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US20030070075A1 - Secure hybrid robust watermarking resistant against tampering and copy-attack - Google Patents

Secure hybrid robust watermarking resistant against tampering and copy-attack Download PDF

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US20030070075A1
US20030070075A1 US10/194,278 US19427802A US2003070075A1 US 20030070075 A1 US20030070075 A1 US 20030070075A1 US 19427802 A US19427802 A US 19427802A US 2003070075 A1 US2003070075 A1 US 2003070075A1
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watermark
frag
data
authentication
robust
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Frederic Deguillaume
Sviatoslav Voloshynovskiy
Thierry Pun
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06T—IMAGE DATA PROCESSING OR GENERATION, IN GENERAL
    • G06T1/00—General purpose image data processing
    • G06T1/0021—Image watermarking
    • G06T1/005—Robust watermarking, e.g. average attack or collusion attack resistant
    • G06T1/0071—Robust watermarking, e.g. average attack or collusion attack resistant using multiple or alternating watermarks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06T—IMAGE DATA PROCESSING OR GENERATION, IN GENERAL
    • G06T1/00—General purpose image data processing
    • G06T1/0021—Image watermarking
    • G06T1/0042—Fragile watermarking, e.g. so as to detect tampering
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06T—IMAGE DATA PROCESSING OR GENERATION, IN GENERAL
    • G06T1/00—General purpose image data processing
    • G06T1/0021—Image watermarking
    • G06T1/005—Robust watermarking, e.g. average attack or collusion attack resistant
    • G06T1/0064—Geometric transfor invariant watermarking, e.g. affine transform invariant
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N1/00—Scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, e.g. facsimile transmission; Details thereof
    • H04N1/32—Circuits or arrangements for control or supervision between transmitter and receiver or between image input and image output device, e.g. between a still-image camera and its memory or between a still-image camera and a printer device
    • H04N1/32101—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title
    • H04N1/32144—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title embedded in the image data, i.e. enclosed or integrated in the image, e.g. watermark, super-imposed logo or stamp
    • H04N1/32149—Methods relating to embedding, encoding, decoding, detection or retrieval operations
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N1/00—Scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, e.g. facsimile transmission; Details thereof
    • H04N1/32—Circuits or arrangements for control or supervision between transmitter and receiver or between image input and image output device, e.g. between a still-image camera and its memory or between a still-image camera and a printer device
    • H04N1/32101—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title
    • H04N1/32144—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title embedded in the image data, i.e. enclosed or integrated in the image, e.g. watermark, super-imposed logo or stamp
    • H04N1/32352—Controlling detectability or arrangements to facilitate detection or retrieval of the embedded information, e.g. using markers
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06T—IMAGE DATA PROCESSING OR GENERATION, IN GENERAL
    • G06T2201/00—General purpose image data processing
    • G06T2201/005—Image watermarking
    • G06T2201/0051—Embedding of the watermark in the spatial domain
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06T—IMAGE DATA PROCESSING OR GENERATION, IN GENERAL
    • G06T2201/00—General purpose image data processing
    • G06T2201/005—Image watermarking
    • G06T2201/0052—Embedding of the watermark in the frequency domain
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06T—IMAGE DATA PROCESSING OR GENERATION, IN GENERAL
    • G06T2201/00—General purpose image data processing
    • G06T2201/005—Image watermarking
    • G06T2201/0061—Embedding of the watermark in each block of the image, e.g. segmented watermarking
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06T—IMAGE DATA PROCESSING OR GENERATION, IN GENERAL
    • G06T2201/00—General purpose image data processing
    • G06T2201/005—Image watermarking
    • G06T2201/0083—Image watermarking whereby only watermarked image required at decoder, e.g. source-based, blind, oblivious
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06T—IMAGE DATA PROCESSING OR GENERATION, IN GENERAL
    • G06T2201/00—General purpose image data processing
    • G06T2201/005—Image watermarking
    • G06T2201/0601—Image watermarking whereby calibration information is embedded in the watermark, e.g. a grid, a scale, a list of transformations
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N2201/00—Indexing scheme relating to scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, and to details thereof
    • H04N2201/32—Circuits or arrangements for control or supervision between transmitter and receiver or between image input and image output device, e.g. between a still-image camera and its memory or between a still-image camera and a printer device
    • H04N2201/3201—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title
    • H04N2201/3225—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title of data relating to an image, a page or a document
    • H04N2201/3233—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title of data relating to an image, a page or a document of authentication information, e.g. digital signature, watermark
    • H04N2201/3236—Details of authentication information generation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N2201/00—Indexing scheme relating to scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, and to details thereof
    • H04N2201/32—Circuits or arrangements for control or supervision between transmitter and receiver or between image input and image output device, e.g. between a still-image camera and its memory or between a still-image camera and a printer device
    • H04N2201/3201—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title
    • H04N2201/328—Processing of the additional information
    • H04N2201/3281—Encryption; Ciphering
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N2201/00—Indexing scheme relating to scanning, transmission or reproduction of documents or the like, and to details thereof
    • H04N2201/32—Circuits or arrangements for control or supervision between transmitter and receiver or between image input and image output device, e.g. between a still-image camera and its memory or between a still-image camera and a printer device
    • H04N2201/3201—Display, printing, storage or transmission of additional information, e.g. ID code, date and time or title
    • H04N2201/328—Processing of the additional information
    • H04N2201/3284—Processing of the additional information for error correction

Definitions

  • interference cancellation which can be performed either at the encoder side by embedding the watermark using quantization as Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) [4] or using product codebooks of dithered uniform scalar quantizers in the Scalar Costa Scheme (CSC) [5], or at the decoder side based on the robust prediction of the embedded watermark as in our previous approach [1,6].
