FCC v. CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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Nos. 24–354 and 24–422

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, et al., PETITIONERS

24–354 v.

CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH, et al.

SCHOOLS, HEALTH & LIBRARIES BROADBAND COALITION, et al., PETITIONERS

24–422 v.

CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH, et al.

on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit

 Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.

 Nearly a century ago, Congress charged the then-new Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) with making communications services available, at affordable prices, to all Americans. That objective became known as “universal service.” Some decades on, near the turn of the 21st century, Congress reaffirmed its commitment to universal service while providing new and more detailed instructions to the FCC about how to achieve it. Under the amended statutory plan, the FCC would use required payments, called contributions, from telecommunications companies to subsidize basic communications services for consumers in certain underserved communities—particularly, rural and low-income areas. To carry out that  mandate, the Commission established discrete subsidy programs for the consumers Congress had identified, set up a special fund to receive and disburse the companies’ payments, and enlisted a private corporation, called the Universal Service Administrative Company, to help manage that fund’s operations.

 The question in this case is whether the universal-service scheme—more particularly, its contribution mechanism—violates the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine, either because Congress has given away its power to the FCC or because the FCC has given away its power to a private company. We hold that no impermissible transfer of authority has occurred. Under our nondelegation precedents, Congress sufficiently guided and constrained the discretion that it lodged with the FCC to implement the universal-service contribution scheme. And the FCC, in its turn, has retained all decision-making authority within that sphere, relying on the Administrative Company only for non-binding advice. Nothing in those arrangements, either separately or together, violates the Constitution.

I

A

 The Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, established the FCC and empowered it to regulate communications services. In the Act’s very first provision, Congress instructed the FCC to pursue the goal now called universal service. The FCC, Congress stated, was “to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States,” reliable communications services “at reasonable charges.” 47 U. S. C. §151.

 The universal-service project arose from the concern that pure market mechanisms would leave some segments of the population without access to needed communications services. That is because providers of those services, also called carriers, can reap greater profits from some classes  of customers than from others. Carriers, for example, make more money in urban areas than in rural ones because fixed costs in cities are spreadable over many more users. See S. Benjamin et al., Telecommunications Law and Policy §15.3.1, p. 763 (2d ed. 2006); In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 FCC Rcd. 8776, 8784 (1997) (Universal Service Order). Similarly, carriers may prefer to focus on business customers instead of residential or not-for-profit customers (like schools and libraries) because the former are willing to pay more for the same services. See id., at 8784. So carriers have incentives to neglect some kinds of customers in providing services or setting prices. See P. Huber, M. Kellogg, & J. Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law §6.1.2, pp. 6–9, 6–10, and n. 26 (3d ed. Supp. 2022). The result, policymakers thought, would be severe inequities in access to communications systems, and a swiss-cheese-like communications network for the whole country. See ibid.; Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8780–8781, 8783.

 Under the original Act, the FCC addressed that concern—and promoted universal service—through a “patchwork quilt of implicit and explicit subsidies.” FCC, Report to Congress 5 (FCC 98–67, 1998). The earliest and dominant squares of that quilt were implicit subsidies, provided under the FCC’s authority to set “just and reasonable” rates. See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8784; 47 U. S. C. §201(b). Carriers then operated as regulated monopolies, with the FCC (and its state counterparts) superintending the rates they could charge different kinds of customers for different services. See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8784–8785; Huber, Federal Telecommunications Law §6.1.1.2, p. 6–7. And regulators used that authority over rates to shift costs: Long-distance rates were set enough above cost “to subsidize local rates, business rates to subsidize [non-business] rates, and urban rates to subsidize rural rates.” Id., p. 6–7. So, for example, a “large  New York [City] brokerage firm making heavy use of long-distance service” would end up “subsidiz[ing] the local services of homeowners in Fishkill.” Ibid.; see Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8784. Over time, though, towns like Fishkill benefited as well from explicit subsidy programs. The FCC, for example, began in the 1980s to levy assessments on long-distance carriers and disburse the proceeds to carriers serving high-cost communities. See id., at 8890–8892; 47 CFR §§36.601–36.641, 69.116(a) (1996). And the FCC began, through the so-called Lifeline program, to make payments directly reducing low-income consumers’ monthly phone bills. See Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8957–8958; §§69.104(j)–(l), 69.117, 69.203(f )–(g).

 In 1996, Congress overhauled the Act to “promote competition and reduce regulation” in the telecommunications sector. See Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. 56. As part of those reforms, Congress created a new framework for achieving universal service. The amended Act discarded the implicit subsidies embedded in ratemaking and substituted a plan for explicit transfer payments to ensure that basic communications services extend across the country. See §254; Universal Service Order, 12 FCC Rcd., at 8783–8784.

 Section 254 of the amended statute requires every carrier providing interstate telecommunications services to “contribute,” in line with the statute and FCC rules, to a fund designed to “preserve and advance universal service.” §254(d). The FCC must use the money in that fund, now known as the Universal Service Fund, to pay for subsidy programs for designated populations and facilities needing improved access. See §§254(a), (e); Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath, 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 2). The statute, for example, continues the Lifeline program aiding low-income individuals. See §254(j). It directs the FCC to provide assistance to rural hospitals, as  well as to schools and libraries. See §254(h)(1). And it instructs the FCC to expand communications access for consumers in “rural” and other “high cost areas.” §254(b)(3). The carrier contributions collected to support those programs, the Act further provides, must be “sufficient” to carry them out and so to “advance universal service.” §§254(d)–(e).

 The statute also provides detailed guidance for identifying the specific communications services to which the statute’s beneficiaries should have access. On the one hand, the Act recognizes that those services, given the expected pace of technological change, are unlikely to stay static: Universal service, says the statute, is “an evolving level of telecommunications services that the Commission shall establish periodically” as it accounts for “advances in telecommunications and information technologies and services.” §254(c)(1). On the other hand, the Act specifies the relevant criteria in every period. In deciding which communications services the “definition” of universal service encompasses, the FCC “shall consider the extent to which” a service (1) is “essential to education, public health, or public safety”; (2) has, through market forces, “been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers”; and (3) is in fact “being deployed in public telecommunications networks by telecommunications carriers.” §§254(c)(1)(A)–(C). So too, the Commission must evaluate whether a service can be made available at an “affordable rate[ ].” §254(b)(1). Congress thus struck a balance in establishing universal service’s metes and bounds—affording the FCC latitude to adapt to technological developments, but insisting that the FCC always look to whether services are essential, affordable, and widely used.

