CN114528603A - Isolation dynamic protection method, device, equipment and storage medium of embedded system - Google Patents

Abstract

The embodiments of the present invention disclose an isolation dynamic protection method, device, device and storage medium of an embedded system. The scheme loads the current program from the off-chip storage space, reads and updates the key from the on-chip storage space; generates verification information when writing data to the off-chip storage space through the current program; Encrypt to obtain encrypted verification information, save the encrypted verification information to the off-chip storage space, and save the key and storage time information to the verification area of the on-chip storage space; when reading data from the off-chip storage space through the current program , read the encrypted verification information from the off-chip storage space; read the key and storage time information from the verification area, and obtain the reference verification information correspondingly; compare the reference verification information and the encrypted verification information to confirm the security . It realizes the independent dynamic protection of data processed by each program, and avoids the situation that the key leakage of one program leads to the leakage of all program information.

Description

Isolation dynamic protection method, device, device and storage medium for embedded system

technical field

Embodiments of the present invention relate to the technical field of embedded systems, and in particular, to a method, apparatus, device, and storage medium for isolation and dynamic protection of embedded systems.

Background technique

Devices based on embedded systems are more and more widely used because of their flexibility and high cost performance. The development trend of more and more embedded terminals and online interconnection also makes the security of embedded systems face greater risks. Corresponding to the risk, the security of the embedded system has also been paid more and more attention.

At present, the common attacks on embedded systems mainly include hardware attacks and software attacks. On the whole, the overall idea of malicious attacks on embedded systems is to obtain program codes and data stored or processed in embedded systems through various methods, resulting in leakage of user privacy information. When dealing with malicious attacks, there are hardware protection strategies and software protection strategies. Software protection strategy is a software-based method, such as running anti-virus and anti-intrusion software to defend against attacks. This protection strategy will bring greater power consumption, and the software itself may also have security loopholes, so the overall cost-effectiveness of protection is low. Compared with software protection strategy, hardware protection strategy has relatively good physical isolation, high computing speed and low resource overhead, and is the preferred strategy for embedded system protection.

In the hardware protection of the existing embedded system, the key is usually configured for the program stored in the off-chip memory. If the key is leaked in this configuration method, the information of all programs may be jointly exposed.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The invention provides an isolation dynamic protection method, device, device and storage medium of an embedded system, so as to solve the technical problem in the prior art that the information of all programs is jointly exposed when the key configured for the whole program is leaked in the prior art.

In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides an isolation dynamic protection method for an embedded system, including:

Load the current program from the off-chip storage space, read the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and update the key read next time;

When data is written to the off-chip storage space through the current program, verification information is generated according to the storage parameters of the data, where the storage parameters include storage address information and storage time information of the data in the off-chip storage space ;

Encrypt the verification information according to the key to obtain encrypted verification information, save the encrypted verification information to the off-chip storage space, and save the key and storage time information to the on-chip storage space. The check area of the internal storage space;

When the data is read from the off-chip storage space through the current program, the encrypted verification information corresponding to the data is read from the off-chip storage space;

Read the key and the storage time information from the verification area, and encrypt the storage address information obtained when reading the data and the storage time information read according to the key to obtain the reference verification information;

The reference verification information is compared with the read encrypted verification information, and the security of the data is confirmed according to the comparison result.

Further, the off-chip storage space includes a plurality of program spaces, and the program is entirely stored in one program space;

Loading the current program from the off-chip storage space, reading the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and updating the key read next time, including:

The current program is loaded from the off-chip storage space, and the key corresponding to the current program is read from the on-chip storage space according to the program identifier of the current program.

Further, the off-chip storage space includes a plurality of program spaces, and the program is entirely stored in one program space;

Loading the current program from the off-chip storage space, reading the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and updating the key read next time, including:

The current program is loaded from the off-chip storage space, and according to the space identifier of the program space where the current program is located, the key currently corresponding to the program space is read from the on-chip storage space as the key corresponding to the current program.

