CN106056192B - A kind of verification method and system of the smart card can verify that function with anti-copying - Google Patents
A kind of verification method and system of the smart card can verify that function with anti-copying Download PDFInfo
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- CN106056192B CN106056192B CN201610392318.8A CN201610392318A CN106056192B CN 106056192 B CN106056192 B CN 106056192B CN 201610392318 A CN201610392318 A CN 201610392318A CN 106056192 B CN106056192 B CN 106056192B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
- G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
- G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
- G06K19/07309—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers
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Abstract
The present invention relates to the verification methods and system of a kind of smart card that can verify that function with anti-copying, this method comprises: in initial phase: in the data write-in smart card for initializing to smart card, and initialization being obtained；In Qualify Phase: being verified using return value of the public key algorithm to smart card；If the return value to smart card is verified, the ID number of smart card is obtained.The present invention is instructed by using original standard card reading, under the premise of not changing original card reading function, only pass through the content of modification card reading function, and the ability of verify data can be analyzed using card reader itself, realize quick, the simple authentication smart card true and false the function, it ensure that the ID number of smart card can not be replicated, be forged, improve the security level of smart card system.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to the technical fields of smart card, can verify that function with anti-copying more specifically to a kind of
The verification method and system of smart card.
Background technique
Smart card is widely used by society at present, and the ID number of every sheet smart card is all unique, unmodifiable, application at present
Most is exactly to carry out smartcard identification using the ID number of smart card.Application system based on smart card ID number can be according to every intelligence
The ID number that can block is building associated data from the background, and the smart card of corresponding ID number is authorized to have different application permission and numerical value.
With the development of technology, the risk that the ID number of smart card becomes reproducible and produces clone's card is increasing, base
Become more and more dangerous in the application system of smart card ID number.The case where not changing original application system framework and function
Under, how to improve security level, prevent the use of clone's card from just becoming necessary.
Summary of the invention
The technical problem to be solved in the present invention is that for the above-mentioned application system based on smart card ID number of the prior art
The defect for becoming dangerous, being easily cloned provides a kind of verification method of the smart card that can verify that function with anti-copying and is
System.
The technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve the technical problems is: constructing a kind of has the function of that anti-copying can verify that
The verification method of smart card,
In initial phase, comprising the following steps:
The data for initializing to the smart card, and initialization being obtained are written in the smart card；
In Qualify Phase, comprising the following steps:
It is verified using return value of the public key algorithm to the smart card；
If the return value to the smart card is verified, the ID number of the smart card is obtained.
Preferably, described that the smart card is initialized, and the smart card is written in the data that initialization is obtained
In step include:
Initialization directive is received, the smart card is initialized according to the initialization directive, obtains the intelligence
Unique ID of the card of card and the public key of card；
The public key of unique ID of the card and the card are bound；
The binding relationship of the public key of unique ID and the card to the card is signed, and corresponding signature is obtained
Value；
The signature value is written in the smart card.
Preferably, described the step of being verified using return value of the public key algorithm to the smart card, includes:
The system public key is first obtained before reading the smart card, and when reading the smart card to the smart card
The instruction for reading the ID number of the smart card is issued, the return value of smart card is obtained by described instruction；
The smart card receives the instruction of the ID number for reading the smart card, and corresponding according to described instruction reply
Return value.
Preferably, the corresponding return value includes: signature, card of the card private key of the smart card to random number
Unique ID, the public key of card, signature value.
Preferably, described the step of being verified using return value of the public key algorithm to the smart card further include:
Using signature value described in the system public key verifications, if the signature value is verified, starting is in next step；If described
The verifying of signature value does not pass through, and releases the smart card；
If the signature value is verified, label of the card private key to random number described in the public key verifications using the card
Name, if the card private key passes through the signature verification of random number, starting is in next step；If the card private key is to the label of random number
Name verifying does not pass through, and releases the smart card.
Preferably, if the return value to the smart card is verified, the ID number of the smart card is obtained
Step includes:
If card private key described in the public key verifications using the card is to the signature of random number, and the card private key
The signature verification of random number is passed through, the ID number of the smart card is obtained.