  • QIM Quantization Index Modulation
  • CSC Scalar Costa Scheme
  • geometrical synchronization aiming at compensating geometrical distortions which desynchronize the embedded signal and make it unreadable.
  • Solutions against geometrical transform can use either a transform invariant domain watermark like the Fourier-Mellin transform [7], or an additional template for resynchronization [8], or a self-reference watermark based on the Autocorrelation Function (ACF) of a repetitive watermark [9].
  • Self-reference watermarks have been shown to have as main advantage over other methods the fact that they exploit the redundancy of the regular structure of the watermark in order to robustly estimate the undergone geometrical distortions.
  • the watermark can be either fragile, meaning that any modification, even a limited change of a small set of pixels, is detected, or semi-fragile, offering a level of tolerance to some “acceptable” alterations such as low-level lossy compression or slight contrast adjustment.
  • the image is generally first divided into small blocks for locality, and a key-dependent hash function is applied to each of them, and the obtained hash-codes are embedded into their corresponding blocks, usually in the least significant bits (LSB) of pixels. Tampering is then detected where the recomputed codes do not match the stored codes.
  • LSB least significant bits
  • Wong [13] proposed such a blockwise approach. At the opposite, semi-fragile watermarks are more tolerant, and can even be used to measure the severity of the alteration; a robust watermarking scheme has sometimes been proposed for this, however this approach is insecure since robust watermarks are usually additive, making them vulnerable to the so-called copy attack: the signal can be easily estimated using denoising techniques and copied to another image [14].
  • the present invention describes a method for hybrid robust watermarking which: first, joins a highly robust watermark (which we will call w) with a fragile authentication watermark (called w frag ) for combined copyright protection, authentication and tamperproofing; secondly, which embeds the authentication watermark w frag in a way which preserves the resistance and the reliability of the robust watermark w.
  • the robust watermark w mainly consists in two parts which are: an informative watermark carrying the embedded message itself (called w inf ), and a key-dependent only reference watermark used as a pilot signal for synchronization as well as for channel state estimation purpose (called w ref ) at the decoder side.
  • the authentication watermark w frag could be embedded orthogonally with respect to the informative watermark w inf , using the positions of the reference watermark w ref only.
  • the density of the robust watermark w is less than 1, positions still remain which contain no robust watermark information at all, called w empty , and which could be used for the embedding of w frag too.
  • FIG. 1 An embodiment for the proposed hybrid embedding algorithm, including both the robust and the authentication parts at the global level, is shown in this block-diagram, each block being identified by a unique number in parenthesis:
  • a Perceptual Model M is computed from the input cover image x (block 1 ) in order to achieve low visual impact; the message b to be embedded is encoded and encrypted ( 2 ) using a user secret key k, resulting into a codeword c; the codeword c is then spatially allocated (i.e. into k key-dependent positions) and embedded into x by the Robust Watermark (WM) Embedder ( 3 ) as a robust watermark w, using the perceptual mask M, to form the robustly marked image y.
  • Blocks 2 and 3 use the secret key k.
  • Fragile part spatial k key-dependent positions and bits are retained for the embedding of the fragile watermark w frag ; these positions can fit those used by w for the reference watermark (w ref ) as well as positions not containing any robust watermark information (w empty ), in order to achieve the orthogonality with respect to the informative watermark (w inf ); the bits retained can be the least significant bits (LSB) of the selected pixels; the Blockwise Bits Selector block ( 4 ) then clears these selected bits (i.e.
