This document outlines the security policy and threat model for the WebdriverIO project.

The WebdriverIO team and community take all security vulnerabilities seriously. If you believe you have found a security vulnerability in WebdriverIO, please report it to us as described below.

DO NOT report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.

Please contact us security@webdriver.io with a description of the vulnerability and steps to reproduce it. You should receive a response within 48 hours. If for some reason you do not, please follow up via the same email to ensure we received your original message.

Threat model analysis assists organizations to proactively identify potential security threats and vulnerabilities, enabling them to develop effective strategies to mitigate these risks before they are exploited by attackers. Furthermore, this often helps to improve the overall security and resilience of a system or application.

The aim of this document is to facilitate the identification of potential security threats and vulnerabilities that may be exploited by adversaries in the WebdriverIO ecosystem, along with possible outcomes and appropriate mitigations.

WebdriverIO is a next-generation browser and mobile automation test framework for Node.js that provides:

• Browser automation via WebDriver and WebDriver BiDi protocols
• Mobile automation via Appium
• Test framework integrations (Mocha, Jasmine, Cucumber)
• Cloud service integrations (BrowserStack, Sauce Labs, TestingBot, LambdaTest)
• CLI tools and test runners
• File upload/download capabilities
• Browser and component testing support

The following assets are considered important for the WebdriverIO project:

• WebdriverIO source code and project documentation
• User test code and configuration files containing sensitive credentials
• WebdriverIO development and release infrastructure
• User devices and CI/CD systems where WebdriverIO is installed and executed
• Cloud service integrations and associated API credentials
• Test data and artifacts including screenshots, videos, and logs
• Package distribution channels (npm registry, GitHub releases)

The following threat actors are considered relevant to the WebdriverIO application:

• External malicious attackers without direct access to user systems
• Internal malicious attackers with access to user devices or CI/CD infrastructure
• Malicious insider actors including compromised contributors or maintainers
• Third-party service providers (cloud testing services, npm registry)
• Supply chain attackers targeting dependencies or distribution channels
• Automated services and bots performing reconnaissance or attacks

• @wdio/cli - Command-line interface for test execution
• Configuration files (wdio.conf.js/ts) with sensitive data
• Environment variable handling for credentials
• Auto-configuration wizard that generates config files

• @wdio/local-runner - Local test execution through processes
• @wdio/browser-runner - Browser-based test execution (uses @wdio/local-runner) for component testing
• Multi-remote capabilities for parallel testing
• Test framework adapters (Mocha, Jasmine, Cucumber)

• BrowserStack, Sauce Labs, TestingBot, LambdaTest integrations
• API key and credential management
• Tunnel connections for local testing
• Session management and reporting

• File upload functionality via WebDriver
• File download capabilities through Selenium Grid
• Archive creation and extraction (ZIP files)
• Temporary file management

• HTTP/HTTPS requests to WebDriver endpoints
• Cloud service API communications
• Proxy support and authentication
• Custom header injection

• Multiple reporter plugins (Allure, JUnit, JSON, etc.)
• Log masking for sensitive data
• Crash reporting and telemetry
• Screenshot and video capture

[User Config] → [CLI] → [Test Runner] → [WebDriver/Cloud Service] → [Browser/Device]
     ↓             ↓           ↓                    ↓                      ↓
[Env Variables] [Validation] [Session Mgmt] [Network Requests] [Test Execution]

In threat modeling, an attack surface refers to any possible point of entry that an attacker might use to exploit a system or application. This includes all the paths and interfaces that an attacker may use to access, manipulate or extract sensitive data from a system.