The present invention also provides a kind of system of smart card that can verify that function with anti-copying, which includes:
Initialization module, for initializing to the smart card, and the intelligence is written in the data that initialization is obtained
In capable of blocking；
Authentication module, for being verified using return value of the public key algorithm to the smart card；
Execution module obtains the ID number of the smart card if being verified for the return value to the smart card.
The verification method and system for implementing the smart card that there is the present invention anti-copying can verify that function have below beneficial to effect
Fruit: the present invention is instructed by using original standard card reading, under the premise of not changing original card reading function, is only read by modification
The content of card function, and the ability of verify data can be analyzed using card reader itself, realize quickly, simple authentication smart card it is true
Pseudo- function, ensure that the ID number of smart card can not be replicated, be forged, improves the security level of smart card system.
Detailed description of the invention
Present invention will be further explained below with reference to the attached drawings and examples, in attached drawing:
Fig. 1 is that the method flow of one embodiment of verification method for the smart card that the present invention can verify that function with anti-copying shows
It is intended to；
Fig. 2 is the structural schematic diagram of one embodiment of system for the smart card that the present invention can verify that function with anti-copying；
Specific embodiment
In order to make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the present invention clearer, below in conjunction with attached drawing and specific implementation
Example, the present invention is further described in detail.It should be understood that ground, specific embodiment described herein are only used for explaining this hair
It is bright, it is not intended to limit the present invention.
The embodiment of the invention discloses the verification methods and system of a kind of smart card that can verify that function with anti-copying, should
System include one with SM2 cryptographic algorithm smart card, one the card reader of smart card can be read and be mounted in card reader
For completing to read the related software of smart card.System will initialize number obtained by initializing to smart card
According to being written in smart card, the authorization to smart card is realized, while card reader exists by acquisition system public key, and by card reading instruction
The return value (return value is the data with verification information and ID number) that smart card is obtained when reading smart card, is calculated using public key
The return value that method replys smart card analyzes and determines that the return value that verifying smart card is replied obtains if verification result passes through
The ID number of smart card.It, can quick, simple authentication intelligence i.e. by carrying out analysis verifying using public key algorithm to the smart card authorized
The true and false that can block.It is described in detail separately below.
As shown in Figure 1, a kind of authentication of smart card that can verify that function with anti-copying for one embodiment of the invention
The flow diagram of method, the legitimacy of smart card can be confirmed by the verification method, it can distinguish the true and false of smart card,
Prevent clone from blocking.This with anti-copying can verify that function smart card verification method the following steps are included:
S101: initializing smart card, and in the data write-in smart card that initialization is obtained.Specifically, the step
Suddenly include: that system receives initialization directive, and is initialized according to initialization directive to smart card, obtain the card of smart card
Unique ID (i.e. CardID) and the public key (i.e. CardPubkey) of card pass through phase in the initialization procedure to smart card
The operational order answered, in the public key (i.e. CardPubkey) for the unique ID (i.e. CardID) and card for obtaining the card of smart card
Afterwards, the CardID of smart card and CardPubkey are bound into (i.e. CardID+CardPubkey), simultaneity factor in systems
It signs to CardID+CardPubkey, obtaining the corresponding signature value of CardID+CardPubkey, (i.e. InfoSign, can be with
Understand ground, which is signature of the system to the binding relationship of CardID and CardPubkey), and the signature value is written
In smart card, and then the initialization to smart card is completed, realizes the authorization to smart card.It is to be appreciated that system mentioned here
The system that system refers to the smart card that can verify that function with anti-copying, in addition, the present invention refers to corresponding operation referred herein
Order is not construed as limiting.
S102: it is verified using return value of the public key algorithm to smart card.