Further, the on-chip storage space saves a plurality of keys;

Loading the current program from the off-chip storage space, reading the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and updating the key read next time, including:

From the plurality of keys according to a random algorithm, a key different from the key currently read is confirmed, and the confirmed key is updated to the key read next time.

Further, the on-chip storage space also correspondingly stores the number of times of use corresponding to each of the keys;

Loading the current program from the off-chip storage space, reading the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and updating the key read next time, also includes:

Update the usage count.

Further, after the update of the number of times of use, it also includes:

When the number of times of use of the key reaches the preset service life, the key is deleted and a key different from the existing key is added.

Further, when writing data to the off-chip storage space through the current program, verification information is generated according to the storage parameter of the data, and the storage parameter includes the storage address information of the data in the off-chip storage space and After storing the time information, it also includes:

Encrypt the program storage information according to the key to obtain program verification information, save the program verification information in the off-chip storage space, and save the program storage information in the verification area;

Correspondingly, before loading the current program from the off-chip storage space, reading the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and updating the key read next time, it also includes:

Read the program verification information and the real-time storage information of the current program from the off-chip storage space, and read the key and program storage information from the verification area;

According to the key, the real-time storage information and the program storage information are respectively encrypted to obtain real-time verification information and original verification information;

Confirm that the real-time verification information, the original verification information and the program verification information exactly match.

In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides an isolation dynamic protection device for an embedded system, including:

The data loading unit is used to load the current program from the off-chip storage space, read the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and update the key read next time;

The writing initialization unit is used to generate verification information according to the storage parameter of the data when data is written to the off-chip storage space through the current program, and the storage parameter includes the value of the data in the off-chip storage space. Storage address information and storage time information;

a data writing unit, configured to encrypt the verification information according to the key to obtain encrypted verification information, save the encrypted verification information to the off-chip storage space, and store the key and storage The time information is stored in the check area of the on-chip storage space;

a data reading unit, configured to read encrypted verification information corresponding to the data from the off-chip storage space when reading data from the off-chip storage space through the current program;

The verification initialization unit is used to read the key and storage time information from the verification area, and encrypts the storage address information obtained when reading the data and the storage time information read according to the key to obtain a reference verification information;

The data comparison unit is configured to compare the reference verification information with the read encrypted verification information, and confirm the security of the data according to the comparison result.

Further, the off-chip storage space includes a plurality of program spaces, and the program is entirely stored in one program space;

The data loading unit includes:

The first loading module is configured to load the current program from the off-chip storage space, and read the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space according to the program identifier of the current program.

Further, the off-chip storage space includes a plurality of program spaces, and the program is entirely stored in one program space;

The data loading unit includes:

The second loading module is used to load the current program from the off-chip storage space, and according to the space identifier of the program space where the current program is located, read the key currently corresponding to the program space from the on-chip storage space as the current program the corresponding key.

Further, the on-chip storage space saves a plurality of keys;

The data loading unit includes:

The password update module is used for confirming a key different from the currently read key from the plurality of keys according to a random algorithm, and updating the confirmed key to the key read next time.

Further, the on-chip storage space also correspondingly stores the number of times of use corresponding to each of the keys;

The data loading unit also includes:

The times updating module is used to update the usage times.

Further, the isolation dynamic protection device of the embedded system further includes:

The key replacement unit is used for deleting the key and adding a key different from the existing key when the number of times of use of the key reaches a preset service life.

Further, the isolation dynamic protection device of the embedded system further includes:

The verification information generation unit is used to encrypt the program storage information according to the key to obtain the program verification information, save the program verification information to the off-chip storage space, and save the program storage information to the the verification area;

Correspondingly, the isolation dynamic protection device of the embedded system further includes:

a program information reading unit, used for reading program verification information and the real-time storage information of the current program from the off-chip storage space, and reading the key and program storage information from the verification area;

a program information encryption unit, configured to encrypt the real-time storage information and the program storage information according to the key to obtain real-time verification information and original verification information;

The program information verification unit is used to confirm that the real-time verification information, the original verification information and the program verification information completely match.

