CN115438332A - Chip identification method, computer equipment and readable storage medium - Google Patents

Abstract

The embodiment of the invention discloses a chip identification method, computer equipment and a readable storage medium. The method comprises the following steps: importing firmware into a chip, wherein the firmware checks a label of the chip; and if the signature verification is unsuccessful, terminating the firmware import. According to the chip identification method, the signature and signature verification functions based on the preset algorithm are realized at the chip end and the firmware end, so that the mutual safety between the chip and the firmware can be better guaranteed, and the protection of the internal data of the chip is further improved.

Description

Chip identification method, computer equipment and readable storage medium

technical field

The invention relates to the technical field of chips, in particular to a chip identification method, computer equipment and a readable storage medium.

Background technique

With the development of the Internet and hardware technology, data security plays an increasingly important role in human life. The chip is a trusted platform module, which has an independent processor and storage unit inside, which can store keys and characteristic data, provide encryption and security authentication services for computers, data encryption and decryption, key generation and other functions can be Realized by chips to protect business privacy and data security.

At present, the mainstream security solution on the market is to use the chip to use the public key to verify the signature and the firmware signed by the private key. When the verification fails, the chip does not open the access right, so as to realize the protection function of the data.

However, the prior art mainly has the following disadvantages: when the chip checks the firmware, the identity authentication method adopted is one-way, which can only realize the function of the chip to verify the legitimacy of the firmware, but cannot determine whether the chip itself is legal, which gives The security of data inside chips and firmware poses risks.

Contents of the invention

In view of this, the purpose of the present invention is to overcome the deficiencies in the prior art and provide a chip identification method, computer equipment and readable storage medium, aiming at solving the problem that the current one-way identity identification method can only realize the legality of the chip verification firmware. Sexuality thus poses a risk to data security.

The present invention provides following technical scheme:

In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a chip identification method, the method comprising:

Import firmware into the chip, and the firmware verifies the signature of the chip;

If the signature verification is unsuccessful, the firmware import is terminated.

Further, a signature of the chip and a corresponding public key are stored in the chip.

Further, the chip identification method also includes:

Processing the unique identification of the chip to obtain the plaintext of the chip;

The plaintext of the chip is encrypted by the private key corresponding to the public key to obtain the signature of the chip.

Further, after encrypting the plaintext of the chip with the private key corresponding to the public key and obtaining the signature of the chip, the method further includes:

Burning the signature of the chip into the one-time programmable memory inside the chip.

Further, the importing the firmware into the chip, and the firmware checking the chip includes:

importing said firmware into said chip;

The firmware invokes a preset algorithm and the public key to verify the signature of the chip.

Further, the chip identification method also includes:

importing the firmware into the chip, and the chip verifies the firmware;

If the signature verification is unsuccessful, the firmware import is terminated.

Further, a signature of the firmware and a corresponding public key are stored in the firmware.

Further, the chip identification method also includes:

Processing the data in the firmware to obtain the plaintext of the firmware;

Encrypting the plaintext of the firmware with the private key corresponding to the public key to obtain the signature of the firmware.

In the second aspect, the embodiment of the present disclosure provides a computer device to solve the problem that the current one-way identity verification method can only realize the legitimacy of the chip to verify the firmware, thus bringing risks to the security of the data. The computer device It includes a memory and a processor, the memory stores a computer program, and the processor implements the steps of the chip identification method described in the first aspect when executing the computer program.

In the third aspect, the embodiments of the present disclosure provide a computer-readable storage medium, which is used to solve the problem that the current one-way identity authentication method can only realize the legitimacy of the chip to verify the firmware, thus bringing risks to the security of the data. The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the chip identification method described in the first aspect are implemented.