Specifically, before starting the return value to smart card and verifying, following steps are first carried out:
System public key is first obtained before reading smart card, and is issued when reading smart card to smart card and read smart card
The instruction of ID number obtains the return value of smart card by instruction.I.e. before reading smart card, card reader first passes through system acquisition
System public key (i.e. SystemPubkey), and the instruction for reading the ID number of smart card is issued to smart card when reading smart card
(i.e. APDU instruction), while the return value that smart card is replied is obtained by APDU instruction；It is to be appreciated that APDU instruction can
With are as follows: the random number of 00 85 00 00 08+8 byte, for the random number of 8 bytes in APDU instruction, the present invention does not make
It limits, can be determined according to practical operation.
Smart card receives the instruction for reading the ID number of smart card, and replys corresponding return value according to APDU instruction.Tool
Body, the APDU that smart card receives the ID number for the reading smart card that system is sent by card reader is instructed, and is referred to according to the APDU
It enables and replys corresponding return value.It is to be appreciated that return value includes: signature, card of the card private key of smart card to random number
Unique ID, the public key of card, signature value.Corresponding, which can be with are as follows: CardSign+CardID+CardPubKey+
InfoSign+9000, wherein CardSign is signature of the card private key to random number of smart card, and CardID is the card of smart card
Unique ID of piece, CardPubKey are the public key of the card of smart card, and InfoSign is system private key to CardID+
The signature of CardPubKey.In a specific embodiment of the present invention, the length of CardSign is generally 64 bytes, the length of CardID
Degree is generally 32 bytes, and the length of CardPubKey is generally 64 bytes, and the length of InfoSign is generally 64 bytes.For
The specific length of CardSign, CardID, CardPubKey and InfoSign can carry out selection determination, this hair according to practical application
It is bright that this is not construed as limiting.
Further, verify using return value of the public key algorithm to smart card further comprising the steps of:
Using the system public key verifications signature value, if signature value is verified, starting is in next step；If signature value is verified not
Pass through, releases the smart card.It is to be appreciated that system passes through the signature value in the return value that system public key replys smart card
I.e. InfoSign is analyzed and determined, the binding relationship of the CardID and CardPubKey in smart card is verified, if system public key
InfoSign is verified, then can confirm the true binding relationship of CardID and CardPubKey, just will start at this time next
Step operation；If system public key does not pass through InfoSign verifying, card reader releases smart card, i.e., the identity of the smart card is not
It is legal.
Under the premise of above-mentioned verification step passes through, i.e. signature value is verified, using card public key (i.e.
CardPubkey card private key) is verified to the signature (i.e. CardSign) of random number, if card private key tests the signature of random number
Card passes through, and starting is in next step；If card private key does not pass through the signature verification of random number, smart card is released.I.e. the step be
What InfoSign was just executed under the premise of being verified.It is to be appreciated that being opened after system public key is verified InfoSign
Dynamic next step, i.e., with the card private key of card public key (i.e. CardPubkey) the verifying smart card of smart card to the signature of random number
(i.e. CardSign), if CardSign is verified, it may be determined that the smart card is exactly the genuine owner of CardPubKey, at this time
It just will start and operate in next step, if verifying is obstructed out-of-date, card reader will release smart card, i.e., the smart card is not
The genuine owner of CardPubKey, identity are illegal.
It is to be appreciated that the public key algorithm of present invention meaning is using system public key (i.e. SystemPubkey) and card
The algorithm that public key (i.e. CardPubkey) verifies the smart card by system initialization.I.e. with SystemPubkey to
The Infosign of the smart card of initialization is verified, and confirms the true binding relationship of CardID and CardPubkey, and verifying is logical
Later Cardsign is verified with CardPubkey again, Cardsign can confirm that the CardID of the smart card is exactly after being verified
The ID number of true smart card, to solve the risk that smart card is replicated.Intelligence can effectively be verified using public key algorithm
The true identity of card prevents from being replicated.