• CLI commands and configuration processing
• Network communications to WebDriver endpoints and cloud services
• File system operations including uploads, downloads, and temporary files
• Package installation and updates via npm/package managers
• Environment variable processing for credentials and configuration

• Configuration file manipulation in user workspace
• Test code execution with elevated privileges
• Log and artifact access containing sensitive information
• Inter-process communication between test runners and browsers
• Memory access to running WebdriverIO processes

• Severity: HIGH
• Description: Attackers could steal cloud service credentials (API keys, access tokens) from environment variables, configuration files, or logs
• Attack Vectors:
  • Environment variable exposure in CI/CD systems
  • Configuration files committed to version control
  • Credentials logged in plain text
  • Memory dumps containing secrets

• Severity: MEDIUM
• Description: Malicious actors could redirect WebDriver traffic to fake endpoints
• Attack Vectors:
  • DNS poisoning
  • Man-in-the-middle attacks on unencrypted connections
  • Malicious proxy configurations

• Severity: HIGH
• Description: Unauthorized modification of configuration files could lead to test manipulation or credential theft
• Attack Vectors:
  • File system access on CI/CD systems
  • Supply chain attacks modifying templates
  • Insider threats with repository access

• Severity: HIGH
• Description: Malicious code injection through test files or configuration
• Attack Vectors:
  • Dynamic configuration loading
  • Unsafe eval() usage in test files
  • Template injection in configuration generation

• Severity: MEDIUM
• Description: Malicious files uploaded through file upload functionality
• Attack Vectors:
  • Path traversal in file uploads
  • Archive bombs (ZIP bombs)
  • Malicious file execution on remote systems

• Severity: HIGH
• Description: The use of recursive merge operations (e.g., deepmerge) on configuration objects could allow an attacker to pollute the Object.prototype. This can lead to various vulnerabilities, including denial of service, remote code execution, or cross-site scripting, depending on how the polluted properties are used throughout the application. The ConfigParser.ts uses deepmerge extensively, making this a relevant threat.
• Attack Vectors:
  • Maliciously crafted configuration files (wdio.conf.js)
  • Supplying crafted configuration objects through command-line arguments or other external inputs that get merged into the main configuration.

• Severity: HIGH
• Description: WebdriverIO's plugin architecture allows for custom services and reporters to be loaded dynamically based on the configuration file (wdio.conf.js). An attacker with filesystem access could replace a legitimate plugin package within the node_modules directory with a malicious one. When WebdriverIO loads the compromised plugin, it would result in arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running the tests.
• Attack Vectors:
  • Direct file manipulation on a developer's machine or a CI/CD runner.
  • Exploiting another vulnerability to gain file system write access.
  • Supply chain attacks that modify packages post-installation.

• Severity: MEDIUM
• Description: Attackers could modify test results without proper audit trails
• Attack Vectors:
  • Reporter plugin manipulation
  • Log file tampering
  • Missing integrity checks on test outputs

• Severity: HIGH
• Description: Credentials, personal data, or sensitive test data exposed in logs
• Attack Vectors:
  • API keys in HTTP request logs
  • Personal data in test inputs/outputs
  • Screenshots containing sensitive information
  • Debug information exposure

• Severity: MEDIUM
• Description: Sensitive data intercepted during network communications
• Attack Vectors:
  • Unencrypted HTTP connections
  • Weak TLS configurations
  • Proxy credential exposure

• Severity: MEDIUM
• Description: Unauthorized access to test files, screenshots, or temporary files
• Attack Vectors:
  • Insecure temporary file permissions
  • Screenshots in shared directories
  • Configuration files with world-readable permissions

• Severity: MEDIUM
• Description: Excessive resource consumption leading to system unavailability
• Attack Vectors:
  • Large file uploads consuming disk space
  • Memory leaks in long-running test suites
  • ZIP bomb attacks through file downloads

• Severity: MEDIUM
• Description: Malicious tests consuming cloud service resources
• Attack Vectors:
  • Infinite loops in test execution
  • Excessive parallel session creation
  • Large file uploads to cloud services

• Severity: HIGH
• Description: Execution of arbitrary commands through CLI or configuration
• Attack Vectors:
  • Unsafe shell command execution
  • Path injection in file operations
  • Deserialization of untrusted data