 Echoing the provisions just described, Congress also listed six “principles” on which the FCC “shall base” all its universal-service policies. §254(b). First, “[q]uality services should be available at just, reasonable, and affordable  rates.” §254(b)(1). Second, “all regions of the Nation” should have access to those services. §254(b)(2). Third, all consumers, “including low-income consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas,” should have access to services that are “reasonably comparable” in quality and price to those in urban areas. §254(b)(3). Fourth, every carrier should make “an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution” to the achievement of universal service. §254(b)(4). Fifth, the subsidies given to advance that goal should be “specific, predictable[,] and sufficient.” §254(b)(5). And sixth, “schools,” “libraries,” and “health care providers” should have access to services. §254(b)(6). That list concludes with a provision enabling the FCC to add “other principles” found both “consistent with” the Act and “necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” §254(b)(7).

 The Commission now operates, under the terms of the Act, four universal-service programs. Lifeline, which predated the Act, gives low-income consumers a markdown on their monthly phone bills, usually of $9.25 per month. See §254(j); 47 CFR §§54.400–54.424 (2024); supra, at 4. The High Cost program, which similarly built on a pre-1996 explicit subsidy program, furnishes carriers with funds enabling them to provide basic communications services in “rural, insular, and [other] high cost areas” at costs comparable to those charged in urban areas. §254(b)(3); §§54.302–54.322; supra, at 4. The E-Rate program subsidizes communications services for schools and libraries across the country, with greater discounts going to facilities in rural or low-income areas. See §§254(b)(6), (h)(1)(B); §§54.500–54.523; Wisconsin Bell, 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). And finally, the Rural Health program supports rural hospitals and other health care facilities, enabling them to use telemedicine in caring for far-flung patients and ensuring that they receive the needed communications services at roughly the rates urban facilities pay. See §§254(b)(6),  (h)(1)(A); §§54.600–54.633.

 To calculate how much carriers must contribute to the Fund for those programs, the FCC has devised a formula, known as the “contribution factor.” 47 CFR §54.709(a). That factor is a fraction, expressed as a percentage, whose numerator is the Fund’s projected expenses for the upcoming quarter (the subsidy payments it will make plus overhead) and whose denominator is the total projected revenue of contributing carriers during that same period. See §54.709(a)(2). A carrier must pay into the Fund an amount equal to its own projected revenue multiplied by the contribution factor. See §54.709(a)(3). So, for example, if the FCC forecasts that it will need, in a given quarter, 25% of all carrier revenues to cover the costs of its universal-service programs, a carrier expecting to generate $100 million in revenue in that quarter will have to contribute $25 million. The carrier may then pass along to its customers the cost of its contributions. See §54.712(a). Every quarter, the FCC updates its expense and revenue projections, comes up with a new contribution factor, and announces it in a public notice. See §§54.709(a)(2)–(3). During the next 14 days, the FCC may revise the factor as it thinks proper. See §54.709(a)(3). If the FCC takes no action within that period, the factor is “deemed approved by the Commission” and goes into effect. Ibid. Carriers must then kick in to the Fund accordingly.

 The FCC in 1998 appointed the Universal Service Administrative Company as the Fund’s “permanent Administrator.” §54.701(a). The Administrator, as we will call it, is a private, not-for-profit corporation owned by an association of carriers. See §54.5; Wisconsin Bell, 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). It manages the day-to-day operations of the Fund, “bill[ing] and collect[ing] contributions from carriers” and “distribut[ing] the resulting pot of money, as FCC rules provide, to program beneficiaries.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2); see §54.702. More relevant here, the Administrator  plays a role each quarter in producing the financial projections that end up determining the contribution factor. See §§54.709(a)(2)–(3). Specifically, the Administrator estimates the Fund’s expenses (again, the costs of the programs plus overhead) and adds up the estimates it receives from individual carriers about their revenues. See ibid. The Administrator then submits those figures, along with supporting documentation, to the Commission for approval and eventual use in calculating required contributions. See ibid.

B

 In December 2021, the FCC proposed a contribution factor of 25.2% for the first quarter of 2022. Respondents—the non-profit organization Consumers’ Research, a carrier, and several consumers (collectively, Consumers’ Research)—filed comments (during the 14-day, post-notice period described above) requesting that the FCC instead set the contribution factor at 0%. In support of that submission, Consumers’ Research argued that the universal-service contribution scheme violates the Constitution’s nondelegation rule. The Commission took no action in response, so the 25.2% contribution factor went into effect.

 Consumers’ Research then petitioned for review in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The en banc court granted the petition, replacing a panel decision to the contrary. See 109 F. 4th 743 (2024); 63 F. 4th 441 (2023). In the full Fifth Circuit’s view, the universal-service contribution mechanism is unconstitutional because of its so-called “double-layered delegation.” 109 F. 4th, at 782.

 The court’s analysis proceeded by expressing “skeptic[ism]” about each of two aspects of the contribution scheme, while declining to rule on either one. Id., at 778. First, the court stated, Congress in Section 254 “may have delegated legislative power” to the FCC by giving it “the power to tax” carriers “without supplying an intelligible  principle to guide [its] discretion.” Id., at 756. The court described Section 254’s limits on the Commission’s authority as “minimal,” “contentless,” and “amorphous.” Id., at 760, 761, 767. Nonetheless, the court decided not to decide whether Congress had impermissibly transferred authority to the Commission. Id., at 767. Second, the court continued, the Commission “may have impermissibly delegated the taxing power to private entities” by involving the Administrator in setting contribution amounts. Id., at 756. The court posited that the FCC had “de facto abdicate[d]” governmental responsibilities to the Administrator by giving it the “final say” on how much carriers pay into the Fund. Id., at 771. Again, however, the court demurred as to the bottom line, reserving judgment on whether the Administrator’s role in the contribution scheme violates the Constitution. See id., at 778.

 The dispositive constitutional problem, the Fifth Circuit ultimately held, is “the combination of Congress’s sweeping delegation to FCC and FCC’s unauthorized subdelegation” to the Administrator. Ibid. (emphasis in original). Relying heavily on this Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477 (2010), the court opined that “two or more things that are not independently unconstitutional can combine to violate the Constitution’s separation of powers.” 109 F. 4th, at 778 (emphasis in original). And that was true here for a pair of reasons. The “double-layered delegation,” the court thought, had “no foothold in history or tradition.” Id., at 782. And, the court went on, that delegation “undermine[s] democratic accountability” by obscuring whether Congress, the FCC, or the Administrator bears responsibility for the amount of contributions. Id., at 783–784.