S103: if the return value to smart card is verified, the ID number of smart card is obtained.Specifically, system is (referred herein
System refer to the system that can verify that the smart card of function with anti-copying) to smart card reply return value carry out it is dual twice
After verifying, that is, it can determine the true identity of the CardID of smart card.I.e. first with system public key (CardPubkey) to signature value
(InfoSign) it is verified.If InfoSign is verified, card reader starting operates in next step, that is, utilizes CardPubkey pairs
CardSign is verified, if CardSign is verified, can determine that the CardID of smart card is exactly true ID number, i.e., should
The identity of smart card is legal, and then obtains the ID number of the smart card.
Further, card reader is instructed using the software of installation inside it by reading smart card, is reading smart card
When obtain after the return value that smart card is replied (return value is the data with verification information and ID number), it is soft inside card reader
The authenticity of the ID number for the smart card that part is returned with verifying from smart card by analysis, to whether judge the smart card read
It is legal smart card.Specifically, it after the software inside card reader gets return value, is returned using system public key verifications smart card
After InfoSign is verified, really tying up for CardID and CardPubKey is can be confirmed in InfoSign in multiple return value
Determine relationship, the CardPubKey being verified verifying CardSign is recycled to determine the intelligence after CardSign is verified
Card is exactly the genuine owner of CardPubKey.The verification method passes through comparison twice, it is determined that the smart card
CardID is exactly the ID number of true smart card, to solve the risk that smart card is replicated.It is to be appreciated that skill of the present invention
ID number in art scheme is the signature mechanism based on the close SM2 algorithm of state, ensure that ID number can not be replicated, forge, and the close SM2 of state is calculated
The key that method generates is especially short, so that public key, Information Signature can be realized in the APDU instruction of 255 bytes,
Therefore it can guarantee that the ID number of smart card can not be replicated and forge using the signature mechanism of this kind of algorithm, and simple and easy, mention
The high safety of smart card.It is to be appreciated that the present invention is instructed by using existing standard card reading, do not changing original reading
Under the premise of card function, only pass through the content of modification card reading function, and the ability of verify data can be analyzed using card reader itself,
Quick, the simple authentication smart card true and false the function is realized, ensure that the ID number of smart card can not be replicated, be forged, improve intelligence
The security level of energy card system.
As shown in Fig. 2, Fig. 2 is the structure of one embodiment of system for the smart card that the present invention can verify that function with anti-copying
Schematic diagram, the system include:
Initialization module 201, for initializing to smart card, and smart card is written in the data that initialization is obtained
In.
Specifically, which includes: that system receives initialization directive, and is carried out initially according to initialization directive to smart card
Change, unique ID (i.e. CardID) of the card of smart card and the public key (i.e. CardPubkey) of card is obtained, to smart card
It in initialization procedure, is instructed by corresponding operation, the unique ID's (i.e. CardID) and card for obtaining the card of smart card
After public key (i.e. CardPubkey), the CardID of smart card and CardPubkey are bound into (i.e. CardID+ in systems
CardPubkey), simultaneity factor signs to CardID+CardPubkey, obtains the corresponding label of CardID+CardPubkey
Name value (i.e. InfoSign, it is possible to understand that ground, the InfoSign are label of the system to the binding relationship of CardID and CardPubkey
Name), and the signature value is written in smart card, and then complete the initialization to smart card, realize the authorization to smart card.It can be with
Understand ground, system mentioned here refers to the system that can verify that the smart card of function with anti-copying, in addition, the present invention is to here
Signified corresponding operation instruction is not construed as limiting.
Authentication module 202, for being verified using return value of the public key algorithm to smart card.
Specifically, before starting the return value to smart card and verifying, following steps are first carried out:
System public key is first obtained before reading smart card, and is issued when reading smart card to smart card and read smart card
The instruction of ID number obtains the return value of smart card by instruction.I.e. before reading smart card, card reader first passes through system acquisition
System public key (i.e. SystemPubkey), and the instruction for reading the ID number of smart card is issued to smart card when reading smart card
(i.e. APDU instruction), while the return value that smart card is replied is obtained by APDU instruction；It is to be appreciated that APDU instruction can
With are as follows: the random number of 00 85 00 00 08+8 byte, for the random number of 8 bytes in APDU instruction, the present invention does not make
It limits, can be determined according to practical operation.