• Severity: MEDIUM
• Description: XSS attacks in browser-based test execution
• Attack Vectors:
  • Untrusted test content execution
  • Malicious test data injection
  • Unsafe DOM manipulation in browser tests

• Severity: HIGH
• Description: Attackers manipulating environment variables to compromise credentials or redirect traffic
• Attack Vectors:
  • Local privilege escalation to modify environment
  • CI/CD pipeline manipulation
  • Configuration injection through environment overrides
  • PATH manipulation to execute malicious binaries

• Severity: MEDIUM
• Description: Inadequate validation of URLs and file paths in WebDriver operations
• Attack Vectors:
  • file:// scheme abuse for local file access
  • Path traversal in URL handling
  • Protocol smuggling attacks
  • Malicious redirect chains

1. T-01: Cloud Service Credential Theft - Direct financial and security impact
2. T-03: Configuration File Tampering - Can compromise entire test infrastructure
3. T-04: Test Code Injection - Can lead to system compromise
4. T-05a: Prototype Pollution - Can lead to widespread and unpredictable vulnerabilities, including RCE.
5. T-07: Sensitive Data in Logs - Compliance and privacy violations
6. T-12: Command Injection - System compromise potential
7. T-14: Environment Variable Manipulation - Credential compromise potential
8. T-16: Malicious Plugin Loading - Arbitrary code execution via compromised plugins

9. T-05: Archive/File Upload Tampering - File system compromise
10. T-08: Network Traffic Eavesdropping - Data breach potential
11. T-09: File System Information Disclosure - Data exposure
12. T-15: URI Scheme Validation Bypass - File system access risks

13. T-02: WebDriver Endpoint Spoofing - Limited attack surface
14. T-06: Test Result Manipulation - Integrity concerns
15. T-10: Resource Exhaustion - Availability impact
16. T-11: Cloud Service Quota Exhaustion - Financial impact
17. T-13: Cross-Site Script Execution - Limited to browser runner

Immediate Actions:

• ✅ Implemented: Environment variable usage for credentials
• ✅ Implemented: Log masking for sensitive data (WDIO_LOG_MASKING_PATTERNS)
• ⚠️ Partial: Configuration templates use environment variables

Additional Mitigations:

// Recommended: Use secret management services
export const config = {
  user: process.env.BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME,
  key: process.env.BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY,
  // Never hardcode credentials
}

// Implement credential validation
function validateCredentials(user, key) {
  if (!user || !key) {
    throw new Error('Missing required credentials')
  }
  if (typeof user !== 'string' || typeof key !== 'string') {
    throw new Error('Invalid credential format')
  }
}

CI/CD Security:

• Use encrypted secrets in CI/CD systems
• Implement credential rotation policies
• Audit access to environment variables
• Use short-lived tokens when possible

The ConfigParser class in @wdio/config is the primary mechanism for loading and parsing configuration files. It performs several validation steps, but security can be enhanced.

Secure Configuration Loading:

• ✅ Implemented: ConfigParser resolves the configuration file path relative to the current working directory, preventing trivial path traversal from the command line.
• ✅ Implemented: It expects a specific export (export const config = { ... }) from the configuration file, reducing the risk of arbitrary code execution through a malicious file.
• ⚠️ Partial: The parser uses dynamic import() to load the configuration file. While convenient for supporting both TypeScript and JavaScript, this can be a vector if an attacker can control the file path to point to a non-configuration file that has side effects upon import.

Recommendations:

• Schema Validation: Implement a comprehensive JSON schema validation for the entire configuration object after it has been merged. This ensures all properties have the expected types and formats, preventing unexpected application behavior.
• File Allow-listing: While ConfigParser doesn't restrict file names, users should be encouraged to use standard names (wdio.conf.js, wdio.conf.ts) and avoid dynamically generating config paths from user input.
• Integrity Checks in CI/CD: For production test environments, use file integrity monitoring or checksums to ensure the wdio.conf.js file has not been tampered with since it was last reviewed.