  • Blockwise Keyed Hashing ( 5 ) generates hash codes from y*, resulting into a set of signatures s which are embedded by the Blockwise Fragile WM Embedder ( 6 ) into y, using the perceptual mask M, to get the final stego image z.
  • Blocks 4 , 5 and 6 use the secret key k; blocks 4 and 6 also use the w ref and w empty positions transmitted from the robust part as shown by the dashed arrows.
  • FIG. 3 An embodiment for the proposed hybrid extraction and verification algorithm, including both the robust and the authentication parts at the global level, is shown in this block-diagram:
  • Robust part the possibly attacked stego image z′ is processed by the Robust WM Extractor (block 9 ) which estimates the robust watermark ⁇ and extracts an estimated codeword ⁇ ; ⁇ is decrypted and decoded ( 10 ) using the secret key k, to get the estimated message ⁇ circumflex over (b) ⁇ .
  • Fragile part the Blockwise Fragile WM Extractor ( 11 ) estimates the embedded fragile watermark ⁇ frag and get the embedded signatures ⁇ ; the Blockwise Bits Selector ( 4 ) clears from z′ all bits reserved for w frag to get z′* on which the Blockwise Keyed Hashing ( 5 ) is performed, resulting into the recomputed set of signatures ⁇ tilde over (s) ⁇ ; then ⁇ and ⁇ tilde over (s) ⁇ are blockwise compared ( 12 ) (schematically denoted as “-”) to get a tampered-blocks map ⁇ circumflex over (T) ⁇ of changed blocks, with values 1 where tampering occurred—i.e.
  • a T (0 ⁇ A T ⁇ 1) can then be computed which counts the ratio of authentic blocks over all blocks (i.e. the ratio of 0's in ⁇ circumflex over (T) ⁇ ).
  • Hybrid diagnostic finally, by combining the robust message ⁇ circumflex over (b) ⁇ and a decoding diagnostic (i.e. is ⁇ circumflex over (b) ⁇ correctly decoded or not, based for example on some integrity check-code applied to the message and including into the binary string b), the tampered-blocks map ⁇ circumflex over (T) ⁇ , and the global authenticity value A T , a Final Decision ( 13 ) is taken about the authenticity or the possible tampering of z′, resulting into the tampering/authenticity diagnostic message d T .
  • a decoding diagnostic i.e. is ⁇ circumflex over (b) ⁇ correctly decoded or not, based for example on some integrity check-code applied to the message and including into the binary string b
  • the tampered-blocks map ⁇ circumflex over (T) ⁇ the global authenticity value A T
  • a Final Decision ( 13 ) is taken about the authenticity or the possible tampering of z′,
  • FIG. 5 Pseudo-code describing the fragile part embedding for all blocks: the robustly marked image y is divided into blocks y i,j , and the blocks processed for each index i,j (lines 1 , 2 ); from the current block y i,j and its neighbors y ⁇ (i,j) the bits which are to be used for the fragile watermark embedding are cleared by the BitsSelector function, resulting into y* i,j and y* ⁇ (i,j) (line 3 ); then y* i,j and y* ⁇ (i,j) are hashed by the KeyedHash function, together with additional information if needed (denoted by the “ . .
  • FIG. 6 Pseudo-code describing the fragile part verification for all blocks: the possibly attacked image z′ is divided into blocks z′ i,j , and the blocks processed for each index i,j (lines 1 , 2 ); from the current block z′ i,j and its neighbors z′ ⁇ (i,j) the bits used for the fragile watermark embedding are cleared by the BitsSelector function, resulting into z′* i,j and z′* ⁇ (i,j) (line 3 ); then z′* i,j and z′* ⁇ (i,j) are hashed by the KeyedHash function, together with the same additional information as for the embedding stage if needed (denoted by “ .
  • FIG. 1 shows the hybrid embedding process at the image level. This is a symmetrical tamperproofing/authentication scheme, that means that both the signature embedding and verification require the same user key k, which should be kept secret.
  • the robust watermark w further consists in the following two non-overlapping, i.e. orthogonal, components: the informative watermark w inf holding the copyright message b, encoded and encrypted to a codeword c with the secret key k (FIG. 1, block 2 ); and the reference watermark w ref only depending on k, used as a pilot e.g. for translation/cropping determination and for other side information which can be used for the decoding step.
  • the allocated positions within each block also depend on k.