Smart card receives the instruction for reading the ID number of smart card, and replys corresponding return value according to APDU instruction.Tool
Body, the APDU that smart card receives the ID number for the reading smart card that system is sent by card reader is instructed, and is referred to according to the APDU
It enables and replys corresponding return value.It is to be appreciated that return value includes: signature, card of the card private key of smart card to random number
Unique ID, the public key of card, signature value.Corresponding, which can be with are as follows: CardSign+CardID+CardPubKey+
InfoSign+9000, wherein CardSign is signature of the card private key to random number of smart card, and CardID is the card of smart card
Unique ID of piece, CardPubKey are the public key of the card of smart card, and InfoSign is system private key to CardID+
The signature of CardPubKey.In a specific embodiment of the present invention, the length of CardSign is generally 64 bytes, the length of CardID
Degree is generally 32 bytes, and the length of CardPubKey is generally 64 bytes, and the length of InfoSign is generally 64 bytes.For
The specific length of CardSign, CardID, CardPubKey and InfoSign can carry out selection determination, this hair according to practical application
It is bright that this is not construed as limiting.
Further, verify using return value of the public key algorithm to smart card further comprising the steps of:
Using the system public key verifications signature value, if signature value is verified, starting is in next step；If signature value is verified not
Pass through, releases the smart card.It is to be appreciated that system passes through the signature value in the return value that system public key replys smart card
I.e. InfoSign is analyzed and determined, the binding relationship of the CardID and CardPubKey in smart card is verified, if system public key
InfoSign is verified, then can confirm the true binding relationship of CardID and CardPubKey, just will start at this time next
Step operation；If system public key does not pass through InfoSign verifying, card reader releases smart card, i.e., the identity of the smart card is not
It is legal.
Under the premise of above-mentioned verification step passes through, i.e. signature value is verified, using card public key (i.e.
CardPubkey card private key) is verified to the signature (i.e. CardSign) of random number, if card private key tests the signature of random number
Card passes through, and starting is in next step；If card private key does not pass through the signature verification of random number, smart card is released.I.e. the step be
What InfoSign was just executed under the premise of being verified.It is to be appreciated that being opened after system public key is verified InfoSign
Dynamic next step, i.e., with the card private key of card public key (i.e. CardPubkey) the verifying smart card of smart card to the signature of random number
(i.e. CardSign), if CardSign is verified, it may be determined that the smart card is exactly the genuine owner of CardPubKey, at this time
It just will start and operate in next step, if verifying is obstructed out-of-date, card reader will release smart card, i.e., the smart card is not
The genuine owner of CardPubKey, identity are illegal.
It is to be appreciated that the public key algorithm of present invention meaning is using system public key (i.e. SystemPubkey) and card
The algorithm that public key (i.e. CardPubkey) verifies the smart card by system initialization.I.e. with SystemPubkey to
The Infosign of the smart card of initialization is verified, and confirms the true binding relationship of CardID and CardPubkey, and verifying is logical
Later Cardsign is verified with CardPubkey again, Cardsign can confirm that the CardID of the smart card is exactly after being verified
The ID number of true smart card, to solve the risk that smart card is replicated.Intelligence can effectively be verified using public key algorithm
The true identity of card prevents from being replicated.
Execution module 203 obtains the ID number of smart card if the return value for smart card is verified.
Specifically, system (system referred herein refers to the system that can verify that the smart card of function with anti-copying) is to intelligence
After the return value that energy card is replied carries out double verification twice, that is, it can determine the true identity of the CardID of smart card.I.e. first with
System public key (CardPubkey) verifies signature value (InfoSign).If InfoSign is verified, card reader starting
It operates in next step, i.e., CardSign is verified using CardPubkey, if CardSign is verified, can determine intelligence
The CardID of card is exactly true ID number, i.e. the identity of the smart card is legal, and then obtains the ID number of the smart card.