// Example of a more robust config loading check
import path from 'node:path';
import Ajv from 'ajv'; // A popular schema validator
import configSchema from './config.schema.json'; // A predefined JSON schema for your config

async function loadAndValidateConfig(configPath) {
  const ajv = new Ajv();
  const validate = ajv.compile(configSchema);

  // The ConfigParser already handles the loading
  const config = await new ConfigParser(configPath).initialize();
  const rawConfig = config.getConfig();

  if (!validate(rawConfig)) {
    throw new Error(`Configuration validation failed: ${ajv.errorsText(validate.errors)}`);
  }

  return config;
}

The ConfigParser.ts uses deepmerge to combine default configurations, file configurations, and command-line arguments. This is a common vector for prototype pollution.

Mitigations:

• ✅ Implemented: WebdriverIO uses deepmerge-ts, which has some built-in protections against prototype pollution. However, no library is infallible, and the risk remains depending on the version and usage.
• Input Sanitization: Before merging, ensure that keys like __proto__, constructor, and prototype are stripped from any user-provided configuration objects (e.g., from CLI arguments).
• Use Object.create(null): When creating new objects that will be part of a merge operation, use Object.create(null) to create objects without a prototype. This prevents them from being a pollution gadget.
• Freezing the Prototype: After application startup and configuration parsing, freeze the Object prototype to prevent any further modification: Object.freeze(Object.prototype). This is a strong mitigation but can interfere with other libraries if they legitimately modify the prototype.

// Example of a safer merge
import { deepmergeCustom } from 'deepmerge-ts';

const customMerge = deepmergeCustom({
    // Add custom logic here if needed, e.g., for specific keys
});

function sanitizeAndMerge(target, source) {
    const sanitizedSource = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(source), (key, value) => {
        if (key === '__proto__' || key === 'constructor' || key === 'prototype') {
            return undefined;
        }
        return value;
    });

    return customMerge(target, sanitizedSource);
}

// In ConfigParser.ts, use sanitizeAndMerge instead of a direct deepmerge.

Secure Configuration Loading:

// wdio.conf.js security template
export const config = {
  // ✅ Use environment variables for credentials
  user: process.env.BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME,
  key: process.env.BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY,

  // ✅ Enforce HTTPS for cloud providers
  protocol: 'https',

  // ✅ Enable strict SSL
  strictSSL: true,

  // ✅ Configure log masking
  logLevel: 'info',

  // ✅ Set resource limits
  connectionRetryTimeout: 120000,
  connectionRetryCount: 3,

  // ✅ Secure headers
  headers: {
    'User-Agent': 'WebdriverIO-SecureClient'
  }
}

// Set masking patterns
process.env.WDIO_LOG_MASKING_PATTERNS = '/password=([^&]*)/gi,/key=([^&]*)/gi'

Secure File Upload:

import fs from 'node:fs'
import path from 'node:path'
import JSZip from 'jszip'

// File validation
function validateUploadFile(filePath) {
  const stats = fs.statSync(filePath)

  // Size limits
  const MAX_FILE_SIZE = 100 * 1024 * 1024 // 100MB
  if (stats.size > MAX_FILE_SIZE) {
    throw new Error('File too large')
  }

  // Extension allowlist
  const ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS = ['.apk', '.ipa', '.zip', '.jar']
  const ext = path.extname(filePath).toLowerCase()
  if (!ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS.includes(ext)) {
    throw new Error(`File extension not allowed: ${ext}`)
  }

  return true
}

// Archive validation
async function validateArchive(archivePath) {
  const zip = new JSZip()
  const data = fs.readFileSync(archivePath)

  const archive = await zip.loadAsync(data)
  let totalSize = 0
  const MAX_TOTAL_SIZE = 200 * 1024 * 1024 // 200MB
  const MAX_FILES = 1000

  const files = Object.keys(archive.files)
  if (files.length > MAX_FILES) {
    throw new Error('Too many files in archive')
  }

  files.forEach(filename => {
    const file = archive.files[filename]
    totalSize += file._data.uncompressedSize

    if (totalSize > MAX_TOTAL_SIZE) {
      throw new Error('Archive too large when uncompressed')
    }

