Abstract
In the online load balancing problem on related machines, we have a set of jobs (with different sizes) arriving online, and the task is to assign each job to a machine immediately upon its arrival, so as to minimize the makespan, i.e., the maximum completion time. In classic mechanism design problems, we assume that the jobs are controlled by selfish agents, with the sizes being their private information. Each job (agent) aims at minimizing its own cost, which is its completion time plus the payment charged by the mechanism. Truthful mechanisms guaranteeing that every job minimizes its cost by reporting its true size have been well studied (Aspnes et al. JACM 44(3):486–504, 1997, Feldman et al. in: EC, 2017). In this paper, we study truthful online load balancing mechanisms that are well-behaved (machine with higher speed has larger workload). Good behavior is important as it guarantees fairness between machines and implies truthfulness in some cases when machines are controlled by selfish agents. Unfortunately, existing truthful online load balancing mechanisms are not well behaved. We first show that to guarantee producing a well-behaved schedule, any online algorithm (even non-truthful) has a competitive ratio at least \(\varOmega (\sqrt{m})\), where m is the number of machines. Then, we propose a mechanism that guarantees truthfulness of the online jobs and produces a schedule that is almost well-behaved. We show that our algorithm has a competitive ratio of \(O(\log m)\). Moreover, for the case when the sizes of online jobs are bounded, the competitive ratio of our algorithm improves to O(1). Interestingly, we show several cases for which our mechanism is actually truthful against selfish machines.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
This can be shown by imagining that we start with the case when all machines have the same speed 0 and gradually increase the speeds of machines to their real speeds.
Suppose the mechanism only looks at the ratio of the speeds to identify the machines.
When all machines have the same makespan, the workload on a machine is proportional to its speed.
Recall that we can assume w.l.o.g. that all machines have different speeds. Equivalently, we can assume that \(s_{l+1}\) is the minimum speed of the machines that are faster than l.
References
Andelman, N., Azar, Y., & Sorani, M. (2005). Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines. In STACS, volume 3404 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (pp. 69–82). Springer.
Aspnes, J., Azar, Y., Fiat, A., Plotkin, S. A., & Waarts, O. (1997). On-line routing of virtual circuits with applications to load balancing and machine scheduling. Journal of ACM, 44(3), 486–504.
Berman, P., Charikar, M., & Karpinski, M. (2000). On-line load balancing for related machines. Journal of Algorithms, 35(1), 108–121.
Caragiannis, I., Kurokawa, D., Moulin, H., Procaccia, A. D., Shah, N., & Wang, J. (2016). The unreasonable fairness of maximum nash welfare. In EC (pp. 305–322). ACM.
Chen, B., & Vestjens, A. P. A. (1997). Scheduling on identical machines: How good is LPT in an on-line setting? Operations Research Letters, 21(4), 165–169.
Christodoulou, G., Koutsoupias, E., & Vidali, A. (2009). A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms. Algorithmica, 55(4), 729–740.
Christodoulou, G., & Kovács, A. (2013). A deterministic truthful PTAS for scheduling related machines. SIAM Journal on Computing, 42(4), 1572–1595.
Dutot, P.-F., Pascual, F., Rzadca, K., & Trystram, D. (2011). Approximation algorithms for the multiorganization scheduling problem. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 22(11), 1888–1895.
Epstein, L., Levin, A., & van Stee, R. (2016). A unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines. Mathematics of Operations Research, 41(1), 332–351.
Feldman, M., Fiat, A., & Roytman, A. (2017). Makespan minimization via posted prices. In EC (pp. 405–422). ACM.
Fleischer, R., & Wahl, M. (2000). Online scheduling revisited. In ESA, volume 1879 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (pp. 202–210). Springer.
Freeman, R., Shah, N., & Vaish, R. (2020). Best of both worlds: Ex-ante and ex-post fairness in resource allocation. In EC (pp. 21–22). ACM.
Graham, R. L. (1969). Bounds on multiprocessing timing anomalies. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 17(2), 416–429.
Hartline, J.D., & Roughgarden, T. (2009). Simple versus optimal mechanisms. In EC (pp. 225–234). ACM.
Huang, Z., Kang, N., Tang, Z. G., Wu, X., & Zhang, Y. (2018). Online makespan minimization: The power of restart. In APPROX-RANDOM, volume 116 of LIPIcs (pp. 14:1–14:19). Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik.
Koutsoupias, E., & Vidali, A. (2013). A lower bound of 1+\({\varphi }\) for truthful scheduling mechanisms. Algorithmica, 66(1), 211–223.
