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injury

Benisek v. Lamone

Issues

The Court will consider three issues: (1) did the district court err when it found that, for First Amendment retaliatory gerrymandering claims, establishing an actual, concrete injury requires proof that the gerrymandered map has dictated and will continue to dictate the results of every election following the gerrymander; (2) did the district court err when it held that burden-shifting is not applicable to First Amendment retaliation challenges to partisan gerrymandering in Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle; and (3) did the district court err in finding that the record does not prove that the 2011 gerrymander dictated the Democratic victories in 2012, 2014, and 2016 in Maryland’s Sixth Congressional District?

In 2012 the State of Maryland, under Democratic Governor Martin O’Malley, and with the help of NCEC Services, a company specializing in electoral analytics and political strategy, redrew its Sixth Congressional District to comply with one-person-one-vote rules. This resulted in the exclusion of approximately 66,000 registered Republicans and the inclusion of 24,000 Democrats in the District. O. John Benisek alleges that the new Sixth District was the result of backdoor meetings intended to consolidate Democratic control of the District. Linda Lamone, the State Administrator of Elections, on the other hand, contends that the current district lines more closely resemble the historic party composition of the voters. Benisek argues that this redistricting treats Republicans unfavorably in violation of the First Amendment. Lamone counters that this is not a valid claim in court because no rigorous judicial standard can be created to assess the impact of gerrymandering in redistricting efforts. Lamone contends that the Plaintiffs cannot put forth a clear, neutral, and judicially manageable standard for these cases, and thus the political process should resolve the issue. But Benisek responds that this is a First Amendment case where the correct inquiry is whether voters suffered retaliation for their political beliefs. The outcome of this case will have implications for the proper role of the legislature and the judiciary in the redistricting process and for levels of citizen civic engagement and political influence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the majority of the three-judge district court erred in holding that, to establish an actual, concrete injury in a First Amendment retaliation challenge to a partisan gerrymander, a plaintiff must prove that the gerrymander has dictated and will continue to dictate the outcome of every election held in the district under the gerrymandered map; (2) whether the majority erred in holding that the Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle burden-shifting framework is inapplicable to First Amendment retaliation challenges to partisan gerrymanders; and (3) whether, regardless of the applicable legal standards, the majority erred in holding that the present record does not permit a finding that the 2011 gerrymander was a but-for cause of the Democratic victories in the district in 2012, 2014, or 2016.

Before 1991, Maryland’s Sixth Congressional District was composed of more registered Democrats than registered Republicans. Brief of Appellees, Lamone et al. at 3. However, in 1991, the district lines were redrawn, leaving registered Republicans outnumbering registered Democrats.

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Department of Education v. Brown

Issues

Do two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education's Student Loan Debt Relief Plan, and did the Department of Education act consistent with its statutory authority and applicable procedural requirements in adopting the Plan?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education’s Student Loan Debt Relief Plan (“Plan”), and whether the Department of Education acted consistent with its statutory authority and applicable procedural requirements in adopting the Plan. The Department of Education argues that Brown lacks Article III standing to challenge the Plan, that the Plan is statutorily authorized under the HEROES Act, and that the Secretary of Education has the authority to waive or modify the relevant procedural requirements. On behalf of herself and a similarly situated individual, Myra Brown counters that she has Article III standing to challenge the Plan, the Department of Education lacks the statutory authority to adopt the Plan, and the Plan is procedurally defective. This case has significant implications for the viability of the Student Loan Debt Relief Plan and the scope of executive power.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education's student-debt relief plan; and (2) whether the department's plan is statutorily authorized and was adopted in a procedurally proper manner.

On October 12, 2022, the Secretary of Education proposed the Student Loan Debt Relief Plan (“Plan”) under authority granted by the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (“HEROES Act”). Myra Brown, et al. v. U.S. Department of Education, et al. at 5.

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Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York

Issues

Does loss of taxable revenue constitute an injury to business or property under RICO and was the City’s injury direct enough to meet the direct injury requirement for standing under RICO?