    // Check for path traversal
    if (filename.includes('..') || filename.startsWith('/')) {
      throw new Error('Invalid filename in archive')
    }
  })
}

Secure Communication:

import tls from 'node:tls'

// Enforce HTTPS for cloud services
function validateEndpoint(hostname, protocol) {
  const CLOUD_PROVIDERS = [
    'hub.browserstack.com',
    'hub.saucelabs.com',
    'hub.testingbot.com',
    'hub.lambdatest.com'
  ]

  if (CLOUD_PROVIDERS.includes(hostname) && protocol !== 'https') {
    throw new Error('HTTPS required for cloud providers')
  }
}

// Certificate validation
const httpsOptions = {
  strictSSL: true,
  checkServerIdentity: (hostname, cert) => {
    // Additional certificate validation
    return tls.checkServerIdentity(hostname, cert)
  }
}

WebdriverIO Native Log Masking:

WebdriverIO provides built-in log masking capabilities through the maskingPatterns configuration option and environment variables:

// wdio.conf.js - Using configuration option
export const config = {
  // Built-in masking patterns for sensitive data
  maskingPatterns: '/password=([^&]*)/gi,/key=([^&]*)/gi,/token=([^\\s]*)/gi',

  // Alternative: More comprehensive patterns
  maskingPatterns: [
    '/password[=:"\'\\s]*["\']?([^"\'\\s&]+)["\']?/gi',
    '/accessKey[=:"\'\\s]*["\']?([^"\'\\s&]+)["\']?/gi',
    '/secret[=:"\'\\s]*["\']?([^"\'\\s&]+)["\']?/gi',
    '/token[=:"\'\\s]*["\']?([^"\'\\s&]+)["\']?/gi',
    '/authorization[=:"\'\\s]*["\']?([^"\'\\s&]+)["\']?/gi',
    // Credit card numbers
    '/\\b\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}\\b/g',
    // API keys (common formats)
    '/[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g',
    // Base64 encoded secrets (common pattern)
    '/[A-Za-z0-9+/]{40,}={0,2}/g'
  ].join(','),

  // Additional security settings
  logLevel: 'info', // Avoid 'trace' or 'debug' in production
  outputDir: './logs',

  // Cloud service credentials via environment variables
  user: process.env.BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME,
  key: process.env.BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY,
}

Environment Variable Configuration:

## Set masking patterns via environment variable
export WDIO_LOG_MASKING_PATTERNS='/password=([^&]*)/gi,/key=([^&]*)/gi,/token=([^\\s]*)/gi'

## Example: Comprehensive masking for CI/CD
export WDIO_LOG_MASKING_PATTERNS='/password[=:"\'\\s]*["\']?([^"\'\\s&]+)["\']?/gi,/accessKey[=:"\'\\s]*["\']?([^"\'\\s&]+)["\']?/gi,/secret[=:"\'\\s]*["\']?([^"\'\\s&]+)["\']?/gi'

Command Masking for Sensitive Operations:

// WebdriverIO supports masking in setValue and addValue commands
await $('#password-field').setValue('mySecretPassword', { mask: true })
await $('#api-key-field').addValue('sk-1234567890abcdef', { mask: true })

// This will show in logs as:
// INFO webdriver: DATA { text: "**MASKED**" }

Secure File Permissions:

import fs from 'node:fs'
import path from 'node:path'
import os from 'node:os'

// Secure temporary file creation
function createSecureTempFile(prefix) {
  const tempDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), prefix))

