A party with multiple claims may wish to aggregate them to meet the jurisdictional amount (also known as amount in controversy) requirement for their desired court. The current amount in controversy requirement is $75,000. While this practice is generally not permitted, a few exceptions apply:
Amount in controversy refers to the amount of money a plaintiff seeks in a lawsuit. The monetary value of a non-monetary remedy such as an injunction can also be included in the amount in controversy.
Whether a defect in a claim as to the nature of “employment” under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination by employers with fifteen or more employees, limits the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Federal courts in hearing Title VII claims, as held by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, or if it only raises an issue going to the merits of the claim, as held by the Second, Seventh, and Federal Circuits?
In November of 2001, Jenifer Arbaugh brought suit against her former employer, Y & H Corporation under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, alleging that she was discriminated against because of her sex, and was forced to resign her position as a bartender and waitress. Y & H admitted to the questions of jurisdiction and its status as an employer under Title VII. In a district court trial, a jury found for Arbaugh. Y & H then advanced the claim that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Arbaugh’s claim because Y & H did not have fifteen full-time employees at the time of the incident, and thus did not actually qualify as an “employer” under § 2000e(b) of Title VII. If an employer’s status is a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, as Y & H proposes, then Arbaugh’s suit would have to be dismissed even though a verdict had already been passed because jurisdiction cannot be admitted to or waived by a defendant, and a challenge to jurisdiction may be brought up at any point in the litigation, even after a verdict has been given. Arbaugh responded that the definition of “employer” is a question of merit and not of subject-matter jurisdiction. As such Y & H could have and did indeed waive the matter in its admission. The district court, after a lengthy determination of whether Y & H did qualify as an employer, ruled in favor of Y & H, and dismissed Arbaugh’s case. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the so-called “employee-numerosity” issue is a jurisdictional question. The Supreme Court’s decision is expected to definitively determine whether the employment status of a Title VII defendant is a jurisdictional matter or one going to the merits of the case to be decided by the trier of fact. The Supreme Court will also resolve existing conflicts between and within the various circuits as to this question, and will hopefully establish a uniform standard for all plaintiffs and defendants in Title VII employment claims.
Section 701(b) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act applies the Title VII prohibition against employment discrimination to employers with fifteen or more employees. Does this provision limit the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Federal courts, or does it only raise an issue going to the merits of a Title VII claim?
Plaintiff-Petitioner Jenifer Arbaugh (“Arbaugh”) was employed by Defendant-Respondent Y & H Corporation (“Y & H”) as a bartender in Louisiana from May 2000 until February 2001. Arbaugh sued Y & H in November 2001 in Federal district court, claiming that Y & H subjected her to a “sexually hostile environment” during the time she was employed. Arbaugh v.
Do state legislators authorized under North Carolina law have a right to intervene to defend the constitutionality of the state’s voter-ID law, even though the Attorney General is representing the state in the litigation; and, must state legislators make a showing of inadequate representation to intervene?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether state legislators have a right to intervene in a lawsuit filed against the state of North Carolina concerning the constitutionality of the state’s voter-ID law when the Attorney General is already representing the state in the matter. Petitioners Philip E. Berger, President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate and Timothy K. Moore, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives argue that Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) and North Carolina law grant state legislators the right to intervene on behalf of the state in judicial proceedings. Petitioners further maintain that Rule 24 only requires state agents to establish a minimum standard of inadequate representation to intervene in litigation involving their state’s interests. Respondents North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP and other North Carolina NAACP branches counter that Rule 24(a)(2) does not allow an additional party to join the case when its interests are identical to the existing party’s interests. Moreover, the Respondents argue that state legislators need to demonstrate a higher standard of inadequacy to show that the Attorney General is inadequately representing the state to join the case. The outcome of this case has important implications for the role of state governments in litigation, future parties that are or will be engaged in litigation with the states, and the judiciary.
1. Whether a state agent authorized by state law to defend the State’s interest in litigation must overcome a presumption of adequate representation to intervene as of right in a case in which a state official is a defendant?
2. Whether a district court’s determination of adequate representation in ruling on a motion to intervene as of right is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion?
3. Whether petitioners Philip Berger, the president pro tempore of the state senate, and Timothy Moore, the speaker of the state house of representatives, are entitled to intervene as of right in this litigation?
In 2018, North Carolina passed Senate Bill 824 (“the Bill”), which required voters to “present one of ten forms of authorized photographic identification” in order to vote. N. Carolina State Conf. of NAACP v.
Does a court have the power to adjudicate a case when the case is not causally connected to a defendant’s in-state conduct?
In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether courts have specific jurisdiction over defendants only when the case arises out of conduct that is causally connected to a defendant’s in-state conduct. The case comes before the Supreme Court after Bristol-Myers Squibb was sued in California for manufacturing a defective anticoagulant, despite having manufactured the anticoagulant in New Jersey and having only a transient connection with California. Bristol-Myers Squibb argues that the California court lacks power to adjudicate this case, because the company’s conduct in California is not causally connected to the plaintiffs’ injuries. California Superior Court, on the other hand, argues that specific jurisdiction does not require proof of causation. Much is at stake in this action: some assert that California’s victory would result in gross injustice to defendants; others claim that BMS’s victory would cause judicial resources to be squandered with duplicative litigation.
Whether a plaintiff ’s claims arise out of or re-late to a defendant’s forum activities when there is no causal link between the defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff ’s claims—that is, where the plaintiff ’s claims would be exactly the same even if the defendant had no forum contacts?
Defendant Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (“BMS”) manufactures anticoagulants—drugs meant to inhibit blood clotting. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of San Francisco Cty., S221038, at 2 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2016).
The burden of allegation, also known as the burden of pleading, refers to the plaintiff’s obligation to plead sufficient assertions of facts to support a cause of action against a defendant.
Does the rule announced in American Pipe, tolling the statute of limitations for individual actions filed after a failed class action, also apply to subsequent class actions?
In American Pipe, the Court held that the statute of limitations is tolled for an individual that files an action after a related class action fails. This case asks the Court to decide whether American Pipe tolling also applies to subsequent class actions. China Agritech, Inc. argues that American Pipe tolling should not apply to subsequent class actions, because such an extension would be inequitable and would conflict with the rationale surrounding current law on class action procedures. Michael Resh counters that American Pipe tolling should apply to subsequent class actions because such an extension would be both equitable and consistent with current law and precedent. The Supreme Court’s ruling could potentially relax the urgency and attentiveness required of class action members, or emphasize the importance of awareness and involvement individuals must display to share in the judgment won by the asserted members of their class. The decision could also implicate burdens on the courts, separation of powers issues, and practical considerations for class action plaintiffs and defendants.
Whether the rule of American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah tolls statutes of limitations to permit a previously absent class member to bring a subsequent class action outside the applicable limitations period.
China Agritech, Inc. (“China Agritech”) is a Delaware-incorporated holding company with its principal place of business located in Beijing, China. Resh v. China Agritech, Inc., 857 F.3d 994, 996. China Agritech claims to sell organic fertilizers and related products to farmers throughout China. Id.
A compulsory counterclaim is a claim made by a defendant against a plaintiff that arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim, and which is forfeited if not raised in the same lawsuit.