In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a computing device, including:

one or more processors;

memory for storing one or more programs;

When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the computing device implements the isolation dynamic protection method for an embedded system according to any one of the first aspect.

In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a storage medium for storing computer-executable instructions, where the computer-executable instructions are used to execute the embedded system according to any one of the first aspect when executed by a computer processor The isolation dynamic protection method.

The isolation dynamic protection method, device, device and storage medium of the above-mentioned embedded system, by loading the current program from the off-chip storage space, reading the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and updating the key read next time When writing data to the off-chip storage space by the current program, generate check information according to the storage parameter of the data, and the storage parameter includes the storage address information and storage time of the data in the off-chip storage space information; encrypt the verification information according to the key to obtain encrypted verification information, save the encrypted verification information to the off-chip storage space, and save the key and storage time information to the The verification area of the on-chip storage space; when reading data from the off-chip storage space through the current program, read the encrypted verification information corresponding to the data from the off-chip storage space; from the verification District reading key and storage time information, according to the key, the obtained storage address information and the read storage time information when reading the data are encrypted to obtain reference verification information; the reference verification information and The read encrypted verification information is compared, and the security of the data is confirmed according to the comparison result. Through the on-chip storage of keys corresponding to different programs dynamically configured, the independent dynamic protection of data processed by each program is realized, avoiding the situation that the key leakage of one program leads to the leakage of all program information.

Description of drawings

1 is a flowchart of a method for isolating dynamic protection of an embedded system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a key configuration of an isolated dynamic protection method for an embedded system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

3 is a schematic structural diagram of an isolation dynamic protection device for an embedded system according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention;

FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a computing device according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.

Detailed ways

The present invention will be further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are used to explain the present invention, but not to limit the present invention. In addition, it should be noted that, for the convenience of description, the drawings only show some but not all structures related to the present invention.

It should be noted that, due to space limitations, the description of this application does not exhaustively list all optional implementations. After reading the description of this application, those skilled in the art should be able to imagine that as long as the technical features are not contradictory to each other, then any Combinations can constitute alternative embodiments.

Each embodiment will be described in detail below.

Example 1

FIG. 1 is a flowchart of an isolation dynamic protection method for an embedded system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. The isolation dynamic protection method for an embedded system provided in the embodiment can be executed by various embedded system-based computing devices, the computing device can be implemented by means of software and/or hardware, and the computing device can be two or more Physical entity composition, can also be a physical entity composition.

Referring to FIG. 1 , the isolation dynamic protection method for an embedded system in Embodiment 1 of the present invention includes:

Step S110: Load the current program from the off-chip storage space, read the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and update the key read next time.

In devices based on embedded systems, the on-chip storage space is generally considered to be a trusted space, and attacks that occur off-chip and on the bus can be implemented as a whole to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the data of the on-chip system, but the embedded system processor The storage and computing resources of the embedded system are limited by the hardware itself. If a complex security mechanism is added to the embedded system processor, it will inevitably affect the implementation of the basic functions of the entire embedded system and bring unnecessary hardware overhead. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the on-chip as much as possible The resource occupation of the system outside the core business. However, the off-chip storage space usually has a lot of data interaction with the outside world, and the read-write setting can be considered as an untrusted space.

In this scheme, the entire program is stored in the off-chip storage space. When there is a program running demand, the current program is state from the off-chip storage space. In order to ensure the security of the data in the untrusted space, in this scheme, the current program is dynamically assigned a password. The key is used to ensure the integrity protection of data written to and read from the untrusted space, so that the data in the off-chip storage space can be found to be attacked and tampered, and the security of embedded system data can be improved. . Specifically, the key is stored in the on-chip storage space, because the on-chip storage space belongs to the trusted space, which can effectively ensure the security of the key itself, and the key corresponding to the current program changes dynamically. different keys, thus ensuring independent support for each data security need.

