collective bargaining
Collective bargaining is the negotiation process between an employer and a union comprised of workers to create an agreement that will govern the
Collective bargaining is the negotiation process between an employer and a union comprised of workers to create an agreement that will govern the
Does the National Labor Relations Act prohibit the enforcement of agreements between employers and employees requiring individual employees to waive the right to participate in collective litigation, collective actions, and collective arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act?
At issue in this case is whether employment contracts barring employees from collectively arbitrating disputes with employers are illegal under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). Employees argue that preventing collective arbitration interferes with the NLRA’s Section 7 protections of “concerted activity” for “mutual aid and protection”. Employers counter that the Federal Arbitration Act governs the arbitration agreements, under which they are enforceable. Employers also contend that enforcing the agreements protects freedom of contract, thus promoting efficiency and protecting judicial resources. Employees respond that collective arbitration allows them to share the costs and risks of litigation, thereby allowing them to pursue claims that, in the aggregate, may reveal abusive practices by employers. One on hand, freedom of contract in the interest of judicial economy may be harmed if the Court does not uphold the validity of the waivers. On the other hand, if the Court does uphold the validity of the waivers, it will may become more difficult for employees to challenge abusive work practices in their workplaces.
Whether the collective-bargaining provisions of the National Labor Relations Act prohibit the enforcement under the Federal Arbitration Act of an agreement requiring an employee to arbitrate claims against an employer on an individual, rather than collective, basis.
The Court here considers three consolidated cases: Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, Ernst & Young, LLP v. Morris, et al., and National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. Epic Systems, Ernst & Young, and Murphy Oil (“Employers”) urge the Court to uphold class action and collective arbitration waivers between employers and employees.
Does the National Labor Relations Act preempt an employer’s state tort claims against a labor union for intentionally destroying the employer’s property during a strategically-timed labor strike?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether an employer can bring a tort claim in state court against a union or its members for intentionally destroying the employer’s property during a strike. The Court will decide if the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which allows employers and unions to tactically use “economic weapons” such as strikes to gain leverage during collective bargaining, preempts such tort claims. The parties agree that tort claims involving conduct which is “arguably protected” under the NLRA are preempted. Glacier Northwest contends that intentional destruction of private property is not “arguably protected” because it is unlawful. Glacier Northwest additionally argues that, even if intentional destruction of private property is “arguably protected,” a “local interest” exception to preemption applies. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 174 counters that intentional destruction of private property is “arguably protected” and that the “local interest” exemption does not apply. The Supreme Court’s decision could significantly impact labor law by opening the door to more frequent employer lawsuits and recalibrating the legal protections for activities that unions engage in to secure bargaining leverage.
Whether the National Labor Relations Act impliedly preempts a state tort claim against a union for intentionally destroying an employer's property in the course of a labor dispute.
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) gives employees the right to collectively bargain and to undertake “concerted activities for… mutual aid or protection.” Glacier Nw. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union No. 174 at 15. Concerted activities include the right to strike.
Under the federal anti-discrimination law, does the filing period for a constructive discharge claim begin to run at the time an employee resigns, at the time an employee gives notice of her resignation, or at the time of the employer’s last discriminatory act giving rise to the resignation?
Federal employees wishing to file a discrimination lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must exhaust their administrative remedies before proceeding to federal court. The first step in that process is contacting an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor (“EEOC”) and reporting the charge within 45 days of the matter alleged to be discriminatory. See Green v. Donahoe, 760 F.3d 1135, 1139–40 (10th Cir. 2014). Green, a United States Postal Service employee, alleges that he was constructively discharged after being forced to retire. See id. at 1137–38. Green contacted an EEOC to report the alleged discrimination within 45 days of his formal retirement. See id. at 1138. The issue before the Court is when the 45-day filing period begins to run. See Brief for Petitioner, Marvin Green at i. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the filing period begins to run when the last allegedly discriminatory act occurred, which in Green’s case was more than 45 days before Green contacted the EEOC. See Green, 760 F.3d at 1142. Green argues that the filing period begins to run when the employee actually resigns following a discriminatory act. See Brief for Petitioner at 17. Postmaster General Brennan maintains that the filing period begins to run when the employee either actually resigns or gives the employer a notice of resignation, which may occur before the actual resignation. See Brief for Respondent, Megan J. Brennan at 14. Court-Appointed Amica Catherine M.A. Carroll, Esq., agrees with the Tenth Circuit’s holding. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae, in Support of the Judgment Below at 21. This case will impact the rule that courts use when applying Title VII and the balance between employees’ need to access the courts and employers’ need for repose from impending lawsuits. See Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. et al., in Support of Petitioner at 23; Brief of Amici Curiae The Equal Employment Advisory Council et al., in Support of Affirmance at 18.