Further, card reader is instructed using the software of installation inside it by reading smart card, is reading smart card
When obtain after the return value that smart card is replied (return value is the data with verification information and ID number), it is soft inside card reader
The authenticity of the ID number for the smart card that part is returned with verifying from smart card by analysis, to whether judge the smart card read
It is legal smart card.Specifically, it after the software inside card reader gets return value, is returned using system public key verifications smart card
After InfoSign is verified, really tying up for CardID and CardPubKey is can be confirmed in InfoSign in multiple return value
Determine relationship, the CardPubKey being verified verifying CardSign is recycled to determine the intelligence after CardSign is verified
Card is exactly the genuine owner of CardPubKey.The verification method passes through comparison twice, it is determined that the smart card
CardID is exactly the ID number of true smart card, to solve the risk that smart card is replicated.It is to be appreciated that skill of the present invention
ID number in art scheme is the signature mechanism based on the close SM2 algorithm of state, ensure that ID number can not be replicated, forge, and the close SM2 of state is calculated
The key that method generates is especially short, so that public key, Information Signature can be realized in the APDU instruction of 255 bytes,
Therefore it can guarantee that the ID number of smart card can not be replicated and forge using the signature mechanism of this kind of algorithm, and simple and easy, mention
The high safety of smart card.It is to be appreciated that the present invention is instructed by using existing standard card reading, do not changing original reading
Under the premise of card function, only pass through the content of modification card reading function, and the ability of verify data can be analyzed using card reader itself,
Quick, the simple authentication smart card true and false the function is realized, ensure that the ID number of smart card can not be replicated, be forged, improve intelligence
The security level of energy card system.
It is to be appreciated that technical solution of the present invention can also be applied in the card reader with multiple operating system, when answering
When in the card reader of multiple operating system, an operating system number (SystemID) is distributed for each operating system, and generate
The system public key (SystemPubkey) of corresponding each operating system, when card reader, which issues APDU to smart card, to be instructed, intelligence
The card return value of card just becomes: CardSign+CardID+CardPubkey+InfoSign+SystemID+9000.Card reader
The public key SystemPubkey of corresponding system is obtained by SystemID, and then judges return value.Herein the present invention no longer
Verification method between the card reader and smart card of multiple operating system is described in detail.Meanwhile operation system mentioned here
System is the operating system being mounted in card reader.
Above embodiments only technical concepts and features to illustrate the invention, its object is to allow person skilled in the art
Scholar can understand the contents of the present invention and implement accordingly, can not limit the scope of the invention.It is all to be wanted with right of the present invention
The equivalent changes and modifications that range is done are sought, should belong to the covering scope of the claims in the present invention.
It should be understood that for those of ordinary skills, it can be modified or changed according to the above description,
And all these modifications and variations should all belong to the protection domain of appended claims of the present invention.
Claims (5)
1. a kind of verification method for the smart card that can verify that function with anti-copying, which is characterized in that
In initial phase, comprising the following steps: the data for initializing to the smart card, and initialization being obtained are written
In the smart card；The smart card is the smart card with SM2 cryptographic algorithm；
It is described that the smart card is initialized, and the step packet in the smart card is written into the data that initialization obtains
It includes:
Initialization directive is received, the smart card is initialized according to the initialization directive, obtains the smart card
Unique ID of card and the public key of card；
The public key of unique ID of the card and the card are bound；
The binding relationship of the public key of unique ID and the card to the card is signed, and corresponding signature value is obtained；
The signature value is written in the smart card；
In Qualify Phase, comprising the following steps:
It is verified using return value of the public key algorithm to the smart card；
Described the step of being verified using return value of the public key algorithm to the smart card includes:
System public key is first obtained before reading the smart card, and issues and reads to the smart card when reading the smart card
The instruction of the ID number of the smart card obtains the return value of smart card by described instruction；
The smart card receives the instruction of the ID number for reading the smart card, and replys corresponding return according to described instruction
Value；
If the return value to the smart card is verified, the ID number of the smart card is obtained.
