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chore(deps): update dependency h11 to v0.16.0 [security] #163
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Reviewer's Guide by SourceryThis pull request updates the h11 dependency from version 0.14.0 to 0.16.0 in both the ai-gateway and browser-agent applications. This update addresses CVE-2025-43859, a security vulnerability related to HTTP request smuggling due to lenient parsing of chunked-encoding. Sequence diagram for HTTP Request Smuggling Vulnerability (h11 < 0.15.0)sequenceDiagram
participant Attacker
participant BuggyProxy
participant h11Server
Attacker->>BuggyProxy: GET /one HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n\n5\nAAAAAXX2\n45\n0
BuggyProxy->>h11Server: GET /one HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n\n5\nAAAAAXX2\n45\n0
activate h11Server
h11Server-->>Attacker: HTTP/1.1 200 OK (Request 1: /one with body AAAAA45)
deactivate h11Server
Attacker->>BuggyProxy: GET /two HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n\n0
BuggyProxy->>h11Server: GET /two HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n\n0
activate h11Server
h11Server-->>Attacker: HTTP/1.1 200 OK (Request 2: /two with empty body)
deactivate h11Server
note over BuggyProxy, h11Server: h11 interprets as two requests, buggy proxy as one.
Sequence diagram for HTTP Request Handling (h11 >= 0.15.0)sequenceDiagram
participant Attacker
participant Proxy
participant h11Server
Attacker->>Proxy: GET /one HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n\n5\nAAAAAXX2\n45\n0
Proxy-->>Attacker: HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request (Invalid Chunked Encoding)
note over Proxy, h11Server: h11 now validates trailing \r\n bytes correctly.
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We have skipped reviewing this pull request. Here's why:
- It seems to have been created by a bot (hey, renovate[bot]!). We assume it knows what it's doing!
- We don't review packaging changes - Let us know if you'd like us to change this.
This PR contains the following updates:
==0.14.0->==0.16.0GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2025-43859
Impact
A leniency in h11's parsing of line terminators in chunked-coding message bodies can lead to request smuggling vulnerabilities under certain conditions.
Details
HTTP/1.1 Chunked-Encoding bodies are formatted as a sequence of "chunks", each of which consists of:
\r\nlengthbytes of content\r\nIn versions of h11 up to 0.14.0, h11 instead parsed them as:
\r\nlengthbytes of contenti.e. it did not validate that the trailing
\r\nbytes were correct, and if you put 2 bytes of garbage there it would be accepted, instead of correctly rejecting the body as malformed.By itself this is harmless. However, suppose you have a proxy or reverse-proxy that tries to analyze HTTP requests, and your proxy has a different bug in parsing Chunked-Encoding, acting as if the format is:
\r\nlengthbytes of content\r\nFor example, pound had this bug -- it can happen if an implementer uses a generic "read until end of line" helper to consumes the trailing
\r\n.In this case, h11 and your proxy may both accept the same stream of bytes, but interpret them differently. For example, consider the following HTTP request(s) (assume all line breaks are
\r\n):Here h11 will interpret it as two requests, one with body
AAAAA45and one with an empty body, while our hypothetical buggy proxy will interpret it as a single request, with bodyAAAAXX20\r\n\r\nGET /two .... And any time two HTTP processors both accept the same string of bytes but interpret them differently, you have the conditions for a "request smuggling" attack. For example, if/twois a dangerous endpoint and the job of the reverse proxy is to stop requests from getting there, then an attacker could use a bytestream like the above to circumvent this protection.Even worse, if our buggy reverse proxy receives two requests from different users:
...it will consider the first request to be complete and valid, and send both on to the h11-based web server over the same socket. The server will then see the two concatenated requests, and interpret them as one request to
/onewhose body includes/two's session key, potentially allowing one user to steal another's credentials.Patches
Fixed in h11 0.15.0.
Workarounds
Since exploitation requires the combination of buggy h11 with a buggy (reverse) proxy, fixing either component is sufficient to mitigate this issue.
Credits
Reported by Jeppe Bonde Weikop on 2025-01-09.
Release Notes
python-hyper/h11 (h11)
v0.16.0Compare Source
v0.15.0Compare Source
Configuration
📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
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