Step S120: When data is written to the off-chip storage space through the current program, verification information is generated according to the storage parameter of the data, and the storage parameter includes the storage address information of the data in the off-chip storage space and Store time information.

In the process of writing data to the off-chip storage space through the program, it is necessary to obtain the key information of the data storage. This key information is usually unique and sensitive. Malicious attacks are likely to cause these key information to change. Therefore, in this paper In the scheme, the key information of data storage is used to ensure the integrity and security of the data. In this scheme, it is mainly the storage address information and storage time information of the data.

Step S130: Encrypt the verification information according to the key to obtain encrypted verification information, save the encrypted verification information to the off-chip storage space, and save the key and storage time information to the off-chip storage space. The parity area of the on-chip storage space.

The key information stored in the data is encrypted according to the key to obtain the encrypted verification information, which is used to record the initial storage state information as a whole, and the encrypted verification information is directly saved to the off-chip storage space along with the data. At the same time, the storage time information and the key are saved in the verification area of the on-chip storage space for subsequent comparison and verification with the encrypted verification information.

Step S140: When reading data from the off-chip storage space through the current program, read encrypted verification information corresponding to the data from the off-chip storage space.

Corresponding to writing encrypted verification information when writing data to the off-chip storage space, and corresponding to reading the encrypted verification information stored before when reading the data.

Step S150: Read the key and storage time information from the verification area, and encrypt the storage address information and storage time information obtained when reading the data according to the key to obtain reference verification information.

Step S160: Compare the reference verification information with the read encrypted verification information, and confirm the security of the data according to the comparison result.

For the data in the on-chip storage space, it is considered to be credible; for the data in the off-chip storage space, if there is no change due to the attack, then the storage address is considered to be the original storage address, the corresponding storage address information and the chip The storage time information stored in the internal storage space is encrypted by the key to obtain the reference verification information. When all the information and the key remain unchanged, the reference verification information and the encrypted verification information are exactly the same, and the correspondence can be confirmed. Data security. Of course, if the reference verification information and the encrypted verification information are inconsistent, it can be confirmed that the data has changed due to malicious attacks, and a defense mechanism can be triggered.

Through this solution, under the condition of basically not increasing the storage and processing burden of the on-chip storage space, it can effectively ensure that each program has an independent dynamic key security mechanism, and effectively improve the ability of each program to deal with malicious attacks, even if a certain program has an independent dynamic key security mechanism. If the key of one program is leaked, it will not cause other programs to be cracked together.

In a specific implementation process, the off-chip storage space includes a plurality of program spaces, and the program is stored in one program space as a whole; step S110 correspondingly may include step S111:

Step S111: Load the current program from the off-chip storage space, and read the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space according to the program identifier of the current program.

This embodiment is equivalent to storing each program as a whole in one program space, and each program corresponds to a set of keys. Of course, the set of keys corresponding to different programs may be the same, but each is used and updated in its own way. As shown in Figure 2, the off-chip storage space 100 has 5 program spaces, each program space saves a program, and all programs correspond to the same set of keys in the on-chip storage space 200. In a recent period of time, the 5 program spaces The first, second and fourth in the set are run as the current program in turn, and the corresponding keys are the third, second and first of a set of keys, respectively.

In another specific implementation process, the off-chip storage space includes multiple program spaces, and the entire program is stored in one program space; step S110 correspondingly may include step S112:

Step S112: Load the current program from the off-chip storage space, and according to the space identifier of the program space where the current program is located, read the key currently corresponding to the program space from the on-chip storage space as the key corresponding to the current program .

In this embodiment, each program space corresponds to a set of keys. When a program in one program space is running, the key corresponding to the current program is confirmed according to the overall password update process of the program space.

Regarding the key, a plurality of keys may be stored in the on-chip storage space; step S110 correspondingly may include step S113:

Step S113 : confirm a key different from the key currently read from the plurality of keys according to the random algorithm, and update the confirmed key to the key read next time.