  We granted certiorari, 604 U. S. ___ (2024), and now reverse the decision below.¹ In this Court, Consumers’ Research separates what the Fifth Circuit combined. It contends (as it did below) that Congress’s delegation to the FCC violates the Constitution, and that the FCC’s delegation to the Administrator does so too. We reject each argument, and also reject the Fifth Circuit’s combination theory.

II

 Article I of the Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” §1. Accompanying that assignment of power to Congress is a bar on its further delegation: Legislative power, we have held, belongs to the legislative branch, and to no other. See Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 472 (2001). At the same  time, we have recognized that Congress may “seek[ ] assistance” from its coordinate branches to secure the “effect intended by its acts of legislation.” J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). And in particular, Congress may “vest[ ] discretion” in executive agencies to implement and apply the laws it has enacted—for example, by deciding on “the details of [their] execution.” Ibid.; see Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 46 (1825) (“[T]he maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other departments”); Whitman, 531 U. S., at 474–475 (A “degree of policy judgment” can “be left to those executing or applying the law”).

 To distinguish between the permissible and the impermissible in this sphere, we have long asked whether Congress has set out an “intelligible principle” to guide what it has given the agency to do. J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 409. Under that test, “the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.” Whitman, 531 U. S., at 475. The “guidance” needed is greater, we have explained, when an agency action will “affect the entire national economy” than when it addresses a narrow, technical issue (e.g., the definition of “country [grain] elevators”). Ibid. But in examining a statute for the requisite intelligible principle, we have generally assessed whether Congress has made clear both “the general policy” that the agency must pursue and “the boundaries of [its] delegated authority.” American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 105 (1946). And similarly, we have asked if Congress has provided sufficient standards to enable both “the courts and the public [to] ascertain whether the agency” has followed the law. OPP Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Div., Dept. of Labor, 312 U. S. 126, 144 (1941). If Congress has done so—as we have almost always found—then we will not disturb its grant of authority.

 A

 Although the intelligible-principle standard has focused our nondelegation doctrine for a century, Consumers’ Research and the dissent primarily argue that we must apply a different test here. Section 254, as just described, authorizes the Commission to raise revenue in the form of carrier “contribut[ions]” for universal-service programs. §254(d); see supra, at 4. Consumers’ Research views those required contributions as taxes. See Brief for Respondents 25–29; see also post, at 12–13, 29–30 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). And it argues that tax statutes—and probably all revenue-raising statutes—have to satisfy a special nondelegation rule. For those statutes, Congress must set a “definite” or “objective limit” on how much money an agency can collect—a numeric cap, a fixed rate, or the equivalent. Brief for Respondents 32, 36; see id., at 33–35; see also post, at 14–16 (stating that a “tax rate” is likely required, but a “cap” may also suffice). Without such a limit, Consumers’ Research claims, no intelligible principle (however constraining) will do. See Brief for Respondents 46, 66. And all agree that Section 254 contains no determinate cap or formula. So, on Consumers’ Research’s telling, it effects an unconstitutional delegation.²

 But this Court’s precedents foreclose that argument. Twice before, we have rejected a party’s request to create a special nondelegation rule for revenue-raising legislation. In J. W. Hampton, a taxpayer contended that when Congress is “exercis[ing] the power to levy taxes and fix customs duties,” it lacks the usual leeway to confer discretion on agencies. 276 U. S., at 409. “The [legal] authorities,” the  Court responded, “make no such distinction.” Ibid. And then the Court set out the “intelligible principle” standard as the universal method for assessing delegations. Ibid. More than sixty years later, we reiterated that holding. In Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U. S. 212, 220 (1989), another litigant urged that “Congress’ taxing power” can be delegated only “with much stricter guidelines” than are normally used. Citing J. W. Hampton, we again—and unanimously—rejected that “two-tiered theory of nondelegation.” 490 U. S., at 220–221. “[N]othing” in the Constitution’s text or structure, Skinner explained, “distinguish[es] Congress’ power to tax from its other enumerated powers” “in terms of the scope and degree of discretionary authority that Congress may delegate to the Executive.” Ibid. Nor, the Court added, did history at all distinguish the two. See id., at 221 (“From its earliest days to the present, Congress, when enacting tax legislation,” has at times delegated “discretionary authority” to the Executive). So whether or not a tax is at issue—so say our cases—the usual nondelegation standard applies. And that standard is, again, trained on intelligible principles, not on numeric caps and “mathematical formula[s].” United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 577 (1939); see supra, at 11.³

  The alternative test Consumers’ Research and the dissent propose also would throw a host of federal statutes into doubt. Relying on this Court’s nondelegation precedents, Congress has often enacted statutes empowering agencies to raise revenue without specifying a numeric cap or tax rate. See Reply Brief for Federal Petitioners 7–9 (listing nine “example[s]”). Indeed, such statutes are endemic in the sphere of financial regulation. The Federal Reserve Board, for instance, funds its operations by levying on Federal Reserve Banks “an assessment sufficient to pay its estimated expenses.” 12 U. S. C. §243. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) likewise “collect[s]” from OCC-chartered banks an “assessment, fee, or other charge” as the Office “determines is necessary or appropriate to carry out [its] responsibilities.” §16. And the Deposit Insurance Fund of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which protects the savings of millions of Americans, is financed through charges on banks “which the Corporation may by regulation prescribe, after giving due consideration to the need to establish and maintain the [Fund’s] reserve ratio.” §1815(d)(1). In none of those (or many other) revenue-raising statutes does a number appear. So all would be on the constitutional chopping block under Consumers’ Research’s reasoning.