  • w is embedded with a density less than 1, free positions still remain that contain no robust information and which we call w empty . Then w is embedded by the robust watermarking algorithm to the cover image x (FIG. 1, block 3 ), taking into account the perceptual model M (FIG. 1, block 2 ) computed from x to ensure low visual distortions.
  • the fragile component has to be applied after the robust one, in order to hash the robust watermark with the image.
  • the fragile watermark called w frag , is then based on a key-dependant blockwise cryptographically secure hash function (FIG. 1, block 5 ), of which input key is derived from k.
  • the resulting code is then embedded as a local signatures s (note that from the cryptographic point of view, we should talk about message digest code (MDC), however in this document we will use the term of secret key signature) is then embedded in a fragile way within each block (FIG.
  • MDC message digest code
  • a set of positions is pseudo-randomly selected in y based on k, and the bits of the signature embedded at these positions into the bits reserved for w frag in y (e.g. the LSB).
  • the hash function takes as input y*, a version of y where all bits (e.g. LSB) selected for the embedding of w frag have been cleared (i.e. set to 0) by the “Bits Selector” block (FIG. 1, block 4 ).
  • the “Keyed Hashing” block could be any keyed hash algorithm, or an unkeyed one encrypted afterwards.
  • the hash function requirements could be summarized as:
  • I and I′ are any input (not necessary visual data), and H k is a hash function depending on a random key k. Moreover, when I ⁇ I′ even for a single bit, H k (I) and H k (I′) are completely uncorrelated. Finally we obtain z, the stego image containing both robust and fragile watermarks.
  • M,N is the image size and m,n the block size in number of pixels (width and height respectively). Note that if the image size is not an exact multiple of the block size, one can actually take the lower integer bounds of M m
  • ⁇ (i,j) ((i ⁇ 1),j ⁇ 1),(i ⁇ 1,j),(i ⁇ 1,j+1),(i,j ⁇ 1),(i,j+1),(i+1,j ⁇ 1),(i+1,j),(i+1,j+1)) (the 8 neighbors)
  • ⁇ (i,j) ((i ⁇ 1,j),(i,j ⁇ 1),(i,j+1),(i+1,j)) (4 neighbors)
  • HBC In addition to HBC, other local or global contextual information can be included in the input of hash functions, such as current block indexes (i,j), the image size (M,N), owner-related data like in the case of robust watermarking, date and time, place, unique image identification name or number, etc.
  • hashed additional information is denoted by the “ . . . ” in pseudo-code in FIG. 5 (line 4 ). Linking individual block hashing with both local and global contextual information is important from the security point of view, in order to defeat a large class of substitution attacks dedicated to fragile watermarking schemes.
  • w frag fragile blocks may or may not coincide with w robust blocks; actually fragile blocks may be sub-blocks from robust blocks for better locality in the tamper detection.
  • an important issue is to preserve the original robustness of the robust watermark: first, embedding the fragile part by LSB modulation of selected pixels ensures very limited modification, which is very unlikely to destroy the robust watermark which has larger amplitude; secondly, we propose to embed the fragile watermark in selected positions not belonging to the robust watermark copyright information component w inf , i.e. we embed w frag in positions of the reference watermark w ref and in positions containing no watermark at all w empty ), thus fully preserving w inf .
  • FIG. 3 shows the extraction and authentication part.
  • the robust extractor (FIG. 3, block 9 ) first estimates the robust watermark ⁇ from the possibly attacked and tampered stego image z′, and decodes an estimate of the copyright message ⁇ circumflex over (b) ⁇ (FIG. 3, block 10 ); the possibly applied global (affine) and local geometrical distortions (RBA) are compensated for in this part.
  • the authentication part takes z′ as input; re-computes signatures (FIG. 3, block 5 ) ⁇ tilde over (s) ⁇ from z′* (a version of z′ where the LSB used for the embedding of w frag have been cleared, i.e. set to 0—FIG. 3, block 4 ); extract ⁇ frag from z′ and get the estimated embedded signatures ⁇ (FIG. 3, block 11 ); outputs a tamper map ⁇ circumflex over (T) ⁇ by comparing the signatures ⁇ tilde over (s) ⁇ and ⁇ for each block (FIG.
  • FIG. 4 and pseudo-code in FIG. 6 show the extraction and verification of the fragile signature at the block level.
  • One possible definition of the comparison operator is:
  • this situation can occur when different robust watermarks are present, all embedded with the same key; note that our robust watermarking algorithm, which works at the local level to achieve resistance to the RBA [2,11], can successfully decode different messages ⁇ circumflex over (b) ⁇ k .