Confirming the update of the key according to the random algorithm is an optional implementation method. In the specific implementation process, it can also be switched according to the set rules.

This solution can also record the use state of the key, that is, the on-chip storage space also stores the corresponding use times of each key; step S110 correspondingly may include step S114:

Step S114: Update the usage times.

By updating the usage times, the usage of the key can be evaluated, and further, it can be judged whether there is an abnormal increase in the number of times caused by an attack in combination with the growth rate of the usage times.

On the basis of recording the usage status, the key can also be replaced by step S115:

Step S115: When the number of times of use of the key reaches a preset service life, delete the key and add a key different from the existing key.

To ensure data security, keys can be deleted and added based on the number of times the keys are used, so as to avoid security degradation during the lifetime of the keys.

In addition to the isolation protection of data, the program itself can also be isolated and protected. After step S130, it also includes step S131, and before step S110, it also includes steps S101-step S103, so as to comprehensively realize the isolation protection of the program itself:

Step S131: Encrypt the program storage information according to the key to obtain program verification information, save the program verification information to the off-chip storage space, and save the program storage information to the verification area .

Step S101: Read program verification information and real-time storage information of the current program from an off-chip storage space, and read a key and program storage information from the verification area.

Step S102: Encrypt the real-time storage information and the program storage information respectively according to the key to obtain real-time verification information and original verification information.

Step S103: Confirm that the real-time verification information, the original verification information and the program verification information completely match.

The above processing verification process is roughly the same as the data verification process, but the program itself has higher security requirements than the data, so a comprehensive verification based on real-time verification information, original verification information and program verification information is finally proposed. match. Only if the confirmation in step S103 is completely matched, there is a program loading and running process in this solution. If one of them does not match, there is no subsequent data loading and data reading and writing process. In addition, if the data verification fails during the data reading and writing process, there will be no follow-up processing, and the corresponding security mechanism will be triggered. The specific embedded system's strategy for dealing with malicious attacks is not the protection focus of this scheme, and it is not done here. Repeat instructions.

The above, the isolation dynamic protection method of the embedded system, by loading the current program from the off-chip storage space, reading the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and updating the key read next time; through the current program When data is written to the off-chip storage space, verification information is generated according to the storage parameters of the data, and the storage parameters include the storage address information and storage time information of the data in the off-chip storage space; The key encrypts the verification information to obtain encrypted verification information, saves the encrypted verification information to the off-chip storage space, and saves the key and storage time information to the on-chip storage space. verification area; when reading data from the off-chip storage space through the current program, read the encrypted verification information corresponding to the data from the off-chip storage space; read the key and the data from the verification area The storage time information is encrypted according to the key to the storage address information obtained when reading the data and the read storage time information to obtain reference verification information; the reference verification information and the read encrypted verification information are encrypted. The verification information is compared, and the safety of the data is confirmed according to the comparison results. Through the on-chip storage of keys corresponding to different programs dynamically configured, the independent dynamic protection of data processed by each program is realized, avoiding the situation that the key leakage of one program leads to the leakage of all program information.

Embodiment 2

FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of an isolation dynamic protection device for an embedded system according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention. 3 , the isolation dynamic protection device of the embedded system includes: a data loading unit 210 , a writing initialization unit 220 , a data writing unit 230 , a data reading unit 240 , a verification initialization unit 250 and a data comparison unit 260 .

Among them, the data loading unit 210 is used to load the current program from the off-chip storage space, read the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and update the key read next time; the writing initialization unit 220 is used for When data is written to the off-chip storage space through the current program, verification information is generated according to the storage parameters of the data, where the storage parameters include storage address information and storage time information of the data in the off-chip storage space The data writing unit 230 is used to encrypt the verification information according to the key to obtain encrypted verification information, save the encrypted verification information to the off-chip storage space, and store the encryption key in the off-chip storage space. and storage time information are stored in the check area of the on-chip storage space; the data reading unit 240 is used to read data from the off-chip storage space through the current program when reading data from the off-chip storage space Get the encrypted verification information corresponding to the data; the verification initialization unit 250 is used to read the key and the storage time information from the verification area, according to the storage address information and the storage address information obtained when reading the data according to the key pair The read storage time information is encrypted to obtain reference verification information; the data comparison unit 260 is used to compare the reference verification information and the read encrypted verification information, and confirm the data according to the comparison result. safety.