  // Set restrictive permissions (owner only)
  fs.chmodSync(tempDir, 0o700)

  return tempDir
}

// Cleanup on exit
process.on('exit', () => {
  // Clean up temporary files
  cleanupTempFiles()
})

Resource Limits:

// Implementation recommendations
const RESOURCE_LIMITS = {
  maxConcurrentSessions: 10,
  maxTestDuration: 30 * 60 * 1000, // 30 minutes
  maxFileSize: 100 * 1024 * 1024, // 100MB
  maxLogSize: 50 * 1024 * 1024 // 50MB
}

function enforceResourceLimits(config) {
  if (config.maxInstances > RESOURCE_LIMITS.maxConcurrentSessions) {
    throw new Error('Too many concurrent sessions requested')
  }
}

Content Security Policy:

import DOMPurify from 'dompurify'

// CSP for browser runner
const CSP_HEADER = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; object-src 'none';"

// Sanitize test content
function sanitizeTestContent(content) {
  // Remove potentially dangerous HTML/JS
  return DOMPurify.sanitize(content)
}

Environment Validation:

// Validate critical environment variables
function validateEnvironment() {
  const criticalVars = [
    'BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME',
    'BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY',
    'SAUCE_USERNAME',
    'SAUCE_ACCESS_KEY'
  ]

  // Check for suspicious modifications
  criticalVars.forEach(varName => {
    const value = process.env[varName]
    if (value && !isValidCredentialFormat(value)) {
      throw new Error(`Invalid format for ${varName}`)
    }
  })

  // Validate PATH for suspicious entries
  const pathEntries = (process.env.PATH || '').split(':')
  pathEntries.forEach(entry => {
    if (entry.includes('..') || !path.isAbsolute(entry)) {
      console.warn(`Suspicious PATH entry detected: ${entry}`)
    }
  })
}

// Secure environment loading
function loadSecureEnvironment() {
  // Store original environment
  const originalEnv = { ...process.env }

  // Apply environment restrictions
  const allowedEnvPattern = /^(BROWSERSTACK_|SAUCE_|WDIO_|NODE_|PATH|HOME)/
  Object.keys(process.env).forEach(key => {
    if (!allowedEnvPattern.test(key)) {
      delete process.env[key]
    }
  })

  return originalEnv
}

URL Validation:

// Secure URL validation
function validateUrl(url) {
  try {
    const parsed = new URL(url)

    // Allowlisted protocols
    const allowedProtocols = ['http:', 'https:', 'ws:', 'wss:']
    if (!allowedProtocols.includes(parsed.protocol)) {
      throw new Error(`Protocol not allowed: ${parsed.protocol}`)
    }

    // Prevent localhost bypass for cloud services
    const cloudHosts = [
      'hub.browserstack.com',
      'hub.saucelabs.com',
      'hub.testingbot.com'
    ]

    if (cloudHosts.includes(parsed.hostname) && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') {
      throw new Error('HTTPS required for cloud services')
    }

    // Prevent private network access
    if (isPrivateNetwork(parsed.hostname)) {
      console.warn(`Private network access detected: ${parsed.hostname}`)
    }

    return parsed
  } catch (error) {
    throw new Error(`Invalid URL: ${error.message}`)
  }
}

// File path validation with scheme checking
function validateFilePath(filePath) {
  // Handle file:// URLs
  if (filePath.startsWith('file://')) {
    const url = new URL(filePath)
    filePath = url.pathname
  }

  const normalizedPath = path.normalize(filePath)

  // Prevent path traversal
  if (normalizedPath.includes('..') || !path.isAbsolute(normalizedPath)) {
    throw new Error('Invalid file path')
  }