 Consumers’ Research is conflicted about how to approach that problem, but sometimes tries to draw a line between taxes and fees. Our decision in National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. United States, 415 U. S. 336 (1974) (NCTA), recognized that distinction, as Consumers’ Research notes. See Brief for Respondents 28. We there described “fees” as “bestow[ing]” a reciprocal “benefit on the [payor], not shared by other members of society.” NCTA, 415 U. S., at  341. By contrast, “taxes” are expected to “inure[ ] to the benefit” of the wider public. Id., at 343. In its brief, Consumers’ Research argues that its numeric-cap standard applies to both taxes and fees: As to either, Congress’s delegation to an agency must include an “objective upper limit[ ].” Brief for Respondents 37; see id., at 36–38. At argument, however, Consumers’ Research relied on the tax vs. fee distinction to get out from under the long list of statutes its position places in jeopardy. Most of those statutes, it argued, involve not taxes but fees, where the charge reflects simply “the value of the benefit to the” payor. Tr. of Oral Arg. 134; see id., at 148. So, Consumers’ Research suggested, if we label carrier contributions “taxes” and then make only taxes subject to the numeric-limit requirement, there would be minimal fallout from adopting its position. See ibid. The dissent joins Consumers’ Research in pressing that argument. See post, at 25–30.

 But the problems with going down that road are substantial. First and as already shown, precedent forecloses it. Indeed, in rejecting a stricter test for delegations made “under Congress’ taxing power,” Skinner specifically noted that its position rendered irrelevant the question (which, we noted, “so exercised the District Court”) whether the charges there were “user fees” or a “form of taxation.” 490 U. S., at 223. Either way, the Court held, the delegation inquiry was just the same, and just the usual one. See ibid.⁴  Second, Consumers’ Research offers no argument for why categorizing something as a fee rather than a tax should matter for delegation purposes. To the contrary, its brief suggests the difference should make no difference—that instead all revenue-raising measures should be treated the same. Brief for Respondents 36–38; Tr. of Oral Arg. 132–133 (repeating the point). The distinction is proposed only as an artificial method for limiting the effects of a holding in Consumers’ Research’s favor, should the court be too squeamish to go all the way.

 And third, the distinction between taxes and fees, even if occasionally needed, is a morass—or as the Government (which levies both) puts it, “unbelievably murky in practice.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 52. A charge is a “fee,” according to NCTA, when it is for a “benefit” granted to the payor that is “not shared by other members of society.” 415 U. S., at 341. But articulating that test is a fair bit easier than applying it, because it is often hard to say whether a benefit is so “shared.” Consider the charge that banks pay to obtain FDIC Deposit Insurance. See supra, at 14. The banks benefit from that insurance (it helps them attract money and prevents bank runs). So maybe the charge looks like a fee? But then again, depositors also benefit (because the insurance protects their money) and so does the wider public (because everyone gains from having a stable banking system). So maybe the charge instead looks like a tax? Or take another example: the OCC’s assessments on banks. See ibid. Are they fees because a bank must pay them to hold an OCC-issued charter? Or are they taxes because the OCC uses the funds collected for regulatory programs benefiting the public? Consumers’ Research does not know. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 134 (describing the OCC statute as “kind of on the  line,” “tough,” and “maybe . . . questionable”).⁵

 Or finally and most relevantly: What category do carriers’ contributions belong in? Universal service is of course a public benefit. But carriers gain in tangible ways from having an all-inclusive network, and they often receive direct subsidies from the FCC’s universal-service programs. For those reasons, the carriers’ main trade associations view the contributions as fees. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 76, 80. The Government, by contrast, sees “genuine ambiguity” on the issue, but “assum[es]” they are taxes. Id., at 52–53. It is a good thing for the state of the law that we do not have to decide between the two, in this case or others raising a delegation challenge.⁶

  And yet a greater problem inheres in the shared position of Consumers’ Research and the dissent: Whatever it applies to (just taxes or fees as well), its focus on numeric limits produces absurd results, divorced from any reasonable understanding of constitutional values. Under that view, a revenue-raising statute containing non-numeric, qualitative standards can never pass muster, no matter how much guidance those standards provide and how tight the constraints they impose. But a revenue-raising statute with a numeric limit will always pass muster, even if it effectively leaves an agency with boundless power. Consider a hypothetical raised at oral argument: Congress tells the FCC it can demand payments from carriers of any amount it wants up to $5 trillion. (The actual cost of universal service is, of course, a tiny fraction of that amount.) According to Consumers’ Research, that statute is permissible because . . . well, because Congress has set the $5 trillion figure. See id., at 124 (“[T]hen we would know that Congress itself has made that determination”); see id., at 123–127; Brief for Respondents 5, 63, 66; see also post, at 34–35. But so what? The purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to enforce limits on the “degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The anywhere-up-to-$5-trillion tax statute would not do that, whereas a statute with qualitative limits well might. In ap proving the former and precluding the latter, the Consumers’ Research approach does nothing to vindicate the nondelegation doctrine or, more broadly, the separation of powers.

B

 We therefore return to the usual intelligible-principle test to decide whether the universal-service contribution scheme violates the Constitution’s nondelegation rule. The question is, again, whether Section 254 adequately guides the FCC in requiring contributions from carriers—whether it expresses the “general policy” the FCC must pursue in setting contribution amounts, as well as the “boundaries” it cannot cross. American Power & Light, 329 U. S., at 105. Here, that inquiry into the nature of the FCC’s discretion involves what turn out to be two closely related questions. First, how much money can the FCC raise through contributions? And second, on what things can it spend those funds? We consider each in turn, and find that Congress answered both. Congress, that is, imposed ascertainable and meaningful guideposts for the FCC to follow when carrying out its delegated function of collecting and spending contributions from carriers.

1

 As Consumers’ Research notes, Section 254 imposes no quantitative but only qualitative limits on how much money the FCC can raise from carriers for universal service. There is not a number or a rate in sight. Instead, the statute directs the FCC to collect the amount that is “sufficient” to support the universal-service programs Congress has told it to implement. §§254(b)(5), (d), (e). That language replicates or resembles the statutory terms Congress has used in other revenue-raising statutes, as described above. See supra, at 14; see, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §243 (instruct ing the Federal Reserve Board to levy on banks “an assessment sufficient to pay its estimated expenses”).

 Consumers’ Research argues that, even under our usual nondelegation test, the term “sufficient” does not do enough. That is because, in the Consumers’ Research view, it sets only “a floor—not a ceiling—on the FCC’s revenue-raising power.” Brief for Respondents 56. Or to put the point differently, Consumers’ Research thinks that the statute gives the FCC power, all on its own, to raise our hypothetical $5 trillion. See supra, at 18–19. And not unreasonably, it thinks that would pose a constitutional problem.