Embodiments of the present application have the following advantages:

The chip authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application includes: importing firmware into the chip, and the firmware performs signature verification on the chip; if the signature verification is unsuccessful, the firmware import is terminated. The above-mentioned chip identification method realizes the signature and signature verification functions based on the preset algorithm on both the chip side and the firmware side, making up for the existing technology, when the firmware is written into the chip, only the chip verifies the legitimacy of the firmware, and there is no firmware verification. Flaws in verifying chip legitimacy. In the prior art, since the validity of the firmware is mainly guaranteed by the signature provided by the firmware supplier, there is a possibility that incorrect firmware from the correct firmware supplier may be imported into the chip, and after the incorrect firmware is imported into the chip, it may be compatible with other firmware A conflict occurs, resulting in a decrease in the robustness of the chip. In this application, when the firmware is written into the chip, the firmware also verifies the legitimacy of the chip, ensuring that the firmware is delivered to the correct chip. The mutual security between the chip and the firmware can be better guaranteed, thereby further improving the protection of the data inside the chip.

In order to make the above objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and comprehensible, preferred embodiments will be described below in detail together with the accompanying drawings.

Description of drawings

In order to illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention more clearly, the accompanying drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of the present invention, and thus It should be regarded as a limitation on the scope, and those skilled in the art can also obtain other related drawings based on these drawings without creative work. In the respective drawings, similar components are given similar reference numerals.

FIG. 1 shows a flow chart of a chip identification method provided by an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 2 shows a schematic structural diagram of a chip identification device provided by an embodiment of the present application.

detailed description

Embodiments of the present invention are described in detail below, examples of which are shown in the drawings, wherein the same or similar reference numerals designate the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar functions throughout. The embodiments described below by referring to the figures are exemplary only for explaining the present invention and should not be construed as limiting the present invention.

It should be noted that when an element is referred to as being “fixed” to another element, it can be directly on the other element or there can also be an intervening element. When an element is referred to as being "connected to" another element, it can be directly connected to the other element or intervening elements may also be present. In contrast, when an element is referred to as being "directly on" another element, there are no intervening elements present. The terms "vertical," "horizontal," "left," "right," and similar expressions are used herein for purposes of illustration only.

In the present invention, unless otherwise clearly specified and limited, terms such as "installation", "connection", "connection" and "fixation" should be understood in a broad sense, for example, it can be a fixed connection or a detachable connection , or integrated; it can be mechanically connected or electrically connected; it can be directly connected or indirectly connected through an intermediary, and it can be the internal communication of two components or the interaction relationship between two components. Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand the specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention according to specific situations.

In addition, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only, and cannot be interpreted as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the quantity of indicated technical features. Thus, a feature defined as "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of these features. In the description of the present invention, "plurality" means two or more, unless otherwise specifically defined.

Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the technical field to which this application belongs. The terminology used herein in the description of the template is only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments, and is not intended to limit the present invention. As used herein, the term "and/or" includes any and all combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.

Example 1

As shown in Figure 1, it is a flowchart of a chip identification method in the embodiment of the present application. The chip identification method provided in the embodiment of the application includes the following steps:

Step 110, import the firmware into the chip, and the firmware performs signature verification on the chip.

Specifically, the purpose of the chip identification method provided by the present application is to realize the two-way identification of the chip and firmware, so the firmware needs to be imported into the chip first, and the firmware will be downloaded to the front-end memory inside the chip through the corresponding front-end interface.

It can be understood that, in this embodiment, the signature of the chip and the corresponding public key are stored in the chip. Specifically, each chip has a unique identifier, and there are corresponding fixed constants for different chips. The unique identifier of the chip is processed, that is, the unique identifier of the chip and the fixed constant are spliced, and then the spliced The data is hashed, and the hashed result is used as the plaintext of the chip. Then encrypt the plaintext of the chip with the private key corresponding to the public key to obtain the signature of the chip. After obtaining the signature of the chip, burn the signature of the chip into the one-time programmable memory inside the chip. It is understandable that for the same chip, the signature and plaintext are consistent.

Further, after the firmware is imported into the chip, the firmware first verifies the legitimacy of the chip. The firmware calls the preset algorithm and the public key to verify the signature of the chip, and compares the result of the signature verification with the plaintext of the chip, and if the comparison results are consistent, it means that the signature verification is passed. Passing the signature verification means that the chip is legal and the firmware has been delivered to the correct chip. In turn, the mutual security between the chip and the firmware can be better guaranteed, and the protection of data inside the chip can be further improved.