Kovács, A. (2005). Fast monotone 3-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines. In ESA, volume 3669 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (pp. 616–627). Springer.
Nisan, Noam, & Ronen, Amir. (1999). Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract). In STOC (pp. 129–140). ACM.
Noam, N., Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E., & Vazirani, V. V. (2007). Algorithmic game theory. Cambridge University Press.
Noga, J., & Seiden, S. S. (2001). An optimal online algorithm for scheduling two machines with release times. Theoretical Computer Science, 268(1), 133–143.
Plaut, B., & Roughgarden, T. (2018). Almost envy-freeness with general valuations. In SODA (pp. 2584–2603). SIAM.
Skowron, P., & Rzadca, K. (2013). Non-monetary fair scheduling: a cooperative game theory approach. In SPAA (pp. 288–297). ACM.
Acknowledgements
The work described in this paper was partially sponsored by Project 11771365 supported by NSFC. The work described in this paper was supported by a grant from Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. CityU 11200518). Bo Li is partially funded by the HKSAR RGC under Grant No. PolyU 25211321, NSFC under Grant No. 62102333, and The Hong Kong Polytechnic University under Grant No. P0034420. Xiaowei Wu is funded by FDCT (0143/2020/A3, SKL-IOTSC-2021-2023), the SRG of University of Macau (SRG2020-00020-IOTSC) and GDST (2020B1212030003).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS 2019).
Appendices
Appendix
A An \(O(\sqrt{m})\)-competitive algorithm for well-behaved scheduling
In this section, we present a simple algorithm that always produces a well-behaved schedule whose makespan is \(\textsf {ALG}= O(\sqrt{m})\cdot \textsf {OPT}\). Assume the machines are ordered by their speeds, i.e., \(s_m \ge \ldots \ge s_1\). The algorithm works as follows.
Algorithm. For each online job j, we schedule j on the slowest machine \(i < m\) satisfying \(C_i(j) + \frac{p_j}{s_i} \le C_{i+1}(j)\). If there is no such machine, j is scheduled on machine m.
In other words, the algorithm schedules each online job to the slowest machine while maintaining the good behavior of the schedule at all time. Hence, it remains to prove the upper bound on the makespan of the schedule.
Lemma 10
We have \(\textsf {ALG}\le 4\sqrt{m}\cdot \textsf {OPT}\).
Proof
Suppose otherwise, we have \(C_m > 4\sqrt{m}\cdot \textsf {OPT}\). In the following, we show that for each machine i we have
Note that given the above, we have
for every machine i. Hence the total size of jobs is
where the second inequality follows from \(s_m\ge \ldots \ge s_1\) and
However, the total workload any schedule can finish within time \(\textsf {OPT}\) is upper bounded by \(\sum _{i=1}^m s_i \cdot \textsf {OPT}\), which is a contradiction. It remains to prove Inequality (4).
Assume the contrary and let i be the maximum such that \(C_i < C_m - 4(m-i)\cdot \textsf {OPT}\). Note that \(i \ne m\) and for all \(k > i\) we have \(C_k \ge C_m - 4(m-k)\cdot \textsf {OPT}\). Similar to the proof of Lemma 4, we let \(J'\) be the jobs that contribute to the last \(2\cdot \textsf {OPT}\) increase in makespan on machines \(\{ i+1,\ldots ,m \}\). Observe that the total size of the jobs in \(J'\) is at least \(2\cdot \textsf {OPT}\cdot \sum _{l = i+1}^m s_l\), which means that at least one of the jobs in \(J'\), say job j, is processed on some machine in \(\{ 1,2,\ldots ,i \}\) in the optimal schedule. Consequently, we have \(p_j \le \textsf {OPT}\cdot s_i\). Furthermore, the processing time of job j on any machine in \(\{ i,i+1,\ldots ,m \}\) is at most \(\textsf {OPT}\).
Now consider the time when job j arrives. Recall that job j is scheduled on some machine \(k > i\). Moreover, we have
Since j is not scheduled on any of the machines \(\{ i,i+1,\ldots ,k-1 \}\), we know that the difference in the makespans of any two consecutive machines in \(\{ i,\ldots ,k \}\) is less than \(\textsf {OPT}\). Therefore, we have
which is a contradiction. \(\square \)
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Li, B., Li, M. & Wu, X. Well-behaved online load balancing against strategic jobs. J Sched 26, 443–455 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10951-022-00770-6
Accepted:
Published:
Version of record:
Issue date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10951-022-00770-6