 

Both the State and the City of New York have enacted laws that require the imposition of taxes on all cigarettes sold or used within their boundaries. The City of New York sued a group of Internet cigarette retailers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The City of New York claimed that the retailers had violated federal and state laws in selling cigarettes to New York residents without charging a tax on tobacco products, constituting a form of consumer fraud as well as tax evasion. The District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the City's claims, holding that the City did not plead that the Internet retailers were an enterprise as defined by RICO. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the lower court and held that the State could hold the retailers liable for its loss of tax revenue. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will affect the ability of Internet sites to sell tobacco products at a discounted price, as well as refine the application of RICO in civil suits.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether city government meets the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act standing requirement that a plaintiff  be  directly injured in its “business or property” by alleging con-commercial injury resulting from non-payment of taxes by non-litigant third parties.

The State of New York imposes a tax on all cigarettes sold or used in the State (known as a use tax). See City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F.3d 425, 432 (2nd Cir.

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·      Bloomberg.com, Greg Stohr: New York Suits Over Cigarette Sales Get U.S. High Court Review (May 4, 2009)

·      Business Week, Brian Burnsed: Preview of Major Business Cases in Supreme Court’s 2009-2010 Term (Sept. 24, 2009)

·      Trade Regulation Talk, John W. Arden & Mark Engstrom: High Court to Consider RICO’s “Business or Property” Requirement (May 22, 2009)

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Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis

Issues

May a federal court certify a class action that includes members who lack Article III standing? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow courts to certify a class in a class action where some members lack Article III standing. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require commonality of questions and predominance of similar injuries to allow certification, and lower courts certified Davis and other blind plaintiffs as a class of all legally blind individuals unable to use Labcorp self-check-in kiosks due to their disability. Labcorp contends that was error because the class contains some members who never experienced any harm from Labcorp and therefore lack Article III standing. Davis counters that all class members within the certified class suffered an injury; but, even if they did not, Article III does not require an injury for all unnamed class members at the class-certification stage. The outcome of this case has implications for settlement frequency and cost and the accuracy of certified classes. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal court may certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury.

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a mechanism for class action lawsuits allowing plaintiffs to file a lawsuit on behalf of a larger group, who can also benefit from any judgment.

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Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn

Issues

Do economic harms, such as losing employment, qualify as injury to “business or property” under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, if those harms stem from personal injuries, such as ingesting an unwanted drug?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property” for the purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Commercial truck driver Horn ingested Dixie X to alleviate his back pain, after learning from the sellers that it contained no THC, even though it did. After testing positive for THC in a random drug test from his employer, Horn was fired. He then sued the sellers for injury to his business under RICO. Medical Marijuana, Inc. argues that ingestion of an unwanted substance like THC is a personal injury, and that economic damages from such an injury do not turn it into an injury to “business or property.” Horn claims that losing his job because of Medical Marijuana’s alleged fraud is an injury to “business or property.” This case has significant implications for the rights of human trafficking victims, the cost of doing business in consumer products, and the vitality of the hemp industry.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant’s acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

Respondent, Douglas Horn, was a commercial truck driver for fourteen years before the event leading to this case occurred. Brief for Respondent, Horn at 3–4. In February 2012, he was involved in a trucking accident in which he sustained injuries to his shoulder and back.

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Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins

Issues

Can a plaintiff who has suffered no concrete harm sue in federal court for a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act without violating Article III of the US Constitution?

 

This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide whether plaintiffs may file lawsuits in federal court simply by showing that a defendant violated a federal statute. On the one hand, Spokeo, Inc. argues that Article III of the United States Constitution requires the plaintiff to show that he was sufficiently harmed by the violation of the statute. See Brief for Petitioner, Spokeo, Inc. at 11–13. On the other hand, Robins contends that although he might not meet the injury-in-fact requirement, he was in fact harmed by the incorrect information that was listed on Spokeo, Inc.’s website. See Brief for Respondent, Thomas Robins at 34. According to Robins, the fact that Congress created a private right of action in the Fair Credit Reporting Act combined with the fact that Spokeo, Inc. violated the statute is enough to file a lawsuit. See Brief for Respondent at 15. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will implicate class action lawsuits involving large corporations, as well as potentially alter the likelihood that corporations will settle claims to prevent significant financial consequences. See Brief for Amici Curiae Ebay Inc. et al., in Support of Petitioner at 13–14; see Brief for Time Inc. and Seven Media Organizations, in Support of Petitioner at 20.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May Congress confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute?

The issues in this case arise from the information that Petitioner Spokeo, Inc. provides to its users about other individuals through its online services. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1892, 191 L. Ed. 2d 762 (2015). Spokeo, Inc.

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