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@marcmo marcmo commented Jul 23, 2025

originates from CR #132926
closes #905

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The created documentation from the pull request is available at: docu-html

* The cryptographic subsystem should be aware that certain attacks will try to observe the overall
system to analyze its inner workings to guess secrets (side channel/timing attacks) or to influence
it to limit its availability for system critical tasks.

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HW separation to specify what is done in S-CORE and what in a TEE/HSW/Hardware and many supported by the OS as well. To be detailed.
Think if combination of key mangmt and cert mngmt possible.
Potentially del line 72


* The cryptographic subsystem typically needs to 'rely on hardware acceleration' to execute operations
efficiently or to access a TRNG (True random number generator) for entropy. Additionally, it MAY be a
good idea to as well have a software-only solution.
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Considering PQC and using SW for that if the HW may not support it.

to ensure it is protected (memory, CPU) from applications and the normal operating system while still offering its functionality to
applications and middleware services.
* 'Time' in the sense of real world wall clock is crucial for the cryptographic subsystem to ensure
that for example a certificate or token is only used within its validity period.
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Integrity of time should be an additional requirement (e.g. signed by a backend and verified on S-CORE).

* The cryptographic subsystem typically needs to 'rely on hardware acceleration' to execute operations
efficiently or to access a TRNG (True random number generator) for entropy. Additionally, it MAY be a
good idea to as well have a software-only solution.
* Will use system level means (co-processor, hardware security module, Trusted Execution Environment, ...)
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Add that we want to rely on HW as primary computational resource and add as well a SW algorithm if the HW does not support specific cases)

|
|
|------------------|
| KeyStore |
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Local in-device key generation and derivate strategies is still missing and should be considered.

| --> Signature (create / verify)
| --> Symmmetic crypto (encrypt, decrypt)
| --> KeyMngmt (generate, import, update, delete, check)
| --> CertificateManagement (add, update, verify)
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Certificates could be protected by means of filesystem OS protection means and ACLs.

* Key exchange (ECDH)
* Hashing (SHA-2, SHA-3, BLAKE3)
* Random number generation (ChaCha20Rng)

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Potentially missing here are RSA for a-sym, EDDSA, MLDSA, SLDSA.

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Need maybe a stakeholder requirement for other markets, e.g. China.


Finally the security subsystem needs to consider the production scenario where potentially several
'initial production keys' are brought into the system.

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ACL for the APIs - add this as well. (manifest, whitelist/blacklist)

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Security Concept, Assumptions of Use must be defined

Following the white house cybersecurity plan and other industry voices to improve robustness of
critical systems by using memory safe languages S-CORE decided to have Rust as a 1st class
citizen. The security subsystem SHALL be developed entirely in Rust.

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Compatibility with existing and already hardened libraries in C++.
In general I admit the feature request is not the place to take a design decision right here.

* Trusted computing environmeent / HSM
* Roles and capability rights management
* Connection to IDS / anomaly detection
* Zero trust - BS or where to use ?
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  • Defense in depth, least right privilege;
  • Assumptions of use of the overall system not being directly exposed to the internet but behind further security controls.

* OS security mechanisms
* Trusted computing environmeent / HSM
* Roles and capability rights management
* Connection to IDS / anomaly detection
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Check with UNECE 155.

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Potentially add that a tamper proof-able or tamper-detetable log/journal is in used.

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  • Time budget, observation and process observation.

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Better to check here
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-160v1r1.pdf
Appendix E. Principles for Trustworthy Secure Design ...


Post quantum readiness
----------------------

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Latest version of WolfSSL, latest version and OpenSSL,v 3.5 already have support here.

Due to the nature of our overall system to be deployed for 10+ years in an embedded systems
such a security plan needs to as well cover 'software-update strategy', 'field observation', 'crypto
algorithm updates', 'repairability', and 'whitstand reverse engineering of secrets'.

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Use "best practices" and follow industry standards like ISO21434.

@HartmannNico
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From the Architecture Meeting 2025/08/04: Feature requirements are mandatory to merge this FR

AlexanderLanin and others added 30 commits October 8, 2025 09:00
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Iulian <iulian.alexandru@continental-corporation.com>
* Removed the first line of teaser under Introduction 

This links to duplicate and outdated contents.
Additionally removed the entries from the top navigation bar
 leading to introduction and how to contribute

* Perform forwarding to marketing website

Added Contribute back into the TOC
Added hidden TOC entry for introduction page to enable forwarding.
Signed-off-by: aschemmel-tech <aschemmel_job@arcor.de>
update to reflect changes in process description
eclipse-score/process_description#167 and
eclipse-score/process_description#148

Resolves: eclipse-score#1310
Change-Id: I6a58c1f0c457c654230e01ffb30a179b1729bcf4
Process Community is responsible for ISSUE_TEMPLATES

Change-Id: I757c4c1672cbc3c05fab0568072bb2fcdad623cb
Fix dac version check issue on merge to main.
Version check should run only on PR.

Signed-off-by: Nicolae Dicu <nicolae.dicu.ext@qorix.ai>
Display a warning message in PR that docs
might not be displayed properly if gh-pages size > 950MB.

Signed-off-by: Nicolae Dicu <nicolae.dicu.ext@qorix.ai>
remove security plan, rephrasing security concept
add security/safety impact
remvove MAY requirements for RUST, is already staekholder requirement
remove security plan, rephrasing security concept
add security/safety impact
remvove MAY requirements for RUST, is already staekholder requirement
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Feature Request for Security & Crypto
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