  // Ensure within allowed directories
  const allowedDirs = [
    process.cwd(),
    os.tmpdir(),
    path.join(os.homedir(), '.wdio')
  ]

  const isAllowed = allowedDirs.some(dir =>
    normalizedPath.startsWith(path.resolve(dir))
  )

  if (!isAllowed) {
    throw new Error('File path not in allowed directory')
  }

  return normalizedPath
}

WebdriverIO dynamically imports reporters and services based on string names in the configuration. It is important for users to understand the source of these plugins:

• Official Plugins (e.g., @wdio/spec-reporter): Plugins published under the @wdio npm scope are officially maintained by the WebdriverIO project. These packages undergo the same security scrutiny as the core framework.
• Community Plugins (e.g., wdio-allure-reporter): Plugins with the wdio- prefix are typically community-developed. While the ecosystem is a vital part of WebdriverIO's strength, the project team does not have control over the security practices of these packages. Users should treat them as any other third-party dependency and perform their own security assessments.

This powerful feature carries the risk of loading malicious code if the underlying package on the filesystem is compromised, especially when using community plugins that may not be well-maintained.

Mitigations for Users:

• Vet Community Plugins: Before adding a community plugin, research its maintenance status, popularity (npm downloads), and open issues. Check for known vulnerabilities in the package and its dependencies.
• Use Immutable Installations: In CI/CD environments, always use npm ci instead of npm install. This command performs a clean install based on the package-lock.json file and verifies that the dependencies in node_modules match the lockfile, failing if they don't. This is the single most effective mitigation against on-disk tampering.
• File Integrity Monitoring: In high-security environments, employ file integrity monitoring (FIM) tools to alert on any unauthorized changes within the node_modules directory.
• Principle of Least Privilege: Run WebdriverIO tests in a containerized environment (e.g., Docker) with a non-root user and minimal permissions to limit the blast radius of a compromised plugin. Restrict filesystem and network access to only what is absolutely necessary.

Mitigations for the Framework (Future Considerations):

• Plugin Signing and Verification: A potential future enhancement for WebdriverIO could be to introduce a mechanism for plugin developers to sign their packages and for the framework to verify that signature before loading the code. This would provide a strong guarantee that the plugin has not been tampered with.
• Sandbox Execution: Explore executing plugins in a sandboxed environment with limited access to the system, though this is complex in a Node.js environment.

Required Security Settings:

// wdio.conf.js security template
export const config = {
  // ✅ Use environment variables for credentials
  user: process.env.BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME,
  key: process.env.BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY,

  // ✅ Enforce HTTPS for cloud providers
  protocol: 'https',

  // ✅ Enable strict SSL
  strictSSL: true,

  // ✅ Configure log masking
  logLevel: 'info',

  // ✅ Set resource limits
  connectionRetryTimeout: 120000,
  connectionRetryCount: 3,

  // ✅ Secure headers
  headers: {
    'User-Agent': 'WebdriverIO-SecureClient'
  }
}

// Set masking patterns
process.env.WDIO_LOG_MASKING_PATTERNS = '/password=([^&]*)/gi,/key=([^&]*)/gi'

1. Never commit credentials to version control
2. Validate all user inputs including file paths and configuration values
3. Use principle of least privilege for file and network access
4. Implement proper error handling without exposing sensitive information
5. Regular security audits of dependencies using npm audit
6. Monitor for security vulnerabilities in used packages

1. Regular credential rotation for cloud services
2. Monitor usage patterns for anomalous behavior
3. Implement access logging for configuration changes
4. Backup and recovery procedures for test infrastructure
5. Incident response plan for security breaches

• Use ESLint security rules
• Implement dependency vulnerability scanning
• Code review security checklist

• Penetration testing of WebDriver endpoints
• Fuzzing of file upload functionality
• Load testing for DoS resistance

• Log analysis for suspicious patterns
• Network traffic monitoring
• Resource usage monitoring

Overview: An insider threat actor, such as a WebdriverIO project contributor, maintainer, or user organization employee with access to the codebase or infrastructure, might abuse their role to compromise the project or user systems.