2. the verification method of the smart card according to claim 1 that can verify that function with anti-copying, which is characterized in that
The corresponding return value includes: unique ID, the card of signature of the card private key to random number of the smart card, card
Public key, signature value.
3. the verification method of the smart card according to claim 2 that can verify that function with anti-copying, which is characterized in that institute
State the step of verifying using return value of the public key algorithm to the smart card further include:
Using signature value described in the system public key verifications, if the signature value is verified, starting is in next step；If the signature
Value verifying does not pass through, and releases the smart card；
If the signature value is verified, card private key described in the public key verifications using the card to the signature of random number, if
The card private key passes through the signature verification of random number, and starting is in next step；If the card private key tests the signature of random number
Card does not pass through, and releases the smart card.
4. the verification method of the smart card according to claim 3 that can verify that function with anti-copying, which is characterized in that institute
Include: if stating the step of return value to the smart card is verified, obtains the ID number of the smart card
If card private key described in the public key verifications using the card to the signature of random number, and the card private key to
The signature verification of machine number passes through, and obtains the ID number of the smart card.
5. a kind of system for the smart card that can verify that function with anti-copying, which is characterized in that the system comprises:
Initialization module, for initializing to the smart card, and the smart card is written in the data that initialization is obtained
In；
The initialization module is specifically used for:
Initialization directive is received, the smart card is initialized according to the initialization directive, obtains the smart card
Unique ID of card and the public key of card；
The public key of unique ID of the card and the card are bound；
The binding relationship of the public key of unique ID and the card to the card is signed, and corresponding signature value is obtained；
The signature value is written in the smart card；
Authentication module, for being verified using return value of the public key algorithm to the smart card；
The authentication module is specifically used for:
System public key is first obtained before reading the smart card, and issues and reads to the smart card when reading the smart card
The instruction of the ID number of the smart card obtains the return value of smart card by described instruction；
The smart card receives the instruction of the ID number for reading the smart card, and replys corresponding return according to described instruction
Value；
Execution module obtains the ID number of the smart card if being verified for the return value to the smart card.
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| CN107483392A (en) * | 2016-11-02 | 2017-12-15 | 深圳市波普安创技术有限公司 | The production authorization system and method for information safety devices |
| CN107359997B (en) * | 2017-05-27 | 2020-06-19 | 南方城墙信息安全科技有限公司 | Intelligent chip protection method and chip protection system based on PKI mechanism |
| CN112311807A (en) * | 2020-11-09 | 2021-02-02 | 珠海格力电器股份有限公司 | Method, device, equipment and storage medium for preventing smart card from being reused |
| CN114841300B (en) * | 2022-06-02 | 2024-08-13 | 成都为开微电子有限公司 | Traceable card issuing method based on true random number and RFID |
| CN115310140A (en) * | 2022-07-06 | 2022-11-08 | 深圳市德明利技术股份有限公司 | Driving record data tamper-proof method, device and driving recorder |
| CN115438332A (en) * | 2022-09-06 | 2022-12-06 | 江苏芯盛智能科技有限公司 | Chip identification method, computer equipment and readable storage medium |
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| CN101727712B (en) * | 2008-10-16 | 2012-10-31 | 中国银联股份有限公司 | An electronic cash transfer method |
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| CN101247230A (en) * | 2008-02-28 | 2008-08-20 | 唐跃文 | Anti-counterfeiting method based on non-contact IC card |
| CN101409619A (en) * | 2008-11-25 | 2009-04-15 | 普天信息技术研究院有限公司 | Flash memory card and method for implementing virtual special network key exchange |
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Effective date of registration: 20200914 Address after: 518000, Shenzhen, Guangdong, Futian District Futian street, China Road, excellent Merlin Center Plaza (North District) 4, 1205 Patentee after: CHINA-VISION INTELLIGENT CARD READER Co.,Ltd. Address before: 518000, Shenzhen, Guangdong, Futian District Futian street, China Road, excellent Merlin Center Plaza (North District) 4, 1206 Patentee before: CHINA VISION MICROELECTRONIC Co.,Ltd. |
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