Step 120, if the signature verification is not successful, then terminate the firmware import.

After the firmware is imported into the chip, the firmware first verifies the legitimacy of the chip. The firmware calls the preset algorithm and the public key to verify the signature of the chip, and compares the result obtained by the verification with the plaintext of the chip. If the comparison results are inconsistent, it means that the signature verification is unsuccessful, and the process is terminated. The import of the firmware.

It is understandable that the firmware is first executed to verify the legitimacy of the chip, which can ensure that the firmware is delivered to the correct chip. When the firmware is delivered to the wrong chip, the firmware will be terminated and discarded, which can effectively avoid firmware failure. Send it to the wrong chip, so that the robustness of the chip is improved, and the protection of the data inside the chip is further improved.

In an optional implementation manner, the chip identification method further includes:

Step 130, import the firmware into the chip, and the chip verifies the signature of the firmware.

Specifically, after the verification of the legitimacy of the chip is passed, the verification of the legitimacy of the firmware delivery is performed. It can be understood that, in this embodiment, a signature of the firmware and a corresponding public key are stored in the firmware. Specifically, the data in the firmware is processed, that is, a preset algorithm is called to process all the data in the firmware, and after processing, a piece of summary information with a fixed length is obtained, and the summary information is used as the plaintext of the firmware. Then encrypt the plaintext of the firmware with the private key corresponding to the public key to obtain the signature of the firmware. It is understandable that for the same firmware, the signature and plaintext are consistent.

Further, the chip verifies the signature of the firmware, and the chip calls the preset algorithm and public key to verify the signature of the firmware, and compares the result of the signature verification with the plaintext of the firmware, and if the comparison results are consistent, it means that the signature verification is passed. Passing the signature verification means that the firmware is legal, and the firmware delivered to the chip is safe and correct.

Further, if the signature verification is passed, the preset algorithm and key are called to encrypt the firmware, and the encrypted firmware is stored in the front-end memory inside the chip, and then flashed to the back-end memory inside the chip.

It is understandable that the firmware will be stored inside the chip only when the chip identification of the chip and the firmware pass the verification, so that the mutual security between the chip and the firmware can be better guaranteed, and the protection of the internal data of the chip can be further improved.

Step 140, if the signature verification is not successful, then terminate the firmware import.

After the firmware is imported into the chip, the chip verifies the signature of the firmware, and the chip calls the preset algorithm and public key to verify the signature of the firmware, and compares the result of the signature verification with the plaintext of the firmware. If the comparison results are inconsistent, It means that the signature verification is unsuccessful, and the import of the firmware is terminated.

It is understandable that by verifying the legitimacy of the chip and the legitimacy of the firmware delivery, when the verification fails, the firmware delivery will be terminated and the firmware will be discarded, which can effectively prevent the firmware from being delivered to the incorrect chip, and also It can effectively prevent incorrect firmware from being stored inside the chip, so that the mutual security between the chip and the firmware can be better guaranteed, and further improve the protection of the data inside the chip.

Further, the preset algorithm used in the embodiment of the present application can be SM2, SM3, SM4 or hash algorithm, and the specific algorithm used can be set according to the actual situation, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.

In the chip identification method provided by the embodiment of the present application, by importing firmware into the chip, the firmware performs signature verification on the chip; if the signature verification is unsuccessful, the firmware import is terminated. The above-mentioned chip authentication method realizes signature and verification functions based on preset algorithms on both the chip side and the firmware side, so that the mutual security between the chip and the firmware can be better guaranteed, thereby further improving the protection of the internal data of the chip.

Example 2

As shown in Figure 2, it is a schematic structural diagram of a chip identification device 200 in the embodiment of the present application, and the device includes:

The first signature verification module 210 is configured to import firmware into the chip, and the firmware performs signature verification on the chip;

The first termination module 220 is configured to terminate the firmware import if the signature verification is unsuccessful.

Optionally, the above chip identification device also includes:

The first plaintext obtaining module is configured to process the unique identification of the chip to obtain the plaintext of the chip;

The first signature obtaining module is configured to encrypt the plaintext of the chip with the private key corresponding to the public key to obtain the signature of the chip.