On the basis of the above embodiment, the off-chip storage space includes a plurality of program spaces, and the entire program is stored in one program space;

The data loading unit 210 includes:

The first loading module is configured to load the current program from the off-chip storage space, and read the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space according to the program identifier of the current program.

On the basis of the above embodiment, the off-chip storage space includes a plurality of program spaces, and the entire program is stored in one program space;

The data loading unit 210 includes:

The second loading module is used to load the current program from the off-chip storage space, and according to the space identifier of the program space where the current program is located, read the key currently corresponding to the program space from the on-chip storage space as the current program the corresponding key.

On the basis of the above embodiment, the on-chip storage space stores multiple keys;

The data loading unit 210 includes:

The password update module is used for confirming a key different from the currently read key from the plurality of keys according to a random algorithm, and updating the confirmed key to the key read next time.

On the basis of the above embodiment, the on-chip storage space also correspondingly stores the usage times corresponding to each of the keys;

The data loading unit 210 further includes:

The times updating module is used to update the usage times.

On the basis of the above embodiment, the isolation dynamic protection device of the embedded system further includes:

The key replacement unit is used for deleting the key and adding a key different from the existing key when the number of times of use of the key reaches a preset service life.

On the basis of the above embodiment, the isolation dynamic protection device of the embedded system further includes:

The verification information generation unit is used to encrypt the program storage information according to the key to obtain the program verification information, save the program verification information to the off-chip storage space, and save the program storage information to the the verification area;

Correspondingly, the isolation dynamic protection device of the embedded system further includes:

a program information reading unit, used for reading program verification information and the real-time storage information of the current program from the off-chip storage space, and reading the key and program storage information from the verification area;

a program information encryption unit, configured to encrypt the real-time storage information and the program storage information according to the key to obtain real-time verification information and original verification information;

The program information verification unit is used to confirm that the real-time verification information, the original verification information and the program verification information completely match.

The device for isolating dynamic protection of an embedded system provided by the embodiment of the present invention is included in a computing device, and can be used to execute any of the methods for isolating dynamic protection of an embedded system provided in the first embodiment, with corresponding functions and beneficial effects.

Embodiment 3

4 is a schematic structural diagram of a computing device according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention. As shown in the figure, the computing device includes a processor 310 and a memory 320, and may also include an input device 330, an output device 340, and a communication device 350; The number of processors 310 in the computing device may be one or more, and one processor 310 is taken as an example in FIG. 4; the processor 310, memory 320, input device 330, output device 340 and communication device 350 in the computing device can be It is connected by bus or other means. In FIG. 4 , the connection by bus is taken as an example.

As a computer-readable storage medium, the memory 320 can be used to store software programs, computer-executable programs, and modules, such as program instructions/modules corresponding to the method for isolating and dynamically protecting an embedded system in this embodiment of the present invention (for example, an embedded The data loading unit 210 , the writing initialization unit 220 , the data writing unit 230 , the data reading unit 240 , the verification initialization unit 250 and the data comparison unit 260 in the isolation dynamic protection device of the system). The processor 310 executes various functional applications and data processing of the terminal device by running the software programs, instructions and modules stored in the memory 320 , that is, to implement the above-mentioned method for dynamic isolation of embedded systems.