Under federal employment discrimination law, does the filing period for a constructive discharge claim begin to run when an employee resigns, or at the time of an employer’s last allegedly discriminatory act giving rise to the resignation?
In early 2008, Marvin Green, an African American United States Postal Service (“Postal Service”) worker, applied for a postmaster position. Green v. Donahoe, 760 F.3d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir.
Must an employee making over $200,000 each year satisfy the “extras regulation” requirements in 29 C.F.R. § 541.604 to be a “highly compensated employee” exempt from overtime pay under the FLSA?
This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether highly compensated white-collar employees must meet the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 541.604 to be exempt from overtime pay. To be exempt from overtime pay, 29 C.F.R. § 541.604 requires that employees receive certain minimum weekly guarantees and that a reasonable relationship exist between the guaranteed amount and amount actually earned. Helix argues that incorporating 29 C.F.R. § 541.604 into the Fair Labor Standards Act’s highly compensated employee exception goes against the text and regulatory history of the highly compensated employee exemption regulation and unnecessarily complicates the exemption process. Hewitt counters that 29 C.F.R § 541.604 has been embraced in the text and practice of highly compensated employee exemption regulation and that it encourages employers to improve welfare and increase job slots. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the oil, gas, and nursing industries, as well as their employees’ job markets.
Whether a supervisor making over $200,000 each year is entitled to overtime pay because the standalone regulatory exemption set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 541.601 remains subject to the detailed requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 541.604 when determining whether highly compensated supervisors are exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s overtime-pay requirements.
Petitioners Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. and Helix Well Ops, Inc. (collectively “Helix”) provide offshore oil and gas well intervention services. Hewitt v. Helix Energy Sols. Grp., Inc. at 1. Helix employed Respondent Michael Hewitt for two years as a Toolpusher. Id. at 2. Hewitt, like most Toolpushers, typically worked and lived on an offshore oil rig for twenty-eight-day periods during offshore trips for Helix.
Should Abood v. Detroit Board of Education be overruled, rendering public sector agency fee arrangements, which require non-union employees to pay a fee to the union, unconstitutional under the First Amendment?
This case will decide whether public-sector workers represented by a union can be required to pay agency fees. Janus argues that requiring public-sector workers to pay agency fees constitutes compelled speech and association, imposing undue restrictions on workers’ First Amendment rights. The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“AFSCME”) argues that imposing agency fees on all workers allows unions to appropriately and fairly represent all workers’ interests, which unions are legally required to do. This issue affects every dues-paying, public sector worker. Accordingly, this case will impact the way unions organize and represent public-sector workers.
Whether Abood v. Detroit Board of Education should be overruled and public-sector “agency shop” arrangements invalidated under the First Amendment.
In 2015, the governor of Illinois filed suit challenging provisions of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (“IPLRA”) on First Amendment grounds. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 851 F.3d 746, 747 (7th Cir. 2017). By filing the lawsuit, the governor of Illinois sought to overrule Abood v.
The authors would like to thank Cornell Law School Professor Angela Cornell for her insight into this case.
Does the Fair Labor Standards Act's anti-retaliation provision, which protects employees who file complaints against their employers from retaliatory firings and other discriminatory acts, apply in the case of an employee who lodges an oral, rather than a written, complaint?
Petitioner Kevin Kasten sued his employer, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, Corp., alleging that Saint-Gobain terminated his employment in retaliation for his oral complaints regarding the location of the company's time clocks. Kasten alleges that Section 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act protects employees who make oral complaints from employer retaliation. However, Saint-Gobain asserts that Section 215(a)(3) only protects written complaints made to governmental authorities. The Seventh Circuit held that Section 215(a)(3) only protects written employee complaints. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect several aspects of the employer-employee relationship, including informal dispute resolution procedures in the workplace and employees’ abilities to raise their grievances without fear of retaliation.