 But in fact the word “sufficient” sets a floor and a ceiling alike. An amount of money is “sufficient” for a purpose if it is “[a]dequate” or “necessary” to achieve that purpose. Black’s Law Dictionary 1447 (7th ed. 1999). That means, of course, that the FCC cannot raise less than is adequate or necessary to finance the universal-service programs Congress wants. But it also means that the FCC cannot raise more than that amount. Were the FCC to raise, say, twice as much as needed, the revenue would not be “sufficient” but instead excessive. Cf. Whitman, 531 U. S., at 475–476 (similarly understanding the term “requisite” to mean “not lower or higher than is necessary”). Take another hypothetical from oral argument. If you told a friend to order a “sufficient” amount of food for five people and 500 boxes of pizza showed up at your house, you would not think he had followed instructions. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 135. So too with Congress and the Commission. Budgeting, to be sure, is not an exact science, so in one quarter the Commission may collect a bit more than it needs and in another a bit less. See 47 CFR §§54.709(b), (c) (telling the Administrator that if it collects “excess” or “inadequate” funds in a given quarter, it should compensate in the next one). But the Commission’s mandate is to raise what it takes to pay for universal-service programs; if the Commission raises much beyond, as if it raises much below, it violates the statute.

  And the Commission has long viewed the statute in just that way. For many years, the Commission has construed the sufficient-funding directive to call for raising “an affordable and sustainable amount of support that is adequate, but no greater than necessary, to achieve the goals of the universal service program.” In re High-Cost Universal Serv. Support, 25 FCC Rcd. 4072, 4074 (2010); see Tr. of Oral Arg. 4 (Solicitor General explaining that Congress has authorized the FCC to collect “only what’s sufficient to achieve universal service, so no more than needed to support specified programs”). The Commission, in other words, sets the contribution factor to raise just enough money—a “sufficient” amount—to implement universal service as Congress directed.

2

 To say that much, though, takes us only halfway, because it raises the question: Sufficient for what? If Section 254’s universal-service program is itself indeterminate—so that the FCC can turn it into anything the FCC wants—then the “sufficiency” ceiling will do no serious work. The FCC could operate—and collect contributions “sufficient” for—either the most barebones or the most extravagant program. But if Congress has given appropriate guidance about the nature and content of universal service, then that plus the “sufficiency” ceiling will defeat this challenge to the contribution system. For Congress will have provided intelligible principles to guide the FCC as it raises funds.

 On this further, “for what” question, our nondelegation precedents provide context—showing what kinds of statutory schemes have passed, and what kinds have failed, the demand that Congress give adequate guidance. Those that have failed are fewer in number—in fact, only two—but offer object lessons about the amount of latitude Congress can confer. In one case, the statute empowered the President  to bar the transport of petroleum products while “establish[ing] no criterion” and “declar[ing] no policy” for whether, when, or how he should do so. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 415 (1935). The statute in the second case was even worse. It authorized the President to approve “codes of fair competition” for “the government of trade and industry throughout the country,” yet imposed “few restrictions” and “set[ ] up no standards” aside from a “statement of the general aims of rehabilitat[ing], correct[ing,] and expand[ing]” the economy. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 521–522, 541–542 (1935). The law thus gave the President “virtually unfettered” authority to govern the Nation’s trades and industries. Id., at 542.

 At the same time, we have found intelligible principles in a host of statutes giving agencies significant discretion. So, for example, we upheld a provision enabling an agency to set air quality standards at levels “requisite to protect the public health.” Whitman, 531 U. S., at 472. We sustained a delegation to an agency to ensure that corporate structures did not “unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power” among security holders. American Power & Light, 329 U. S., at 104. And we affirmed authorizations to regulate in the “public interest” and to set “just and reasonable” rates, because we thought the discretion given was not unbridled. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 225–226 (1943); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 600 (1944); see supra, at 3. Of course, our cases did not examine those statutory phrases in isolation but instead looked to the broader statutory contexts, which informed their interpretation and supplied the content necessary to satisfy the intelligible-principle test. See, e.g., National Broadcasting, 319 U. S., at 226 (“It is a mistaken assumption” that the phrase “public interest” is “a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations”; rather, “[t]he purpose of  the Act, the requirements it imposes, and the context of the provision in question show the contrary”); see also infra, at 29.

 Section 254, for its part, provides the FCC with determinate standards for operating the universal-service program. The statute makes clear whom the program is intended to serve: those in rural and other high-cost areas (with a special nod to rural hospitals), low-income consumers, and schools and libraries. See §§254(b)(3), (6), (h)(1); see supra, at 4–6. And in provisions defining universal service and stating the program’s core “principles,” the statute provides specific criteria for which services those statutory beneficiaries should receive. §§254(b), (c)(1). In deciding whether a service falls within the program’s ambit, the FCC must consider whether the service has “been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers.” §254(c)(1)(B). If that objective criterion is not met, the FCC generally may not subsidize the service. So too, the service must be one that can be made available to all consumers in all regions at “reasonable[ ] and affordable rates”—so more a basic than a budget-busting good. §§254(b)(1), (3).⁷ And still more, the service must be “essential to education, public health, or public safety”—a necessity, not a luxury, in order to live in the world. §254(c)(1)(A). The conditions, each alone and together, have bite, creating a bounded program. Section 254 instructs the Commission to provide to an identified set of recipients a defined sort of benefit—widely used, generally affordable, and essential telecommunications services.

 That limited conception of universal service is rooted in its history—except that the new statute, as compared with  the old, holds the FCC to more specific requirements. As earlier explained, the 1934 Act charged the FCC with pursuing universal service—that is, with making available to all Americans telecommunications services “at reasonable charges.” §151. As then understood, that objective did not reach for the stars: Though quite important, it was also “relatively modest.” Benjamin, Telecommunications Law and Policy §18.2, at 863. The idea was to “reduc[e] the costs of basic telephone service and, in that way, increas[e] national subscribership.” Ibid. By the time of the 1996 amendments, though, new telecommunications technologies and services had emerged. And so Congress enabled the FCC, in carrying out universal-service programs, to do more. See id., at 863–864; see, e.g., §§254(b)(6), (h)(1). But still the statute’s policy was a circumscribed one: to provide to all (especially, the rural and poor) the services that most already had, if those services were both necessary and affordable. The key difference between the original statute and the amended one is a matter of means, and on that score, the latter provides far greater congressional guidance. Under the 1934 Act, the FCC gave implicit (and often obscure) subsidies under its general (i.e., “just and reasonable”) ratemaking authority. See supra, at 3; see also post, at 3 (explaining that in the pre-1996 regime, “[r]egulators manipulated rates” to fund universal service). Under the 1996 Act, the FCC gives explicit (and transparent) subsidies in accord with the detailed criteria described above. See supra, at 4, 23. So today, when the FCC carries out Congress’s century-old commitment to universal service, the statutory policy is clear and the statutory boundaries specific.

