • the reference numeral 10 designates a reader for chip-cards 11 which are constituted, in a known manner, by a support made of rigid polymeric or paper-based material that includes an integrated circuit or chip, a plurality of contact laminae
  • the reader 10 comprises a slot 13 for inserting the card 11 and is internally provided with a block of reading contacts 14 that is formed by a plurality of protruding connectors or pins 15 that are adapted to lower onto the laminae 12 of the card 11 when said card is fully inserted in the slot 13 in order to establish an electrical connection between the chip of the card 11 and the reading circuits 16 associated with the reader 10.
  • a pair o f f acing but mutually separated metallic laminae 17- 17 ' is arranged inside the slot 13 of the reader 10 , the card 11 arranging itself between said laminae , as clearly shown in the figure .
  • the laminae 17-17' are made of the known metal alloy known as nickel silver, and each lamina has a thickness of two tenths of a millimeter and is insulated by means of an adhesive protective sheet, for example a sheet of embossed polycarbonate, of the type known by the trade-name "Makrofol D", produced by the Bayer company.
  • an adhesive protective sheet for example a sheet of embossed polycarbonate, of the type known by the trade-name "Makrofol D", produced by the Bayer company.
  • the pair of laminae 17-17' is arranged adjacent to the block of the reading contacts but is physically separated therefrom; for example, the block 14 and the pair of laminae 17-17' are mutually separated by a gap of ten millimeters.
  • One end of each lamina 17-17' is connected, by means of a respective lead, to a detector circuit 18 comprising an amplifier A, a filter F, and a rectifier R, whose function will be described hereinafter.
  • the block 14 of the reading contacts is connected to the reading circuits 16, with the interposition of an electronic switch 19 which, under the control of a microprocessor, for example the microprocessor ⁇ P of the telephone set TF with which the reader 10 is associated, disconnects the contacts 14 from the circuit 16 and connects them to an oscillator 20.
  • a microprocessor for example the microprocessor ⁇ P of the telephone set TF with which the reader 10 is associated
  • an oscillating test signal "st" with a frequency comprised for example between 80 and 110 kHz which, by means of the switch 19, is sent to the contacts 14 in a periodic manner, for periods lasting between 70 and 120 milliseconds during the telephone call or in any case during the pause when data exchange between the chip of the card and the circuits 16 is interrupted.
  • the laminae 17-17' Due to the nearness of the contacts 14 to the laminae 17-17', said laminae are adapted to pick up the signal irradiated by the contacts 14, for which they behave as true antennas. Accordingly, the laminae 17-17' become the seat of an induced signal "si" having the same frequency as the test signal "st" and a strength that depends on the preset and constant distance between said laminae and the contacts 14 and of course on the strength of the test signal, also having a preset value.
  • the induced signal "si" is applied to a detector 21 that amplifies it in A, processes it with the filter F tuned to the frequency of the test signal, and rectifies it in R, providing in output a useful voltage signal "sv" which, by means of an A/D converter, is sent to the microprocessor of the telephone set TF.
  • the level of the useful signal "sv” is instead altered significantly, and typically increased to a value “sw” that is significantly higher than said reference threshold, when a fraudulently tampered chip-card such as the one designated by the reference numeral 110 in figure 2 is inserted into the slot 13.
  • the tampered chip-card 110 comprises a bundle of leads 111 connecting to the contact laminae 12, running along said card, and possibly recessed flush in a milling provided for this purpose to exit from the slot of the reader and connect to an apparatus 30, typically constituted by a PC.
  • the apparatus 30 can be used fraudulently, for example to provide the reading circuits 16 with false indications that deletion has occurred or to simulate, towards said reading circuits, the behaviour of a valid chip-card, or for other equally fraudulent purposes.
  • test signal "st" also flows along the leads 111 connected to the laminae 12, and since said leads are closer to the laminae 17-17', they allow said laminae to pick up a significantly stronger signal, thus producing a corresponding increase in the signal "sw" , which exceeds said threshold value.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Artificial Intelligence (AREA)
  • Computer Vision & Pattern Recognition (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
  • Prepayment Telephone Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Ce dispositif comprend: une paire de lames (17, 17') métalliques superposées, la carte à puce (11) étant placée entre celles-ci et lesdites lames étant disposées à l'intérieur de la fente (13) du lecteur (10) de manière à être adjacentes à l'ensemble (14) des contacts de lecture de carte, tout en en étant séparées physiquement; un commutateur électronique (19) destiné, sous la commande d'un microprocesseur, à débrancher les contacts (14) de lecture des circuits (16) de lecture et à les brancher périodiquement à un oscillateur (20) produisant un signal témoin (st) reçu par les lames (17, 17'); et un circuit (18) de détection relié aux lames et conçu pour détecter le signal (si) induit sur celles-ci de manière à produire un signal de tension utile (sv) qui croît de manière importante au-dessus d'un seuil préétabli lorsque la carte à puce possède des conducteurs qui connectent, dans des intentions frauduleuses, les contacts (12) à lamelles de sa puce à un dispositif placé à l'extérieur du lecteur.
PCT/EP1995/002460 1994-06-29 1995-06-23 Dispositif et procede de detection de tentatives frauduleuses dirigees contre des lecteurs de cartes de telephone du type a circuit integre WO1996000951A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU29247/95A AU2924795A (en) 1994-06-29 1995-06-23 Device and method for detecting attempts at fraud in readers of the integrated-circuit type telephone cards