  • the copied area comes from another image
  • two cases can be distinguished: either the other image is not watermarked or is watermarked with a different key, and the copied object will be detected as tampered; or the other image is watermarked with the same key, and the copied area can be seen as authentic. Therefore the problem arises when the images used are all watermarked using the same key.
  • This type of attack aiming at replacing parts or the entire image, are known as substitution attacks.
  • the different variants above could be named copy-and-paste attack when an object is pasted into a valid image, or the already mentioned collage attack when a composite image is generated from several marked source images.
  • an advanced version of the substitution attack can be mounted using vector-quantization (VQ) techniques [19], which is known as the vector quantization attack, or the Holliman-Memon attack.
  • VQ vector-quantization
  • This is an enhancement of the collage attack, which is able to construct an arbitrary composite image using the smallest possible areas—the blocks themselves.
  • the attacker first needs to gather a set of watermarked images, all marked with the same key. These blocks are sorted in order to regroup together blocks corresponding to the same embedded logo or the same block-synchronization used for the fragile watermark embedding; this is actually the case for all blocks having the same index i,j, if the division is made in the same order for all images.
  • the attacker can reconstruct a completely new image by picking up, for each block synchronization, a block from the group corresponding to the same synchronization, which is visually the closest to the image to be constructed.
  • This approach is merely the same as vector quantization, where we can think of a “code book” as the collection of all blocks that would be correctly decoded.
  • the gathering of a sufficient number of set of images marked with the same key is quite realistic, for example from a database; actually a small number of images (i.e. less than 10) is often sufficient to apply this attack, with very little visual artifact.
  • This attack can also be named the cut-and-paste attack [20].
  • Hash-Code Block Chaining HBC
  • HBC2 hash-code block chaining version 2
  • un-deterministic signature means that two strictly identical input hashed using the same key produce two randomly different signatures: consequently the assumption that images are all watermarked with the same key does not help anymore, since signatures always look random to an attacker.
  • any deterministic hash function may be turned into an un-deterministic one by using a random salt, taken as input and appended to the signature.
  • the salt consists in a random string r which is appended to the hash-code h or the signature s; at the embedding stage r is included in the input of the hash function as:
  • the time-stamp is included in the input of the hash functions, and at the verification stage is used before recomputing the signature.
  • signatures will be authenticated again in every copied area again, but the extraction of different time-stamps can alerts us that a collage attack probably occurred. With this method it is even possible to count the number of copied areas and to localize them.
  • the collage attack detection can be enhanced, since the robust algorithm could either fail, or decode different independent messages correctly when the RBA-resistant version of our robust method [2,11] is used (due to the fact that it extracts the watermark at the local level).
  • This feature corresponds to the item 3. of the decision enumeration given in the “Tamperproofing/authentication decision” paragraph.
  • the stamp/time-stamp approach we have then another criteria to detect such attacks; further, if the same robust message was embedded in all parts (resulting into only one decoded message), the embedded stamp approach can still distinguish the different parts.
  • hash-codes of sufficient lengths hash-codes of at least 128 bits should be used, and we propose the MD5 (128 bits) or the SHA (160 bits), in order to defeat the anniversary attack.
  • hash extra global and local information hashing the indexes i,j of the current block makes block synchronization necessary for an attack to succeed; hashing the image's size M,N restrict attacks to images of the same size; hashing an unique ID for each image makes substitutions attacks merely infeasible, but may be not practicable in many applications (this ID should be stored separately).
  • hash and embed an unique stamp hash an unique stamp for each image (e.g. a random ID), which is embedded beside the signatures, to defeat the collage attack, and to allow to distinguish and localize pasted areas; can also carry useful information such as a time-stamp. This method can be used in place of the unique ID approach of item 5.
  • This patent presents a hybrid robust watermarking scheme for visual data, which combines copyright protection, detection of tampering, and authentication.
  • the robust part exhibits high robustness to signal processing attacks, geometrical transforms as shown by the Stirmark [23] results, as well as robustness to printing and rescanning.
  • the algorithm is resistant against random local geometrical distortions too as well as to projective and non-linear transforms, and can also defeat collage attack by extracting and decoding the copyright information locally.
  • the fragile part does not decrease the robustness of the robust part, due to its nearly orthogonal embedding with respect to the robust information. Exploiting the diagnostics from both the robust and the fragile parts, the algorithm is resistant against different kinds of attacks, including the copy attack and the collage attack.

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Cited By (77)

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US20030118208A1 (en) * 2001-12-20 2003-06-26 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Varying segment sizes to increase security
US20030152225A1 (en) * 2002-02-13 2003-08-14 Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. Digital watermarking system using scrambling method
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