 The proof is in the pudding: Each of the four programs the FCC now operates under Section 254 reflects Congress’s choices about universal service’s scope and content. The Lifeline program, which began under the original Act, advances a basic commitment. Now codified, it helps make phone service affordable to all Americans by providing a  modest monthly subsidy. See §254(j); 47 CFR §§54.400–54.424; supra, at 4, 6. The High Cost program similarly implements a longstanding principle—to integrate rural communities into the Nation’s communications network. See §151; §§54.302–54.322; supra, at 3–4, 6. And it does so now in accordance with the statutory directive to ensure that rural and other high-cost areas have access to roughly the same needed services, at the same affordable prices, as urban areas do. §254(b)(3). The Commission’s other two programs, E-Rate and Rural Health, are of a piece. Specifically authorized in the amended Act, they underwrite services essential to education and healthcare, with a focus on underserved populations. §254(h)(1); §§54.500–54.523, 54.600–54.633; supra, at 6–7. Not one of those important but decidedly ordinary programs suggests an agency vested with unbridled discretion. Each provides communications services satisfying the Act’s listed criteria to the Act’s identified beneficiaries. And maybe surprisingly (given what we are used to when it comes to government programs), they have done so at roughly constant inflation-adjusted dollars. Compare USAC, 2000 Annual Report 5 (charging carriers $7.4 billion in 1999 when so adjusted), with USAC, 2024 Annual Report 18 (charging carriers $8.4 billion in 2024).⁸ That is because in the amended Act, Congress made  clear the parameters of the programs, and the FCC has operated within them.⁹

 Consumers’ Research and the dissent tell a different story—that the Act gives the FCC boundless authority—but the provisions they point to show nothing of the kind. They first pluck out a few words to argue that the criteria for subsidizing services, described above, are not “real limit[s].” Brief for Respondents 55; supra, at 23. On affordability, both contend that because Section 254(b) states that services “should”—rather than “shall”—be made available at “reasonable[ ] and affordable rates,” there is in fact no such requirement. Brief for Respondents 47–48; see post, at 20–21. But that reading starts in the middle. The provision, starting from the start, says that the FCC “shall” base all universal-service policies on the principle (among others) that services “should be available” at “reasonable[ ] and affordable rates.” §254(b)(1). The mandatory “shall” requires the FCC to follow the affordability principle—which means providing all services at “reasonable[ ] and affordable rates.” And similarly as to whether a service is widely used and essential. Per Consumers’ Research and the dissent, Section 254(c)(1) says only that the FCC must “consider” those criteria and thus establishes no more than a “weak[ ] procedural requirement.” Brief for Respondents 54; see post, at 6–7, 19–22. But the list of criteria the FCC “shall” consider resides in the very “definition” of the “ser vices” it can subsidize. §254(c)(1). The statute, read sensibly, does not tell the FCC to muse on those criteria before developing its own. Rather, it tells the FCC to “consider,” as to any given service, whether it satisfies the listed criteria (and therefore can be subsidized). And that is, indeed, how the Solicitor General, representing the FCC, understands the provision. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 10, 27–29, 177–178.

 The dissent therefore fails in its related claim that the FCC can balance different universal-service criteria against each other—so, for example, fund a service because it is “essential to education” even though it has not been adopted “by a substantial majority” of customers. Post, at 6–7; see post, at 18–19; supra, at 23. Again, the Solicitor General has represented in this Court that each of the criteria has to be met. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10, 27–29, 177–178. In any event, and yet more important, we must “exercise [our] independent judgment in deciding” what power Congress has conferred. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 412 (2024). And for all the reasons given above, we view the statutory criteria—which, contra the dissent, post, at 18, define universal service—as separately mandatory. See §254(c)(1); supra, at 23, 26–27. Of course, the Commission may still have to strike balances in addressing those criteria, along with the statute’s other provisions. It may, for example, have to decide whether to make a service more affordable (by giving a larger subsidy) or instead extend it to a broader swathe of recipients. But that kind of discretion—balancing or no—does not raise a constitutional problem: A “degree of policy judgment,” as we have explained, “can be left to those executing or applying the law.” Whitman, 531 U. S., at 474–475.

 We likewise see no constitutional issue in Section 254(c)(1)’s description of universal service as an “evolving level of telecommunications services that the Commission  shall establish periodically” in light of “advances in telecommunications and information” services. According to Consumers’ Research and the dissent, that language enables the FCC to “redefine universal service” over time as it and only it “sees fit.” Brief for Respondents 8, 54; see post, at 18. But Congress’s statement that universal service should “evolve” is itself a direction—and a near-inevitable one, given the reality of technological change. If universal service did not evolve—if Congress had defined it as, say, a landline in every home (or, as the dissent would have it, “touch-tone [phone] service,” post, at 19)—the program would have long since become obsolete. The Act’s embrace of evolution—the permission it gives the FCC to subsidize different services now than 30 years ago—ensures that the universal-service program will be of enduring utility. But that conferral of discretion does not strip the statute of standards and constraints. The Commission still may fund only essential, widely used, and affordable services, for the benefit of only designated recipients. See supra, at 23. So Congress has ensured that the Commission will continue to carry out the same objectives according to the same criteria and principles, even as it has allowed adaptation to a changing technological landscape.

 Finally, we do not view as Consumers’ Research does the provision in Section 254 enabling the FCC to articulate “[a]dditional principles,” beyond the six listed, to guide its universal-service programs. §254(b)(7); see supra, at 6. Recall that the added principles are ones the FCC “determine[s] are necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity and are consistent with this chapter.” See supra, at 6. As Consumers’ Research sees it, the FCC can, through devising those principles, “rewrite its own authority.” Brief for Respondents 50 (capitalization altered); see post, at 18. But that is not so because, again, the added principles must be “consistent with” the rest of the statute. They cannot change any of the  statute’s other principles, much less its conditions on what subsidies can go toward and who can receive them. The new principles can only operate, within those statutory parameters, to further channel the FCC’s discretion. So they are a way to superimpose self-restraint on congressional restraint, which is hardly improper. And the provision’s broadly framed reference to the “public interest” suggests nothing to the contrary. The public-interest requirement lies on top of the consistency requirement—connected with an “and,” not an “or”—and anyway is complementary to it. For we have long held that “the words ‘public interest’ in a regulatory statute” do not encompass “the general public welfare” but rather “take meaning from the purposes of the regulatory legislation.” NAACP v. FPC, 425 U. S. 662, 669 (1976); see New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12, 24–25 (1932); see supra, at 22–23. So the whole of the “[a]dditional principles” provision supplies a means of further implementing, rather than dispensing with, Congress’s instructions.