Optionally, the above chip identification device also includes:

The storage module is used for burning the signature of the chip into the one-time programmable memory inside the chip.

Optionally, the above chip identification device also includes:

an import module, configured to import the firmware into the chip;

The first signature verification sub-module is used for the firmware to call a preset algorithm and the public key to verify the signature of the chip.

Optionally, the above chip identification device also includes:

The second signature verification module is used to import the firmware into the chip, and the chip performs signature verification on the firmware;

The second termination module is configured to terminate the firmware import if the signature verification is unsuccessful.

Optionally, the above chip identification device also includes:

The second plaintext obtaining module is configured to process the data in the firmware to obtain the plaintext of the firmware;

The second signature obtaining module is configured to encrypt the plaintext of the firmware with the private key corresponding to the public key to obtain the signature of the firmware.

The chip authentication device provided by the embodiment of the present application realizes the signature and verification functions based on the preset algorithm on both the chip side and the firmware side, so that the mutual security between the chip and the firmware can be better guaranteed, thereby further improving the security of the chip. Protection of internal data.

In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed devices and methods may also be implemented in other ways. The device embodiments described above are only illustrative. For example, the flowcharts and structural diagrams in the accompanying drawings show the possible implementation architecture and functions of devices, methods and computer program products according to multiple embodiments of the present invention. and operation. In this regard, each block in a flowchart or block diagram may represent a module, program segment, or part of code that includes one or more Executable instructions. It should also be noted that, in alternative implementations, the functions noted in the block may occur out of the order noted in the figures. For example, two blocks in succession may, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or they may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality involved. It is also to be noted that each block of the block diagrams and/or flow diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and/or flow diagrams, can be implemented by a dedicated hardware-based system that performs the specified function or action may be implemented, or may be implemented by a combination of special purpose hardware and computer instructions.

In addition, each functional module or unit in each embodiment of the present invention can be integrated together to form an independent part, or each module can exist independently, or two or more modules can be integrated to form an independent part.

If the functions are realized in the form of software function modules and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the essence of the technical solution of the present invention or the part that contributes to the prior art or the part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including Several instructions are used to make a computer device (which may be a smart phone, a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) execute all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic disk or optical disk and other media that can store program codes. .

The above is only a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Anyone skilled in the art can easily think of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention. Should be covered within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (10)

1. A chip identification method, characterized in that the method comprises: Import firmware into the chip, and the firmware verifies the signature of the chip; If the signature verification is unsuccessful, the firmware import is terminated. 2 . The chip authentication method according to claim 1 , wherein the chip stores a signature of the chip and a corresponding public key. 3 . 3. The chip identification method according to claim 2, wherein the method further comprises: Processing the unique identification of the chip to obtain the plaintext of the chip; The plaintext of the chip is encrypted by the private key corresponding to the public key to obtain the signature of the chip. 4. The chip authentication method according to claim 3, wherein the plaintext of the chip is encrypted by the private key corresponding to the public key, and after obtaining the signature of the chip, further comprising: Burning the signature of the chip into the one-time programmable memory inside the chip. 5. The chip identification method according to claim 2, characterized in that, said importing the firmware into the chip, and the firmware checking the chip includes: importing said firmware into said chip; The firmware invokes a preset algorithm and the public key to verify the signature of the chip. 6. The chip identification method according to claim 1, wherein the method further comprises: importing the firmware into the chip, and the chip verifies the firmware; If the signature verification is unsuccessful, the firmware import is terminated. 7. The chip authentication method according to claim 6, wherein a signature of the firmware and a corresponding public key are stored in the firmware. 8. The chip identification method according to claim 7, wherein the method further comprises: Processing the data in the firmware to obtain the plaintext of the firmware; Encrypting the plaintext of the firmware with the private key corresponding to the public key to obtain the signature of the firmware. 9. A computer device, characterized in that it comprises a memory and a processor, the memory stores a computer program, and the processor implements the chip identification according to any one of claims 1-8 when executing the computer program method steps. 10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the chip identification according to any one of claims 1-8 is realized method steps.

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