Is an oral complaint of a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act protected conduct under the anti-retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)?
Petitioner Kevin Kasten worked for Respondent Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics ("Saint-Gobain"), a company that manufactures high performance plastic materials, from October 2003 through December 2006. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir.
· Wex: Fair Labor Standards Act
· Workplace Prof Blog: Supreme Court Grants Cert in Saint Gobain FLSA Case (Mar. 22, 2010)
· Law.com, Tresa Baldas: High Court to Decide Whether Anti-Retaliation Shield Protects Only Those Who Complain in Writing (Mar. 25, 2010)
Minimum wage laws establish a base level of pay that employers are required to pay certain covered employees. The current federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. In addition to a federal minimum wage, some states also have their own minimum wages, codified either in a state statute or in the state's constitution. States are broken up into 4 classifications for minimum wage:
Does transferring an employee to an equivalent but arguably less prestigious position based on their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether an employer’s decision to transfer an employee, motivated by discrimination but without a judicial finding of substantial detriment to the employee, contravenes Title VII. Petitioner Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow argues that her employer, the City of St. Louis Police Department, made a sex-based decision to reassign her from the police intelligence unit to a more peripheral position and thus violated Title VII, regardless of any judicial assessment of significant disadvantage. Respondent the City of St. Louis counters that Muldrow’s transfer was routine, and that a Title VII claim of discrimination requires demonstrable harm. The Court's decision in this matter will likely influence the scope of Title VII protections against workplace discrimination, thus distinctly affecting employment practices and operational efficiency. The Court’s decision will also impact the number of actionable employment decisions and potential lawsuits.
Whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in transfer decisions absent a separate court determination that the transfer decision caused a significant disadvantage
Petitioner Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow (“Muldrow”) had been a patrol detective in the Intelligence Division of the St. Louis Police Department (“Department”) since 2008 until her transfer in 2017. Muldrow v. City of Saint Louis at 684. She worked on cases involving public corruption, human trafficking, gun crimes, and gangs. Id. The position was a traditional eight-hour workday Monday through Friday. Id.
Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act’s choice-of-law provision, does state law apply only where federal law does not address the issue; or, does state law also apply when it addresses the issue and it is not pre‑empted by, or inconsistent with, federal law?
The Supreme Court will determine whether state wage-and-hour laws may supplement existing federal wage-and-hour laws for disputes arising on the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) of the United States. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) provides that state law that is “applicable and not inconsistent” with federal law may apply to cases on the OCS. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, however, are split as to whether the OCSLA requires state law to only be used as a gap-filling device when federal law is not on point, or if state law may be used even when it supplements or overlaps with existing federal law. Petitioner Parker Drilling Company, Ltd. (“Parker Drilling”) argues that the text and legislative history of the OCSLA, as well as Supreme Court precedent, requires state laws to only be used as a gap-filling device when federal law does not address the issue. Parker Drilling also contends that even if state law can be used to supplement existing federal law, California wage-and-hour laws cannot be used because they are inconsistent with federal wage-and-hour laws. Brian Newton (“Newton”) counters that the text of the OCSLA allows for a more expansive use of state law that also includes supplementing existing federal law, as long as there is no conflict. Newton further asserts that California wage‑and‑hour laws can be applied here because they are relevant and compatible with existing federal wage‑and‑hour laws. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it may have implications for offshore drilling employer‑employee relationships and the responsibilities of federal officials administering the OCSLA.
Whether, under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, state law is borrowed as the applicable federal law only when there is a gap in the coverage of federal law, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held, or whenever state law pertains to the subject matter of a lawsuit and is not pre‑empted by inconsistent federal law, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held.
Beginning in January 2013, Respondent Brian Newton (“Newton”) worked for Petitioner Parker Drilling Management Services (“Parker Drilling”) on drilling platforms for approximately two years. Newton v. Parker Drilling Mgmt.