 In a sense, each of the arguments Consumers’ Research and the dissent make about Section 254 suffers from the same flaw. At every turn, they read Section 254 extravagantly, the better to create a constitutional problem. As earlier seen, “sufficient” means to Consumers’ Research as much as the FCC wants, a floor without a ceiling. See supra, at 20. The statute’s mandatory conditions on funding services are instead mere suggestions, for the FCC to observe or not as it chooses. See supra, at 26–27. The phrase “evolving level” of service licenses the FCC to create a whole new program, unhindered by the statute’s existing standards and boundaries. See supra, at 27–28. And the possibility of “[a]dditional principles” coming from the FCC somehow subverts the limiting principles Congress put on the FCC, so that everything about universal service is up for grabs. See supra, at 28–29. All in all, the arguments do not show statutory construction at its best. Nor, relatedly,  do they show proper respect for a coordinate branch of Government. Statutes (including regulatory statutes) should be read, if possible, to comport with the Constitution, not to contradict it. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Industrial Union Dept., AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 646 (1980) (plurality opinion); West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 722–723 (2022). That disposition nowhere appears in the efforts Consumers’ Research and the dissent make to force Section 254 past the Constitution’s breaking point.

 Properly understood, the universal-service contribution scheme clears the nondelegation bar. The policy it expresses is clear and limiting. If, says the statute, a substantial majority of Americans has access to a communications service that is both affordable and essential to modern life, then other Americans should have access to that service too. And to make that happen, the statute continues, carriers should kick in the needed funds. At bottom, that is all the contribution scheme challenged here accomplishes. Through that statutory mechanism, the FCC raises sufficient funds (neither more nor less than needed) to bring to underserved Americans, mainly in rural and low-income communities, a bounded and commonplace set of communications services. The FCC no doubt exercises significant discretion in carrying out that charge. But it is discretion tethered to legislative judgments about the scope and content of the universal-service program. And so the main delegation at issue here, from Congress to the Commission, does not offend the Constitution.

III

 The next question Consumers’ Research raises is whether a different delegation, now from the Commission to the Administrator (which, recall, is a private, not-for-profit corporation), independently flouts a constitutional command.  Here, Consumers’ Research invokes what is commonly called the private nondelegation doctrine. See Brief for Respondents 74–75. In the leading case of Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 310–311 (1936), this Court struck down a statute authorizing certain coal producers to set maximum hours and minimum wages for the rest of the industry. We explained that the statute involved “delegation in its most obnoxious form” because it was made to “private persons whose interests” are often “adverse to the interests of others.” Id., at 311; see Schechter Poultry, 295 U. S., at 537. Consumers’ Research contends that the FCC has in like manner conferred governmental power on a private party, by (in its description) giving the Administrator carte blanche to set the contribution factor, which then determines what individual carriers pay into the Fund. See Brief for Respondents 3–4, 75; supra, at 7–8.

 Carter Coal, though, has a counterpart case, addressing how Government agencies may rely on advice and assistance from private actors. In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 388 (1940), this Court considered a statute, enacted in response to Carter Coal, permitting boards of coal companies to propose minimum coal prices to a Government agency for “approv[al], disapprov[al], or modifi[cation].” That arrangement, we held, was “unquestionably valid.” 310 U. S., at 399. After all, we explained, the private boards “function[ed] subordinately to” the agency and were subject to its “authority and surveillance.” Ibid. As long as an agency thus retains decision-making power, it may enlist private parties to give it recommendations.

 Here, the Administrator is broadly subordinate to the Commission. The FCC appoints the Administrator’s Board of Directors and approves its budget. See 47 CFR §§54.703(b)–(c), 54.715(c). The Administrator “may not make policy,” and must carry out all its tasks “consistent with” the FCC’s rules, “orders, written directives, and other instructions.” §54.702(c); Memorandum of Understanding  Between the Federal Communications Commission and the Universal Service Administrative Company 2 (Oct. 17, 2024) (Memorandum of Understanding). And anyone aggrieved by an action of the Administrator may seek de novo review by the Commission. §§54.719–54.725. So in the relationship between the two, the Commission dominates.

 And critically, that is as true in determining the contribution factor as in other matters: Although the Administrator plays an advisory role, the Commission alone has decision-making authority. Recall that each quarter’s contribution factor is a function of the carriers’ projected revenues and the Fund’s projected expenses. See supra, at 7. The Administrator makes the initial projections. On the revenue side, that means just doing arithmetic: The carriers submit their projections on FCC forms and the Administrator adds them up. See §§54.709(a)(2)–(3), 54.711(a). On the expense side, the Administrator’s estimates involve considerably greater effort—but still no policy-making. The FCC’s rules implementing the Act dictate the programs’ scope: For example, they set eligibility criteria for beneficiaries, provide formulas for calculating subsidies, and impose some funding caps. See, e.g., §§54.410, 54.507, 54.604–54.606.¹⁰ Working within those rules, the Administrator estimates the programs’ cost. It then publicly reports those projections, along with supporting documents, to the Commission—on the revenue side, at least 30 days before a quarter starts, on the expense side, at least 60. See §54.709(a)(3). That gives the Commission a chance to review—and, if needed, to revise—the projections before approving final figures. See ibid. When the review process is complete, the Commission sets the contribution factor and  posts it in a public notice. See ibid. The Commission then has 14 days to make additional changes before the factor is “deemed approved.” Ibid. So the Commission is, throughout, the final authority—just as the agency was in Sunshine Anthracite. The Administrator, following the FCC’s rules, makes recommendations. But the Commission decides whether or how to use them in setting the contribution factor.