Potential Attack Scenarios:

• Malicious code injection in WebdriverIO source code or dependencies
• Backdoor implementation in authentication or networking components
• Credential harvesting through modified logging or reporting mechanisms
• Supply chain poisoning through compromised build or release processes
• Documentation manipulation to mislead users into insecure configurations

Possible Outcomes:

• Widespread compromise of user systems and credentials
• Reputation damage and loss of trust
• Financial losses for affected organizations
• Regulatory compliance violations

Mitigations:

• Multi-party code review requiring approval from multiple maintainers
• Automated security scanning of all code changes
• Reproducible builds with cryptographic verification
• Separation of duties for release and signing processes
• Background checks for maintainers with elevated privileges
• Activity monitoring and audit logging for sensitive operations
• SLSA compliance for build and release security

Overview: WebdriverIO relies on numerous third-party dependencies that could introduce vulnerabilities or be compromised by attackers. The Node.js ecosystem's extensive dependency chain creates multiple potential attack vectors.

Supply Chain Risks:

• Vulnerable dependencies with known security flaws
• Typosquatting attacks through similar package names
• Dependency confusion attacks targeting internal packages
• Compromised package maintainers introducing malicious code
• Build system compromises affecting package integrity
• Registry attacks targeting npm or other package repositories

Specific WebdriverIO Dependencies at Risk:

// Example high-risk dependency categories
const riskAreas = {
  networkLibraries: ['node-fetch', 'axios', 'request'],
  fileHandling: ['archiver', 'jszip', 'fs-extra'],
  processExecution: ['child_process', 'shelljs'],
  protocolParsing: ['url', 'querystring'],
  cryptography: ['crypto', 'bcrypt', 'jsonwebtoken']
}

Mitigations:

• Dependency scanning: Integrate automated security scanning into the CI/CD pipeline. Use tools like npm audit --audit-level=high, Snyk, or GitHub's Dependabot to continuously monitor for new vulnerabilities in dependencies.
• Version pinning: Use a lock file (package-lock.json) to pin dependency versions. This ensures that builds are reproducible and prevents unexpected updates from introducing vulnerabilities. Use tools like npm-ci for installation in CI environments.
• Subresource Integrity (SRI): While primarily a browser feature, the principle of verifying resource integrity is crucial. For build systems, this means verifying checksums of downloaded packages against a trusted source.
• Scoped Packages: Utilize private or scoped packages (@wdio/...) to mitigate typosquatting and dependency confusion attacks.
• Regular security updates: Establish a process for regularly reviewing and applying security patches for dependencies. This should be a scheduled, recurring activity, not just a reaction to an incident.
• Dependency license compliance: Use tools to scan for and manage license compliance of dependencies to avoid legal risks.
• SBOM (Software Bill of Materials): Generate and maintain an SBOM using standards like SPDX or CycloneDX. This provides transparency into the software supply chain and helps in vulnerability management.

Attack Vectors:

• npm registry compromise affecting package distribution
• CDN attacks targeting package delivery networks
• Package signing bypass through compromised certificates
• Social engineering targeting package maintainer accounts

Mitigations:

• Package signing with GPG keys or Sigstore
• Multi-factor authentication for npm accounts
• Package integrity verification by users
• Mirror validation for alternative package sources
• Provenance tracking for build and release processes

WebdriverIO, as a test automation framework, handles sensitive credentials and has access to both local systems and cloud services. The primary security concerns revolve around credential management, file handling, and network communications. The framework has implemented several security measures including log masking and environment variable usage, but additional hardening is recommended.

Priority Actions:

1. Implement comprehensive input validation
2. Enhance file upload security controls
3. Strengthen credential management practices
4. Improve logging security with better masking
5. Add configuration integrity checks
6. Address malicious plugin loading vulnerability

Regular security reviews and updates should be conducted to address emerging threats and maintain the security posture of the framework.

Document Version: 1.0 Last Updated: 2025-06-25 Next Review: 2026-01-25