The memory 320 may mainly include a storage program area and a storage data area, wherein the storage program area may store an operating system, an application program required for at least one function; the storage data area may store data created according to the use of the terminal device, and the like. Additionally, memory 320 may include high-speed random access memory, and may also include non-volatile memory, such as at least one magnetic disk storage device, flash memory device, or other non-volatile solid-state storage device. In some instances, the memory 320 may further include memory located remotely from the processor 310, and these remote memories may be connected to the terminal device through a network. Examples of such networks include, but are not limited to, the Internet, an intranet, a local area network, a mobile communication network, and combinations thereof.

The input device 330 may be used to receive input numerical or character information, and generate key signal input related to user setting and function control of the terminal device. The output device 340 may include a display device such as a display screen.

The above terminal equipment includes an isolation dynamic protection device for an embedded system, which can be used to execute an isolation dynamic protection method for any embedded system, and has corresponding functions and beneficial effects.

Embodiment 4

Embodiments of the present invention further provide a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, implements the method for isolating dynamic protection of an embedded system as provided in any embodiment of the present application. related operations, and have corresponding functions and beneficial effects.

As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, the embodiments of the present application may be provided as a method, a system, or a computer program product.

Accordingly, the present application may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present application may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) having computer-usable program code embodied therein. The present application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present application. It will be understood that each flow and/or block in the flowcharts and/or block diagrams, and combinations of flows and/or blocks in the flowcharts and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to the processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine such that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device produce Means for implementing the functions specified in one or more of the flowcharts and/or one or more blocks of the block diagrams. These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory result in an article of manufacture comprising instruction means, the instructions An apparatus implements the functions specified in a flow or flows of the flowcharts and/or a block or blocks of the block diagrams. These computer program instructions can also be loaded on a computer or other programmable data processing device to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process such that The instructions provide steps for implementing the functions specified in one or more of the flowcharts and/or one or more blocks of the block diagrams.

In a typical configuration, a computing device includes one or more processors (CPUs), input/output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory. Memory may include non-persistent memory in computer readable media, random access memory (RAM) and/or non-volatile memory in the form of, for example, read only memory (ROM) or flash memory (flash RAM). Memory is an example of a computer-readable medium.

Computer-readable media includes both persistent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media, and storage of information may be implemented by any method or technology. Information may be computer readable instructions, data structures, modules of programs, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase-change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read only memory (ROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM), Flash Memory or other memory technology, Compact Disc Read Only Memory (CD-ROM), Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) or other optical storage, Magnetic tape cartridges, magnetic tape disk storage or other magnetic storage devices or any other non-transmission medium that can be used to store information that can be accessed by a computing device. As defined herein, computer-readable media does not include transitory computer-readable media, such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.

It should also be noted that the terms "comprising", "comprising" or any other variation thereof are intended to encompass a non-exclusive inclusion such that a process, method, article or device comprising a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also Other elements not expressly listed, or which are inherent to such a process, method, article of manufacture, or apparatus are also included. Without further limitation, an element qualified by the phrase "comprising a..." does not preclude the presence of additional identical elements in the process, method, article of manufacture or apparatus that includes the element.

Note that the above are only preferred embodiments of the present invention and applied technical principles. Those skilled in the art will understand that the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments described herein, and various obvious changes, readjustments and substitutions can be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, although the present invention has been described in detail through the above embodiments, the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, and can also include more other equivalent embodiments without departing from the concept of the present invention. The scope is determined by the scope of the appended claims.

Claims (10)