 In contending otherwise, Consumers’ Research misunderstands the regulatory scheme. Its primary argument rests on the words “deemed approved” in the FCC’s regulations. Consumers’ Research takes that to mean that the Administrator’s projections can “take legal effect” just by the “deem[ing]” mechanism—that is, without receiving “formal FCC approval.” Brief for Respondents 80. But that account ignores everything that happens before the 14-day period following public notice. Prior to that time, the Commission reviews the Administrator’s projections, and either revises or approves them. Then, the Commission sets the contribution factor based on the vetted projections and issues it to the public. So the Administrator’s projections can have only the legal (or, indeed, practical) effect the Commission decides they should. Not the Administrator, but the Commission endorses final projections, converts them into a contribution factor, and formally promulgates them. At the end of all that action, the “deemed approved” provision just operates to shut off an additional two-week opportunity the Commission has to revise the published contribution factor—because something (including public comments like Consumers’ Research submitted) has caused it to change its mind. That provision does nothing to negate the Commission decision-making that has already taken place.

 The alternative argument Consumers’ Research makes does not fare any better. Here, Consumers’ Research appears to concede that the FCC approves the projections going into the contribution factor; the problem instead is that  the approval is too often automatic—simply “rubber-stamp[ing].” Id., at 82. But the relevant legal question is not how often the FCC revises the Administrator’s projections, just as in Sunshine Anthracite it was not how often the agency rejected the coal companies’ pricing advice. It is sufficient in such schemes that the private party’s recommendations (as is true here) cannot go into effect without an agency’s say-so, regardless of how freely given. See 310 U. S., at 399. This case suggests at least one reason why: It may not be clear what the ratio of approvals to rejections actually means. On the view of Consumers’ Research, the infrequency with which the Commission changes the Administrator’s publicly submitted projections shows that it simply is not paying attention. But an amicus brief submitted by former FCC Commissioners offers an alternative explanation—that the Administrator “informally shares its projections” with the Commission before it publicly submits them, so that much of the discussion between the two occurs behind the scenes. See Brief for Bipartisan Former Commissioners of the FCC as Amici Curiae 11; see also Memorandum of Understanding 7 (establishing that informal procedure). And yet a third account might suggest that the absence of frequent dispute reflects the limited role the Administrator performs in estimating the expenses of programs whose contours FCC regulations precisely define. See supra, at 32–33. The explanation, that is, would lie in the narrow scope of the assignment the FCC has given to the Administrator.

 So the Commission’s transfer of accounting functions to the Administrator offers no reason for holding the universal-service contribution scheme invalid. In every way that matters to the constitutional inquiry, the Commission, not the Administrator, is in control.

IV

 Consumers’ Research almost wholly ignores the basis of  the decision below: that the “combination” of Congress’s grant of authority to the FCC and the FCC’s reliance on the Administrator for financial projections violates the Constitution, even if neither one does so alone. See 109 F. 4th, at 778 (emphasis in original). But because that theory accounts for the decision we are reviewing, we cannot close without addressing it briefly.

 The Fifth Circuit, as noted earlier, founded its combination theory—that a constitutional non-violation plus a constitutional non-violation may equal a constitutional violation—on this Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund. See supra, at 9. There, we struck down a statute because it gave an executive officer two “layers of protection” from the President’s removal authority: The President was “restricted in his ability to remove a principal officer, who [was] in turn restricted in his ability to remove an inferior officer.” 561 U. S., at 483–484. Even granting that each layer of good-cause protection was alone permissible, we thought the combination was too much. The two together, more than either alone, insulated the officer from the President’s firing power, thus super-charging the officer’s “independence.” Id., at 496. That holding, in the Fifth Circuit’s view, gave rise to a “general principle”: “[T]wo constitutional parts do not necessarily add up to a constitutional whole.” 109 F. 4th, at 779. And the court thought that principle applied here. Even if Congress lawfully conferred discretion on the Commission and the Commission lawfully sought assistance from the Administrator, the combination was both “unprecedented” and “incompatible” with “democratic accountability.” Id., at 779, 783–784. So what the Fifth Circuit called “the universal service contribution mechanism’s double-layered delegation” had to go. Id., at 784.

 But the court’s analogy and associated logic do not work. In Free Enterprise Fund, each of the two layers of for-cause protection limited the same thing—the President’s power to  remove executive officers. And when combined, each compounded the other’s effect, so that the President was left with no real authority. Or otherwise said, the two layers of restrictions operated on a single axis with the one exacerbating (we thought exponentially) the other. But that reasoning has no bearing here. A law violates the traditional (or call it, for comparison’s sake, “public”) nondelegation doctrine when it authorizes an agency to legislate. And a law—whether a statute or, as here, a regulation—violates the private nondelegation doctrine when it allows non-governmental entities to govern. Those doctrines do not operate on the same axis (save if it is defined impossibly broadly). So a measure implicating (but not violating) one does not compound a measure implicating (but not violating) the other, in a way that pushes the combination over a constitutional line. “Two wrong claims do not make one that is right.” Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U. S. 438, 457 (2009). If a regulatory scheme authorizes neither executive legislation nor private governance, it does not somehow authorize an unlawful amalgam. Contra the Fifth Circuit, a meritless public nondelegation challenge plus a meritless private nondelegation challenge cannot equal a meritorious “combination” claim.

 And indeed Sunshine Anthracite as well as said so before. As earlier noted, that case involved a private nondelegation challenge—that a board of coal companies advising an agency played too great a role in setting industry prices. See 310 U. S., at 399; supra, at 31. In addition, the case involved a public nondelegation challenge—that even the agency could not set prices because Congress had failed to provide it with sufficient guidance. See 310 U. S., at 397–399. The Court discussed and rejected the one challenge; and then it discussed and rejected the other. See ibid. And then the Court stopped. It did not think some further “combination” analysis was required. That was because (1) an executive agency exercising only executive power, plus (2) a  private entity exercising no government power (but merely giving advice) equals (3) a permissible constitutional arrangement.

V

 When Congress amended the Communications Act in 1996, it provided the Commission with clear guidance on how to promote universal service using carrier contributions. Congress laid out the “general policy” to be achieved, the “principle[s]” and standards the FCC must use in pursuing that policy, and the “boundaries” the FCC may not cross. J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 409; American Power & Light, 329 U. S., at 105. Our precedents do not require more. Nor do they prevent the Commission, in carrying out Congress’s policy, from obtaining the Administrator’s assistance in projecting revenues and expenses, so that carriers pay the needed amount. For nearly three decades, the work of Congress and the Commission in establishing universal-service programs has led to a more fully connected country. And it has done so while leaving fully intact the separation of powers integral to our Constitution.

 We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.