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
IT94TO000534A IT1268084B1 (it) 1994-06-29 1994-06-29 Dispositivo e procedimento per rilevare tentativi di frode nei lettori di schede telefoniche del tipo a circuito integrato.
ITTO94A000534 1994-06-29

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO1996000951A1 true WO1996000951A1 (fr) 1996-01-11

Family

ID=11412634

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/EP1995/002460 WO1996000951A1 (fr) 1994-06-29 1995-06-23 Dispositif et procede de detection de tentatives frauduleuses dirigees contre des lecteurs de cartes de telephone du type a circuit integre

Country Status (3)

Country Link
AU (1) AU2924795A (fr)
IT (1) IT1268084B1 (fr)
WO (1) WO1996000951A1 (fr)

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE29804510U1 (de) 1998-03-13 1998-05-28 Deutschmann, Ingo, 06237 Leuna Terminal für Chipkarten
EP0849696A1 (fr) * 1996-12-22 1998-06-24 ddm hopt + schuler GmbH & Co. KG Lecteur de cartes a puce
WO2001006783A1 (fr) * 1999-07-15 2001-01-25 Thomson Licensing S.A. Appareil et procede associe permettant de limiter l'acces a des informations transmises entre un dispositif de securite electronique et un dispositif hote
US6970068B1 (en) 1999-07-15 2005-11-29 Thomson Licensing S.A. Apparatus and associated method for limiting access of information transferred between an electronic security device and a host device
EP3422260A1 (fr) * 2017-06-29 2019-01-02 NCR Corporation Détection de manipulation par carte à puce
WO2021015920A1 (fr) * 2019-07-25 2021-01-28 Mastercard International Incorporated Procédé de contrôle d'intégrité des éléments matériels d'une carte à circuit intégré

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0323347A1 (fr) * 1987-12-28 1989-07-05 Schlumberger Industries Dispositif de lecture/écriture pour cartes à mémoire muni d'un dispositif anti fraude
EP0447686A1 (fr) * 1990-02-06 1991-09-25 ALCATEL BELL Naamloze Vennootschap Détecteur électronique de fraude
EP0468848A1 (fr) * 1990-07-12 1992-01-29 LANDIS & GYR COMMUNICATIONS (Suisse) S.A. Connecteur électrique pour carte contenant un circuit électronique et dispositif et procédé de détection de fraude en faisant application
FR2693014A1 (fr) * 1992-06-26 1993-12-31 Monetel Détecteur d'utilisation d'une carte à puce fraudulause.

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0323347A1 (fr) * 1987-12-28 1989-07-05 Schlumberger Industries Dispositif de lecture/écriture pour cartes à mémoire muni d'un dispositif anti fraude
EP0447686A1 (fr) * 1990-02-06 1991-09-25 ALCATEL BELL Naamloze Vennootschap Détecteur électronique de fraude
EP0468848A1 (fr) * 1990-07-12 1992-01-29 LANDIS & GYR COMMUNICATIONS (Suisse) S.A. Connecteur électrique pour carte contenant un circuit électronique et dispositif et procédé de détection de fraude en faisant application
FR2693014A1 (fr) * 1992-06-26 1993-12-31 Monetel Détecteur d'utilisation d'une carte à puce fraudulause.

Cited By (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP0849696A1 (fr) * 1996-12-22 1998-06-24 ddm hopt + schuler GmbH & Co. KG Lecteur de cartes a puce
DE19653412A1 (de) * 1996-12-22 1998-07-02 Hopt & Schuler Ddm Kartenlesevorrichtung
DE29804510U1 (de) 1998-03-13 1998-05-28 Deutschmann, Ingo, 06237 Leuna Terminal für Chipkarten
WO2001006783A1 (fr) * 1999-07-15 2001-01-25 Thomson Licensing S.A. Appareil et procede associe permettant de limiter l'acces a des informations transmises entre un dispositif de securite electronique et un dispositif hote
US6970068B1 (en) 1999-07-15 2005-11-29 Thomson Licensing S.A. Apparatus and associated method for limiting access of information transferred between an electronic security device and a host device
EP3422260A1 (fr) * 2017-06-29 2019-01-02 NCR Corporation Détection de manipulation par carte à puce
US10592904B2 (en) 2017-06-29 2020-03-17 Ncr Corporation Card shimmer detection
WO2021015920A1 (fr) * 2019-07-25 2021-01-28 Mastercard International Incorporated Procédé de contrôle d'intégrité des éléments matériels d'une carte à circuit intégré

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
IT1268084B1 (it) 1997-02-20
ITTO940534A1 (it) 1995-12-29
AU2924795A (en) 1996-01-25
ITTO940534A0 (it) 1994-06-29

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