1. the isolation dynamic protection method of embedded system, is characterized in that, comprises: Load the current program from the off-chip storage space, read the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and update the key read next time; When data is written to the off-chip storage space through the current program, verification information is generated according to the storage parameters of the data, where the storage parameters include storage address information and storage time information of the data in the off-chip storage space ; Encrypt the verification information according to the key to obtain encrypted verification information, save the encrypted verification information to the off-chip storage space, and save the key and storage time information to the on-chip storage space. The check area of the internal storage space; When the data is read from the off-chip storage space through the current program, the encrypted verification information corresponding to the data is read from the off-chip storage space; Read the key and the storage time information from the verification area, and encrypt the storage address information obtained when reading the data and the storage time information read according to the key to obtain the reference verification information; The reference verification information is compared with the read encrypted verification information, and the security of the data is confirmed according to the comparison result. 2. The isolation dynamic protection method of an embedded system according to claim 1, wherein the off-chip storage space comprises a plurality of program spaces, and the program is stored in a program space as a whole; Loading the current program from the off-chip storage space, reading the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and updating the key read next time, including: The current program is loaded from the off-chip storage space, and the key corresponding to the current program is read from the on-chip storage space according to the program identifier of the current program. 3. The isolation dynamic protection method of an embedded system according to claim 1, wherein the off-chip storage space comprises a plurality of program spaces, and the program is stored in a program space as a whole; Loading the current program from the off-chip storage space, reading the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and updating the key read next time, including: The current program is loaded from the off-chip storage space, and according to the space identifier of the program space where the current program is located, the key currently corresponding to the program space is read from the on-chip storage space as the key corresponding to the current program. 4. The isolation dynamic protection method of an embedded system according to any one of claims 1-3, wherein the on-chip storage space preserves a plurality of keys; Loading the current program from the off-chip storage space, reading the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and updating the key read next time, including: From the plurality of keys according to a random algorithm, a key different from the key currently read is confirmed, and the confirmed key is updated to the key read next time. 5. The isolation dynamic protection method of embedded system according to claim 4, is characterized in that, described on-chip storage space also correspondingly preserves the usage times corresponding to each described key; Loading the current program from the off-chip storage space, reading the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and updating the key read next time, also includes: Update the usage count. 6 . The method for isolating dynamic protection of an embedded system according to claim 5 , wherein after updating the usage times, the method further comprises: 6 . When the number of times of use of the key reaches the preset service life, the key is deleted and a key different from the existing key is added. 7. The isolation dynamic protection method of an embedded system according to claim 1, characterized in that, when writing data to off-chip storage space through the current program, verification information is generated according to the storage parameter of the data , the storage parameter includes the storage address information and storage time information of the data in the off-chip storage space, and further includes: Encrypt the program storage information according to the key to obtain program verification information, save the program verification information in the off-chip storage space, and save the program storage information in the verification area; Correspondingly, before loading the current program from the off-chip storage space, reading the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and updating the key read next time, it also includes: Read the program verification information and the real-time storage information of the current program from the off-chip storage space, and read the key and program storage information from the verification area; According to the key, the real-time storage information and the program storage information are respectively encrypted to obtain real-time verification information and original verification information; Confirm that the real-time verification information, the original verification information and the program verification information exactly match. 8. The isolation dynamic protection device of the embedded system is characterized in that, comprising: The data loading unit is used to load the current program from the off-chip storage space, read the key corresponding to the current program from the on-chip storage space, and update the key read next time; The writing initialization unit is used to generate verification information according to the storage parameter of the data when data is written to the off-chip storage space through the current program, and the storage parameter includes the value of the data in the off-chip storage space. Storage address information and storage time information; a data writing unit, configured to encrypt the verification information according to the key to obtain encrypted verification information, save the encrypted verification information to the off-chip storage space, and store the key and storage The time information is stored in the check area of the on-chip storage space; a data reading unit, configured to read encrypted verification information corresponding to the data from the off-chip storage space when reading data from the off-chip storage space through the current program; The verification initialization unit is used to read the key and storage time information from the verification area, and encrypts the storage address information obtained when reading the data and the storage time information read according to the key to obtain a reference verification information; The data comparison unit is configured to compare the reference verification information with the read encrypted verification information, and confirm the security of the data according to the comparison result. 9. A computing device, comprising: one or more processors; memory for storing one or more programs; When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the computing device implements the isolation dynamic protection method for an embedded system according to any one of claims 1-7. 10. A storage medium storing computer-executable instructions, wherein the computer-executable instructions, when executed by a computer processor, are used to perform the isolation of the embedded system according to any one of claims 1-7 Dynamic protection method.

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